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ABSTRACT 
Increasing levels of development assistance have been coupled with increased attention to 
its effectiveness, resulting in a series of international declarations outlining an agenda of 
five principles of aid effectiveness: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, management for 
results and mutual accountability. This PhD thesis examines whether the Tanzanian health 
Sector Wide Approach (SWAP) has achieved these principles.  
It uses a case study approach, mixing quantitative and qualitative methods. It first maps out 
the health policy and financial landscape of Tanzania since the introduction of the SWAP. 
The thesis then explores the international aid effectiveness agenda and develops a set of 
indicators to assess its achievement in the Tanzanian health SWAP. This includes analysing 
external and domestic health financing flows over the last ten years; document review of 
key processes and in-depth interviews. The application of this indicator framework shows 
mixed results. Better progress is found towards indicators from international declarations, 
which are based on having aid-management processes in place, than towards those 
developed as defined by local stakeholders. Institutional factors, including the incentives of 
the institutions and individuals involved in aid relationships, as well as the political context 
within which aid relationships take place, are found to be key in explaining these results. 
A political economy approach is then undertaken to characterise and explore these factors 
further. Individual and institutional incentives are found to be unaligned with aid 
effectiveness principles. Furthermore, the structure of the SWAP is technocratic, excludes 
important stakeholders and does not fully reflect the political context and power dynamics 
of aid relationships. This thesis finds fatigue and disengagement with the SWAP and the aid 
effectiveness agenda, and recommends that the international community engage in SWAP 
as a process of institutional reform rather than just a technocratic solution to development 
assistance. Principles of aid effectiveness should allow for greater adaptation to national 
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contexts. More research is needed to further integrate political and economic elements of 
frameworks to analyse aid relationships and deepen our understanding of how best to 
achieve institutional reform and improve aid effectiveness.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
There has been a long history of high-income countries providing development assistance 
to low- and middle-income countries, most pledging to devote 0.7 per cent of their Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) for this purpose (1). Although most countries have not met their 
target, the amount of development assistance has risen exponentially over the past ten 
years.  
The history of development assistance has taken many turns, with infrastructure and ‘hard’ 
sectors being favoured in the earlier decades, and ‘softer’ social sectors preferred in the 
first decade of this century. The health sector has received particularly generous funding, 
having quintupled from US$5.82 billion in 1990 to US$27.73 billion in 2011 (2).The amount 
of Development Assistance for Health (DAH) roughly remained at the 1995 level until 
2000—the new millennium saw a surge in DAH. This increase in funds has been 
accompanied by a proliferation of actors who provide, manage and spend DAH (3), who 
deliver development assistance for health using different funding modalities, including 
project, programme aid, sector wide approaches and budget support (4).  
However, the global financial crisis has taken its toll, and after peaking in 2010, the amount 
of total DAH globally fell in 2011; it has not been a dramatic fall, but it has certainly 
confirmed worries regarding the sustainability of continuous increases in funding (5). 
Increases in development assistance and worries about its sustainability, together with the 
increasingly complex and dynamic aid architecture, have resulted in widespread interest in 
the effectiveness of development assistance, with a growing literature seeking to assess 
whether it has had any impact on growth and social development. This PhD thesis seeks to 
contribute to this emerging literature by assessing the implementation of the aid 
effectiveness agenda in the Tanzanian health Sector Wide Approach (SWAP). 
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1.1 Aim 
The aim of this PhD study is to develop and apply methods to assess and explain the 
achievement of the global aid effectiveness agenda at the country level, using the 
Tanzanian health Sector Wide Approach as a case study. 
1.2 Objectives 
The specific objectives of the thesis are:  
1. To describe the history and the current structure of the Tanzanian health SWAP 
policy landscape 
2. To analyse health financing flows (domestic and external) to Tanzania during the 
time period of 2000-2010 
3. To develop a set of indicators to measure whether the implementation of the 
Tanzanian SWAP is consistent with the principles outlined in the global aid 
effectiveness agenda  
4. To apply the indicators developed to assess the extent to which aid effectiveness 
principles have been achieved 
5. To explain the achievement of the aid effectiveness agenda through an analysis of 
institutional factors and relationships between the actors present in the Tanzanian 
health SWAP using a political economy framework  
6. To develop policy recommendations based on the findings for national 
policymakers implementing SWAPs, development partners and researchers at the 
national and global level 
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1.3 Structure of the thesis 
After this introduction, this thesis reports on the results of a literature review conducted to 
describe the DAH architecture, explore how aid effectiveness has been previously assessed 
and ascertain the state of the current knowledge on the key factors affecting the 
effectiveness of DAH and strategies to deal with these (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 then provides 
an account of the methods used to carry out this study. Chapter 4 describes the conceptual 
framework underpinning this study. This is followed by a description of the Tanzanian 
health sector landscape, including key policies and a map of all the actors active in the 
sector in Chapter 5. Chapters 6-9 then give an account of the results of this PhD research. 
Chapter 6 provides a map of the health sector financing in Tanzania. Chapter 7 develops an 
analysis framework to assess whether the Tanzanian health sector wide approach has 
followed the aid effectiveness agenda. This framework is then applied in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 9 then utilises the political economy framework outlined in Chapter 3 to explore 
the institutional factors that may explain the results found. Chapter 10 brings together the 
findings from all of the study objectives and discusses their relevance and contribution to 
the literature, and the limitations of the research, before finishing by making 
recommendations to policymakers and researchers at the national and global level. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this literature review was to examine the current evidence regarding the 
effectiveness of aid in the health sector, including the measures of effectiveness and 
analysis methods used, the reasons for lack of effectiveness and knowledge gaps.  As we 
shall see below, this literature shows mixed results, hindered by methodological difficulties 
and lack of data. 
After this introduction this chapter describes the methods used to conduct the literature 
review, followed by a description of the Development Assistance for Health (DAH) system, 
including actors and funding trends. The chapter then provides an outline of the 
methodological challenges in assessing the effectiveness of DAH, a review of the different 
approaches that have been used to study DAH and the current evidence on whether it 
works. The chapter then outlines the factors hindering the effectiveness of DAH and 
reviews the policies adopted by the international community to address concerns about 
the effectiveness of aid (including DAH). The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
knowledge gaps. 
2.2 Methods 
Two broad searches were carried out to identify the methodology and frameworks that 
have been used to assess DAH and the key factors affecting the effectiveness of aid in 
general and DAH in particular. These broad searches found a number of key factors 
hindering aid effectiveness, broadly falling under two categories: how aid is given and 
institutional factors. Broad searches were followed by more specific searches of each 
factor, to examine for each factor, its causes, the implications it has on the effectiveness of 
DAH and what, if anything, has been done about each factor.  
19 
 
Both peer-reviewed and grey literature was searched to avoid publication bias. Three 
databases (EconLit, Global Health and Web of Science) and several sources of grey 
literature were searched, including the Eldis and EThOs databases, the Center for Global 
Development, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 
selected module course readings from the London School of Economics and School for 
Oriental and African Studies. In addition, references of articles were checked and the 
relevant ones incorporated, using a snowballing technique. When searching for the factors 
affecting DAH effectiveness, keywords for aid and DAH were used in order to maximise the 
information obtained (for instance on the consequences or causes of each factor).  
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Table 2.1: Search terms used for the literature review 
Search Keywords 
DAH effectiveness Aid effectiveness, development assistance, overseas development 
assistance, ODA, foreign aid, development assistance for health, 
DAH, Health ODA, International development assistance, IDA 
Methodology Aid effectiveness, development assistance, overseas development 
assistance, ODA, foreign aid, development assistance for health, 
DAH, Health ODA, International development assistance, IDA, 
measure*, method*,  assess*, eval*, method*, agency theory, 
political economy, framework, institutio*, anthropol*, logic model, 
process evaluation 
Accountability Aid, development assistance, overseas development assistance, 
ODA, development assistance for health, DAH , accountability, 
transparency 
Allocation Aid, development assistance, overseas development assistance, 
ODA, development assistance for health, DAH , Health financing, 
priority, distribution 
Fragmentation Aid, development assistance, overseas development assistance, 
ODA, development assistance for health, DAH , fragment*, 
proliferat*, harmoni* 
Fungibility Aid effectiveness, development assistance, overseas development 
assistance, ODA, foreign aid, development assistance for health, 
DAH, Health ODA, International development assistance, IDA, 
fungibility, domestic expenditure, health 
Incentives Aid, development assistance, overseas development assistance, 
ODA, development assistance for health, DAH , economics, 
incentive,  
Ownership Aid, development assistance, overseas development assistance, 
ODA, development assistance for health, DAH , ownership 
Predictability Aid, development assistance, overseas development assistance, 
ODA, development assistance for health, DAH , predictab*, budget, 
commitment, disbursement 
Tanzania Aid effectiveness, development assistance, overseas development 
assistance, ODA, foreign aid, development assistance for health, 
DAH, Health ODA, International development assistance, IDA, 
fungibility, domestic expenditure, health, Tanzania 
SWAP Sector Wide Approach, SWAP, health, harmonisation, coordination, 
Paris Declaration, Busan, basket, pooled funds, funding mechanism 
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Table 2.1 shows the search terms used. Search terms were used on their own or in 
combinations in the abstract, title and topic fields. The literature review was conducted in 
two stages, first between October 2010 and April 2011 without setting any date limits, to 
design the study (this has been written up as a Working Paper for the University of United 
Nations World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), see Appendix 
A1). The literature review was then updated in December 2013, using the same search 
terms but limiting the dates to 2011-2013.  
Abstracts were reviewed and included following a set of inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
Articles were selected if they discussed DAH and were in English, French and Spanish2. Two 
exclusion criteria were adopted. First, studies on humanitarian aid were excluded, as the 
focus of this work was on assistance for development. Second, studies that did not 
specifically look at DAH effectiveness (but studied aid in general) were excluded from the 
methodological search (when reviewing the specific factors affecting the effectiveness of 
DAH, if no articles were found for a specific factor, inclusion criteria were broadened to 
include articles or reports studying development assistance in general). All types of studies 
were included in order to be as comprehensive as possible, given the limited literature 
available on this subject. In addition, no limits were set on the date of publication of 
studies.  
The diagram shown on Figure 2.1 below shows the number of articles identified and 
included in the review. From the initial search (conducted in 2010-2011), 561 articles and 
reports were retrieved and 141 included. The second search (conducted in 2013) retrieved 
an additional 157 articles and reports, of which 92 were included. A total of 218 studies 
were included in the review.  
                                                          
1 MMA wrote sections 1, 3, 4 and 5; AA wrote section 2 and contributed to section 4.1. Section 6 
was written jointly. 
2 Languages readily understood 
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Figure 2.1: Articles identified, reviewed and included3  
 
2.3 The DAH system 
This section describes the DAH system, including funding flows, the different agencies 
involved, the channels through which DAH funds are delivered and the current status of the 
literature on them.  
DAH has consistently increased from the early 1990s, but has experienced exponential 
growth from the year 2000, peaking at $28.2 billion in 2010 (5). Growth has been 
attributed to three diseases (HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria), and new initiatives, such 
as the GAVI Alliance in Support of Childhood Vaccination (5). However, there have been 
                                                          
3 Diagram adapted from the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses 
(PRISMA) initiative (http://www.prisma-statement.org/)  
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fears about the un-sustainability of increases in funding, as total DAH was $27.4 billion in 
2011 and $28.1 in 2012 (5).  
DAH funds are disbursed and channelled through a variety of agencies, making up an 
increasingly complex architecture. Figure 2.2 below shows schematically the different 
players and funding flows of DAH, with blue lines representing DAH flows and green lines 
health services.  
Figure 2.2: The DAH system 
 
Actors involved in DAH can be classified as sources, channels, implementers and 
beneficiaries. DAH sources are members of the general public in high- and middle-income 
countries, private foundations or philanthropies. Citizens of high- and middle-income 
countries provide DAH in the form of taxes to their governments or through voluntary 
donations to international non-government organisations and multi-lateral organisations, 
which act as channels. Private philanthropies also contribute to these channels, and in 
addition directly fund recipient country Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and the 
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private for-profit sector, as well as private foundations. Governments of aid-giving 
countries either channel DAH themselves (as bi-lateral agencies) or through other channels, 
such as multi-lateral organisations, international and national NGOs and the private sector. 
According to figures from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), in 2010 
38.7% of all DAH was delivered through NGOs, 25% through government entities and the 
rest through multi-lateral  agencies (5). Citizens of the United States (US) and Canada 
provided more funding through NGOs (about half of all DAH flows) than European 
countries, which channelled more funds through bi-lateral and multi-lateral agencies (5). 
Bi-lateral and multi-lateral organisations deliver DAH funds to implementers of health 
services, which include recipient country governments, NGOs and the private sector, who 
in turn provide health services to beneficiaries. International NGOs and some multi-laterals, 
such as the World Health Organisation, also provide health services themselves (5). The 
rest of this section provides a description of the agencies involved in channelling DAH funds 
(Development Partners (DPs)), as they are the focus of this thesis. 
Bi-lateral development partners 
Bi-lateral DAH is characterised as being from a donor country to a recipient, and has been 
praised for fostering political and economic ties between donor and recipient countries (6). 
Bi-lateral channels of DAH have traditionally been governments of high-income countries, 
particularly from Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand, belonging to 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD-DAC). The latest report from the IHME found that the amount of DAH 
channelled through bi-lateral agents has decreased by 4.4% in 2012 (5). The report found 
that the US was the largest donor of DAH in 2010, providing $10 billion (35.6% of total DAH 
for that year). European countries showed mixed trends, probably as a result of the 
turbulent economic climate in the region. The UK was the second biggest provider of DAH, 
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giving $2.3 billion in 2010 or 8.2% of the total; however, this figure represented a decrease 
relative to 2009. Between 2009 and 2010, DAH from Norway increased slightly (by 0.5%), 
but Spain, Germany and Netherlands all decreased their DAH contributions by 25.4%, 9.5% 
and 5.9% respectively. Non-European OECD countries (Japan, Canada and Australia) 
increased their DAH contributions significantly in 2010. Projections for 2012 and beyond do 
not look optimistic, however, with the IHME report quoting that most countries have 
dropped their overall Official Development Assistance (ODA) amounts; with similar 
patterns expected from DAH. 
There has been recent attention in the literature to new and emerging donors, who do not 
belong to the OECD-DAC, but are increasingly engaging in South to South co-operation. So 
far the evidence indicates that there are no significant differences between new and old 
DPs in their distribution of aid, except that new DPs appear to be less influenced by the 
level of corruption of the recipient country when making decisions about aid allocation (7) 
and that some, such as China, favour infrastructure, whereas DAC DPs prefer social sectors 
(8). However, differences have been found with regards to aid management practices. Non-
DAC DPs mainly engage in project assistance and technical co-operation (9), with Chinese 
assistance programmed through high level discussions and sometimes visible projects, 
whilst DAC DPs favour (although do not fully rely on) development assistance strategies, 
budget support and pooled funds (8). In addition, DAC DPs operate are under a set of aid 
effectiveness declarations (see below), which non-DAC have not fully endorsed (for 
instance, the Chinese government has no interference and tying of aid as explicit principles 
of aid, whereas DAC DPs have committed (although not fully achieved) to untying of aid 
(8)). 
Non-DAC DPs have been praised for bringing in extra funds and providing more flexible 
assistance, and have the advantage of being able to provide significantly valuable expertise, 
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some of them being aid recipients until recently themselves (or still receiving aid) (10). 
However, there are concerns they are increasing fragmentation, they provide high levels of 
tied aid, do not engage in the dialogue with partner countries and are unwilling to 
harmonize with other DPs (9). On the other hand, questions have been raised as to 
whether this means non-DAC DPs are less effective (11), or indeed whether they should be 
classified as one homogeneous group (12). For instance, in a study comparing China and 
DAC DPs in Nigeria and Angola, Brautigam found that Chinese assistance has been more 
streamlined and faster at reaching its targets than DAC DPs (8). Further, a study conducted 
in Cambodia found that non-DAC DPs are not just different from DAC DPs, but are also a 
diverse group in terms of aid strategies and adherence to DAC norms and principles (12). 
There is therefore a need for concrete case studies to explore how emerging DPs compare 
to traditional DAC DPs on the ground (11).  
A new form of co-operation, known as triangular (or tri-lateral) co-operation, has emerged, 
where traditional DAC DPs provide assistance to support southern DPs’ programmes, given 
their technical advantage. An example of this is Germany’s support for Brazilian HIV 
programmes across Latin America (9). There has been little academic literature on 
triangular cooperation, although it has the potential to improve aid effectiveness by 
harnessing experiences of southern partners, challenging northern DPs and having a better 
balance of power between providers and receivers of assistance (13). However, these 
advantages remain to be proved, and there are concerns that trilateral cooperation may 
have higher transaction costs (13).  
Multi-lateral agencies and Global Health Initiatives (GHIs) 
Multi-lateral organisations channelled about 36% of all DAH in 2010 (5); they are 
characterised by consisting of multiple members, and have been praised for being less 
influenced by the politics of their members than bi-lateral agencies (6). Traditional multi-
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lateral organisations include United Nations (UN) agencies and development banks. There 
are several UN agencies involved in health, including the World Health Organisation (WHO), 
the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). DAH provided by UN 
agencies grew by 3.4 % in 2012; however, expenditure by WHO fell by 2% in 2012, 
amounting to $2.1  billion (5). Development banks include the World Bank and regional 
banks, such as the African, Asian and Inter-American Development Banks. The World Bank 
provides DAH in the form of grants and non-concessionary loans through its International 
Development Association (IDA)4. DAH expenditure by the World Bank grew by 22% in 2012, 
spending $912 million through  IDA (5). Regional development banks, on the other hand, 
decreased their DAH contributions by 17% from 2011 to 2012, distributing a total of $234 
million (5). 
Since the year 2000, there has been a proliferation of new initiatives known as Global 
Health Initiatives, which focus on a single disease or group of diseases. The two most 
prominent GHIs are the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the Global Fund 
henceforth) and the GAVI Alliance in Support of Childhood Vaccination (GAVI), although 
there are many others. GAVI’s funding increased by nearly 42% from 2011 to 2012, 
disbursing $1.8  billion (5). Support for the Global Fund has been less consistent, with its 
funds decreasing by 17% in 2011, but increasing again by 12.3% in 2012 to make up $3.1 
billion. The emergence of GHIs has received attention in the literature. For instance, a study 
of two large GHIs in Uganda found that despite government preference for aid to be 
delivered as general or sector budget support, GHIs delivered their funds as disease-specific 
projects (14). Conversely, a study comparing different multi-lateral agencies, found that the 
                                                          
4 IDA lends money on concessional terms (with little or no interest) or through grants. The World 
Bank also spent $1.3 billion in 2012 through the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), which provides non-concessional loans and advice (see 
http://www.worldbank.org/ida/what-is-ida.html)  
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Global Fund and GAVI were more responsive to civil society needs than development 
banks, something the authors associate with the different political and civil societal 
processes leading to the formation of these agencies (15). The debate about the merits of 
GHIs is part of a broader debate on whether DAH should be delivered as vertical and 
horizontal programmes, which is reviewed in section 2.5 below.  
International NGOs, private sector and philanthropic organisations 
International NGOs receive funding from citizens, philanthropic organisations and bi-lateral 
and multi-lateral organisations (Figure 2.2). The role of these NGOs in disbursing DAH has 
become more prominent in recent years. However, data from NGOs are harder to obtain, 
because their funding comes from multiple sources (3) and they do not systematically 
report DAH flows in a standard manner the way bi-lateral and multi-lateral organisations do 
(2). Data compiled by the IHME shows that US NGOs experienced a surge in DAH funding 
from the mid-1990s, peaking in 2009 at $3.7 billion, but have decreased in subsequent 
years, having been badly affected by the financial crisis (5). These falls in funding were 
mostly from governments and private foundations (particularly the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation) (5). 
Private and philanthropic organisations are funded by wealthy contributors; they do not 
receive funds from citizens or governments (16) and have become important players in 
recent years. There is no centralised system for tracking DAH flows from private and 
philanthropic organisations (16), although some do report to global DAH databases and 
publish financial reports on their websites. For instance, according to its website, the Bill 
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and Melinda Gates foundation spent almost $2 billion in global health grants in 2011, the 
main support being towards vaccines, HIV/AIDS and malaria5.  
The private sector has also been an important source of DAH funds, particularly from 
pharmaceutical companies (3), with the International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers & Associations Health Partnerships Directory listing 220 partnerships of 
pharmaceutical companies with 160 countries6. The private sector is also increasingly used 
to channel DAH through public-private partnerships, particularly by traditional (OECD) DPs 
(17). 
The DAH system is therefore one of increasing complexity, with a growing amount of funds 
delivered from a variety of sources, through numerous channels to aid recipients. This is 
further complicated by the dynamic nature of the DAH system, with the amount of funds 
fluctuating in recent years and worries about sustainability, new actors emerging and 
traditional actors adapting to the evolving nature of the system. The rest of this chapter 
describes the efforts undertaken by the international and research communities to assess 
and improve the DAH system.  
2.4 Frameworks and methods for examining aid effectiveness 
This section reviews the different methods and frameworks that have been used in the 
literature to study the effectiveness of DAH, highlighting the methodological difficulties 
these studies face. The DAH studies found in this literature review were classified according 
to four dimensions: the criteria used to assess DAH (effectiveness with regard to what), 
geography (single or multiple country studies), methods (quantitative versus qualitative) 
and the framework they use (policy, economic, realist/logic model). This section is 
structured around the first dimension – the criteria studies use to assess DAH. These 
                                                          
5 http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/General-Information/Financials/2011-Annual-
Snapshot-of-Grants-Paid  
6 http://partnerships.ifpma.org/pages/  
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criteria include: inputs (financial resources), process (relationships and institutions), 
outputs (human resources for health, healthcare utilisation) and outcomes (mortality, 
disease burden), based on the logic model proposed by Cummings to assess aid 
effectiveness (18). For each of these criteria, the types of studies, methods and frameworks 
that have been used to assess DAH are described.  
The intuitive approach to study DAH effectiveness would be to compare trends in health 
outcomes (typically mortality) and development assistance. This has mainly been done 
through the use quantitative methods. A commonly used outcome is infant mortality, 
which has been used by Mishra and Newhouse (2007) to assess the links between DP 
expenditure and infant mortality (19), by Wilson (2011) to test the effect DAH has on infant 
and child mortality (20) and Burnside and Dollar (1999) to examine the effect of ODA on 
infant mortality (21). There has also been one study assessing health outcomes in a single 
country, conducted by Masanja et al. (2008) in Tanzania, to assess the effect of increasing 
health expenditure (including DAH) on child mortality (22). In addition, Bendavid and 
colleagues assessed the impact of DAH provided by a single agency (the United States 
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)) on all-cause adult mortality (23). 
Finally, a series of cross-country regressions have assessed the outcomes of DAH targeted 
to specific priorities, for instance the impact of funding for HIV/AIDS on the outcomes of 
treatment and prevention of HIV and other Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs) (24), the 
effect of investment in malaria on child mortality (25) and the impact of investment in 
maternal and newborn health on newborn survival (26).   
However, a recent systematic review on the effects of funding for HIV and Tuberculosis, 
found few studies that could demonstrate impact, as most studies focused on statistical 
association rather than contribution or causation (27). There are inherent difficulties in 
attributing changes in health outcomes to DAH. The first and most important problem is 
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the lack of good-quality data, as recipient countries often have weak health management 
and information systems, with incomplete and inaccurate data on health care expenditure, 
utilisation and health outcomes. Second, questions as to whether aid benefits recipient 
countries are confounded by endogeneity problems, including reverse causality. This is the 
case for ‘donor darling’ countries with a large number of DPs along with large per capita 
development assistance. Indeed, Cassen (1986) and Wilson (2011) have noted the 
tendency for aid to follow well-performing countries (20, 28). This may indicate that DP 
countries would like to see their aid work and claim credit for good performing countries, 
where aid follows good performance while lack of aid follows bad performance. Third, 
improvements in health outcomes may be lagged as results may take time to be seen (29). 
Finally, given the diversity of factors that influence health, there are difficulties with 
attributing improvements (or indeed lack of) to DAH. This is further complicated by the 
difficulty of establishing a counterfactual, without which it is not possible to assess what 
would have happened in the absence of DAH. Cross-country regressions using panel data 
can overcome some of these problems. However, linking inputs to outcomes has also been 
criticised for ignoring the “heterogeneity of aid motives, the limitations of the tools of 
analysis and the complex causality chain liking external aid to final outcomes” (30). 
Perhaps due to these methodological difficulties, DAH effectiveness has also been assessed 
in terms of inputs. This has been done through the use of quantitative methods in several 
cross-country studies evaluating the distribution of DAH according to need – either defined 
as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (31) or disease burden (31-33), or through single country 
case studies assessing the distribution of DAH inputs according to different health sector 
activities, including drugs, infrastructure and human resources (34). Some problems arise 
when contrasting total DAH with GDP per capita, as a few newly emerging middle-income 
countries—such as India, Pakistan and China—have large populations, and are home to 
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over 50% of the world’s poor (35). Similarly, there have been calls to better target DAH in 
the Latin America and Caribbean region, which has received a decreasing amount of DAH 
since the turn of the millennium, and although not the poorest region in the world, it is the 
most unequal (36). 
Other studies have evaluated DAH inputs using different indicators of aid quality. For 
instance, a study in Uganda assessed DAH in terms of the channels used to disburse funds 
and the degree of alignment to Ugandan sector priorities (37). Similarly, studies have 
assessed DAH inputs according to their degree of harmonisation and alignment to country 
priorities in Zambia (38) or of multi-lateral DAH flows globally (39). In addition, the degree 
of DAH fragmentation has also been used to assess DAH quality, either quantitatively 
through cross-country statistical models (40-49) and single country case studies (44), or 
qualitatively through the use of policy models in Bangladesh (50) and in a three-country 
study of Ghana, South Africa and Tanzania (51). Finally, the predictability of ODA funds has 
been assessed quantitatively through cross-country regressions (52), with single country 
case studies of DAH conducted in Uganda (53) and Zambia (54).  
Very few studies were found that assess DAH effectiveness with respect to outputs. With 
the exception of Flaxman et al., which assessed the distribution of insecticide-treated bed 
nets across 44 countries in Africa (55), all of the studies found in this review have 
undertaken a case study approach. One such study used qualitative policy analysis to assess 
the impact of GHIs on human resources and anti-retroviral rollout in Zambia (56). Another 
involved a four country case study (Ethiopia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Liberia and 
Mozambique) to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of aid flows to human resources for 
health, including the allocation of DAH and its predictability (57). Finally, a study of the 
Malawian health Sector Wide Approach (SWAP) assessed the technical efficiency of the 
essential health package (58).  
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Finally, a branch of the DAH literature has focused on the process of aid-giving, particularly 
on the relationships between the institutions involved, including who delivers DAH and 
how, and the fiscal response of the recipient countries. Purely quantitative cross-country 
studies, often using statistical models, have been used to assess accountability (59-61), 
quality of governance (62-63) and fungibility (64-69) of development assistance, both at the 
central government, and the health sector and sub-sector levels. However, some of these 
studies have been criticised for relying on data that are not complete or accurate enough 
(70), the methodology used both to estimate missing values (multiple imputation) and to 
obtain the results (regression) (71) and for being biased for not distinguishing between on- 
and off-budget DAH (72). From a more qualitative perspective, the effectiveness of 
development assistance has been explored from a political economy angle (73-75), 
including complexity theory (76) and a utility maximization framework (77). Policy models 
have also been developed to evaluate the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (78). In 
addition, individual frameworks have been developed to study accountability (79-84). At a 
more in-depth level, agency theory frameworks have been used (6, 85), often to explore 
the relationship between DPs and recipient governments (86) and DPs’ incentives (87). At 
the qualitative end of the spectrum, purely anthropological studies have been conducted to 
explore aid relationships (88-89). 
A few studies have used aid effectiveness declarations as a framework to evaluate DAH in 
Mali (90) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (91), or to examine DP-government 
relationships in the context of HIV/AIDS and health systems governance (92). In addition, 
Ojakaa et al. conducted a case study of a civil society organisation (AMREF) to analyse two 
HIV programmes in Kenya using the Paris Declaration as a framework of aid effectiveness 
(93). Finally, the principles of the Paris Declaration have been used to assess the quality of 
Spanish ODA (94) and interventions targeting Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 5 (95).  
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A final strand of the aid management literature focuses on single DP agencies. For instance, 
Brown et al. analysed the World Bank’s policy impact using literature reviews and 
participant observation in relation to the concepts of partnership and country ownership 
(96), Rosser and Bremmer (2013) used a political economy framework to assess the World 
Bank’s performance in Timor-Leste (97) and Nixon explored the reasons for Canada’s 
changes in HIV funding (98). 
These studies have been criticised for being too process-driven and for lacking 
generalisability due to the contextual nature of the findings (99). In contrast, others have 
highlighted the importance of understanding institutional factors, especially of 
understanding the incentives, interests and politics within the health sector to better 
understand aid relationships (100) and have called for more research into these, 
particularly from political economy angle (101). 
This review of the literature only found one study that used mixed methods to study aid 
effectiveness linking inputs (quantitatively) and processes (qualitatively) in Vietnam (100). 
In summary, there is no ideal method to assess the effectiveness of DAH. Evaluating DAH 
against outcomes is difficult, but evaluations focusing on inputs, outputs and process may 
not be able to assess the impact of DAH on health. Cross-country regressions can use a 
breadth of data to highlight issues, but lack details on the local context, institutions and the 
political and historical background. In contrast, in-depth case studies often lack quality data 
and are sometimes restricted by the context specific nature of the factors studied, limiting 
their generalisability.  
2.5 Factors affecting the effectiveness of DAH 
This section summarises the current knowledge on the key factors hindering the 
effectiveness of DAH, which include its distribution across countries and priorities, the 
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funding modality used, the fragmentation of DAH, the fiscal response of recipient countries 
(fungibility) and institutional factors, particularly a lack of accountability between 
institutions and towards beneficiaries. For each factor, the current state of knowledge on 
the causes and implications it has on DAH effectiveness is discussed.  
2.5.1 DAH levels and allocation 
The amount of DAH has increased dramatically over the past decade. However, this 
increase has been uneven both between countries and across different health priorities. 
This section describes the current literature on the distribution of DAH across different 
countries and health priorities, including a brief account of the debate on the relative 
merits of horizontal and vertical funds. This is followed a discussion of the reasons behind 
DAH allocation patterns. 
There has been recent interest in the literature on the patterns of DAH allocation across 
countries. The 2010 IHME Financing Global Health report highlights that the share of DAH 
allocated to sub-Saharan Africa has increased steadily (albeit departing from low levels of 
investments) to account for 29% of all DAH in 2008. This makes it the best-funded region in 
the world (102) and also reflects the severe deficits in health service provision, poor health 
outcomes in the region and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. A few studies have explored whether 
DAH is allocated in response to need. A cross-country analysis found no correlation 
between countries’ GDP per capita and the amount of per capita DAH they received, 
indicating that aid is not targeted to poorer countries, although this trend is improving (31). 
However, one might argue that the motive of DAH is to improve health, begging the 
question of whether DAH is targeted to countries with the highest disease burden. The 
literature highlights some (but not full) correlation between countries’ burden of disease 
and the level of funding they receive (31-32). For instance, a study carried out by Boussalis 
and Peiffer in 2011 on the determinants of HIV/AIDS allocation found population, per 
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capita GDP and HIV prevalence to be important determinants of the distribution of DAH 
(103). In addition, the Countdown to 2015 project, which assesses annual trends in funding 
towards maternal, newborn and child health in 74 priority countries, found that initially, 
countries with higher under-five mortality received higher amounts of DAH, but there was 
no correlation between DAH and maternal mortality (33). However, the targeting of DAH 
towards countries with higher maternal and child mortality has improved from 2005 (104).  
Studies have also evaluated the distribution of DAH towards different priorities. For 
instance, Ravishankar et al. found that of the US$13.8 billion DAH in 2007 for which 
project-level information was available, US$4.9 billion was spent on HIV/AIDS, compared 
with US$0.6 billion on tuberculosis, US$0.7 billion on malaria, and US$0.9 billion on health 
sector support (31). Further, Nugent (2010) found that non-communicable diseases 
received US$0.78 per disability-adjusted life year (DALY) in 2007, compared to US$23.9 per 
DALY attributable to HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria (105). In a separate study of DAH 
allocation in 27 low- and middle-income countries, Esser et al. found no correlation 
between public or private aid flows and disease burden, and a weak but significant 
correlation of public ODA with health priorities (106). Finally, an assessment of distribution 
of DAH according to need performed in Uganda found differences in the goods and services 
that DAH funded; for instance, more funding was allocated to the procurement of drugs 
than to human resources or infrastructure (34).  
The literature therefore suggests there is some targeting of DAH according to need (disease 
burden), which is improving globally. However, more progress is needed as some 
conditions and population groups remain neglected. In addition, and linked to discussions 
on DAH distribution, there has been an active debate in the literature regarding the relative 
merits of vertical, disease-focused programme funding, and horizontal health system 
approaches, not least because despite a generally downward trend in the overall amount 
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of DAH funding globally, agencies providing vertical funds (mainly GHIs) have managed to 
maintain growth in their level of financing (5). This literature shows mixed results (107), 
although the evidence on which the debate has been based is scarce.  
Proponents for ‘vertical’ disease-focused programmes have argued that the urgency of 
tackling the spread of some diseases means specific programmes have to be designed and 
implemented for them (108-109). In addition, Dodd and Lane (2010) propose that global 
health partnerships have been successful in raising and delivering funds and can provide 
longer-term funding, suggesting this is something from which other DPs should learn (110).   
On the other hand, others studies have found the evidence to be mixed. For instance, a 
case study of Global Fund-funded HIV/AIDS projects’ interactions with the health system in 
Ghana found that whilst Global Fund projects have integrated successfully into some health 
systems components (financing, planning, service delivery and demand generation), 
parallel monitoring and evaluation and governance structures had also emerged, resulting 
in inefficiencies (111). These findings have been supported by a subsequent study, which 
found that PEPFAR had little or no influence on health outcomes not targeted specifically 
(112) and by a multi-country review carried out by the World Health Organization’s Positive 
Synergies Collaborative Group (2009), which found that there were significant gaps in the 
data and that while access to services targeted by GHIs increased, there was mixed 
evidence regarding access to other services (109). In addition, although GHIs were found to 
have an overall positive influence on health sector governance, there were worries that the 
performance-based approach employed by GHIs may distort these indicators towards their 
specific targets (109). Similarly, a seven-country study by Spicer et al. (2010) found that 
although GHIs (the Global Fund in particular) have had positive effects on coordination at 
the national level, they increased the complexity of the aid architecture, undermined 
alignment and lacked harmonization, especially at the sub-national level (113).  
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Finally, some studies have found vertical funding to be detrimental to the effectiveness of 
aid, for instance by highlighting that broader health systems constraints slow down 
progress towards making improvements in these diseases, and in health more generally 
(107, 114-116). In addition, a case study examining vertical funds, health systems and the 
SWAP in Mozambique found that vertical programmes gave rise to coordination difficulties, 
inequalities between the health system components that were financed and those that 
were not and health worker migration from public sector (117). 
A third ‘middle’ way between horizontal and vertical approaches has been put forward, 
known as the ‘diagonal’ approach. This approach consists of using single disease projects 
and programmes to address broader health systems issues, such as human resources, drug 
supply and financing (118). Examples of the diagonal approach include the Global Fund’s 
health systems strengthening programmes7 and PEPFAR’s investments in human 
resources, supply chains and health systems infrastructure (119). However, there are 
worries that unless accompanied by an increase in funding, this new approach will fail 
(120).  
This section has so far shown that aid does not always follow need, across countries or 
priorities. Further, there are disagreements in the literature on whether DAH should be 
delivered through vertical disease-focused approaches or as horizontal programmes 
addressing health systems needs. A final strand of the DAH distribution literature focuses 
on the factors explaining DAH allocation decisions. A study of DAH distribution in 109 
recipient countries between 1995-2006 found that countries with more political rights, as 
well as those with high levels of corruptions receive significantly more DAH, which the 
author argues may suggest DAH is used to reward political reforms (62). Similar findings 
were obtained from a study of the factors influencing the allocation of ODA in 146 
                                                          
7 http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/diseases/hss/  
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countries in the time period of 1990-2007, which found that both recipient need (in terms 
of size of population and income) and DP interests (including governance and being a 
former colony) explained ODA distribution patterns (121). In contrast, the above-
mentioned study by Boussalis and Peiffer found little evidence of political relationships and 
the quality of policy environment having much effect on distribution (103).  
With regard to DAH allocation to different priorities, two recent studies highlight the 
political dimensions of priority setting at the global level, where for instance, funding for 
non-communicable disease control has been largely ignored in the “corridors of power”, 
despite epidemiological evidence of need (122), whereas the reasons for the emphasis on 
HIV/AIDS has been explained through the use of a global crisis model, where the response 
was perceived as one of urgency that needed immediate action, at the cost of broader 
socio-economic causes and sustainability concerns (123).  
Discussions in the literature also indicate that DPs may have non-altruistic motives for 
giving aid. Countries may use DAH as a strategy within their foreign and security policy 
(124); for instance, to control infectious diseases that pose a threat to DPs’ national 
security (125-126). In addition, there is some evidence that priorities are set to serve the 
interest of DP countries’ foreign policy and trade agenda (127). This is corroborated by an 
analysis of India’s funding patterns between 2008-2010 across 125 recipient countries, 
which also found that India gives aid for political and self interest reasons (128). Finally, a 
study by Stuckler et al. of DAH funding patterns from 15 OECD DP countries in times of 
financial crises, cautions against ideological political shifts that may affect global and 
national DAH allocation decisions (129).  
There therefore seems to be a mixture of factors explaining DAH distribution patterns, 
involving a combination of need, political interests and power relations. The current 
distribution of DAH affects its effectiveness in two ways. First, resources may not be 
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directed to where they are most needed, limiting potential impact and decreasing 
efficiency. Second, the popularity of some countries and priorities means that DPs and 
implementing agencies crowd around them, resulting in DP fragmentation, duplication and 
competition. Further, vertical funding may hinder coordination and there is a danger these 
funds only benefit targeted diseases. However, most of the literature evaluates global 
distribution patterns of DAH, with very little discussion of allocation of DAH within 
individual countries, taking into account their needs and resource constraints. 
2.5.2 Fragmentation 
Increased levels of development funding have resulted in the proliferation of the number 
of DPs and the amount of projects and programmes they fund. This phenomenon is known 
as fragmentation, and it affects countries differently. A study by Frot and Santiso (2010) 
found that poor and stable democratic countries, such as Tanzania, which had 1,601 aid 
projects in 2007, suffer most from fragmentation (44).  
Fragmentation of DAH reduces its effectiveness by increasing the transaction costs of aid 
delivery (130), and thereby decreasing efficiency. Transaction costs are defined as “all the 
economic costs associated with aid management that add no value to aid delivery” (131), 
and have been classified by Acharya et al. (2006) as direct and indirect costs (40). Direct 
transaction costs are a result of both the large number of DPs, which require substantial 
amounts of senior officials’ time, and the amount of projects they fund, which generates a 
considerable managing and reporting burden for governmental authorities (40). Indirect 
costs include aid agencies attracting public servants away from the government, thereby 
exacerbating staff shortages (41); time and money spent by DPs on technical assistance and 
training of local staff, which results in reduced worker productivity (40, 132); limited DP 
capacity to exert pressure on recipient governments as acting alone amongst other DPs 
(133), together with a lack of DP individual sense of responsibility (45); recipient 
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government having to balance out many different interests; and more difficult DP 
coordination resulting in duplication. A recent study found that DPs could save up to $2.5 
billion per year if they reduced fragmentation by becoming more specialised in recipient 
countries (130). Most studies in the literature examine fragmentation patterns globally, 
however, across a panel of recipient countries or DP agencies. A single country case study 
in Cambodia found that fragmentation does not necessarily need to be reduced, as for 
instance in the context of emerging DPs, it was found that they provided novel ways of 
managing aid and resulted in healthy competition with traditional DPs (12). This was also 
found by Frot and Santiso, who developed a DP monopoly index and showed that some 
countries suffer from too little fragmentation, where power is concentrated among too few 
DPs.   
Generally, however, fragmentation is considered to be detrimental to the effectiveness of 
aid, due to its effect on transaction costs. As a result, DPs have committed to decreasing 
their fragmentation by becoming more concentrated across countries and sectors. They 
have so far had limited success, as a study of country concentration of 23 DPs over 18 years 
found that despite the different commitments to recipient country concentration there has 
been little achievement in this practice, something the authors attribute to the political 
motivations behind aid-giving (134). A deeper understanding of the factors driving 
fragmentation and how these can be addressed is needed to reduce fragmentation. In 
addition, more country-level case studies would help to determine the effects of 
fragmentation at the recipient country level, and whether the absolute goal should be to 
reduce fragmentation. 
2.5.3 Funding modality 
DPs shown in Figure 2.2 disburse funding using different modalities, depending on the 
degree of earmarking and trust in country systems. Project aid is the most earmarked type 
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of aid. Projects are discrete interventions delivered either through the government or 
parallel systems. In project-based aid, DPs have control over the design, monitoring, 
disbursement and accountability procedures, and NGOs or the private sector are in charge 
of implementation (4). Projects are also sometimes delivered using government systems, 
where DPs control the policy conditions and the sector in which the project is situated, but 
the funds are disbursed and accounted for using government systems (4). All types of 
development partners disburse some of their funds as projects, but GHIs in particular use 
this funding modality to disburse funds.  
The literature assessing the merits of project-based modalities shows mixed results. On one 
hand, projects have been shown to achieve outcomes and meet their objectives. A series of 
case studies conducted by the What Works Group at the Center for Global Development 
found that a World Bank funded project in China averted 30,000 cases of tuberculosis per 
year. The project’s success was associated with high levels of political commitment at all 
levels of government and the use of creative incentives to both patients and providers 
(135). Further, a recent study by Bendavid and colleagues found that between 2004 and 
2008, all-cause adult mortality declined more in PEPFAR focus countries than in non-focus 
countries (23). However, the authors were not able to determine whether PEPFAR was 
associated with mortality effects outside reductions in HIV-specific deaths (ibid.).  
On the other hand, other studies have criticised project-based aid for lacking sustainability 
(136), having high transaction costs (137-138), as they are harder to coordinate and there is 
a risk of duplication, and hindering partner country ownership (139).  
An analysis of projects financed by the World Bank throughout the years 1983-2009 found 
that the success of projects was correlated with overall country performance (140). In 
addition, it highlighted that the true impact of projects only becomes apparent over time, 
and later evaluations tend to be less optimistic, therefore raising concerns regarding the 
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sustainability of projects (140). The evaluation found that some factors, such as high 
preparation costs and low country ownership, were associated with lower impact of 
projects. On the other hand, smaller size, good management and supervision were 
correlated with a higher impact of projects. However, the authors of the analysis do 
acknowledge that a significant proportion of the variation observed in project performance 
cannot be explained by these factors, highlighting the importance of the local context on 
project outcomes (140). 
Overall, however, concerns regarding sustainability, increased burden and difficulties in 
coordination have meant project-based modalities are generally considered detrimental to 
DAH effectiveness. Other modalities, including pooled funds and budget support, have 
been introduced from the early 2000s to address these concerns. These modalities are 
discussed in section 2.6.2 below. 
2.5.4 Predictability 
By its very nature, DAH is discretionary spending for DPs, and as such can be extremely 
unpredictable. Predictability is defined by the OECD as the disbursement of committed 
funds in a timely manner, as well as the provision of long-term indicative figures of aid 
flows (141). DPs often fail in both dimensions (142). A panel regression of 60 low-income 
countries for the time period 1990-2005 found that, on average, levels of annual aid 
disbursements differed greatly from commitments, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (52). 
It also found that this relationship had only shown small improvements over time. Perhaps 
surprisingly, a lack of predictability was found both as shortfalls and as excesses in the 
amounts of funds received compared to those expected, with sub-Saharan African 
countries more likely to receive excess disbursements (ibid). This finding has been 
corroborated in single-country studies of DAH in Uganda (53) and Zambia (54). Other 
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studies have found significant differences between countries (143), and that the poorest 
countries are particularly affected by the unpredictability of DAH (52). 
Predictability does not only imply DPs keeping to their commitments, but also encompasses 
stability of funding and long term commitments. Studies focusing on unpredictability as 
uncertainty about future funding have also found evidence that it takes place and has 
detrimental effects on the recipient governments. In a recent study of 80 low-income 
countries between 1984-2004, Kangoye found that aid was unpredictable, and that it was 
statistically correlated with corruption, particularly when aid was delivered as programmes 
as opposed to projects, and in countries with weaker institutions (144). A recent study by 
Bulíř and Hamann (2008) in 76 countries from 1975 to 2003 also found that aid is more 
volatile than domestic revenue, and that foreign aid disbursement cycles did not coincide 
with recipient government shocks or funding shortfalls (142). 
Different reasons are found in the literature for the lack of predictability of aid flows. A 
survey of DPs found that unmet policy conditions, DP administrative problems, recipient 
government delays in meeting conditions and political problems in the DP country all 
contributed to a lack of predictability (143). However, Celasum and Walliser (2008) found 
that only 25 per cent of unpredictability was explained by recipient country stability and 
levels of aid disbursed. They blamed the rest on ‘fickle’ DP behaviour (52).  
Lack of predictability can hinder aid effectiveness in several ways. First, it hinders recipient 
governments’ ability to plan their budgets (53). This is a particularly important problem in 
the health sector, as health systems development is a long-term process, where many costs 
are recurrent, resulting in governments being reluctant to scale up activities (110, 145). 
Furthermore, aid that is larger than planned for may not be incorporated into the budget, 
and expenditure may be delayed (52). Second, lack of predictability has resulted in 
recipient ministries of finance being unwilling to allow long-term health spending 
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commitments (146), hence contributing to fungibility (see below). Third, unpredictable aid 
undermines recipient governments’ budgets by forcing adjustments in expenditure and 
changes in original allocations during budget execution, hindering the achievement of 
government objectives, and disrupting the implementation of poverty reduction strategies 
(147). Despite these, this review found a dearth of empirical papers specifically assessing 
the extent and impact of unpredictability of DAH on recipient country systems. 
2.5.5 Fungibility 
The issue of fungibility is often hotly debated in discussions concerning the effectiveness of 
DAH. Fungibility is the process by which the recipient government “offsets donor spending 
for a particular purpose by reducing its own expenditures on the same purpose... therefore 
aid substitutes rather than supplements local spending” (4). The existence of fungibility of 
development assistance has been documented extensively in the literature from as early as 
1993 (148-149). Fungibility can occur at the macroeconomic (150-151), sector (64, 67, 150) 
and sub-sector (68, 150) levels. Although the data available on health sector spending in 
low-income countries is often scarce and of bad quality, several studies have found that it 
is particularly affected by fungibility. Estimates of the extent of fungibility in the health 
sector for every dollar spent vary from a decrease in US$0.27-$1.65 (64, 67, 150) to a 
US$1.50 increase (19). In addition, two recent studies assessing fungibility at the health 
sub-sector level – of DAH targeted towards HIV/AIDS – found no evidence overall of 
fungibility of development assistance for HIV/AIDS (152-153).  
Although the general conclusion is that globally DAH is fungible, merely documenting 
whether it takes place is insufficient. First, little is known about why or how fungibility 
occurs (66, 154). Some studies have shown that low levels of recipient country income (64), 
fragmentation (150), lack of predictability and the short-nature of DAH flows (64, 150) have 
been associated with increased fungibility, but there is still a dearth of data on the 
46 
 
mechanisms through which fungibility occurs (152). There have been suggestions that 
fungibility may be a government’s way of reallocating funding to other priorities, to 
anticipate the long-term unreliability of DAH, or to smooth DAH by spreading it across 
different years (64), a practice advised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (155). 
Fungibility may also be seen as an indication that the recipient governments are aware of 
the DAH coming into the country, which may explain why funds channelled through NGOs 
do not result in fungibility (as governments are less aware of NGO funding levels) (156). 
Finally, fungibility may be a result of low absorption capacity of the recipient government 
(157). 
Second, there is no consensus in the literature on whether fungibility is necessarily a bad 
thing that diminishes the effectiveness of aid. On the one hand, some studies suggest 
fungibility decreases aid effectiveness because external funds do not result in additional 
expenditure on health (67), or indeed by increasing corruption if DAH is displaced from the 
government coffers (66). Worryingly, a recent study by Dieleman et al. has shown that 
when DAH levels fall they are not replaced by the recipient government, causing long-term 
damage to health sector expenditure (158). On the other hand, two separate studies have 
shown that there is no evidence of a difference between the impact fungible and non-
fungible aid has on growth (159) or on under-five mortality (69). Indeed, Waddington 
(2004) has suggested fungibility may lower the effectiveness of earmarking, but not 
necessarily the effectiveness of DAH (160). Others have argued that DPs should 
acknowledge sovereign governments will make their own funding allocations (161), and 
that fungibility may be a rational response to DAH, resulting from DPs’ and recipients’ 
differing priorities (150, 160, 162). Finally, some studies have concluded that fungibility is 
too narrow a concept to analyse aid effectiveness (163), and that it may distract from the 
real issues  of coordination and DP harmonisation (162, 164). 
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Consequently, there have been concerns regarding the policy decisions made from cross-
country analyses (71, 154, 156), with studies acknowledging that there is heterogeneity 
across countries (154, 165) and little is known on what DPs can do to prevent fungibility, if 
anything (164) (suggestions include modifying the channel and mechanisms of DAH 
disbursement (166)). More research is therefore needed to investigate the heterogeneity 
observed across countries, in particular the drivers and consequences of fungibility at the 
country level. 
2.5.6 Institutional factors and accountability 
The process of giving aid is in itself often a subject of study. The focus of this literature is 
often not on a particular actor or agency, but on the system of relationships DAH 
generates. A variety of actors are involved in the delivery and use of DAH, as shown on 
Figure 2.2. These actors form dynamic and interactive relationships, which are shaped by 
differing underlying incentives, motivations and information and power asymmetries, often 
resulting in lack of accountability (73, 76, 167-170). This section will explore the notions of 
accountability, incentives and information and power asymmetries that characterise DAH 
relationships. 
Accountability is understood as the ‘means by which individuals and organizations are held 
responsible for their actions’ (171). It is considered vital to the effectiveness of DAH, and 
has been repeatedly called for in the various declarations and commitments to aid 
effectiveness (172-173). Accountability should happen at all stages of the aid process, from 
decision-making, through to implementation, monitoring, and evaluation (174). There are 
four components of a well-functioning accountability system: a clear statement of goals 
(175), transparency of decision-making and use of funds (170, 176-177), an appraisal 
process with published results (175-176), and mechanisms for holding those responsible to 
account (175). 
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In theory, beneficiaries should hold DPs and implementing agencies to account, DPs should 
be accountable to their constituents and DPs and implementing agencies should be 
mutually accountable to one other for the distribution and outcomes of DAH. The rest of 
this section describes the factors hindering accountability in these sets of relationships. 
Repeated calls for mutual accountability between DPs and recipient governments have 
proven difficult to implement in practice. Several reasons have been put forward in the 
literature for this. First, the DAH system faces the problem of being a ‘global public good’, 
where every country can benefit from improved health indicators and development in 
general (168), which may result in DPs eluding individual responsibilities, as the rewards 
will be shared amongst all DPs. Second, DPs’ main accountability line is to their funders 
(178), and they may therefore feel less responsibility towards the recipient government for 
their actions. This is particularly problematic if the interests of beneficiaries and funders are 
in conflict. Further, accountability lines within DPs mean that country offices are 
accountable to their headquarters, rather than the recipient government (6). Third, DP 
incentives are also often skewed towards spending of funds rather than achieving results, a 
trend known as the ‘money-moving syndrome’, which hinders accountability to 
beneficiaries. In a study of World Bank funding, Monkam found this to be the case, 
concluding that in cases where DP employees are more focused on meeting disbursement 
targets than on achieving results, aid quantity becomes more important than quality. 
Further the author theorised that this may be even more the case for bi-lateral agencies, as 
they may be more susceptible to end of year pressures to spend resources (179-180).  
Recipient governments also fail to be accountable to DPs. Lack of trust in recipients’ 
accountability mechanisms has resulted in a range of responses, each with their own 
limitations. DPs may set up parallel systems, which undermine the government (50), or 
attach conditions on how assistance is managed and accounted for, which limits the 
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predictability of aid and country ownership. DPs may also attempt to improve 
governments’ systems through technical assistance, which has been blamed for wasting 
resources on international consultants or for luring government employees away from 
their jobs for training purposes with per diems or salary top-ups (132). Alternatively, DPs 
may choose to engage in projects, where they can have more control, rather than rely on 
government systems. 
Studies have also shown that accountability is hindered by power inequality between DPs 
and recipients (76), as DPs have control over resources, and can withdraw them at any 
point if they feel the recipient governments are not adhering to the conditions attached to 
the DAH (81). In contrast, there is no mechanism for sanctioning DPs if they default on their 
commitments (76). Having said this, DPs also face the Samaritan’s dilemma, which arises 
when the cost of enforcing conditionality (i.e. withdrawing DAH) is higher than the cost of 
the conditions not being met (73).  
Recipient governments and those implementing DAH funded services may not be fully 
accountable to their beneficiaries due to a phenomenon known as the ‘broken feedback 
loop’, whereby the people paying for the services are different to those receiving them 
(181). Moreover, aid has sometimes been shown to weaken government accountability to 
its citizens. In a review of national accountability mechanisms in Tanzania and the effect 
DPs have on them, Tripp found that DPs undermine accountability of the government by 
allowing the government to use the budget for political means, undermining accountability 
in the decentralisation processes by supporting the removal of unpopular taxes that 
reduced the income of district councils, and by encouraging privatisation without fully 
engaging in political realities (182). Accountability to beneficiaries is slowly improving, 
however, largely due to the advocacy efforts of increasingly stronger civil society 
organisations, both in donor and recipient countries (183). 
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The literature has thus far shown that the incentives of the actors involved in aid are not 
conducive to accountability, there is a broken feedback loop between those receiving 
health services and those paying for them, there are political motivations to disbursing 
DAH, and that power imbalances between DP and recipient governments and DPs can 
disrupt domestic accountability processes. However, there is no consensus on how to 
design a system of incentives that is conducive to accountability to beneficiaries, how to 
improve the power balance and increase DP accountability to recipient government and 
beneficiaries and how and whether DPs should engage in recipient country political 
processes. Further, although there is an increasing number of empirical papers of these 
issues, the literature is dominated by theoretical discussions. 
2.6 Policy response 
This section reviews the policy response of the international community to improve the 
effectiveness of aid, by first describing the aid effectiveness agenda, followed by a 
discussion of new aid modalities and coordination mechanisms through which the agenda 
is implemented. 
2.6.1 The global aid effectiveness agenda 
The international community has acknowledged the problems associated with aid and has 
taken steps to improve its effectiveness through holding several high level forums where 
DPs, recipients and representatives of civil society have signed international declarations 
on aid effectiveness. These declarations essentially attempt to enhance the effectiveness of 
aid by reforming the approach to aid management in several ways. First, by recognising the 
importance of recipients’ ownership of aid projects and their results, and of aligning DP and 
recipient country priorities, which is expected to improve the distribution of DAH and 
reduce fungibility (162). Second, driven by disappointment with conditionalities attached to 
aid, the new approach to aid has an increased emphasis in managing for results, aimed at 
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modifying incentives away from assessing inputs into outputs and outcomes (99, 184) 
(although this move has sometimes been criticised for pre-determining the expected 
results and how they will be measured, as well as for increasing DP control (76)). Finally, 
there has been a shift towards increased accountability for results from both development 
partners and recipients of aid. 
The main aid effectiveness declarations include the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for 
Development in 2002, the Rome Declaration on Harmonization in 2003 and the Joint 
Marrakech Memorandum on Managing for Results. The most important declaration so far, 
however, has been the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005, where governments 
of aid-giving and receiving countries and DPs agreed on five principles of “good practice”: 
ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability. 
These five principles aimed at improving aid effectiveness through three dimensions: 
efficiency of aid delivery, management of aid and strengthening partnerships (185). The 
Paris Declaration had a deadline of 2010 to achieve the five principles, and a set of 
indicators to measure the achievement of each principle. The mid-term evaluation of the 
Paris Declaration conducted in 2008 found that although some progress was being made, it 
was not fast enough (186), which lead to the signing of the Accra Agenda for Action in 
2008, to accelerate progress towards ownership, inclusive partnerships and results.  
The deadline of the Paris Declaration is now up, and its final evaluation found that overall 
the quality of the management of aid has improved, in particular the relationships and 
dialogue between DPs and recipients, but highlights the uneven progress across countries 
and DPs, a lack of transparency and the burden of aid management as impeding progress. 
Importantly, it calls for more realistic expectations of the contribution of aid to 
development (185).  
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Some studies in the literature have also assessed the implementation of the Paris 
Declaration at the country level. A study of stakeholder perceptions of implementation of 
the Paris Declaration in the Democratic Republic of Congo found there has been little 
progress, and calls for increased accountability and government ownership (91). In 
addition, a study assessing the implementation of the Paris Declaration in Colombia found 
it posed a threat to civil society and may have been used by the government to push DPs 
away from country politics (187). However, other studies have highlighted the importance 
of the principles in improving collective action of a highly fragmented aid system (188), and 
have suggested the Paris Declaration should also be applied to civil society and non-
government organisations (93). 
Given the health sector’s numerous actors and channels of aid delivery, the international 
community signed a declaration specific to health: the International Health Partnership 
(IHP+). The IHP+ was signed in London in 2007 with the aim of implementing the Paris 
Declaration in the health sector. A recent review of the implementation of the IHP+ found 
that whilst there has been progress in national planning processes and the use of 
programme based approaches (see below), there has been insufficient improvement in the 
use of country financial and procurement systems and in unifying performance assessment 
frameworks (189). The evaluation further concluded that the health sector is ahead of 
other sectors, given its mechanisms for promoting harmonisation, alignment and the 
monitoring frameworks, but in-country capacity should be strengthened in order to achieve 
further progress (189).  
The Paris Declaration was followed by the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 
which took place in Busan in November 2011. Busan represented a shift from aid to 
development effectiveness, and a recognition of the importance of new DPs and South-
South co-operation (190). However, the principles of aid effectiveness agreed at this Forum 
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are not too dissimilar from previous declarations. Partners committed to ownership of 
development priorities by recipient countries, a focus on results, inclusive development 
partnerships and transparency, and accountability between DPs and recipient countries. Up 
until the Paris Declaration, the aid effectiveness agenda was signed by a mix of donor and 
recipient countries, as well as international organisations.  An improvement of the Busan 
Partnership was the increased role of civil society, which was a participant rather than an 
observer (191). Conversely, new DPs did not adopt the Busan Partnership, but agreed 
instead to use its commitments and principles as a reference for South-South co-operation 
on a “voluntary basis”. Although many see the engagement of new DPs in the forum as 
progress, there is clearly some way to go before they are fully integrated in aid 
effectiveness declarations. Tanzania is a signatory of the Paris and Busan declarations, but 
is not a partner of the IHP+. In addition, there have been calls for decision-making to be 
more bottom up and for clearer definitions of what “development” means at the country 
level, so that changes in language equate changes in mindset (191).  
Despite evaluations of the different aid effectiveness declarations having been undertaken 
by the OECD and in some studies in  the literature, current indicator frameworks have been 
criticised for being narrow in scope and not including measures of behaviour change or 
development results (90). Further, they do not take into account that development 
strategies are “translated” and interpreted differently in different contexts, which has been 
shown in a study of Uganda, Zambia and Bangladesh (192). 
2.6.2 Shift in funding modalities and DAH coordination mechanisms 
Discontent with traditional aid approaches, concerns regarding the sustainability of DAH 
delivered as vertical projects and their potential for weakening country systems have 
driven the international community to favour programme-based approaches. This shift was 
at the heart of the Paris Declaration in 2005 and is still being pursued by many DPs. DPs 
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committed to giving two-thirds of their aid in the form of Programme-Based Approaches 
(PBAs) by 2010 in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005. PBAs are defined by 
the OECD as having the following characteristics (141):  
1. Being lead by the partner country 
2. Having a single, comprehensive programme and budget framework 
3. Promoting DP coordination and harmonization of DP procedures for budgeting, 
management, procurement and reporting 
4. Increasing use of partner country systems 
PBAs encompass basket funding, SWAPs and budget support. They also include project aid 
that is delivered as part of a SWAP (141). The mid-term evaluation of the Paris Declaration 
found that the proportion of aid delivered as PBAs had only increased from 43 per cent of 
all aid in 2005 to 47 per cent in 2007 (141). The final evaluation of the Paris Declaration 
found that with a few exceptions—such as Uganda—there had been no rapid or linear 
move towards PBAs, with most of the evaluated countries and DPs delivering aid using 
mixed modalities (185). Further, the evaluation found a general reluctance on the part of 
the DPs to move towards these approaches, mainly due to the slow pace of public reforms, 
which contributed to high fragmentation of aid (185). Nonetheless, the evaluation also 
found that although PBAs require more effort than traditional project aid, they resulted in 
higher policy influence by the DPs (for instance, in better targeting of expenditure on 
poorer communities), and better understanding of performance-based approaches by the 
partner governments, which led the evaluators to reinforce the suitability of PBAs as the 
core target of the Paris Declaration, and to recommend they be included in further 
declarations and policy discussions (185). 
The rest of this section discusses the current evidence on budget support, pooled funds and 
sector-wide approaches. 
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Budget support and pooled funds 
Budget support is a disbursement mechanism that is characterized by having little or no 
earmarking (4). There are two types of budget support: general and sector budget support. 
General Budget Support (GBS) involves DPs providing aid directly to the government’s 
budget, linked to a poverty reduction strategy (193). This approach provides maximum 
autonomy to the recipient country in terms of how aid is used, as it is not specifically 
earmarked for health or any other sector. The success of budget support has been shown 
to be dependent on the governance and policy environment of the partner country (30). 
The concerns with this approach relate to the risk of corruption and misuse of funds (30). 
Between 2002 and 2006 only 6.4 per cent of all aid was allocated as budget support (194), 
reflecting DPs’ concerns and unwillingness to engage in this aid modality. However, the 
popularity of budget support has since been reported to be growing, particularly amongst 
European DPs (139). A study of general budget support in seven countries over 1994-2004 
found a positive association with government ownership, accountability and capacity for 
public financial management (195). In addition, general budget support was found to 
improve DP harmonization and alignment (195). Despite the authors of the study taking 
measures to deal with a lack of counterfactual and avoid reverse causality (by carefully 
developing a theory of change (196)), these results may still be biased by these. However, 
these findings have been corroborated in further studies (136, 139, 197).  
Although DPs do not decide how GBS funds are distributed across sectors, negotiations of 
general budget support by DPs can serve to increase the budget allocation to the health 
sector. Despite this, this literature review only found one study assessing the effects of GBS 
on the health sector through a cross-country panel data from 82 low- and middle-income 
countries during the time period of 2002-2007 (198). Somewhat surprisingly, the study 
showed that GBS has had no impact (positive or negative) on health expenditure (198).  
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The second type of budget support is sector budget support. This modality still involves DPs 
providing aid to the recipient government’s budget, but funds are earmarked to a particular 
sector, often the health and education sectors. A study of ten sectors (including health) in 
six African countries found that sector budget support had improved the efficiency of 
public resource use by supporting planning, budgeting, management and accountability 
processes (199). However, it also found that although access to services had been greatly 
expanded, the quality and equity in the delivery of these services had not (199). Another 
study of sector budget support in four sectors (including health) in Mali, Tunisia and Zambia 
found that it had not resulted in higher harmonisation amongst DPs, who still delivered 
funds off-budget, and as such had not succeeded in lowering transaction costs (200). 
However, this study may have been confounded by a lack of counterfactual, as transaction 
costs may have been higher if there had been no budget support. 
Finally, basket funds are a type of sectoral budget support that is often used in the health 
sector to fund primary health care at the local level (4). Basket funds are delivered using 
the government’s financial management systems, but are more earmarked than sector 
budget support, with development partners often specifying what the funds are spent on 
and having additional reporting requirements than in sector budget support (which relies 
on governments’ accounting systems). This review found little literature on basket funds, 
although they are often studied within sector wide approaches, which are reviewed below. 
Sector wide approaches 
SWAPs arose in the mid 1990s as a result of the prevailing discontent with project aid (201). 
Although there is no agreed definition of precisely what SWAPs involve, in essence, a SWAP 
represents a partnership between DPs working in the same sector and the partner 
government, often led by the health ministry of the partner government (202). The terms 
of this partnership are usually agreed in advance, and vary between different countries 
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(192). SWAPs are often associated with delivering aid as budget support and basket funds, 
with the aim of supporting partner ownership and country systems, improving DP 
coordination and lowering the transaction costs of aid (192, 202).  
Foster described the sector-wide approach as having four dimensions (203) (which are 
similar to those of PBAs): 
1. Single sector policy and expenditure programme 
2. Under government leadership 
3. Adopting common approaches across the sector 
4. Progressing to using government disbursement and accountability procedures 
There have been a few studies of the implementation of SWAPs in the health sector. A five 
country case study undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute in 1999 in 
Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania, Cambodia and Vietnam found that health SWAPs were 
integrated into budget planning process, the use of common procedures was key to 
reducing costs, joint reviews were in place (although their success depended on DPs using 
them) and links between policy and implementation were growing because governments 
had resources to implement health sector plans (204). However, the study highlighted 
concerns that DPs were still undertaking their own monitoring, the management 
complexity of moving from projects to single sector programme was straining government 
capacity and the largest DPs were not participating (204).  
A later evaluation of SWAP implementation in the health sector in six countries 
(Bangladesh, Ghana, Kyrgyz Republic, Malawi, Nepal and Tanzania) found the SWAP was 
successful in putting in place tools and processes for health sector coordination and 
oversight (such as medium term expenditure framework, dialogue structures and 
procedures for strengthening country systems), the SWAP dialogue was led by the 
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government, DPs formed consortia and government and DPs undertook joint planning and 
assessment. However, the study also raised concerns regarding the lack of DP 
accountability, the fact that the objectives of national health programmes were only 
modestly achieved due to weak monitoring and evaluation, and the excessive emphasis on 
disbursement systems rather than focusing on results (205).  
Finally, in a review of the literature on the implementation of SWAPs in the health sector, 
Peters et al. found that SWAPs have deviated from their original expectations of 
strengthening relationships between governments and DPs. However, they found that 
SWAPs have contributed to the development of national health policies and expenditure 
frameworks, strengthened institutional capacity and reduced fragmentation. They also 
found that government leadership varied widely across different countries, and that SWAPs 
were often undermined by DPs bypassing SWAP arrangements through global health 
initiatives to address global priorities (206). Nevertheless, SWAPs have been met with great 
optimism in smaller single-country case studies, and have been labelled as a promising 
vehicle for achieving aid effectiveness principles in the Solomon Islands (207), for attracting 
more and better aligned DAH in Tajikistan (208), as a vehicle for achieving health sector 
reform and increased coordination in Ghana (209), as a contributor to an increase in 
women delivering using skilled birth attendants in Tanzania (210) and as an effective 
mechanism to deliver cost-effective interventions that improve health service delivery in 
Malawi (58). 
Although the evidence on the impact of the sector wide approach on the health sector is 
mixed, it is important to take into account that the SWAP mechanism involves a reform in 
the way aid is given and in the relationship between the DPs and the government, which 
means it will take time for the impact to be seen (202). For instance, a smaller evaluation of 
the health SWAP in Zambia attributed the lack of success on the fact that the SWAP was 
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not fully developed and DPs had not fully embraced it (211). In addition, the SWAP is an 
approach to aid management, but its implementation varies between different countries, 
as the local political and cultural context have been found to influence the ‘shape’ of the 
SWAP, and hence its effectiveness (192).  
Finally, studies have found gaps in our understanding are undermining the effectiveness of 
the SWAP approach. These include a better understanding of the political economy (205); 
for instance, on how to achieve stronger national ownership and innovative institutional 
arrangements to balance both targeted initiatives and health systems funds (212). In 
addition, Leiderer (2013) has recently highlighted the implementation of the aid 
effectiveness agenda has been “sketchy”, criticising the lack of rigorous evidence on the 
impact of “Paris-compliant aid modalities” (38). Lastly, McNee (2012) has highlighted the 
importance of assessing government and DP incentives that are compromising the SWAP 
through the use of the aid effectiveness agenda as an analytical frame (213). 
2.7 Discussion 
This chapter has provided a review of the literature on the effectiveness of development 
assistance for health. It has first provided an overview of the DAH architecture, showing 
that increasing flows have been accompanied by an increasingly complex system of actors 
and instruments for DAH delivery. The chapter then reviewed the inherent methodological 
difficulties found when trying to ascertain the impact of aid on the health sector, including 
quality of data, reverse causality and the generalisability of context-specific findings. 
Moreover, despite studies assessing the effectiveness of DAH using different methods, 
disciplines and frameworks, this review has found the research community has yet to find 
an ideal methodological approach to tackling the complex nature of DAH, with all available 
approaches having important shortcomings.  
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This literature review has also summarised the current knowledge on key impediments to 
effective development assistance for health, including allocation of resources, DP 
fragmentation, funding modalities, fungibility of funding and institutional issues associated 
with the process of aid delivery. The policy response of the international community to 
tackle these factors has also been discussed, including the international aid effectiveness 
agenda, the shift from project aid to programme-based approaches and the adoption of 
sector-wide approaches in the health sector. 
One thing that has become clear is the importance of the local context, and that successful 
projects and programmes tend to be those that adapt best to the local circumstances and 
where there is real ownership by the local partners. In addition, there is a need to examine 
how the global issues affecting aid effectiveness identified in this review interact at the 
country level, such as for instance, whether DAH is allocated according to country (rather 
than global) need, the contextual factors driving fungibility or the burden of a fragmented 
aid architecture.  
This literature review has also shown that addressing politico-institutional factors is key to 
improving the effectiveness of DAH. However, there is a dearth of evidence of whether the 
aid effectiveness agenda has addressed these factors. In general, there has been little 
assessment of the extent to which aid effectiveness principles in international declarations 
have been achieved or not, partly because there are no agreed indicators for measuring 
achievement. Further, little is known about whether they actually result in more effective 
aid, or indeed if the approaches and modalities designed to implement the aid 
effectiveness agenda have achieved this in practice, particularly at the country level.  
It is important that these issues receive more attention, as given the lack of clear evidence, 
and the difficulties in establishing whether DAH is effective, there is a danger that the 
international community fluctuates between different approaches without evaluating what 
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has worked or failed and why. This thesis aims to contribute to this gap in the literature by 
using a political economy conceptual framework to assess whether the SWAP has achieved 
the aid effectiveness agenda in the Tanzanian health SWAP through the use of locally-
relevant indicators.  
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3 METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the methodology used to conduct this study. It first describes the 
study approach, including the study design, the time period, the use of mixed methods and 
epistemology and reflexivity. It then describes the quantitative and qualitative methods 
used before outlining the ethical considerations and procedures followed. 
3.1 Study approach 
3.1.1 Study design 
A single country, single sector case study design was adopted for this research. This 
approach has been recommended by the World Bank’s series on Evaluating Development 
Effectiveness (214), and has the advantage of providing political, historical and societal 
context. It also allows for the study of policy responses to factors hindering aid 
effectiveness as highlighted in Chapter 2 in more depth, thereby complementing cross-
country approaches, common in the aid effectiveness literature. There are some criticisms 
of the case-study approach, the most important being its lack of generalisability (215). By 
giving importance to the local context, case studies may produce findings that are not 
applicable to other contexts. However, they allow for the development of or contribution 
to theory, and therefore provide “analytic” and conceptual (216) rather than statistical 
generalisability (215). Furthermore, Flyvbjerb calls this lack of generalisability a myth, and 
argues that even in the natural sciences, theories can be informed from a single experiment 
carefully chosen, that case studies sometimes allow for more discoveries if intensely 
studied rather than larger sample sizes and that if the purpose of “science” is to generate 
knowledge, this can be done without achieving generalisability (217).  
The health sector has been chosen for this case study as it has received much attention in 
the past decade due to the links between health and development and as a result of the 
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recognition of health as a human right (218); in addition, health is the direct focus of three 
of the eight Millennium Development Goals8 (MDGs). Furthermore, the generous external 
funding received by the health sector makes it highly aid-dependent and particularly 
vulnerable to the factors hindering the effectiveness of Development Assistance for Health 
(DAH), including fragmentation, fungibility and need for coordination. Tanzania was 
selected as the case study country because it is one of the top recipients of DAH globally 
and is heavily dependent on external health funding (which accounted for 40% of total 
health expenditure in 2009 (219)). In addition, Tanzania has a long history of democratic 
institutions, is a signatory to all major international declarations on aid effectiveness and 
(at least on paper) has kept its promises, and has been hailed as a success story in aid (182). 
In the Tanzanian health sector, Development Partners (DPs) and the government have 
been working under a sector-wide approach since 1998, DPs have structures for 
coordination, and have been providing development assistance in the form of the health 
basket fund and budget support for the past ten years. The Tanzanian health sector 
therefore makes it an ideal setting to study the application of principles of aid 
effectiveness9. 
3.1.2 Time period  
The Tanzanian aid landscape has undergone important changes in the last decade, with the 
adoption of the Paris Declaration, the design of national aid effectiveness and health sector 
strategies (including the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania, the National Health Policy 
and the Health Sector Strategic Plan) and the introduction of the health Sector Wide 
Approach (SWAP). It was therefore important to reflect these political events by 
considering changes in the delivery and use of DAH over time, rather than at a single point. 
                                                          
8 MDG4: to reduce child mortality rates, MDG5: to improve maternal health, MDG6: to combat 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases.  
9 The use of Tanzania in this thesis refers to Mainland Tanzania, as Zanzibar has separate 
government and development partner structures 
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As much as was possible, the timeframe used for this study was from the launch of the 
SWAP in 1998 until the present day. Quantitative data were obtained from the year 2000 
(although for some indicators data were only available for later years), as earlier data was 
either deemed too inaccurate (for external financing) or was not available (for domestic 
flows). Interviewees were selected to represent actors with a current and/or historical 
experience of the SWAP. Documents reviewed span the whole timeframe of the SWAP. 
Non-participant observation and field notes only encompass the timeframe of the 
fieldwork. 
3.1.3 Mixed methods 
Addressing the objectives of this study required the use of different methods, as shown in 
Table 3.1 below. 
Table 3.1: Study objectives and methods used for each 
Objective Type of method used 
1. History and current structure of the Tanzanian 
health sector  
Document review 
In-depth interviews 
2. DAH flows to Tanzania during the time period of 
2000-2010 
Quantitative 
3. Develop indicators to assess the global aid 
effectiveness agenda 
Document and literature review 
In-depth interviews 
4. Assess the extent to which the Tanzanian health 
SWAP has achieved the aid effectiveness 
principles 
Document and literature review 
In-depth interviews 
Non-participant observation 
Quantitative 
5. Explore institutional factors and relationships in 
the Tanzanian health SWAP to explain the degree 
of achievement of the agenda 
Document and literature review 
In-depth interviews 
Non-participant observation 
There has been some debate in both social science and health research literature about the 
mixing of quantitative and qualitative methods. Mixed methods have been criticised for 
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lacking coherence (220) and rigour (221), not being developed enough to be robust as yet 
(222), coming from contradicting paradigms (223) and favouring quantitative methods at 
the cost of qualitative ones (223-224). On the other hand, mixed methods approaches have 
been praised for their ability to generate more complete data that can be used to 
corroborate results (225) and to generate further insights on the findings from one method 
(226). Recent studies have also shown the potential for mixed methods to be driven by 
qualitative methods (and to indeed enhance them) (224, 227). The overall consensus is on 
the need for good quality of mixed methods study designs and for transparency about the 
integration of methods, as well as clarity of the protocol followed for each of the 
components (221). The rest of this section aims to achieve this by providing a detailed 
account of the study design and the approach used to mix the different quantitative and 
qualitative methods used in this thesis. 
The reason for using mixed methods was three-fold. First, the methods were driven by the 
research questions. An approach was taken where the quantitative and qualitative 
methods were seen as being complementary and as forming part of a “research toolkit” 
(228) or palette (227), available to answer different research questions. In this way, 
evaluating the attainment of the aid effectiveness agenda required the analysis of trends in 
health financing quantitatively, as well as a deeper understanding of the relationships that 
make up the health SWAP, which can only be achieved through the use of qualitative 
methods. Second, some triangulation of multiple sources of evidence provided a more 
complete in-depth picture (215). Finally, the different methods were complementary. 
Focusing on a single country, combined with data constraints found in low income 
countries, means the amount and quality of quantitative data collected was not sufficient 
to determine causation. Qualitative data were used instead to add depth to the 
quantitative trends observed, to understand the contextual factors in which they occurred 
and develop explanations for the quantitative trends found. 
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The rest of this section describes how the different methods were mixed. Methods can be 
integrated at different stages: at the paradigm level (epistemology), sampling, data 
collection, analysis and interpretation (229). In this study some integration took place 
during the analysis section, but results were mainly integrated at the interpretation stage.  
Epistemology 
This study is rooted within the discipline of development studies applied to public health; it 
borrows methods and theories from health economics and health policy. Using a mixed-
methods inter-disciplinary approach is not without difficulty, and does result in tensions 
between different epistemological positions. Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that is 
concerned with theories of knowledge and assumptions about the truth. Different 
epistemological positions range from a positivist approach that assumes that there is one 
objective and neutral reality that can be observed and measured, unchanged by the 
researcher (230-231), to a constructionist approach, which assumes there is no one 
absolute truth, but rather truth is constructed through people’s social interactions, and 
research can only represent people’s perceptions of reality (232). Quantitative research, 
often including economic and some health systems research, is typically rooted within a 
positivist tradition (230). On the other hand, qualitative approaches, such as anthropology, 
are often based on constructionist philosophy. In the middle of the spectrum sit realist 
approaches. Realism assumes that a reality independent of the researcher exists that can 
be known, but researchers’ interpretations of this reality cannot be value-free (233).  
There has been some debate in the literature on whether mixed methods research should 
address epistemological differences between the different methods. Some studies 
advocate for a pragmatic approach, ignoring epistemological assumptions and letting 
research questions and results justify the approach (234). However, others have voiced 
concerns that if carried out in this way, mixed methods research is a “Trojan Horse for 
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positivism” (223), and that indeed different methods can be rooted in the same 
epistemological position (227). The latter is the view adopted here.  
This study is informed by a subtle realist perspective, where it is assumed that reality exists 
independent of the researcher, but “knowledge is based on assumptions and purposes and 
is a human construction” (233). Positivism is rejected here because it is acknowledged that 
researchers are not value-free and therefore cannot produce objective accounts of reality. 
A constructivist approach is not taken because we assume there is a reality independent of 
the researcher, rather than multiple realities constructed by the researcher and the 
researched (91). A purely (or naïve) realist approach is also rejected because we believe 
that although there is one reality independent of our beliefs, we cannot come into contact 
with it. Instead, a subtle realist perspective is adopted because we assume phenomena 
exist independent of our claims, but acknowledge that we can only attempt to represent, 
rather than reproduce the phenomena we are studying, which we can only achieve through 
our cultural assumptions (91). The analysis undertaken in this PhD recognises that the data 
and results are not independent of the societal context in which the research takes place, 
or the researcher’s assumptions and views. This applies to the quantitative as well as the 
qualitative parts of the study. Although quantitative methods are often classified as 
positivist, in this study it is acknowledged the categories constructed and the interpretation 
of the analysis is inevitably subjective. Data generated for the qualitative parts of the study 
are also not value-free, in particular when bringing together the findings from the different 
parts of the study and making recommendations.  
Data collection 
Different strategies can be used to combine quantitative and qualitative methods. A 
modified sequential transformative strategy was used here, as described by Creswell (2003) 
(222). This strategy involves carrying out the two methods in sequential stages of data 
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collection, and provides a degree of flexibility to investigate findings as they emerge (222). 
There were two periods of data collection (Figure 3.1), during which several iterations of 
both methodologies took place. The first exercise of data generation took place during a 
two week pre-fieldwork visit to Dar es Salaam in June 2011, where key informant 
interviews were undertaken. A scoping exercise to search for all the global sources of 
financial expenditure (quantitative data) took place over the subsequent two months. 
The second stage of data collection took place during the main period of fieldwork, from 
October 2011 to September 2012. This involved collecting quantitative financial data on 
DAH and domestic expenditure on health, and generating qualitative data through 
document review, non-participant observation and in-depth interviews.  
Figure 3.1: Steps of data collection 
 
Data analysis and interpretation 
Integration of the different methods took place during data analysis and interpretation. The 
integration technique used here was influenced by the works of O’Cathain et al. (221, 235) 
and Mason (227). O’Cathain et al. describe three different methods for integrating mixed 
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methods: triangulation, following a thread and developing a mixed methods matrix (235). 
Mason, on the other hand, suggests methods should be meshed or linked, providing multi-
dimensional explanations to multi-dimensional problems (227, 236).  
Some integration took place during the analysis, where there was some cross-checking 
between methods to explore emerging themes from one method using another (“following 
a thread”). There was significant flexibility in the approach, which allowed for new issues to 
emerge. In this way, issues deemed more important were researched in more depth 
through the different methods. For instance, at the beginning of data analysis it became 
apparent that the indicators and definitions used to evaluate aid effectiveness principles in 
international policy documents had ambiguous meanings and were interpreted differently 
by different stakeholders. This led to the modification of the analysis framework to explore 
stakeholder understanding of aid effectiveness principles and the development of a set of 
locally relevant and meaningful definitions and quantitative and qualitative indicators. This 
set of indicators was then used to analyse the quantitative and qualitative parts of the 
analysis. Following a thread was also carried out through the different qualitative methods. 
For instance, SWAP policy documents state the number and frequency of meetings that 
should take place, although observation of some of these meetings revealed that the 
frequency and attendance was lower than expected; following this up through in-depth 
interviews revealed this was indeed an issue of great concern for DPs. 
The key stage at which integration took place in this study, however, was during the 
interpretation. When the different methods were addressing different questions, these 
were reported separately. On the other hand, when the different methods were addressing 
the same issue, they were reported as providing different layers of an account, with some 
degree of triangulation. As O’Cathain et al. and Sandelowski point out, triangulation can be 
defined in two ways: as a process to corroborate findings from one method with another or 
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the use of different methods to obtain a more complete picture (235, 237). Although there 
was some corroboration of results – for instance DPs that took place in interviews were 
sometimes shown preliminary results on health financing trends to check their accuracy – 
the main objective of triangulation here was complementarity and to test “inter-method 
discrepancy”. This was not just done between quantitative and qualitative methods, but 
also between the different qualitative methods. When different methods contradicted 
each other, this was reported and explored in more depth. For instance, using the example 
of fungibility, government stakeholders contradicted the results of the quantitative 
analysis; however, when analysing how resource allocation took place, it became apparent 
that they did not view fungibility as a deliberate policy of the government, but rather as a 
part of a rational way of allocating resources. 
3.1.4 Reflexivity 
Consistent with a subtle realist approach’s assumptions about reality being understood 
through the social constructions of the researcher, it is important to examine how the 
researcher may influence the results of the research, which is known as reflexivity (238). 
The researcher can influence the outcomes of research both through his/her background 
and beliefs. In this section I address how both my background and beliefs may have 
influenced my PhD findings. Addressing the former first, I am white, female and younger 
than all the people that took part in the study. During the time of fieldwork I was affiliated 
with the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) and the Ifakara Health 
Institute (IHI). This had different effects on different study participants. For those of 
Tanzanian origin, being foreign raised a level of distrust about what would happen to the 
data and the purposes of the research. This affected my ability to collect quantitative data 
as well as to attend meetings and to elicit data through interviews. Being affiliated with a 
local institution – IHI – opened doors into the government, but many participants still 
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viewed me as a DP representative, and as a result may have felt less comfortable sharing 
information with me. My relative youth meant I was viewed by non-Tanzanian stakeholders 
as inexperienced but also less threatening. During my stay in Tanzania, I learned 
conversational Swahili, but did not acquire a level of proficiency that allowed me to 
conduct my research in the language. Aside from the polite greetings, all communication 
related to the research took place in English. All research participants spoke fluent English; 
however, it may have had an influence on how comfortable they were in participating in 
the research and the level of trust they had on me as a researcher.  
My background and ideology may have also had an influence on data collection, analysis 
and interpretation. I have an undergraduate degree in Biology and a Masters degree in 
Control of Infectious Diseases. My philosophical position has changed during the period of 
doctoral research from positivist to pragmatist and subtle realist. My ethical and political 
beliefs include social justice and human rights, including access to health care and good-
standard living conditions. These are common to health systems researchers; however, 
they may have had an influence on my interpretation of results and attitude towards study 
participants. Further, my field notes show an increasingly pessimistic tone as the fieldwork 
went on, which was reflected in early drafts of results. Although since being back in London 
I have been able to get some distance from the field, feelings of disappointment with the 
“aid world” may have still influenced my interpretation and analysis of data.  
3.2 Quantitative Methods 
This section describes quantitative part of the study, including the analytical framework, 
the different types of health financing data available, data sources used and the coding 
methodology. The section ends with a description of the method used to analyse the 
quantitative data.  
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3.2.1 Analytical framework 
Quantitative methods were used to describe the Tanzanian health financing landscape in 
the time period of 2000-2010 and to assess the quantitative indicators of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. A different analytical framework was used for each of these two 
objectives.  
In order to construct a financing map of the Tanzanian health sector, financing flows were 
classified by source (domestic versus DAH), source of DAH and sub-sector distribution. Pitt 
et al. advise researchers to choose analytical frameworks carefully when examining DAH 
flows, as some items cannot be compared directly (239). In line with this view, in this study 
care has been taken to select a coherent list of indicators that are comparable over time. 
These are:  
1. Health expenditure distribution by source of funding 
a. Trends in Government Health Expenditure as a source (GHE-S) (total 
government expenditure on health coming from the government coffers), 
both as absolute terms and as a proportion of Total Government 
Expenditure (TGE) 
b. Trends in DAH, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of total ODA 
2. DAH distribution by source of funding 
a. Trends in bi-lateral, multi-lateral and private foundations and 
philanthropies, both in absolute terms and as proportion of total DAH 
b. DAH by DP, both in absolute terms and as proportion of total DAH 
3. DAH distribution by sub-sector 
a. Trends in DAH distributed as horizontal, diagonal and vertical programmes 
(in absolute terms and as a proportion of total DAH) 
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b. Trends in disease-specific priorities (in absolute terms and as a proportion 
of total DAH) 
c. HIV/AIDS funding by source (domestic versus external, and by DP) 
The method and rationale used to select the quantitative indicators to assess the aid 
effectiveness agenda are described in section 3.3 below and in Chapter 7. The indicators 
selected are: 
1. Fungibility – Trends in GHE-S and Development Assistance for health delivered 
through the government (DAH-G): 
a. As absolute numbers 
b. As a proportion of total government expenditure on health 
c. As a proportion of total government expenditure 
d. Per capita 
2. DAH funding channels 
a. Trends in DAH delivered through and outside the government (as absolute 
amounts and as proportions of total DAH) 
b. Trends in DAH delivered through and outside the government by DP 
3. DAH funding modalities 
a. Trends in DAH delivered through pooled funds (basket funds and budget 
support) 
4. DAH fragmentation 
a. Trends in number of DPs 
b. Trends in the proportion of DPs accounting for less than 10% of all DAH 
c. Trends in the number of projects (by DP and disease priority) 
d. Trends in average size of project (by DP and disease priority) 
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A range of alternative analytical frameworks were considered but had to be dropped due 
to data constraints. These included exploring DAH allocation by level of care (primary, 
secondary and tertiary); classifying DAH according to the health system activity it funded, 
such as health policy, infrastructure and human resources (available data only allowed 
between 30-60% of projects to be classified in this way); and the predictability of DAH flows 
through comparing commitments with disbursements (only 2624 projects - approximately 
half – had both commitment and disbursement data). 
The rest of this section describes the methods and data used to calculate these indicators. 
3.2.2 Types of health financing data 
Powell-Jackson and Mills (2007) describe four types of health financing data that can be 
tracked: budgets, commitments, disbursements and expenditure (240). Budgets indicate 
the resources planned to be spent; they are least reliable as there is no guarantee that they 
have been spent. Commitments represent a promise to spend money (241); they are more 
accurate than budgets, may indicate future trends and show willingness to fund. However, 
committed funds are not always disbursed due to structural factors and they are usually 
reported as a “lump sum” on a single year, even if projects are funded over multiple years 
(239). Disbursements, in contrast, show resources given to the recipient in a calendar year 
(242); they reflect real value of funding, but for DAH they are only relatively complete since 
2002 (239). Expenditures represent the “value of goods and services consumed within a 
country during a calendar year” (240), they are the most accurate measure of funding, but 
also the hardest to obtain, as audited accounts are not always available in a timely manner. 
Most aid-tracking studies and available databases report on either disbursements or 
commitments. Domestic data were available as budgets and expenditures. In this study 
disbursements were used for DAH, as they represent actual funds, and wherever possible, 
expenditures were used for government funding flows (either as source or agent).  
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3.2.3 Data sources 
Global level data 
At the global level there are three main databases tracking DAH: Creditor Reporting System 
(CRS), the DAH database compiled by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 
(IHME) and AidData. An overview of the strengths and limitations of these sources of data 
for DAH tracking is provided elsewhere (240, 243-244), and summarised below. 
The CRS is managed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
Development (OECD). It is the most widely used database for tracking aid flows. It provides 
project level data (project name and description, channel of fund delivery, commitment 
and disbursement levels) by year and by DP for all donor countries belonging to the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), United Nations (UN), World Bank and some 
Global Health Initiatives. It has the advantage of having standardised methods and 
definitions used for reporting (242), which are used by Development Partners (DPs) to 
report twice annually. The CRS avoids double counting by not reporting bi-lateral 
contributions to the regular budgets of multi-lateral organisations (244). The limitations of 
the CRS database include that it does not allow for multiple coding of a single project, and 
therefore multi-purpose projects are classified under a single code (for instance, a project 
targeting HIV, malaria and human resources may be coded under HIV and sexually 
transmitted infections). In addition, the CRS does not include data from all DPs, with 
emerging DPs such as China, Arab states, India, the Clinton Foundation and European Non-
government Organisations (NGOs) being largely absent. As DPs self-report to the CRS, the 
amount of detail in the database varies considerably. Data incompleteness varies across 
fields, but is particularly problematic for the project name and description and the channel 
of delivery. Further, some projects are multi-sector and it is not possible to know from the 
available data how much goes to each sector. It is also not possible to assign General 
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Budget Support (GBS) to specific sectors such as health (245). Finally, many projects are 
regional projects and the allocation to specific countries is not shown.  
The AidData and IHME databases are based on the CRS, but include data on a wider range 
of DPs. AidData includes data from non-DAC bi-laterals and other multi-laterals and has a 
more user-friendly interface, which increases the usability of the data (244). However, data 
collection is less standardised and there is potential for double-counting of aid flows, as 
data are collected directly from multilateral agencies (244). A recent journal issue featured 
a series of articles using this database (246). The IHME DAH Database (Country and 
Regional Recipient Level) provides data on bi-lateral and multi-lateral organisations, as well 
as private foundations. It codes DAH flows according to different disease areas but does 
not provide disaggregated project descriptions, so it is difficult to perform analyses using 
these data on topics areas other than those already present in the database (244). 
DAH data can also be obtained directly from DP websites, budgets and reports.  
Country level data 
At the national level in Tanzania, there are a number of different sources of health 
financing data. These report both on financing sources and expenditures. Sources of health 
expenditure are divided into tax and non-tax revenue. Health expenditures are divided into 
recurrent expenditures, which are those that occur every year (and are further sub-divided 
into Personal Emoluments (salaries) and Other Charges (operating costs)), and 
development expenditures, which include new infrastructure and other investments that 
do not recur each year (247). Expenditure of foreign funds is coded as development 
expenditure; however, a significant part of it is still delivered off-budget and not captured 
by the government’s budget system. Therefore, national-level sources based on the 
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government’s budget may miss some foreign funds. Data are reported in financial, rather 
than calendar, years, which in Tanzania run from the 1st of July to the 30th of June.  
In Tanzania health expenditure data (domestic and foreign) is found in the National Health 
Accounts (NHA10), Public Expenditure Reviews (PER), budget books and budget speeches. 
The NHA have been institutionalised and are conducted by the Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare (MoHSW) every three-four of years. They use a matrix where expenditures 
are classified by source, agent, health provider and function (248). They also have sub-
accounts for HIV/AIDS, reproductive health, malaria and child health. Within the time 
frame of this study three NHA exercises were undertaken: 2002/03, 2005/06 and 2009/10. 
NHA relies on primary and secondary data; ideally data used in the NHA should be readily 
available, but surveys are often conducted to fill in data gaps, especially in relation to out of 
pocket payments (240).  
PERs of the Tanzanian health sector have been undertaken annually by the MoHSW 
(sometimes with input from technical assistants) from the financial year 1999/2000 (249). 
They assess trends in total health spending by year, both as approved estimates and actual 
expenditure by financing source, by level of government (central, regional and council), 
development and recurrent expenditure and by sub-sector distribution (including human 
resources or level of care, although these vary in different years). PERs are based on data 
collected from central government agencies (including the MoHSW, the Ministry of Finance 
(MoF), the Prime Minister’s Office, Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-
RALG), and the National Health Insurance Fund) and Local Government Authorities (LGAs). 
LGA data comes from the Comprehensive Council Health Plans (CCHPs) and Technical and 
Financial Implementation Reports and are often supplemented with surveys of a sample of 
districts (250). Multi-sector PERs have also been undertaken for HIV/AIDS from the financial 
                                                          
10 These are also available globally by compiling country’s NHA reports 
(http://www.who.int/nha/en/) 
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year 2001/2002, commissioned by the Tanzania Commission for Aids (TACAIDS) under the 
annual public expenditure review process of the Ministry of Finance. 
In addition, the budget books report government expenditure data at the end of each 
financial year. They include expenditure by sector at the central, regional and local level, 
broken down by type of activity and expenditure (development and recurrent). These are 
publically available online for the time period of 2007-201011. Data from the budget books 
needs to be used with caution as they are not audited (the budget books are eventually 
closed and then audited, but this final version is harder to access and was not used in this 
study). Finally, the annual budget speech12 outlines total government budget and 
expenditure by source and type of expenditure for the previous year. Data from budget 
speeches represent audited expenditures. 
The table below summarises the advantages and disadvantages of the different data 
sources as well as which sources were selected for each health financing indicator.  
  
                                                          
11 http://openmicrodata.wordpress.com/2011/02/11/tanzania-budget-data/  
12 Available from: http://parliament.go.tz/index.php/budget/index/all/all/2013-2014/minister  
79 
 
Table 3.2: Data sources 
Data 
source 
Available 
indicators 
Benefits  Drawbacks Selected 
CRS DAH 
DAH-G 
ODA 
 Data 
disaggregated by 
project/transaction 
 Standardised 
methods and 
definitions 
 Avoids double 
counting 
 Only DAC DPs 
 Data missing 
 Multi-purpose, multi-
sector and multi-country 
projects 
DAH 
DAH-G 
IHME DAH  Data from private 
foundations and 
American NGOs 
 No disaggregated 
project descriptions 
 Can only use database 
coding 
DAH 
AidData DAH  DAC and non-DAC 
DPs 
 Interface more 
user-friendly 
 Does not avoid double 
counting 
 Data collection less 
standardised 
DAH 
DP 
websites 
DAH  Data sometimes 
more complete 
than in global 
databases 
 Time consuming 
 Data availability 
variable across different 
DPs 
DAH 
NHA GHE-S 
 
 Routine reporting 
and ad-hoc surveys 
(more flows 
captured) 
 Only three exercises in 
time period of study 
No 
PER GHE-S  Available from 
2001 
 Does not capture all 
DAH flows 
 Does not allow for re-
coding 
GEH-S 
Budget 
books 
TGE  Very detailed and 
disaggregated 
budget and 
disbursement data 
at the project level 
 Available from 2007 No 
Budget 
speech 
TGE  Available from 
2001 
 Data not disaggregated 
at the project level, 
presented as totals 
TGE 
 
 
Data sources selected 
This study compared the various data sources to select the most complete data for the 
study. In some cases a combination was used to maximise on completeness. In order to 
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select the most suitable data, the different sources were plotted to visualise differences 
between them and facilitate the selection of the most appropriate sources for analysis. 
These graphs are shown in Chapter 6. AidData disbursements were converted from current 
US Dollars (USD) to constant 2010 USD using OECD deflators13 for consistency with the CRS 
database. The analysis found that the CRS was the most complete database, although 
AidData contained data for non-DAC DPs and IHME for private foundations, which were 
missing from the CRS. To compare figures from global sources with those reported by the 
NHA, NHA figures were converted to USD at the average annual exchange rate provided by 
the Bank of Tanzania as reported by the WHO Global Health Expenditure database14 and 
adjusted for inflation by using OECD-DAC deflators15. 
Therefore, a database was compiled from the three global data sources to analyse DAH 
trends. Data were primarily obtained from the CRS database by extracting all transactions 
to Tanzania from all DPs for the time period of 2000-2010. The CRS database does include 
regional projects; however, these were not included as it was not possible to accurately 
identify the amounts of aid from these going to Tanzania specifically. This means the 
amount of DAH will be under-estimated. The AidData and IHME databases were then used 
to complement these data with information from DPs not included in the CRS (Brazil, 
Poland and Czech Republic from AidData and Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation from 
IHME). Once data had been extracted from each of the databases, they were merged. 
Where currencies were not in constant 2010 USD they were converted to USD at the 
exchange rate relevant for the time period and then adjusted to 2010 USD using OECD-DAC 
deflators. DAH was not extracted from the PER as it was not disaggregated into individual 
                                                          
13 Available from: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/development-co-operation-report-
2012/deflators-for-resource-flows-from-dac-donors-2010-100_dcr-2012-table79-en  
14  http://apps.who.int/nha/database/DataExplorer.aspx?ws=0&d=1  
15 Available from: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/development-co-operation-report-
2012/deflators-for-resource-flows-from-dac-donors-2010-100_dcr-2012-table79-en  
81 
 
projects or sub-sector priorities, and did not provide the required information for this to be 
done manually.  
Although this approach maximises the number of DPs included, there are some key 
omissions. For instance, the CRS database does not include spending by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO). A review of WHO strategic documents found that in 2002 out of the 
total budget of $13.7 million, $10.8 million came from “other sources” (as opposed to its 
core budget). Therefore, it is hoped that a large proportion of WHO funding would be 
captured on contributions from other DPs. To avoid double counting, no WHO information 
was added from other sources. 
Government health expenditure data were extracted from the PER. This is because it 
offered the most complete set of data. Total government expenditure was extracted from 
the budget speeches, as again they provided the most complete picture. NHA data were 
not used because they were only available for three points in the time period (comparison 
of PER with NHA showed that they were similar, see Chapter 6 for graphs). The NHA does 
estimate expenditures for the years in between NHA exercises; however, these are less 
reliable (67) and were therefore not included. Data on other indicators from the budget 
books were not used because these were only available electronically from the year 2007 
and matched the data from the budget speech, which were available from 2001.  
 
3.2.4 Definitions and coding methodology 
Health was defined in line with the World Health Report (2000) (also used in the NHA) as 
“all the activities whose primary purpose is to promote, restore or maintain health” (251). 
DAH was defined by adapting Ravishankar et al.’s definition (31) as all financial and in-kind 
contributions from channels of assistance by official agencies (bi- and multi-lateral 
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agencies, global health initiatives, NGOs and private foundations) to Tanzania with the aim 
to achieve either health improvements or to finance health related global public goods 
such as research and development, disease surveillance, monitoring and evaluation, and 
data collection. This includes loans on concessional terms, which charge below-market 
interest rates. Research funded by DAH channels of assistance were counted as DAH, 
whereas health research by other institutions whose primary purpose was not 
development assistance was not included (so for instance, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation was included). All health sector activities (such as the provision of curative and 
preventative services), family planning, as well as education, nutrition and water and 
sanitation activities whose primary objective was health were included. Humanitarian aid 
provided to Tanzania is usually in the form of food aid and help for refugees and was 
excluded. World Bank debt relief projects were also excluded. 
Domestic expenditure was used directly in the format available in the PER and budget 
speeches and did not require further manipulation. However, the extraction and analysis of 
DAH data required a number of steps to ensure projects were correctly identified as DAH, 
to re-code projects by source, channel (agent) and generate additional codes for sub-sector 
distribution.  
Pitt et al. outline three different approaches to coding aid projects: line-by-line, keyword or 
using the databases’ own codes (239). Line-by-line coding is the most accurate (albeit 
labour intensive), although keyword searches are more transparent and replicable (239). 
Doing a country level analysis restricted the number of projects, and therefore, a mixture of 
line-by-line and keyword coding was used here, to maximise specificity and feasibility. The 
rest of this section describes how DAH projects were identified and coded according to 
source, channel and sub-sector priorities. All coding was done manually using Microsoft 
Excel to create new numerical codes for each of the categories as described below. The 
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coding frameworks were reviewed and approved by two of the supervisors of this thesis 
(AV and JB).  
Measurement of DAH 
To ensure that all DAH projects were correctly identified, the following steps were 
performed. First, all projects from the following CRS sector codes were included: health 
general, basic health and population policies/programmes and reproductive health. A 
keyword search16 was then carried out on the retrieved projects to remove those related 
to the census. This was followed by a keyword search on the rest of the database. Different 
keywords were tested and all of those that returned health projects were used:  “health”, 
“HIV”, “tuberculosis”, “tb”, “malaria”, “matern”, “disease”, “STD” and “medic”. These were 
translated into German, Dutch, Spanish and French to ensure all languages of the CRS 
database were included. All of the projects that resulted from the keyword search were 
reviewed line-by-line and those meeting the inclusion criteria were included. Finally, all 
selected projects were reviewed line-by-line to ensure they were correctly classified as 
DAH. Performing the keyword search highlighted a number of purpose codes that 
consistently contained health projects17. A line-by-line search was subsequently 
undertaken on each of these purpose codes. Data from the IHME DAH database is not 
available at the project level, and therefore no re-coding was possible. All health-relevant 
                                                          
16 Keywords used were “census” and “cens” 
17 Basic life skills for youth and adults, advanced technical and managerial training, water supply 
and sanitation - large systems, basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation, waste 
management/disposal, education and training in water supply and sanitation, economic and 
development policy/planning, women’s equality organisations and institutions, social/ welfare 
services, multisector aid for basic social services, Social mitigation of HIV/AIDS, multisector aid, 
multisector education/training, research/scientific institutions, food aid/food security programmes, 
administrative costs, support to national NGOs, support to local and regional NGOs and sectors not 
specified 
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purpose codes from the AidData database were included18, and projects checked line by 
line. 
A final consideration was whether or not to include GBS. These funds are not often 
included as health sector funds in the literature, except for the Countdown project and 
Stierman, who allocate GBS according to the proportion of government expenditure that is 
spent on health (37, 252). Foster developed a methodology for assigning GBS to the 
education sector, based on the share of government expenditure to the education sector 
as a proportion of government spending on ODA-eligible sectors (i.e. excluding expenditure 
on defence and security) (253). It was not possible to obtain government expenditure on 
defence and security in this study. Advice was sought from national-level financing experts, 
who reported that it was not possible to track GBS at the sector level.  
“… it’s crazy to think of attribution, if you drop a bucket full of water into a lake, 
how do you identify where that bucket went in the lake, did it go down the falls?” 
(DP)  
The Countdown methodology was therefore followed and GBS was allocated to the health 
sector using the proportion of government expenditure on health over the time period of 
study. This may be an over- or under-estimate of the actual amount going in as government 
budgetary allocations may have been affected by the conditions for spending in social 
sectors attached to GBS, which could have resulted in higher amounts going into the health 
sector, or the health sector may not be able to absorb all the increase of funding, resulting 
in lower allocations.  
                                                          
18 The following AidData purpose codes were included: Basic drinking water supply, basic drinking 
water supply and basic sanitation, basic health care, basic health infrastructure, basic life skills of 
youth and adults, basic nutrition, basic sanitation, family planning, health, health education, health 
personnel development, health policy and admin management, health combination (get full), 
infectious and parasitic diseases, infectious disease control, malaria, medical education, medical 
research, medical services, personnel development population and reprod., population and reprod., 
population and reprod. Admin and policy, reproductive health care, STD control including HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis control 
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DAH distribution by source and channel of delivery 
The NHA analysis framework, which classifies DAH by source and channel of delivery, was 
used (248). Sources provide the funds and agents channel them or use them to pay for 
health activities. Sources of DAH were divided into bi-lateral (including the European 
Commission), multi-lateral (development banks, global health initiatives and United 
Nations agencies) and private foundations/philanthropies (Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation and Bloomberg). 
Channel of delivery is one of the least complete fields on the CRS database, despite its 
importance to evaluate the coordination of funds and use of country systems, two key 
principles of aid effectiveness. The CRS database has three fields for channel of delivery: 
“Channel Code”, “Channel name” and “Channel reported name”. Channel code and 
channel name were essentially the same, the former a numeric code and the latter 
providing a description of the code (for instance code 12000 has channel name Recipient 
government). Channel reported name contained the name of the organisation through 
which the funds were disbursed. When either the “Channel name” or “channel reported 
name” had a value, these were classified as “Projects through the government”, “Projects 
outside the government” (including NGOs and consultancies) and “Health Basket Fund”. In 
addition, the estimated proportion of GBS to the health sector was also included as going 
through the government. Where the channel code was another DP, this was assumed to go 
outside of the government19. 
Efforts were made to improve the completeness of available data, by going through the 
database line-by-line. For projects that did not contain information on channel name, the 
“channel reported name” field was reviewed. For projects where this field was blank, the 
“project title”, “short description” and “long description” fields were reviewed for names of 
                                                          
19 The CRS asks DPs to report this in order to avoid double counting 
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the organisation through which the project was disbursed. This was supplemented by 
online searches, a review of DP documents and by asking local stakeholders. Being based in 
Tanzania for a year helped to identify the language used by the DPs and specific terms 
referring to different channels. To test the usefulness of re-coding fields in this way, the 
percentage of projects that was re-coded was calculated. 
DAH sub-sector distribution  
This is perhaps the most popular framework for DAH analysis, but also the most 
contentious. The approach adopted here was first to measure the amount of DAH that is 
delivered through the different modalities (earmarked vertical and diagonal programmes 
versus horizontal funds), and second to disaggregate vertical programmes to analyse DAH 
allocation to different disease priorities. 
To assess DAH modalities, three new codes were created: “vertical”, “diagonal” and 
“horizontal”. Disease, condition or population specific DAH funds were classified as vertical 
(for instance, reproductive health and malaria), funds targeted at improving the health 
system, but delivered as a project were coded as diagonal (including projects for 
infrastructure, medical supplies and health workers not specific to a single disease), and 
finally, health basket funds and the proportion of GBS allocated to health were coded as 
horizontal funds (cutting across the sector). Some studies have estimated the proportion of 
pooled funds and budget support that is allocated to specific diseases (252, 254). This was 
not done here for two reasons. First, a big proportion of basket funds are spent on medical 
and drug supplies and local government authorities, rather than supporting specific 
conditions/diseases. Second, there was no way of estimating accurately the sub-division of 
horizontal funds according to disease priorities. Diagonal and horizontal funds are likely to 
be an under-estimation of health systems activities, however, as vertical disease specific 
programmes also invest in health systems components such as drug supply mechanisms 
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and human resources. Equally, a proportion of all other funds (health systems, pooled 
funding and budget support) also benefit vertical disease programmes.  
Vertical programmes were then further disaggregated into one of 12 priority categories as 
shown on Table 3.3. This was done to assess the disease-specific distribution of DAH. Some 
categories already existed in the CRS (such as malaria and tuberculosis). Others were 
constructed here, such as HIV/AIDS (separating it from other sexually transmitted 
infections), combining reproductive and maternal health with child health (for ease of 
visualisation) and “blank” for projects that could not be assigned a single disease category. 
To do this, line-by-line coding was undertaken and projects/transactions were reclassified 
by reviewing the “project title”, “short description” and “long description” fields. As 
highlighted above, the CRS does not allow for multiple purpose codes. Different 
approaches have been taken in the literature to deal with this, either by attributing all the 
expenditure to one purpose (68), dividing the expenditure equally between the different 
purposes (5) or using an index to estimate expenditure based on assumptions and the 
literature (33). Here, rather than make any estimates based on assumptions, DP reports 
and budgets were reviewed to estimate the purpose of funding wherever possible. Where 
activities could not be assigned to a single category, they were coded as “multi-purpose”. 
Activities spanning multiple sectors or without information in the project title and 
description fields were classified as “blank”.  
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Table 3.3: Vertical disease priorities 
Priority Inclusion criteria 
HIV All activities for which the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS was the sole purpose. Activities including other Sexually 
Transmitted Infections were excluded. 
Malaria All activities for which the prevention and control of malaria was the sole purpose 
Reproductive 
Maternal,   
Neonatal and 
Child Health   
All projects specifically targeting reproductive, maternal, neonatal and child health. A modified version of the Countdown project 
definition is used. They define maternal and neonatal health activities as those “whose primary purpose is to restore, improve, and 
maintain the health of women and their newborn during pregnancy, childbirth, and the 7-day postnatal period”, in 
addition to sexual and reproductive health activities (255). The emphasis in this study was on a disease/condition rather than a 
population group. Therefore, and unlike Countdown methodology, interventions such as malaria in pregnancy and Prevention of 
Mother to Child Transmission were included in the malaria and HIV categories respectively20. Immunisations were also included. 
Sexually 
Transmitted 
Infections (STI) 
All activities for which the prevention and control of Sexually Transmitted infections was the main purpose (excluding HIV/AIDS) 
Tuberculosis All activities for which the prevention and control of Tuberculosis was the main purpose  
Immunisation All activities relating to the storage and delivery of immunisations (excluding for tuberculosis) 
Other 
Infectious 
Diseases 
All activities whose main purpose is the prevention and control of infectious diseases, except malaria, HIV/AIDS, STIs, 
tuberculosis and those related to childbirth. Diarrhoeal, vector-borne, bacterial, viral and parasitic diseases are included. 
Non-
Communicable 
Diseases 
 
 
 
All activities whose primary purpose was to restore, improve and maintain dental, mental and eye health; provide medical 
rehabilitation; control of non-infectious diseases and drug and substance abuse. 
Nutrition Only activities with a direct health focus were included. The OECD-DAC definition for basic nutrition was used: “direct 
feeding programmes (maternal feeding, breastfeeding and weaning foods, child feeding, school feeding); determination of 
                                                          
20 This means Reproductive Health does not include any HIV/AIDS funding  
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micro-nutrient deficiencies; provision of vitamin A, iodine, iron etc.; monitoring of nutritional status; nutrition and food 
hygiene education; household food security”. (242)  
Water and 
Sanitation 
Only activities with a direct health focus were included. These included basic water supply and sanitation through low-cost 
technologies (handpumps, spring catchment, gravity-fed systems, rain water collection, storage tanks, small distribution 
systems, latrines, small-bore sewers and septic tanks and activities promoting hygiene, such as hand washing campaigns 
Multi-Purpose Activities that had more than one purpose within the health sector (for instance HIV and STI control) 
Blank Projects that could not be coded under any of the above categories. These included multi-sector projects, or those that 
had no information on “project title”, “short description” and “long description” 
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To assess the differences coding made to the database all of the categories re-coded (DAH, 
channel of delivery and vertical priorities) were plotted before and after coding. For the 
two categories for which coding made the most differences (adding GBS to the health 
sector and channel of delivery) the percentage difference coding made was calculated. 
Domestic financing 
Two indicators were used to assess domestic expenditure: Total Government Expenditure 
(TGE) and Government Health Expenditure as a source (GHE-S). To compare domestic and 
external financing, GHE-S was also explored at the sub-sector level for HIV/AIDS, 
reproductive health and malaria.  
TGE was obtained from the budget speech. Due to data constraints GHE-S is difficult to 
obtain. In their studies of fungibility, the IHME estimate it by deducting DAH delivered 
through the government from government expenditure on health as an agent (158). In this 
study GHE-S was obtained from the PER. However, in order to avoid double counting, the 
proportion of GBS allocated to the health sector was subtracted from the GHE-S figure 
found in the PER. In this way, it is hoped that the figures provided are as close as possible 
to the actual amount of domestic expenditure on health. Domestic HIV/AIDS expenditure 
was obtained from the HIV/AIDS PER.  
Amounts were converted to US dollars using annual averages and converted to 2010 US 
dollars using OECD deflators. To account for population changes, both GHE-S and DAH-G 
were assessed as absolute amounts and per capita. Population figures were obtained from 
the World Bank21. 
                                                          
21 http://data.worldbank.org/country/tanzania 
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3.2.5 Analysis 
The first objective of the quantitative part of this thesis was to draw a map of the 
Tanzanian health sector between 2000 and 2010. The indicators used in this part of the 
analysis (health financing source, DAH funding source and sub-sector distribution) were 
presented as trends, without further analyses performed to them.  
In addition to describing the health financing landscape of Tanzania for the time period of 
2000-2010, quantitative methods were also used to assess the principles of aid 
effectiveness through four indicators: fungibility, use of government systems, use of pooled 
funding modalities and fragmentation. The rest of this section describes how each of these 
indicators were analysed. 
Lack of sufficient historical data on domestic and external health financing and difficulty in 
controlling confounders meant a causal relationship on whether DAH causes fungibility 
could not be established at the country level in Tanzania. The scope of this study is 
therefore limited to a descriptive account of domestic and external health expenditure 
trends as sources and agents (this was complemented through qualitative methods). To 
assess use of country systems and alignment to country strategies quantitatively, trends in 
the proportion of DAH channelled through the government and the proportion of DAH-G 
that was delivered as pooled modalities over the time period of 2001-2010 were assessed 
(domestic data were not available for 2000). This involved plotting these indicators as they 
were developed in the database. 
Fragmentation was assessed through four indicators: Amount of DAH, number and average 
size of projects and proportion of DPs that together account for less than 10% of DAH for 
each year in the time period of 2000-2010 (256). Fragmentation was only assessed using 
the projects extracted from the CRS and AidData databases, as the IHME database does not 
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disaggregate DAH flows by project. The CRS database’s activities often reflect single 
transactions rather than projects (even those that have a CRS unique identifier). To 
calculate the number and size of projects, the project title was used, which involved 
manually selecting these throughout the years. Projects are usually disbursed over multiple 
years. However, as they do not only incur transaction costs on the year they are 
committed, it was felt that this provided an appropriate measure of fragmentation. It does 
mean, however, that the number of projects shown in a given year is the number of 
projects “active” in that year. To assess the effect of the basket fund on fragmentation, the 
average size of projects was compared with and without including the health basket fund, 
and the percentage change was calculated. Disbursements through budget support were 
excluded from the analysis as they were delivered as part of the government system and as 
such did not incur extra transaction costs, as were those classified as debt relief and core 
contributions to NGOs (following the OECD methodology for assessing fragmentation 
(256)). Fragmentation levels were further assessed at the sub-sector level and by different 
DPs. 
3.3 Qualitative Methods  
A mix of qualitative methods was used to construct a map of health sector management in 
Tanzania, including budgeting processes, policy strategies and stakeholders involved; to 
develop and apply a set of indicators to assess the aid effectiveness agenda in the 
Tanzanian health SWAP; to understand quantitative financing trends and the use of 
different financing modalities; and, to explore the relationships present in the”aid system”. 
Qualitative methods used in this study include document review, non-participant 
observation and key informant and in-depth interviews. This section describes how these 
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were carried out, followed by an account of the method used to analyse the data 
generated22.  
3.3.1 Data generation 
Document and literature review 
Green & Thorogood (2009) describe the aims of document review as either to elicit 
background information or as part of the data for the study (216). In this study it was 
carried out for both purposes.  
First, a number of documents were reviewed to understand the national and international 
political context, both in terms of health sector policies and development cooperation. In 
addition,  the historical context of the SWAP was explored, including how it was set up, by 
whom and what relationships were at play, as well as the current policy and expenditure 
frameworks and accountability mechanisms.  
A search was undertaken in Eldis, Google and Scholar Google using the following search 
terms: Tanzania, SWAP, health, DP, development partner and basket fund on their own and 
in combinations. This was complemented by a website search of DP websites, the 
Development Partner Group portal (including the Development Partner Group for Health), 
the Government of Tanzania, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Office for Regional Administration and Local 
Government websites, and websites of civil society and non-government organisations 
(SIKIKA, REPOA and TWAWEZA). In addition, when interviewing study participants, they 
were asked to recommend documents. Snowballing was also used by checking through the 
references of documents selected. Documents were included if they described the SWAP, 
                                                          
22 The term data generation (rather than collection) is used consistent with a subtle realist 
perspective, which assumes data are generated through the researcher’s interpretations 
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domestic and external health financing mechanisms and health policy strategies in 
Tanzania, were in English and were published in the time period of 1995-2012 (from the 
conception of the SWAP to the time when the search was conducted). A total of 53 
documents were included. Tanzanian health sector policies, SWAP and basket fund 
documentation, international declarations and national assistance strategies were 
reviewed to understand the current context. Early SWAP and basket fund reports, studies 
and minutes of meetings of the SWAP and pre-SWAP discussions were reviewed for the 
purpose of understanding the historical context of the SWAP. Finally, joint annual health 
sector reviews, budget guidelines and technical and financial reports were reviewed to 
understand the sector financial and accountability mechanisms. 
Using documents has the advantage of data being readily available; and in some cases 
documents are the only source of data on a particular topic (216). However, some 
limitations were also encountered, including availability of data, as often annual reports 
were not available for every year, and the reliability and accuracy of documents, such as 
minutes from meetings. Wherever possible, validity was cross-checked during interviews 
and non-participant observation, but it was more difficult to verify older documents as 
stakeholders were not able to recall beyond a certain period.  
The second objective of the document and literature review was to inform the 
development of indicators to assess the aid effectiveness agenda. The aim here was to 
review definitions and assessments of aid effectiveness internationally and in national 
declarations in Tanzania, and their evolution over time; to review how principles of aid 
effectiveness have been assessed in the literature; and to explore how these principles 
were interpreted and implemented in practice within the Tanzanian health sector context.  
Key policy documents were reviewed, including international and Tanzanian declarations 
95 
 
on aid effectiveness23, the SWAP Code of Conduct (2002 and 2007) and the Health Basket 
Fund Generic document (2009) and the Health Basket Memorandums of Understanding 
(2003 and 2008).  
To search the literature, the Global Health, EconLit and Web of Science databases were 
searched. In addition, to avoid any publication bias, key websites were consulted for grey 
literature, including Eldis, the OECD and government and DPs’ websites. The following 
search terms were used: aid, aid effectiveness, health, Paris Declaration, ownership, 
basket, results, results based management, harmonisation, coordination, accountability, 
sector-wide approach and SWAP. Terms were used alone and in combination. In order to 
obtain as wide a selection as possible no restriction was placed on sector or date of 
publication. Papers in English, Spanish and French (languages readily spoken) were 
included. Papers were only included if they had a definition of indicators to measure at 
least one of the aid effectiveness principles. Titles and abstracts were reviewed and for 
those found to be relevant the full text was downloaded and included in the review. 
Snowballing was used to find further relevant material by searching references of relevant 
articles and reports. In total 221 abstracts were reviewed, and 108 papers and reports were 
identified and included for full text review. The only information extracted from these 
papers was the definition of aid effectiveness principles and/or the indicators used to 
assess them.  
A final source of documentary evidence was the field notes taken during the year-long 
fieldwork period and the two-week pre-fieldwork visit. These recorded informal 
conversations and interactions, news articles, as well as personal thoughts and reflexions 
                                                          
23 International declarations: Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development, Rome 
Declaration on Harmonisation, Marrakech Memorandum of Managing for Results, Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness, Accra Agenda for Action, International Health Partnership, Busan Partnership 
for Effective Development. National declarations: Helleiner review, Tanzania Assistance Strategy and 
Joint Assistance Strategy of Tanzania 
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on the experiences during fieldwork. These helped understand the context, and fed into 
the design of the study tools and helped with the interpretation of the results. 
Non-participant observation 
The purpose of non-participant observation was threefold: first, to observe stakeholder 
behaviour and interactions between the different actors in their natural state (216); 
second, to triangulate/validate findings from document review, in-depth interviews and 
quantitative methods; and third, to identify, gain access to and develop relationships with 
key stakeholders that subsequently participated in the in-depth interviews. Nine meetings 
were attended and observed. These included DP coordination meetings as part of the 
Development Partner Group for Health (DPG-H) and the basket fund, meetings between 
DPs and the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, and SWAP meetings, where all actors 
active in the health sector were present. In order to minimise influencing the content of the 
meetings attended, efforts were made to remain “inconspicuous” to the other participants. 
This was easier in some of the bigger meetings, but harder in meetings were participants 
sat around a table, or where there were a very small number of foreign participants. Non-
participant observation took place throughout the period of fieldwork. During meetings 
detailed notes were taken of topics discussed and interactions between participants. Notes 
were typed up immediately to increase accuracy.  
Key informant interviews 
Key informant interviews were undertaken in June 2011 to identify the key stakeholders, 
refine the research objectives and design the interview tool, which was subsequently used 
to guide discussion in the in-depth interviews (see Appendix B). Twelve key informant 
interviews took place during this visit (table 3.4). Key informants were initially identified 
through online searches of health SWAP meetings and by contacting the participants in 
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them. Snowballing was then carried out to identify further key informants. These 
interviews were highly informative in terms of context, data sources and identification of 
relevant stakeholders. Key informant interviews were informal and were not recorded. 
During interviews, efforts were made to elicit key health policies and documents, identify 
important areas to investigate within the health SWAP and aid effectiveness and key 
actors. In addition, two further key informant interviews were carried out during the period 
of fieldwork. The rationale for conducting these during fieldwork was for practical reasons 
– neither of the informants was in the country at the time of the preliminary visit, but their 
knowledge of the Tanzanian health sector was key to conducting the fieldwork. 
In-depth interviews 
This section describes how the in-depth interviews were conducted in this study. It starts 
by describing the rationale for using in-depth interviews, before describing the 
development of the interview tool, the sampling strategies and how the interviews 
themselves were carried out. 
In-depth interviews are “a specific kind of interaction, in which the researcher and the 
interviewee produce language data about beliefs, behaviour, ways of classifying the world, 
or about how knowledge is categorized” (216). Interviews were selected as a research 
method because of their ability to elicit information from respondents regarding their own 
experiences and social worlds (257). Concerns have been voiced regarding the validity of 
data generated through interviews, particularly linked to discussions of whether knowledge 
is a pre-existing phenomenon that can be retrieved or if it is constructed through the 
interview process, raising concerns regarding the stability and validity of the data (258). 
Kvale provides a metaphor to understand this distinction and describe two different types 
of interviewer. The first interviewer acts like a miner that “unearths” knowledge from the 
respondent as if it was a mineral ore from inside a mine. It assumes knowledge is hidden 
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inside the subject of research “unpolluted” by leading questions. In the second, the 
interviewer acts like a traveller on a journey exploring new territory and engaging in 
conversations with subjects about their own world, to produce an account in the form of 
reconstructed stories (259). In this study, guided by subtle realism, in-depth interviews 
were used both to elicit respondents’ views and opinions on the topics discussed, but also 
to elicit knowledge about how the aid system worked and description about events that 
had taken place (such as meetings during the policy dialogue). Using Kvale’s terminology, 
this may be viewed as the interviewer travelling inside a mine with the subject. 
In-depth interviews were undertaken during the actual field work with health sector 
stakeholders to explore their perceptions of how the aid effectiveness agenda had been 
implemented in the Tanzanian health sector, including what the agenda (and its principles) 
meant to them, how they felt they should be measured, and to explore whether they felt 
aid effectiveness principles had been achieved and why/why not. In addition, in-depth 
interviews were used to explore relationships and incentives of the individuals interviewed 
and their organisations. 
Development of the interview tool 
The findings from the preliminary fieldwork visit were used to design the interview tool 
used to guide discussion in the in-depth interviews (see Appendix B). Preliminary findings 
from the quantitative data, document review, non-participant observation and informal 
conversations also fed into the design of the interview tool (interviews did not take place 
until six months into the fieldwork period).  
Two principles were taken into account when designing the interview tool: structure and 
flexibility (231). The tool was semi-structured. It started with ice-breaker questions on the 
role of the participant and their organisation, which were followed by open questions on 
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the aid effectiveness agenda, the SWAP and choice of modality, priorities and relationships. 
The tool had a set of probing questions under each of these topics to achieve depth (see 
Appendix B) (231). The extent of probing and structure in the interview varied according to 
the interviewee. Probing questions were only used if the participant was unclear about the 
meaning of the questions or to guide discussion if responses were not elaborate.  
The open nature of the questions allowed flexibility for the participant to bring in new 
themes. Care was taken to allow for these new themes to emerge. The key informant 
interviews conducted during the preliminary visit also acted as a pilot, where I reflected 
upon my interviewing style. I further listened to the recordings of interviews to try to 
improve my interviewing technique during the period when the interviews took place. For 
instance, in the initial interviews the manner of interviewing appeared rigid. However, 
upon reflection the interview technique became much more flexible, with fewer or no 
interruptions, to allow the interview to flow more naturally, rather than be concerned 
about whether all the topics in the interview guide were covered. 
Sampling 
Initially, interviewees were sampled purposefully to represent all the main actors active in 
the health sector and engaged in the health SWAP dialogue. Further participants were 
identified by using snowballing, until saturation was reached. Through this technique, two 
further stakeholder groups were identified: the Prime Minister’s Office for Regional 
Administration and Local Government and civil society. Four key informants from the 
preparatory visit were identified as meeting the inclusion criteria and were therefore re-
interviewed as shown below. Whilst this may have facilitated data collection, since these 
stakeholders were known and had already demonstrated a willingness to participate in the 
study, re-interviewing key informants as part of the in-depth interviews may have 
influenced the outcome of the interviews, as the key informants had provided input into 
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who the key stakeholders were (a criteria which they themselves met) and which questions 
were included in the interview guide, questions which they themselves subsequently 
answered (and may have therefore been better at answering). The preparatory visit 
revealed the importance of going beyond national level stakeholders (only carried out 
previously by Sundewall in Zambia (260)).  As a result one sample regional health team and 
two district health teams within it were chosen purposively (based on geographic access 
and where there were pre-existing research contacts). At the regional and district level, the 
criteria for selecting respondents were those who participated in health planning and 
reporting exercises (the sample included members from all ranks, from regional and district 
medical officers to health workers).  
Stakeholder access was greatly facilitated by being based at a local research institute 
(Ifakara Health Institute) and through the contacts of JB, who is an established researcher 
in Tanzania. No reward was offered for participating in the interview. However, one 
participant from a district asked to have a “tea”24 before the interview. I do not believe 
this made any difference to the amount or validity of the data generated as part of this 
interview. The lack of reward in exchange for the interview meant one district-level 
stakeholder refused to participate. They were quite new to the post, so it is hoped that no 
important information was lost through their refusal. They did, however, have significant 
experience at the national level. Therefore, other national level respondents were included 
in the sample (current and past employees). 
In total, 22 in-depth interviews were conducted with representatives from the MoHSW, the 
PMO-RALG, regional and council health management teams, civil society and DPs (see table 
3.4). 
  
                                                          
24 Tea can be used to refer to an actual cup of tea or a meal; in this case it was the latter 
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Table 3.4: Key informant and in-depth interview participants  
Stakeholder type Key Informant Interviews 
June 2011 
In-depth interviews 
April-July 2012 
Government   
Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare 
2 3 
Prime Minister’s Office-Regional 
Administration and Local 
Government  
 1 
Regional Health Management 
Team 
 3 
Council Health Management Team  5 
Total Government 2 12 
Development Partner   
Bi-lateral 4 5 
Multi-lateral  2 
Total DP 4 7 
Non-government   
Civil Society 2 1 
Technical Assistants 2 2 
Consultants / Academics 2  
Total Non-government 6 3 
Total Interviews 12 22 
The interviews 
This section describes how the interviews were conducted. In-depth interviews were 
conducted between April and July 2012. They were conduced face-to-face to facilitate 
interaction between researcher and interviewee (231), in English and lasted for about an 
hour. Ritchie and Lewis define interviews as a conversation, with varying degrees of 
structure and “activeness” from the interviewer (231). In this study the amount of direction 
and structure in the interviews depended on the behaviour of the respondent. For some 
respondents, introductory questions such as “What changes have you observed since you 
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have worked in your role?” would elicit a response that would cover most of the points in 
the topic guide, and would only require some further probing questions for further 
explanations of some statements. My attitude in these interviews was more relaxed, 
although I tried to avoid stepping outside of my role as asker of questions to express my 
own opinions (such as is sometimes done in feminist approaches (231)). This was in order 
to avoid as much as possible influencing the outcome of the interview. It was not always 
easy to do, however, as respondents often asked for my views on the topics discussed. 
Going through interview transcripts and notes helped provide neutral answers to these 
questions, but this was something that I improved at as the fieldwork went on and I 
learned from conducting the interviews.  
Some respondents, particularly some representatives from the government, were 
noticeably less at ease during interviews. In these cases, I played a more active role, asking 
questions more precisely and answering their frequent requests of clarification of the aims 
of the research or of a particular question. One respondent was particularly difficult to 
interview and spent considerable time during the interview answering phones and talking 
to colleagues who interrupted the interview. It was very difficult to obtain answers, 
although the notes from the interview contained important information. In addition, 
several steps were taken to compensate for this: non-participant observation revealed 
some of this person’s attitudes and opinions, the sample size from the respondent’s 
stakeholder group was extended to improve the inclusiveness of the sample, and themes 
that were deemed important from the interview notes were followed up with other 
stakeholders in subsequent interviews. Although at the time this interview was rather 
frustrating, upon reflection it appeared to convey some of the power relations that were at 
play and that were later described by DPs. The respondent did not want to disclose much 
information, but rather than say no to the interview upfront, they agreed to it, then made 
it very difficult to obtain information from them by asking me to come in at a time that was 
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very busy and prioritising phone calls and colleagues over the interview. In this way they 
had participated in the study, but had no contributed much information to it. This was the 
most extreme example, however, and the majority of respondents were open, frank and 
generous with their time.  
On two separate occasions, the interviewee asked for a more junior colleague to be 
present during the interview. This was granted with different results. On one occasion the 
colleague greatly contributed by correcting several inaccuracies of the account of 
processes. On the other occasion the colleague made the discussion more difficult by 
interjecting and disagreeing. However, overall the interview was enriched by their 
contributions and the debates ensuing from their objections, despite the actual interview 
being harder to conduct. 
Where the participants agreed, interviews were recorded and transcribed. Transcription 
was sub-contracted out to a trusted person. In order to assure quality and to familiarise 
myself with the data, I went through every transcript to ensure it matched the recording. 
The transcriptionist was based in the United States, which meant transcription was done 
overnight and transcripts readily available for review the day after the interview. Where 
participants did not agree to being recorded, notes were taken during the interview and 
typed up straight away. Some national participants (particularly from the government) did 
not agree to be recorded or quoted (in total only 11 interviews were recorded). This had an 
impact on the accuracy of my account of the results. To increase the representation of 
national voices in the account of results, the sample size from the government was 
increased. Their views are also presented in the narrative and in the absence of quotes.  
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3.3.2 Data analysis 
Qualitative analysis takes place through a process in which analytical categories are 
developed to describe and explain the data (261). This process can be undertaken 
deductively, by applying a set of pre-determined categories to the data, or inductively, 
where categories “emerge” from the data  (262). When considering the type analysis that 
would be most suitable for this study, several factors were taken into consideration, 
including the fact that this was a mixed methods study that bridges across disciplines, takes 
a subtle realist epistemological perspective and needs a flexible approach to data analysis, 
given the different purposes for which qualitative data were generated, meaning both 
inductive and deductive approaches were needed. 
The framework approach (231) was found to be the most appropriate method of analysis. 
Framework analysis is a method for policy research developed by the UK National Centre 
for Social Research25 that has become increasingly popular in health research (263). 
Framework approach allows for systematic analysis of data with enough flexibility to 
accommodate different epistemological positions, inductive and deductive approaches, 
and has recently been recommended for multi-disciplinary mixed methods research (263). 
Despite framework analysis being usually associated with deductive approaches to coding 
(261), it has recently been argued that it also allows for inductive coding (263). The 
framework approach involves five steps of data analysis: familiarisation with the data, 
development of an analytical framework, indexing, charting and mapping and 
interpretation (231, 261). This section describes how each of these steps was carried out.  
 
 
                                                          
25 http://www.natcen.ac.uk/  
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Familiarisation with the data 
The first step of analysis involved familiarisation with the data; this allowed for immersion 
within the data to get an initial feel for the main themes of the study. Familiarisation with 
the data was done in different ways. Although interview transcription was contracted out, 
one interview was transcribed to understand the process involved. In addition, once all the 
transcripts were received, each one was read whilst listening to the interview recording. 
Finally, field notes and notes from observation of meetings and interviews that were not 
transcribed were also read through.  
Development of an analytical framework 
An analytical framework is a list of the key issues, concepts and themes that can then be 
applied to index the whole data set (261). The analytical framework used here was 
developed through a process known as coding. A code is a conceptual label applied to a 
data excerpt (263). The process of developing an analytical framework involves creating a 
list of codes, which can subsequently be grouped into a coding tree of themes. A mix of 
deductive and inductive approaches was used here, depending on the purpose for which 
the data was analysed.  
An initial analytical framework was developed from the topic guide and literature review. 
This already contained the five principles of the aid effectiveness agenda (ownership, 
alignment, harmonisation, results and accountability). Six transcripts were then chosen at 
random and coded inductively by reading them line-by-line and identify emerging codes 
from the data. The analytical framework was then modified to incorporate new codes that 
arose from this exercise. An example of a theme that emerged from the data was 
“dialogue”, which respondents often referred to when discussing the relationships 
between the government and DPs.  
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Codes were grouped into broader themes and sub-themes into a coding tree (shown in 
Appendix C). Each theme had a number of sub-themes, for example the theme 
“accountability” had ten sub-themes, including “accountability processes” and 
“consequences/enforcing accountability”. In addition, each theme had a sub-theme named 
“other” to allow for new sub-themes to emerge during the analysis of the whole data set. 
The development of the analytical framework was undertaken by highlighting text and 
writing notes manually, without the use of any Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis 
Software (CAQDAS). 
Indexing 
The analytical framework was applied to label all of the data, including interview 
transcripts, notes from meetings and interviews, and documents; a process known as 
indexing. Sometimes a single data excerpt was allocated multiple indices. For instance, the 
same extract for a respondent describing whether a particular aid effectiveness principle 
had been met, such alignment, was coded as a definition for how the particular respondent 
defined that principle. The NVIVO CAQDAS software was used to do this. During this 
process, the analytical framework was refined by periodically checking the “other” category 
for each theme, and incorporating themes that re-occurred frequently.  In this way, several 
iterations of indexing took place, until no themes arose and all of the data had been 
indexed. 
Charting 
The next step was to explore and re-categorise codes into broader themes or categories. To 
do this, the coded data were charted into a “framework matrix” using NVIVO. Framework 
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matrices are essentially tables plotting cases26 (rows) against themes (columns).  Each cell 
then contains the data corresponding to a particular case for each of the themes. Rather 
than using the original data, however, in this study the content of each cell was 
summarised.  This step is important not only to synthesise the amount of data, but also to 
gain a deeper understanding of the data. There is a danger at this point of over-
summarising and thereby losing some of the meaning of the data (263). To avoid this, there 
was constant cross-checking between the data and the summarised categories. When a cell 
contained an interesting quote, an asterisk was added to the description for ease of finding 
the original source in later stages of the analysis and in writing. One matrix framework was 
created for every key theme (a “thematic matrix”), where the columns were the sub-
themes falling under the particular theme. This is a key step in the framework approach, as 
having thematic matrices allows for the movement between themes and across cases, 
facilitating subsequent understanding and interpretation of the data (231, 263). 
Mapping and interpretation 
In this final step of data analysis the thematic matrices were used to define, classify and 
categorise concepts, map different phenomena and identify relationships between 
different themes to provide explanatory accounts of the findings (261). To do this, several 
steps were undertaken, following the methodology described by Ritchie and Lewis (2003) 
(231).  
Before this process began, the thematic matrices were extracted to Excel for ease of use, 
and explored by reading each theme and sub-theme moving across different cases to 
identify different concepts. A different Excel file was created for each theme, with 
individual sheets for each of the sub-themes (a cell of the framework matrix). Each sheet 
                                                          
26 A case is a unit of analysis. In this study a case was defined as an individual interview, meeting or 
document. 
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contained a matrix with three columns (the rows were still the cases). The first column 
contained the synthesised content for the relevant sub-theme. After reading through the 
content of each sub-theme, different elements were identified and entered into the second 
column. Reading through these, in turn, allowed for broader categories to be generated 
(see Appendix D for an example). Categories were broad and reached across thematic 
charts, encompassing different elements and sub-themes. During this process of 
categorisation the original data were often re-visited to ensure the categories and 
elements were representative of data they were based on. Categories were reviewed and 
classified into broader categories.  
The final part of the analysis involved mapping and interpretation to explore the 
relationships between concepts and the categories generated. This was done in two steps. 
First, linkages between different phenomena were identified, and phenomena were 
classified into different sub-groups. This was done by reading through the thematic 
matrices and the elements and the categories generated. Hypotheses of linkages between 
phenomena were tested across the whole dataset by going back to individual thematic 
charts, by reading across data by each individual cases or case sub-groups. For example, 
phenomena were found to vary according to the interview respondent, so respondents 
were classified into three stakeholder sub-groups (DP, government and non-government); 
also, the indicators developed to assess the aid effectiveness agenda were classified as 
those derived from this study and those identified from international declarations, as 
important differences were found between the indicators in the two sub-groups. 
Sometimes sub-groups were rejected, for instance it initially seemed that phenomena 
could be separated into SWAP, DP and government. However, this did not apply to all the 
elements of the study, so it was dropped. 
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Finally, explanatory accounts were generated by verifying associations and exploring why 
these associations exist. Sometimes explanations arose from explicit accounts found on the 
data (for instance a direct quote from a respondent), other times, they were derived 
through linkages between phenomena. When searching for explanations, original 
transcripts and synthesised data were reviewed, and potential associations were drawn 
into mind-maps and spider diagrams. When a hypothesis for an explanation was generated, 
it was first tested within a single case, then across cases in the same group and finally 
across cases in different sub-groups (following the constant comparative method described 
by Boeije (2002) (264)). Emerging hypotheses were then contrasted with theory and other 
empirical studies. This sometimes resulted in important changes to the study. For instance, 
it was by moving between the data and theory that this study found that institutional and 
political factors were key in explaining the extent to which the aid effectiveness agenda 
was achieved. This in turn led to the modification of the conceptual framework of the study 
described in Chapter 4, which was initially only based in economic theory, and was later 
altered to incorporate elements from policy analysis. In this way, the broader categories of 
“institutions”, “relationships” and “political context” were derived, as well as sub-
categories including “incentives” and “structural factors”. 
3.3.3 Validity and reliability 
This section describes the steps taken to maximise the validity and reliability of this study. 
Validity is the precision and correctness of the research (231). Hammersley defined it in the 
context of subtle realism as the extent to which an account accurately represent the social 
phenomena to which it refers (265). Two approaches were undertaken to maximise the 
validity of the qualitative results. First, using constant comparative method helped ensure 
the internal validity (228) through testing hypotheses from one part of the data on the 
others. Second, care was taken to represent views from different stakeholders, particularly 
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when these differed. This was done through a process known as deviant case analysis 
(266), which involved exploring cases that both fitted and contradicted emerging patterns 
and explanations. Deviant cases were always reported, and sometimes further explorations 
of their views led to explanatory accounts on themselves. This was the case of one 
particular DP, whose answers consistently disagreed with all the other DPs, and often with 
the government. However, putting their answers together with policy documents and non-
government respondents was pivotal in understanding some important findings of this 
study, such as the different levels of dialogue between DPs and government. 
Reliability refers to the replicability of research findings (216, 231). There are debates in the 
literature regarding the possibility of replicating qualitative work, given its dynamic nature 
and particularly in subtle realism, where the role of the researcher’s interpretations are 
viewed as influencing the results (233). Nevertheless, several steps were taken during 
fieldwork and analysis to maximise the reliability of the study. During fieldwork, careful 
notes were taken during non-participant observation, but also during interviews and 
immediately after any informal conversation relating to the study. Notes were typed up 
immediately (or as soon as was feasibly possible) to ensure accuracy. Each interview 
transcript was reviewed to ensure the accuracy of the transcription. To check the reliability 
of the analytical framework, a transcript was co-coded by a colleague; any disagreements 
were discussed and incorporated into the coding framework where appropriate. Finally, 
care was taken to select a representative sample of actors active in the health SWAP 
dialogue. 
3.4 Ethical considerations 
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the following Institutional Review Boards: 
- London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (UK) (Ref: 6061) 
- Ifakara Health Institute (Tanzania) (Ref: IHI/IRB/No. 22 – 2011) 
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- National Institute of Medical Research (Tanzania) (Ref: NIMR/HQ/R.8a/Vol. 
IX/1468) 
Several steps were taken to ensure the study complied with ethics procedures: 
Informed consent. Consent was obtained from each participant before the interview took 
place. This involved providing them with an information sheet (see Appendix E); where 
possible an electronic version was emailed in advance, although a paper copy was always 
provided at the interview. The purpose of the study and the interview were then discussed, 
as well as a description provided of how the data would be handled. This was followed by 
giving the participant time to ask any questions of clarification and finally the signing of the 
consent form. Some participants felt uneasy about signing the consent form, so some time 
was devoted to explaining its meaning and answer any questions related to it. Some 
participants preferred signing the consent form after the interview was conducted, as they 
felt more comfortable doing so after they knew what questions were asked and how they 
answered them. This option was offered to all. An information sheet was also circulated in 
advance of meeting observations. 
Confidentiality. Quantitative data used consisted of public domestic and external financial 
flows and did not need procedures for confidentiality. Several steps were taken to ensure 
confidentiality of qualitative data. The transcriptionist hired signed a confidentiality 
agreement. All recordings and transcripts were given unique identifier numbers, and 
participants were referred to using only their identifiers. Data were stored in password-
protected computers.  
Anonymity. All quotes reported in the study were anonymised. Where participants gave 
their consent they were identified as belonging to one of two groups: DP or Non-
government. Government participants did not agree to be quoted, and their views were 
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therefore only represented in the narrative. When participants disclosed something they 
were uncomfortable with, this was noted and was not included in the research or was 
quoted as anonymous, according to their preferences. Some of the anonymous quotes also 
belong to government officials. In addition, the findings of the meetings observed were not 
reported directly, but were used to help with the analysis and are incorporated into the 
narrative of the text to ensure the content of what was discussed remained confidential 
(consistent with the information sheet provided). 
Participant discomfort. As this study did not include the discussion of any personal 
subjects, it was not anticipated to cause any participant discomfort. However, participants 
were informed of their right to withdraw from the study at any point during their interview 
or subsequently.  
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4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter describes the theoretical basis underpinning this thesis. It starts by reviewing 
the different frameworks that have been employed to analyse aid institutions and 
relationships. It then describes the two theoretical approaches used in this study to frame 
aid relationships: principal agent theory and policy analysis. The chapter ends with a 
description of how the two approaches are integrated. 
4.1 Introduction 
There are a variety of frameworks that can be used to examine aid institutions and 
relationships, with varied theoretical foundations and underpinning values.  In her work, 
Gulrajani divides the aid effectiveness literature into aid radicals (opponents of aid) and 
reformists (proponents of aid) (267). Aid radicals come from both the left and the right of 
the politico-economic spectrum (Table 4.1). On the left, radicals come from the field of  
critical development management, with key works by Cooke & Dar (268), Ferguson (269) 
and Escobar (270). Their work is influenced by neo-Marxist beliefs and, inspired by the 
work of Foucault, posits that aid justifies the existence of the aid industry and power over 
the South. On the right, radicals follow neo-liberal ideas and believe that aid creates 
dependency and crowds out investment. They propose market-based solutions are more 
conducive to development than aid. Key in this field is the work of the economists Easterly 
(271-272) and Moyo (273).  
Reformists, on the other hand, are optimistic about aid and believe it can be effective if 
delivered in the right way. This literature is dominated by managerial theories based on 
improving efficiency. The global aid effectiveness agenda follows this logic (274), as does 
the work by economists Burnside and Dollar, who argue the effectiveness of aid is 
dependent on the institutional setup, fiscal policies and governance structures of the 
recipient country (275), and Sachs, who has argued that with the right policies and 
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interventions extreme poverty can be eradicated by 2025 (276). Non-managerial reformist 
literature includes the work of Eyben, who analyses aid relationships, power and 
accountability through the use of relationalist frameworks, and frames aid relationships as 
a complex web of interactions, rather than the linear setup assumed by managerial 
reformists (76, 277). 
Table 4.1: Development studies literature on aid effectiveness  
Critical Reformist 
Left Right Managerial Non-managerial 
• Critical 
Development 
Management 
•  Cooke & Dar 
• Free market  
• Easterly 
• Technocratic, efficiency-
based approaches 
• Aid effectiveness agenda 
• Burnside & Dollar  
• Relationalism 
• Eyben 
Sources: Author and (267, 274) 
This thesis is rooted in the reformist literature. It adopts a conceptual framework that 
borrows elements from managerial and non-managerial approaches to frame the aid 
effectiveness agenda and to explore the institutions and relationships present in the 
dialogue between the Government of Tanzania (GoT) and Development Partners (DPs) 
within the Tanzanian health SWAP. Two analytical models are used. The first is rooted in 
the discipline of economics (principle agent theory), and examines the different incentives 
of the different actors of the aid architecture and how the aid effectiveness agenda can be 
framed as an effort to align these. The second analytical model lies in policy analysis, where 
aid relationships and the attainment of the agenda are explored in the context of power 
and the broader political arena in which they take place.  
4.2 The managerialistic model: Principal agent theory 
From an economic perspective, efficient aid is a key aim of aid effectiveness, and the 
agenda can be interpreted as intending to achieve the highest results from aid. Efficient aid 
is commonly defined as that which achieves the highest social welfare for the investments 
115 
 
made. Social welfare is primarily determined as welfare gained by the beneficiaries of the 
services that are funded by development assistance. There are different reasons why aid 
management may not be as efficient as it could be. For instance, the different actors 
involved in the aid system have their own utility function, and reasons for giving aid. In 
addition, these actors interact with one another and form relationships.  
One branch of neo-institutional economics that can be used to assess aid relationships is 
Principal Agent (PA) theory (6). A principal agent situation arises in hierarchical structures, 
where the principal cannot take all the decisions and carry out all the tasks him/herself, 
and therefore delegates tasks to an agent. PA relationships are characterised by incentive 
misalignment and information asymmetries. Incentive misalignment occurs because the 
agent may have different objectives to the principal (278). Information asymmetries arise 
because the agent typically has specialised knowledge, meaning the principal can never 
completely monitor the agent’s performance (278-279). Information asymmetry and 
misaligned incentives can result in inefficiency through moral hazard (if agents carry out 
tasks in a way that advances their own interests over those of the principal) and adverse 
selection (if the agent has information unavailable to the principal and manipulates it 
against the principal’s interest) (6).  
In a PA relationship, the principal bears the costs, but receives the benefits of the task, and 
needs to find a way to motivate the agent to act in a certain way, knowing that agent’s 
actions cannot be fully monitored or enforced (6). In every PA relationship there is 
therefore a (implicit or explicit) contract, where principals negotiate the agents’ rewards, 
knowing that their interests are not in full harmony (280).  
A principal agent framework can be applied to explore aid relationships, both between DPs 
and recipient governments (macro-institutional) and within DP and government agencies 
(micro-institutional). Indeed, there are many PA relationships between the different actors 
116 
 
involved in the aid architecture in Tanzania, such as the relationship between DP 
headquarters and national offices. This is further complicated by the fact that there are 
multiple principals and agents with multiple objectives (6). Figure 4.1 shows a simplified 
schematic representation of the actors present in the aid system in Tanzania, and potential 
PA relationships between them, based on the theoretical framework developed by Martens 
et al (6).  
Figure 4.1: Principal agent relationships in the aid system27 
 
For this study, aid relationships are classified into two distinct chains of relationships, which 
are then assessed to determine the extent and nature of any contractual relationships: 
(1) DP-GoT-Beneficiaries (macro-institutional). In a straightforward PA relationship the 
funder of a good or service and beneficiary would be the same (in this case the 
Tanzanian population would pay for and receive health services). However, in a health 
sector with a high level of development assistance, the GoT acts as an agent of both 
domestic beneficiaries and DPs, who share the role of principal. There may be 
information asymmetries between both principals (DPs and domestic beneficiaries) 
                                                          
27 Acronyms: Development Partner Headquarters (DP HQ), Development Partner national office 
(DPnat), Government of Tanzania (GoT), P (Principal) and A (Agent). 
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and the agent (GoT); and a complex asymmetry of information if both agents have no 
route of direct information sharing between them.  DPs may have their own incentives 
and reasons for giving aid, which may differ from the domestic beneficiaries’. This may 
result in incentive misalignment between the two principals. For example, bi-lateral 
DPs are in a sense also agents ultimately financed by taxpayers in developed countries 
(who therefore act as principals), and multi-laterals are financed by multiple funders 
(and therefore have multiple principals). This is further complicated by the fact that 
there is a multiplicity of DPs present in the Tanzanian health sector, who may have 
diverse objectives. The agent (GoT) may also have incentives that are not in line with 
either principal; in particular it may act as an agent for other principals (such as local 
elites), may have other political and civil service objectives to achieve and may not 
always fully act in the interests of the social welfare of its beneficiaries.  
(2) DP headquarters-DP national office-GoT (micro-institutional). Both the principal (DPs) 
and the agent (GoT) have hierarchical PA relationships within their organisations. 
Within the GoT, there are several hierarchical structures and delegation between 
employees, which also give rise to PA situations. For example, between the head of a 
department of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare and his/her employees. 
Similarly, DPs also have hierarchical structures resulting in PA relationships, in 
particular the interests of headquarters and national offices may also be misaligned. 
Principal-agent frameworks have been previously applied to understand aid relationships. 
The core of this literature has taken a macro-institutional perspective, examining 
conditionality contracts between DPs as principals and recipient government as agents 
(281-282). Oliveira-Cruz and McPake for instance, consider that the SWAP or GBS are 
themselves are a contract and subject to PA relationships, where DPs agree to give funds if 
recipient governments undertake specific processes or achieve specified outcomes or 
outputs (281). They found that performance targets were often poorly defined and the 
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system to penalise bad performance was not applied by DPs, something the authors 
conclude is a result of DP’s skewed objectives to disburse funds (281). These findings have 
been corroborated in two micro-institutional studies, analysing incentives to disburse in the 
World Bank (179) and analysing the relationships between DPs, consultants and the 
government in Ghana (82). Both these studies found DP incentives deterred them from 
using their power to enforce the “aid contract”. Despite these studies, PA theory in the 
context of micro-institutional relationships has received relatively little attention in the 
literature. Martens et al. provide a theoretical model to analyse the whole “aid-giving” 
chain (6), which has been further developed into a conceptual framework proposed to 
analyse incentive problems faced by the US Agency for International Development (283), 
and to study the incentives involved in a hydropower station project funded by the Swedish 
International Development cooperation Agency in Zambia, where the author finds recipient 
incentives are not conducive to country ownership (73).  
The literature up to now has delineated incentive problems that may hinder aid 
relationships, with some studies pointing to the incentive problems that may undermine 
the aid effectiveness agenda (38). This study extends this and is the first time PA theory is 
applied to understanding the global aid effectiveness agenda at the country level, assessing 
both macro- and micro-institutional factors.  
In this study, the principles of the aid effectiveness agenda are viewed as a recognition that 
the complex structure of development assistance requires explicit efforts to align 
incentives and improve information flows between shared principals and their agents 
(Table 4.2). In addition, it is posited that the aid effectiveness agenda may lower 
transaction costs. Transaction costs are defined as the costs of negotiating, establishing and 
enforcing a contract (284), and are believed to lower the efficiency of aid by adding cost to 
aid management but providing no benefit to aid delivery (131). The aid effectiveness 
agenda can therefore be seen as an approach to enforce the “aid contract” by improving 
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incentive alignment, sharing of information and reducing transaction costs. Country 
ownership and managing for results are formal efforts that can help align incentives of DPs 
and beneficiaries, as well as those of the DPs and GoT as principal and agent. 
Harmonisation aims to align incentives of the multiple DPs. Harmonisation and alignment 
can also reduce transaction costs by improving information sharing amongst DPs 
(harmonisation) and between DPs and recipient government (alignment to government 
financial systems). Finally, mutual accountability and ownership facilitate sharing of 
information during the dialogue, as well as set out conditions to enforce the contract. 
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Table 4.2: Global aid effectiveness agenda principles enforcing of the “aid contract” 
Principle  Definition28 Incentives  Information  
Transaction 
costs  
Ownership  Partner countries 
exercise effective 
leadership over 
their development 
policies, and 
strategies and co-
ordinate 
development 
actions  
Align incentives 
of DP with 
beneficiaries 
(principal) 
Align incentives 
of principals with 
the agent (GoT)  
  
Alignment  DPs base their 
overall support on 
partner countries’ 
national 
development 
strategies, 
institutions and 
procedures  
 Joint systems 
can result in 
equal access 
to information  
Reduction in 
transaction 
costs due to 
use of 
shared 
systems  
Harmonisation  DPs’ actions are 
more harmonised, 
transparent and 
collectively 
effective  
Align incentives 
of DPs (multiple 
principals)  
DPs share 
information 
on their 
activities  
Lower 
transaction 
costs as GoT 
only speaks 
to a 
representativ
e of DPs  
Managing for 
results  
Managing 
resources and 
improving 
decision-making 
for results  
Align incentives 
of DP with 
beneficiaries 
(principal) and of 
principals with 
the agent (GoT), 
by providing 
common goals  
Measuring 
results 
provides 
information 
on what is 
achieved  
 
Accountability  DPs and partners 
are accountable for 
development 
results  
 Improves 
availability of 
information 
through the 
dialogue  
 
 
                                                          
28 Definitions taken from the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) 
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However, while the aid effectiveness can be viewed as an explicit attempt to in part 
address some of the risks of complex principal agent relationships, it also can itself be 
undermined by the very same issues highlighted in principal agent theory. For example, 
understanding the degree of information asymmetry and incentive alignment between 
different actors involved in development assistance may help explain why or why not the 
principles of aid effectiveness are adhered to.  
This study therefore uses the PA framework outlined here to assess the incentives of both 
the institutions and the individuals involved in the health SWAP and to explore the ability 
of principals to enforce the “aid contract”. The study then assesses whether the aid 
effectiveness agenda is an appropriate vehicle to address the extent of inefficiency caused 
by weak ‘principal agent’ aid relationships. It should be noted, that as the study was 
conducted in Tanzania, the funder-DP HQ relationship was not assessed. Further, it was not 
feasible to assess GoT-beneficiary relationships; these have therefore also been excluded 
from the analysis.  
4.3 The non-managerialistic model: power and political context  
PA theory implies a contract can be drawn to regulate the relationship between the 
principal and the agent, within a legal framework and enforceable by a “benevolent” court 
of justice (278) and thus is viewed by some in being a limited framework for the analysis of 
aid relationships. In their study of aid contracts, Azam & Laffont make the assumption that 
the existence of some  “benevolent” court of justice  implies DPs have the power to hold 
the government to account (285). However, there have been some concerns in the 
economic literature regarding the contractual nature of aid relationships. For instance, 
Mursheed highlights that given that there are multiple principals with different incentives, 
no one principal can succeed in offering the government – as an agent – incentives to carry 
out their task (286). Moreover, it may be in the interest of both principal and agent that aid 
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is effective, requiring cooperative behaviour for which it would be difficult to design a 
contract (286). In addition, non-managerial writers, such as Eyben, have highlighted that if 
aid is seen as a gift, resulting from solidarity, human rights and justice, then defining the 
DP-recipient relationship as purely contractual may be restrictive and may not encompass 
the perspective of aid as “transformative solidarity” or of “oppressive adverse 
incorporation into an unfair world” (287). Therefore a strict application of the PA theory to 
aid effectiveness may be considered reductionist.  
This study therefore supplements the PA analysis with a policy analysis to help explore 
whether and how relationships are more complex than would be assumed by a 
straightforward PA framework, both in terms of the number actors active in the health 
sector (although not necessarily present in the dialogue) and how they interact with each 
other.  
Policy analysis can be used to study the process of policy-making, and there have been calls 
to increase its use in the health sector, in particular to explore the (often neglected) 
political nature of decision-making and health sector reform (288-289). Policy analysis in 
the health sector has been conducted using different frameworks. In their seminal paper, 
Walt and Gilson (1994) argued for the use of a comprehensive framework for analysing the 
context, actors and process of policy-making, as well as the content of reforms in the 
health sector (290). In a review of the political determinants of HIV/AIDS policy, Dickinson 
and Buse (2008) used a framework based on institutions (defined as organisations), ideas 
(including arguments and evidence) and the interests and political incentives of 
stakeholders (288). At the same time, Buse (2008) has argued for the benefits of 
conducting prospective policy analysis, which allows for “immediate lesson-learning”, 
facilitating the incorporation of proposed strategies into the policy process (289). To allow 
for this, he developed a framework based on previous literature, consisting of four 
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dimensions: context (including the factors that influence policy change, such as situational, 
structural and cultural factors (based on (291)), formal and informal processes of decision-
making (based on (292)), the players affected by the proposed interventions, and the 
power of different stakeholders (based on (293)).  
Very few studies have been undertaken a policy analysis to study the application of the aid 
effectiveness agenda in the health sector. Shiffman (2009) developed a framework based 
on policy communities (defined as networks of individuals and organisations), ideas and 
institutions (defined as both organisational entities and a set of “rules, norms and 
strategies” (294)) to explore why certain issues gain importance in the global health 
agenda. This was taken further by Dodd and Olive (2011), who used a policy networks 
framework to assess aid effectiveness in the health sector in Vietnam (100). They do so by 
framing the aid effectiveness agenda as a policy community itself, with actors that interact 
in formal and informal networks, a knowledge base and a set of norms (such as the Paris 
Declaration) (100). Based on this, they frame the aid effectiveness agenda as a player 
rather than a referee, “competing with other policy communities for influence, resources 
and institutional space in the governance of health policy” (100). They suggest this 
framework helps in understanding the complexity of aid relationships (100).  
The view of Dodd and Olive is rejected here, in favour of Eyben’s view of the aid 
effectiveness agenda as an attempt to shift power from aid givers to recipients (287). In this 
way, the aid effectiveness agenda is framed as an approach to aid management that is 
based as a set of rules that guide aid relationships. To explore aid relationships operating 
under this set of rules, a framework influenced by the policy analysis proposed by Buse 
(289) and Walt and Gilson (290) has been developed. This framework consists of three 
dimensions: actors, power and context.  
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One of Eyben’s criticisms of the PA approach is that it assumes there are only two parties 
involved in each  aid relationship, where in reality there many other actors involved or 
influencing aid relationships (277). The first dimension of the framework adopted for this 
study therefore involves mapping all the actors active in the health sector, including, but 
not restricted to, those participating in the health SWAP dialogue (and therefore those 
included in the “aid contract”). 
The second dimension involves an exploration of the power dynamics of the relationships 
between the identified actors. To explore power dynamics, it is important to define what is 
meant by power and how it can be exerted. Different definitions of power have been put 
forward in the literature in the context of aid relationships. In his study of power relations 
in the context of the Paris Declaration, Hyden defines “power to” as an ability to do 
something, under the assumption that there is consensus to achieve a global agenda (295). 
However, in the absence of political consensus, where different actors have different 
preferences and varying degrees of influence (as is the case in the Tanzanian health sector), 
it is more useful to define power as “power over”, i.e. the ability of an actor to get another 
actor to act in a way it would not have otherwise done (296). In his study of how the SWAP 
has influenced decentralisation processes in Uganda, Jeppsson uses a power framework 
based on Foucault (297), defining power as a complex, fluid and impermanent concept, 
intertwined with knowledge and highly dependent on context (298). In terms of how power 
is exerted, Lukes identified three dimensions: power as decision making (who decides what 
policies are adopted, based on earlier work by Dahl (299)), non-decision making 
(stakeholders  keeping items off political agendas) and thought control (influencing others 
by shaping their preferences) (300). Based on these three dimensions, Gaventa designed a 
framework for analysing how power is exerted (301). Part of this framework describes 
power as being visible, hidden and invisible. Visible power can be observed through 
decision-making mechanisms, in which there are winners and losers, hidden power can be 
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exerted by setting the agenda behind the scenes and invisible power involves social 
conditioning and ideology (301).  
A modest approach is taken to explore power in the study. Informed by Gaventa’s (301) 
and Buse’s (289) frameworks, power dynamics are analysed through the formal and 
informal processes of decision-making. This is mainly done through visible mechanisms, but 
some investigation of hidden and invisible power is also conducted. 
The final dimension is the political context. Aid relationships do not take place in a political 
vacuum. Walt and Gilson (1994) identified both a changing development and health 
context as influencing health sector reform (290). Different political processes may affect 
aid relationships, including elections and changes in the positioning of global actors. 
However, given that this study is undertaken from the perspective of Tanzania, the scope 
of the analysis of the political context is limited to the political situation of Tanzania, and 
that of DP headquarters, which may influence the implementation of the aid effectiveness 
agenda at the country level. 
4.4 Integrating managerialistic (economic) and non-managerialistic (policy) models 
The theoretical models described thus far underpin the thesis and place the thesis within 
the broader development, micro-economic and political literature. The last piece of 
analysis of this thesis draws on the analysis of the institutional and individual factors 
influencing the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda (Chapter 9). For this part of 
the analysis, the managerialistic and non-managerialistic approaches are integrated into 
the conceptual framework.  
Some of the works referenced earlier advocate for this approach; for instance Eyben 
herself acknowledges that aid practitioners’ behaviour shows both substantialist and 
relationalist characteristics (287). Further, Buse recommends undertaking an eclectic 
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approach to policy analysis, and advocates for political economy factors to be given more 
importance, particularly in assessments of the health sector (289).  
One way to explore both how institutional and individual factors influence the aid 
effectiveness agenda is through a stakeholder analysis. Stakeholder analysis is “a 
systematic way of analyzing the relevant groups and individuals inside and outside 
government who might influence the process of policy choice” (293). It is essentially a tool 
to generate data about actor behaviour, interests and relationships, as well as their 
influence on decision-making and implementation processes (302), and has been labelled 
as the most recommended tool for analysing the political dimensions of health sector 
reform (303).  
Therefore, to explore the aid relationships of the Tanzanian health sector, a stakeholder 
analysis was undertaken, adapting Roberts et al.’s methodology (304), as described by 
Gilson et al. (303). This was done in four steps: 
1. Mapping all the stakeholders who influence the aid dialogue, both from inside and 
outside of Tanzania 
2. Identifying the incentives of stakeholders, both at the micro (employee) and macro 
(organisation) institutional levels 
3. Exploring the power dynamics between these stakeholders with the aim of 
determining the extent that the relationship is contractual 
4. Understanding the political context within which the aid effectiveness agenda is 
implemented and relationships and dialogue take place 
The stakeholder analysis was undertaken through in-depth interviews, non-participant 
observation and document review as described in Chapter 3. The results from this analysis 
are reported in Chapter 9.  
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5 THE TANZANIAN HEALTH SECTOR 
This chapter addresses the first objective of the thesis and describes the Tanzanian health 
sector landscape by providing an outline of the health profile, health system organisation, 
actors, financing and management procedures, including a description of Sector Wide 
Approach (SWAP) dialogue and coordination mechanisms. 
5.1 Health profile 
Despite receiving large sums of Development Assistance for Health (DAH), and significant 
health sector reforms over the past decade, Tanzania’s health indicators show mixed 
progress. World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates of life expectancy are 58 for males 
and 61 for females (305). Communicable diseases are the main cause of mortality, 
accounting for 78% of deaths, followed by non-communicable diseases (13%) and injuries 
(8%) (305). Within the main communicable diseases, the incidence of malaria is 22,681 per 
100,000 population, the HIV prevalence rate in the population aged 15-49 is 3383 per 
100,000 population and the prevalence of tuberculosis is 177 per 100,000 population (305). 
The HIV prevalence rates in the population aged 15-49 have decreased from 6% in 2006 to 
5.8% in 2011. In terms of risk factors for non-communicable diseases, 8.3% of men and 
8.5% of women have raised blood glucose, 36.2% of men and 33.9% of women have raised 
blood pressure and 4% of men and 6.8% of women are obese (305). Under five mortality 
has decreased from 143 to 68 per 1000 live births in the last 15 years (305). Maternal 
mortality was 460 per 100,000 live births in 2010, which is high, although below the 
regional average of 480 (305); however, there are signs that it also has started to decline 
(306). Table 5.1 below shows the figures of key health indicators available for the time 
period of study.   
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Table 5.1: Tanzanian population health indicators  
Indicator/Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Age-standardized mortality rate by cause (ages 30-70, per 100 
000 population) - All causes29 
      1733     
Age-standardized mortality rate by cause (ages 30-70, per 100 
000 population) – Cancer31 
      113     
Age-standardized mortality rate by cause (ages 30-70, per 100 
000 population) - Cardiovascular disease and diabetes31 
      341     
Age-standardized mortality rate by cause (ages 30-70, per 100 
000 population) - Chronic respiratory conditions31 
      86     
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100 000 live births)31    610     460   
Malaria - number of reported deaths31 815 15251 19859 18322 20962 12593 12434 16776 15867 11806 7820 
Deaths due to HIV/AIDS (per 100 000 population) 31           167 
Prevalence of HIV among adults aged 15 to 49 (%)31     6.0     5.1  
Under Five mortality rate 30    112   91  81   
 
                                                          
29 Source: WHO United Republic of Tanzania Statistics Summary (available from http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.country.country-TZA) 
30 http://hdptz.esealtd.com/fileadmin/documents/Basket_Documents_2011/Health_Sector_Performance_Profile_Report_2010.pdf  
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5.2 The Tanzanian health system 
The government is the main provider of health services in Tanzania, owning 74% of all 
health care facilities in 2013 (307). The health sector is made up of health centres, 
dispensaries, and district, regional, zonal, specialised and national hospitals. Other 
providers include the private sector and Faith-based providers, which own 14% and 12% of 
all health care facilities respectively31 (307). The Tanzanian health system suffers from 
acute staff shortages, with only 35% of health posts filled by a qualified health worker 
reported in 2009 (308). The number of physicians per 10,000 population in 2005 was 0.5 in 
2012 (compared to a regional32 average of 2.5) and of nurses and midwives was 2.4 (well 
below the regional average of 9.1) in 2010 (305). 
In terms of health service utilisation, according to the WHO 49% of births are attended by 
skilled birth personnel in 2010, 93% of one-year-olds are vaccinated against measles and 
the treatment success for smear-positive tuberculosis is 90% (305). In addition, 
immunisation coverage was at 75%, HIV testing increased from 6% to 28% of adults, and 
the proportion of households who own an insecticide treated net has increased from 23% 
in 2004 to 64% in 2010 (306). 
5.3 Health policy 
Tanzania has a Poverty Reduction Strategy known as MKUKUTA and a development 
strategy known as Vision 2025. These are implemented through successive Five Year 
Development Plans. All sector policies fall within these overarching strategies and are 
summarised in Table 5.2 below. 
  
                                                          
31 Faith-based providers receive subsidies from the Government, whereas private providers are self-
financing 
32 WHO Africa region 
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Table 5.2: Tanzanian health programmes, Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) and 
policies 
Year Policy 
1990-2002 National Health Policy 
2003-2006 National Health Policy 
2007-Present National Health Policy 
1999-2002 Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP) I 
2003-2008 HSSP II 
2009-2015 HSSP III 
1994 Local Government Reform Programme (Decentralisation by devolution) 
2007-2017 MMAM – Primary health services development programme   
2008-2013 Human Resource for Health Strategic Plan 
2006-2010 Tanzania National Health Research Priorities 
2001 National AIDS Policy 
2003-2007 National Multi-Sectoral Strategic Framework on HIV and AIDS 
2008-2012 Second National Multi-Sectoral Strategic Framework on HIV and AIDS 
2013-2017 Third National Multi-Sectoral Strategic Framework on HIV and AIDS 
2008-2013 Health Sector HIV and AIDS strategy II 
2000 National Package of Essential Health Interventions in Tanzania 
2004-2008 National Adolescent Health and Development Strategy 
2008-2015 
National Road Map Strategic Plan To Accelerate Reduction of Maternal, 
Newborn and Child Deaths in Tanzania 
2002-2006 SWAP Code of Conduct 
2007-Present SWAP Code of Conduct 
2003-2008 Health Basket Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
2008-2015 Health Basket Fund MOU 
Source: HSSP III and author 
Tanzania has had a National Health Policy from 1990, which provides the Government’s 
vision for a healthy society, through the provision of basic, quality health services that are 
affordable and sustainable. The National Health Policy has been periodically updated, with 
its latest version signed in 2007. The National Health Policy is operationalised by the Health 
Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP), of which there have been three spanning the time period of 
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1999-2015 (Table 5.2). The first HSSP, also known as the Programme of Work, was aimed at 
achieving health sector reform and putting systems in place (309). This was followed by the 
HSSP II, which covered the years of 2003-2008, and provided a strategy to ensure health 
service delivery was of a high quality, aimed at achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). The most recent HSSP was adopted in 2009 and will guide the health sector 
until 2015. It is rooted in the goals of the MKUKUTA and the MDGs. The HSSP III is divided 
into 11 strategies and has 42 indicators, which are assessed annually through the health 
sector performance profile report (307). In 2001 the Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF) was introduced by the Ministry of Finance to guide planning and financing of the 
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare for three-year programmes of work (308). 
5.4 Actors 
Actors active in the health SWAP comprise development partners (DPs), government and 
non-government agencies. DPs include bi-lateral, multi-lateral agencies and private 
foundations. Government agencies come from all levels of government: central (Ministry of 
Finance (MoF),  President’s Office Public Service Management (POPSM) and Prime 
Minister’s Office Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG), sector 
(Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW)), regional and district. Non-government 
agencies include Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs), Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Non-
Government Organisations (NGOs) and the private, for profit sector. Table 5.3 below 
describes these agencies and their roles.  
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Table 5.3: Stakeholders in the Tanzanian health sector  
National stakeholder Role 
Ministry of Finance 
(MoF) 
 Decides the overall health budget 
 Channels DP and central government funds to MoHSW and 
PMO-RALG 
Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare 
(MoHSW) 
 Formulates health policies  
 Has technical and regulatory role 
 Hosts the Medical Stores Department, which provides drugs 
and medical supplies to the districts 
 Responsible for national referral hospitals 
 Provides technical supervision to RHMTs and CHMTs 
Prime Minister’s Office 
Regional Administration 
and Local Government 
(PMO-RALG) 
 Ministry for decentralisation. 
 Responsible for providing financing to RHMT and CHMT.  
 Provides financial and administrative supervision to RHMT and 
CHMT 
 Responsible for regional hospitals (through Regional 
Administrative Secretary) 
Regional Health 
Management Team 
(RHMT) 
 Headed by the Regional Medical Officer 
 Supervises, advices and monitors implementation of activities 
according to allocated planning at the council level 
Council Health 
Management Team 
(CHMT) 
 Headed by the District Medical Officer 
 Have ultimate responsibility for providing health services and 
supervising facilities 
 Carry out planning, budgeting and monitoring and evaluation 
of comprehensive council health plans (containing annual 
budgets and activities for the district in the health sector) 
Council Health Service 
Boards 
 Ensure the delivery of health services is appropriate, 
affordable, equitable and efficient 
 Submit health plans and budgets to the CHMT 
Health Facility 
Governing Committees 
 Ensure health services meet quality standards and satisfy 
need of local population 
 Discuss and approve plans, budgets and progress reports 
President’s Office Public 
Service Management 
(POPSM) 
Have responsibility for human resources 
Christian Social Services 
Commission  
Provide social services including health  
Private sector Provide health services  
Civil Society Hold government to account for health resources 
Development partners  Provide funds to government and non-government agencies 
 Participate in government health sector dialogue 
 Provide technical assistance  
 
5.5  Health sector funding management 
Domestic funds are generated through taxation and out of pocket expenditures. External 
funding is provided through a mix of modalities: unmarked General Budget Support (GBS) 
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and earmarked health sector funding in the form of the Health Basket Fund (HBF) to the 
MoF; vertical projects directly with the MoHSW, RHMTs and CHMTs; and off-budget 
through NGOs. 
The health basket fund was established in 1999 as part of the SWAP launch, where six DPs 
(Danida (Denmark), the UK’s Department for International Development, Irish Aid, the 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation and the World Bank) some development partners signed a 
commitment for joint funding (310). It pools un-earmarked funds from the government and 
development partners, and is spent according to the priorities specified in the Health 
Sector Strategic Plan. By year 2008 there were eleven Development Partners contributing 
to the Health Basket Fund with Canada, Germany, Netherlands, the United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) having joined it 
(311). However, for the financial year 2013/14 there were only seven DPs left in the basket 
(Danida, Irish Aid, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, UNFPA, UNICEF, 
World Bank and the Canadian International Development Agency)33. In addition, in 2001 
nine development partners started providing development assistance in the form of 
General Budget Support (GBS).  
The government health budget negotiations involve an annual process in which the MoF 
sets the budget “ceilings” for the sector. This is followed by the development of the budget 
guidelines, where priorities are decided upon, a process to which all ministries active in the 
health sector and DPs can contribute. The CHMT then use these budget guidelines to 
allocate their budget, known as the Comprehensive Council Health Plan (CCHP), which is 
approved by the RHMT and centrally to ensure priorities are in line with national ones.   
                                                          
33 Personal communication 
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Financial resources (GBS and HBF, together with taxation) are then managed at three levels 
within the health sector. The Ministry of Finance (MoF) receives the funding (domestic and 
external) and channels it to the MoHSW, the PMO-RALG and the CHMT. The MoHSW 
provides technical assistance, training and guidelines (but no direct funding) to the 
Regional and Council Health Management Teams (RHMT and CHMT respectively). The 
PMO-RALG provides financing to the RHMT and CHMT to deliver health services, subject to 
the provision of a yearly budget (CCHP), without going through the MoHSW. The CHMTs 
and RHMTs are then responsible for service delivery (through hospitals, health centres and 
dispensaries). The POPSM is in charge of allocating human resources, including those in the 
health sector. 
5.6 The health SWAP  
Development partners and the government have worked under a sector wide approach in 
the health sector since 1998, making it an early adopter of the approach. The aim of the 
SWAP is for DPs and government to work in partnership, in support of the government’s 
national health and financing policies with harmonised procedures. The Tanzanian health 
sector is essentially managed through the SWAP, which consists of dialogue and 
coordination mechanisms (Figure 5.1). The aim of these mechanisms is to increase 
coordination between the government and development partners, increase government 
ownership and support and use country systems (310, 312). The SWAP therefore aims to 
improve efficiency, effectiveness and impact of DAH by strengthening transparency, 
improving predictability and allocation of financing, reducing transaction costs and 
administrative burden and improving coordination (313).  The rest of this section describes 
the different SWAP mechanisms shown in Figure 5.1 below.   
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Figure 5.1: Health sector wide approach structure in Tanzania   
 
Health sector planning and accounting for resource use is done through the policy dialogue, 
shown in red circles in Figure 5.1. DPs, central government (MoHSW, MoF and PMO-RALG), 
Parliament, and non-government agencies (including civil society and the private sector) all 
participate in principle. All of the actors in the SWAP meet twice annually to discuss 
broader policy issues. The core of the sector dialogue happens through the Joint Annual 
Health Sector Review (JAHSR), where health sector priorities are set and accounted for. 
Stakeholders review progress through a technical review and joint field visits, and then set 
milestones and new policies for the coming year in a subsequent policy meeting. The more 
technical decisions are taken through 13 Technical Working Groups (TWGs) that are chaired 
by the MOHSW and meet monthly. 
DPs contributing to the basket fund discuss the allocation, use and reporting of basket 
resources during the Basket Fund Committee (BFC) and audit sub-committee meetings, 
which take place biannually and quarterly respectively, and are attended by both the 
MoHSW and the PMO-RALG. The BFC culminates in the signing of the Side Agreement, 
which takes place every year and outlines how the funds will be used and accounted for. 
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This triggers the disbursement of funds. Other (vertical) development assistance is, in 
theory, coordinated through the TWGs. 
DPs working in the health sector coordinate through three mechanisms: the Development 
Partner Group for Health (DPG-H), the Basket Fund and delegated cooperation (green flag-
shaped boxes in Figure 5.1). The Development Partner Group (DPG) was set up in 2004 with 
the aim of strengthening “development partnership and effectiveness of development 
cooperation” by working with the government of Tanzania and other national stakeholders 
(314). There is a DPG specifically for health, of which 17 bi-lateral and multi-lateral agencies 
are members. The Development Partner Group for Health (DPG-H)34 is a key coordination 
mechanism, where SWAP DPs meet monthly to share information on their plans, prepare 
for meetings and agree on a “common front” before meeting with other actors in the 
SWAP dialogue. DPG-Health is organised through a Troika chairing structure, which involves 
a chairing structure composed of an out-going, present and in-coming chair. The DPG-H 
supports the National Health Policy, Health Sector Strategic Plans and the Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework. DPs active in HIV/AIDS have a similar DPG known as DPG-AIDS. 
Similarly, DPs who contribute to the HBF meet and agree their position before negotiating 
with the government at the BFC. This means that DPs involved in the basket fund have a 
further forum for interaction with the government through the financial dialogue in the 
basket fund committee and the basket audit sub-committee. Finally, delegated cooperation 
is sometimes used to coordinate vertical projects, which involves DPs disbursing funds to 
each other to deliver a project on the ground. Although not always on budget, delegated 
cooperation is included in the SWAP dialogue.  
  
                                                          
34 http://hdptz.esealtd.com/index.php?id=6  
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6 HEALTH FINANCING FLOWS IN TANZANIA 
This chapter presents the results of the second objective of this thesis and describes 
domestic and external health financing flows in Tanzania during the time period of 2000-
2010, corresponding with the methods outlined on pages 71-92. Results are presented in 
several parts. The chapter begins by making the case of the importance of assessing DAH 
financing trends from the perspective of the recipient country level, followed by a box 
summarising the key messages of the chapter. The chapter proceeds with a comparison of 
the different data sources currently available at the global and national level that can be 
used to track DP and government expenditure from a recipient country perspective to 
compile a comprehensive database of health financing flows. This is followed by a 
comparison of the different coding methods used by each source in order to improve the 
accuracy and categorisation of the data. The chapter then describes health expenditure as 
a proportion of total domestic and external expenditure, before analysing the distribution 
of DAH by source and sub-sector priority in order to draw a health financing map that will 
set the scene for the rest of the thesis. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
implications of findings for the funding of the Tanzanian health sector, as well as future 
resource tracking studies that use secondary data sources to seek to analyse expenditures 
at the country level. 
6.1 Introduction 
Rising levels of Development Assistance for Health (DAH) have resulted in an increased 
emphasis globally on accountability for how and where DAH funds are spent. This is 
reflected in the literature, with the publication of a growing number of articles tracking aid 
flows in the last few years. The focus of the aid-tracking literature is mainly on describing 
and analysing the distribution of DAH across countries using different comparative criteria, 
including country characteristics (36, 255, 315-316), poverty related equity measures of 
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need (31, 37, 252, 255, 317-321), burden of disease (3, 25-26, 31, 55, 104-105, 114, 239, 
245, 252, 254, 316, 321-329), DAH source or modality (3, 31, 37, 255, 316, 330-331). These 
studies can be useful for holding Development Partners (DPs) accountable for the levels 
and allocation of DAH across countries.  
Multi-country studies may be of less use to planning DAH in individual recipient countries. 
In particular, DAH tracking analyses are hindered by the quality of data on aid flows 
(including for example the lack of timeliness of data and reporting differences between 
DPs), giving rise to recent concerns about the level of analysis and recommendations made 
from them (239, 244). The extent of work required to clean and analyse the large DAH 
databases that exist may be robust in terms of aggregate analyses, but lack precision in 
terms of understanding how individual countries are allocating and using their DAH (239, 
332). In addition, many of the studies have been criticised for excluding domestic 
expenditure when drawing their conclusions (although some do include both domestic and 
DAH expenditures  (333)) and others have been seen as too narrow in terms of focusing on 
single priorities without taking into account the interdependence of health sector activities 
or being able to fully identify broader health systems funds that may contribute to health 
sector outcomes (239, 333).  
Although informative at the global level, these limitations mean that these exercises may 
not be the best source for understanding how allocations of DAH are made at any 
individual country level. Therefore, in order to fully understand the DAH allocation, cross 
country analyses of the determinants DAH need to be complemented, and can be better 
understood, by analyses of health financing flows at the country level, to compare 
allocation across the different priorities, contrast external and domestic financing and 
provide an in-depth review of the quality and availability of data. The lessons learned in 
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developing such an approach can also facilitate recipient countries holding DPs to account 
on their commitments and aid management practices.  
 
Box 1: Key messages of Chapter 6 
 Health expenditure in Tanzania has increased between 2000 and 2010 from all 
sources, although it appears health is a bigger priority for DPs than for the 
government. 
 DAH delivered horizontally and vertically has increased; however, increases in 
vertical priorities have outgrown horizontal ones. HIV/AIDS is the main priority. 
 Tanzania has experienced changes in the composition of DPs in the time period 
of 2000-2010, with the arrival of new global health initiatives and differences in 
the proportion of bi-lateral and multi-lateral DPs. These differences are closely 
linked with DAH priorities. 
 Global and national sources of health expenditure vary, and no one source is 
best. In this study a database was compiled from a combination of data sources. 
Future studies relying on secondary data could use the Creditor Reporting 
System for DAH analysis, National Health Accounts (NHA) for in-depth studies on 
financing that do not require time trends, and Public Expenditure Reviews (PER) 
(where available) for analysing funding trends. 
 Care needs to be taken not to over-interpret data on health funding flows from 
global databases, as it is sometimes incomplete and sub-sector categories are 
difficult to separate. This is particularly the case with vertical and horizontal 
flows. It may be of more use for future studies to assess expenditure by level of 
health service delivery instead. 
 There are currently simultaneous processes tracking health financing data at the 
country level in Tanzania. It would be more efficient if these processes were 
unified. For instance, it may be worth investing in the quality and standardisation 
of the PER than to develop new processes or producing the more resource-
intensive NHA more frequently.  
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6.2 Comparison of data sources 
The first step of the analysis of health financing flows in Tanzania was to undertake a data-
scoping exercise to assess what sources were available, compare their accuracy and 
construct a comprehensive database using the methods outlined in Chapter 3 (hereafter 
referred to as the “study database”). Several different data sources were found. These 
include the Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Creditor Reporting 
System (OECD-CRS), AidData, the DAH database of the Institute for Health Metrics and 
Evaluation (IHME), National Health Accounts (NHA), Public Expenditure Reviews (PER), 
budget books and budget speeches.  
Figure 6.1 below shows a comparison between the different global and national data 
sources for Tanzanian health financing indicators and, after revising these, a comparison 
with the database constructed using a combination of sources. Overall, it shows that the 
results vary depending on which data source is used, particularly for total DAH and DAH 
channelled through the government (DAH-G). Total DAH varies between sources, with NHA 
showing the highest levels and AidData the lowest, and the CRS and IHME databases in the 
middle, with similar results to each other (Figure 6.1a). NHA rely on surveys of health 
financing sources and expenditure at the country level (including employers, medical 
insurers, non-government organisations and development partners (219)), so they would 
represent the most complete dataset, possibly identifying DPs that do not report to the 
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). However, data are only in aggregated 
form and available for three points in the time period of study, so the data is less reliable in 
terms of understanding trends over time. The results obtained from AidData are 
unexpected as according to its specifications it should include all OECD-CRS projects35. This 
                                                          
35 http://aiddata.org/user-guide#data_sources_and_coverage  
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may be due to the fact that AidData and the CRS use different codes to classify projects. 
However, AidData also reports CRS codes, and using these to compare AidData and the CRS 
gave even more discordant results (data not shown). 
For this research, the CRS database was therefore used as the starting point to obtain DAH 
flows because it is the most complete in terms of years available and projects 
disaggregated. It was complemented with data from AidData on non-DAC DPs and IHME on 
private foundations and philanthropies – to ensure that non OECD-DAC DPs were included. 
However, Figure 6.1a shows that by doing this the study database did not increase 
substantially. It was not possible to include additional DPs identified by the NHA because 
data were only available for three points during the time period of study and were not 
available in disaggregated form.  
Figure 6.1b examines the sources for Total Government Expenditure (TGE), and shows that 
expenditure data reported retrospectively from budget speeches are the most complete 
and generally are very similar to the budget books and the PER. Therefore in this study, 
data on total government expenditure were obtained from the budget speeches, as they 
were comparable to the other data sources and were the most complete, thereby allowing 
for better comparison of trends over time. 
Examining the amount of DAH going through the government (Figure 6.1c) we find higher 
amounts reported in our CRS-based study database36 than in the PER. The green lines on 
the graph show the Health Basket Fund (HBF), which is similar between the two data 
sources, so this would suggest that the differences between CRS and PER are from the 
reporting of source of vertical funds going through the government. This may possibly be 
that the PER was not able to establish the split of financing in each development project 
                                                          
36 GBS was not included in this to allow for comparison as it is not included in PER assessments, so 
real amount of DAH-G is higher  
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between the governments and DPs, from the records available within the government. CRS 
data were therefore used to assess DAH delivered through the government.  
Finally, Figure 6.1d shows domestic health expenditure (Government Expenditure as a 
source (GHE-S)). The two sources for this are the NHA and the PER, which show similar 
trends. The structure of the budget books did not allow the extraction of domestic health 
expenditure37. Data on government expenditure on health as a source were therefore 
obtained from the PER. GHE-S is higher in the PER and NHA than in the study database. This 
is because both NHA and PER include General Budget Support (GBS) as part of government 
expenditure. Conversely, in this study the proportion of GBS allocated to the health sector 
was estimated and subtracted from GHE-S (see below and page 84 in Chapter 3), therefore 
giving the lower figures observed. 
Section 6.6 below shows the comparison of domestic and external expenditure on 
HIV/AIDS. Domestic expenditure for HIV/AIDS was obtained from the HIV/AIDS PER, as it 
included the most complete data available. As with other indicators of external funding, 
DAH targeted to HIV/AIDS was obtained from the study database, using the method 
outlined in pages 86-89 in Chapter 3. This was the only sub-sector comparison undertaken, 
as data for other priorities were not available to study trends (NHA includes data on 
reproductive health and malaria, but these were only available for three points in time and 
the definition used to assess reproductive health was different to that of the CRS, which 
would have made comparisons difficult). 
                                                          
37 The budget books are classified by “votes”, in such a way that the Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare (MoHSW), each region and district are given a vote number. It was therefore not possible to 
disaggregate health expenditure at the regional, district level or central level outside of the MoHSW 
143 
 
Figure 6.1: Comparison of the figures available from the different data sources for DAH, DAH-G, HBF, TGE and GHE-S38 
 
                                                          
38 DAH: Development Assistance for Health; TGE: Total Government Expenditure; DAH-G: Development Assistance for Health disbursed through the government; HBF: 
Health Basket Fund; GHE-S: Government Health Expenditure as a source 
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6.3 Data coding 
Once the study DAH dataset was compiled from the different sources (CRS, AidData and 
IHME), it was re-coded following the methods outlined in Chapter 3. The reason for this 
was threefold: first, to ensure all projects falling under the health sector were correctly 
captured (including the portion of GBS allocated to health); second, to fill in the gaps in the 
CRS data to the extent possible; and, third, to re-categorise some expenditures into 
categories (such as HIV/AIDS and Reproductive, Maternal, Newborn and Child Health 
(RMNCH)). 
Figure 6.2 below shows the difference in disbursement levels using coded and non-coded 
data for selected indicators. Figure 6.2a shows the results of re-coding health projects (blue 
bars) and Figure 6.2b shows the re-coding of DAH by sub-sector priority. Re-coding health 
projects did not make an important difference (dotted blue line Figure 6.2a). DAH in the 
CRS database was $40.9 million, whereas after re-coding it was $34.5 million in 2000. By 
2010 the CRS figure was $739.5 million whereas the re-coded figure was $717.8 million. 
This suggests that most projects were correctly identified as falling under the health sector, 
although the re-coded database had consistently smaller amounts of DAH39 (except in 
2007, where it was slightly higher). However, including a proportion of  GBS did make a 
difference (continuous green line), adding $13 million in 200140 and consistently raising to 
$67 million in 2010, before lowering again in 2010 to $34 million, raising the total DAH 
amount to $752 million. This is both due to a decrease in GBS and a slightly lower 
proportion of government expenditure on health.  
 
                                                          
39 The projects removed mainly targeted animal health, gender and women’s rights or where health 
projects in Zanzibar. 
40 Data on government expenditure was only available from 2001; as GBS estimates are based on 
the percentage of government spent on health, they are also only available from 2001 
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Re-coding single diseases, such as malaria and RMNH did not make a big difference to the 
estimated DAH sub-sector distribution (Figure 6.2b). This is in part explained by the fact 
that re-coding of multi-sector projects was only done when there was enough information 
to do this accurately (no assumptions were made or re-distribution of pooled funds or 
health systems projects and multi-sector projects were assigned a separate code and are 
shown separately in the rest of the chapter). However, re-coding at the sub-sector level 
was still a useful process in terms of the addition of new categories, such as RMNCH 
(combining RMNH, Child Health and Immunisations) and HIV/AIDS (separating it from other 
sexually transmitted infections). For instance, in 2010 the targeted to RMNH41 was $26.3 
million, going up to $71.4 once projects were re-coded and child health was added. The 
method used to classify projects relied on keywords, and therefore only projects 
mentioning HIV/AIDS were included as HIV/AIDS projects. Projects targeting health systems 
components, which would also benefit HIV/AIDS or malaria, are not included (shown as 
“health systems” hereafter), and therefore the sub-sector categories shown here remain an 
underestimate of the real amount of DAH spent on each sub-sector priority.  
The biggest difference the country based re-coding made to the database was in filling the 
gaps found in the channel of delivery (Figures 6.2c, 6.2d and 6.2e). The amount of DAH that 
had a channel name was much lower in the CRS original database (Figure 6.2c)42. Figures 
6.2c and 6.2d show the proportion of DAH projects that had a channel name before and 
after re-coding. Even after all the line-by-line and keyword-based re-coding, it was not 
possible to identify the channel or sub-sector allocation of some projects. These were 
labelled as “blank”. There were marked differences between the different DPs quality of 
reporting, with bi-laterals generally including less detailed information and thereby being 
harder to re-code. 
                                                          
41 Reproductive Health did not include HIV/AIDS projects 
42 GBS was not included in this, as the channel was known to be the government system 
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Figure 6.2: Comparison of Total DAH, channel of delivery and sub-sector priorities before and after re-coding  
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Figure 6.2 above does not include the proportion of GBS allocated to health in the channel 
name field, in order to show the amount of projects for which DAH channel was re-coded 
(as the channel for GBS is known). Table 6.1 below shows this to illustrate the proportions 
that had a channel name both including and excluding GBS. The proportion of all DAH 
projects of the CRS database that had a channel of delivery was less than 3 %, which stayed 
under 5 % until 2003, after which it steadily increased up to 83 % in 2010. The re-coded 
version of the database still shows large percentages of DAH without a channel of delivery 
(starting from in 2000 59 % if GBS is included); however, it is approximately half of that of 
the CRS database. This shows that the reporting of DPs to the CRS has become more 
detailed over time, with re-coding of the database adding a channel name for 12 % extra 
the projects in 2010 (compared to 45 % in 2000 excluding GBS). 
Table 6.1: Proportion of projects with a channel code before and after re-coding 
 Without re-coding After re-coding 
Year 
% projects that 
had a channel 
code (no GBS) 
% projects that 
had a channel 
code (inc GBS) 
% projects that 
had a channel 
code (no GBS) 
% projects that 
had a channel 
code (inc GBS) 
2000 2.9 23.6 47.8 58.9 
2001 1.4 27.9 42.2 57.7 
2002 2.7 23.0 60.2 68.5 
2003 4.5 35.4 49.6 65.9 
2004 19.2 32.4 54.6 62.1 
2005 45.2 55.2 70.9 76.2 
2006 45.9 55.8 75.6 80.1 
2007 63.5 69.6 79.7 83.1 
2008 77.8 79.8 90.9 91.8 
2009 77.3 81.4 85.9 88.5 
2010 82.7 84.5 95.5 96.0 
 
No effort was made to re-code the data on domestic sources of health financing, primarily 
because the data represents the audited government figures and was not available at a 
highly disaggregated level. 
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6.4 External and domestic health expenditure  
The rest of this chapter describes health sector expenditure in Tanzania that resulted from 
analysing the database compiled and re-coded for DAH and data extracted from the budget 
speeches and PER reports for domestic expenditure on health.  
A total 28,139 aid projects/transactions were delivered to Tanzania in the time period of 
2000-2010. Of these, 5,603 were classified as belonging to the health sector. DAH made up 
an increasing proportion of total aid flows (Figure 6.3b). Both Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) and DAH have been rising in the time period of 2000-2010, with ODA 
increasing from $816 million to almost $3 billion, and DAH rising from $34.5 million to $718 
million. However, the proportion of ODA made up by DAH has almost quadrupled from 6.2 
% in 2000 to 24.1 % in 2010.  
Government data were only available from 2001. They show a similar increasing trend both 
in total government expenditure and government expenditure on health as a source, with a 
noticeable increase since 2008. GHE-S increased from $76 million in the year 2001 to $370 
million in 2010. However, TGE experienced a fivefold increase (from $1.6 to $8.2 billion). 
Therefore, despite the marked increases in GHE-S during the time period of study, the 
proportion of total government expenditure on health has fluctuated between 4-7%, which 
is well below the Abuja target of 15% (334). This is lower than the figures on the PER 
(where it fluctuates between 10-12%), although close to those of the NHA (6-7%). There 
are two reasons for the difference between the ratios found in this study and those of the 
PER. First, the GHE-S is lower than that reported in the PER, since the GBS portion allocated 
to health has been deducted from it (see Methodology section). Second, in this study, 
consistent with the budget speech, total government expenditure includes the 
Consolidated Fund Services (CFS, which is debt repayment), whereas this is excluded in the 
PER.  
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Figure 6.3: Comparison of Development Assistance for Health and Government Expenditure on Health as Source as absolute amounts and as a proportion 
of total Official Development Assistance and Total Government Expenditure respectively43 
 
                                                          
43 ODA does not include non-DAC DPs, whereas DAH does; therefore, DAH as a proportion of total ODA (graph Xb) will be slightly over estimated 
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Figure 6.4: DAH to Tanzania by source44 
 
                                                          
44 Private/philanthropies include the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Bloomberg, but not expenditure from international NGOs 
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6.5 DAH by source 
The rest of this chapter focuses on DAH in more detail, by analysing both its sources and 
allocation according to different priorities. DAH from all sources has increased. The top two 
DAH DPs to Tanzania are the United States (US) and the Global Fund. Despite having 
started out from similar levels in 2000, bi-lateral sources have consistently outweighed 
multi-laterals from 2001 (Figures 6.4a and 6.4b). Looking at the DP breakdown, this is 
explained by increases in funding from the US, which has been the dominant DP since 
2006, and since 2007 has roughly made up 50 % of all DAH. The US is followed by a group 
of European DPs (Netherlands, Germany and Denmark), Canada, and Norway, Ireland and 
Switzerland (by size of DAH). The United Kingdom is not shown graphs 6.4c and 6.4d 
because, despite globally being the second largest provider of DAH (see Chapter 2), in 
Tanzania, during the time period of study, the United Kingdom moved out of the health 
sector and favoured General Budget Support (although it has since resumed providing 
DAH). Emerging bi-lateral DPs and providers of South-South co-operation were not found 
to contribute substantial amounts of DAH, although this may be a reflection of data 
availability on these DPs.  
In terms of multi-lateral trends, up to 2005 the WB was the leading agency, but since then 
it has been overtaken by the Global Fund. UN agencies (dark blue bars in bottom right 
graph) represent a decreasing proportion of total DAH, under 20% in 2004, reducing to 10% 
in 2010, although DAH levels have stayed constant at about $10 million per year. The level 
of funding from bi-lateral sources has shown a more constant upward trend, compared to 
multi-lateral funding, which follows a more uneven pattern. 
6.6 DAH sub-sector distribution 
This section describes the last part of the analysis of funding flows, which explores the sub-
sector distribution of both domestic and external health funds. Figures 6.5a and 6.5b show 
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the trends in the amount of DAH being delivered vertically (targeting a single disease), 
horizontally (pooled funds and budget support) and diagonally (health systems 
interventions delivered as projects) in absolute amounts and as a proportion of total DAH 
respectively. Figures 6.5c and 6.5d show the different vertical priorities. Looking at the top 
half of the figure first, blue-shaded bars represent vertical funds, red-shaded ones 
horizontal funds and purple bars diagonal funds (green bars represent DAH flows that could 
not be coded). All forms of financing have increased in absolute terms. However, in relative 
terms only vertical priorities have increased, with horizontal programmes reducing their 
share of total DAH from 47 % to 28 % between 2000 and 2010, whereas vertical 
programmes have increased from 34 % of DAH flows in 2000 to about 69 % in 2010. This 
suggests that investment in health systems has received lower attention than vertical 
disease programmes. However, this needs to be interpreted with caution, as vertical 
projects may also target health system components and investments in health systems also 
benefit vertical programmes. Diagonal approaches (classified as those projects targeting 
health systems components rather than a particular disease/population group) made up 
7% of all DAH in 2000, decreased between 2004 and 2007, before rising again to 7% in 
2010. In absolute terms, however, they started at $3.2 million in 2000 and increased 
exponentially to $54 million.  
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Figure 6.5: Sub-sector distribution of DAH, by vertical (disease oriented), horizontal (health systems pooled) and diagonal (health systems project-based) 
distribution, and by vertical priorities, in absolute amounts and as a share of total DAH45 
 
                                                          
45 Blank represent projects for which the purpose could not be identified 
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Figures 6.5c and 6.5d show the distribution of vertical DAH by sector priority. Pink (blank) 
and dark blue (multi-purpose) bars represent projects that could not be allocated to the 
priorities selected. The amount of projects that could be coded improved over time, 
particularly after 2003. The data show there are marked differences between the different 
priorities. HIV/AIDS, malaria and RMNCH have received increasing amounts of funding; 
however, funds for water and sanitation46, non-communicable diseases (NCD), 
Tuberculosis, Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs), and other infectious diseases have 
remained low. HIV/AIDS received the most project funding, making up over 50% of all 
vertically distributed DAH from 2005. It is followed by malaria, which has received an 
increasing share of DAH since the year 2004, mainly as a result of the Global Fund and US 
bi-lateral funding (data not shown). The proportion of vertical DAH funding for RMNCH has 
increased, but this is mostly due to child health (data not shown), and still remains below 
10 % of all DAH. 
To examine vertical funding trends in more detail, Figure 6.6 below shows the distribution 
of vertical funds across more aggregated categories of DP type and disease priority. Both 
bi-lateral and multi-lateral DPs fund HIV/AIDS as their first priority (Figures 6.6a and 6.6b 
respectively). However, bi-laterals place more emphasis on health systems components 
than multi-laterals, whereas multi-laterals spend a bigger proportion of their funds on 
malaria than bi-laterals do. Figures 6.6c and 6.6d further break down DAH financing by 
showing the DPs financing HIV/AIDS. They show that the trends in HIV/AIDS are directly 
correlated with trends in DP composition, as the two DPs providing the highest amount of 
DAH (The Global Fund and the US) are also the top providers of HIV/AIDS funds. The share 
of these two DPs in HIV/AIDS DAH increases both in real terms (Figure 6.6c) and in relative 
terms, providing 90% of all HIV/AIDS funds between them in 2010 (Figure 6.6d). Funding 
for HIV/AIDS from other multi-laterals has remained relatively constant in real terms and 
                                                          
46 This only includes water and sanitation projects that specifically targeted health 
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funds from other bi-laterals have shown increases, particularly from 2007 (data not 
shown).  
The distribution of DAH by channel of delivery was also assessed and is reported in Chapter 
8, as it is one of the indicators selected to assess the aid effectiveness agenda. 
156 
 
Figure 6.6: DAH vertical priorities by type of DP47 
 
                                                          
47 Blank represents projects for which the purpose could not be identified. 
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Finally, Figure 6.7 shows a comparison of the sub-sector distribution of DAH and domestic 
funds targeted to HIV/AIDS using data from the HIV/AIDS PER and the study database. 
HIV/AIDS funding trends show external expenditure rising exponentially and domestic 
expenditure initially increasing from $2.3 million in 2001 to $18 million in 2005 before 
falling to $8 million in 2010. However, this may be an underestimate of the amount of 
funds spent by the government on HIV/AIDS, as the government accounting system is not 
structured around vertical programmes and government expenditure on health systems 
(such as human resources and medicine supply chains) would benefit HIV/AIDS. 
Nevertheless, HIV/AIDS funding is heavily DP-dependent. 
Figure 6.7: HIV/AIDS funding comparison between domestic and external sources48 
 
Other sub-sector comparisons could not be made due to lack of data availability. 
 
 
                                                          
48 Sources: Xa National Health Accounts data and Xb HIV/AIDS Public Expenditure Review for 
domestic expenditure and the study database for DAH 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
2
0
1
0
 U
SD
 m
ill
io
n
Government
DAH
158 
 
6.7 Discussion 
This chapter has analysed health financing flows in Tanzania during the time period of 
2000-2010. It has shown that health expenditure in Tanzania from all sources and through 
all channels has greatly increased between 2000 and 2010. Government expenditure on 
health has quadrupled in the time period, but has not managed to increase as fast as total 
government expenditure, and has not achieved the Abuja target of 15% of total 
government expenditure (334). In contrast, DAH has outpaced increases in ODA, making up 
over 20% of total ODA. This may indicate that the government does not prioritise health as 
much as DPs, but may also be a result of low absorption capacity for extra funds (335) or 
indeed may be a sign of fungibility (336). These possibilities are further explored in 
Chapters 8 and 9. 
Although increasing DAH levels are encouraging in resource-poor settings such as Tanzania, 
there have been discussions in the literature regarding the sustainability of increases in 
DAH funding, particularly in the current global economic climate. The annual global DAH 
tracking conducted by the IHME suggests DAH is beginning to plateau (331), although a 
recent study by Stuckler et al. (2011) concludes previous economic recessions did not affect 
development assistance levels, so there is no precedent to assume DAH will decrease 
(unless it is driven by ideological shifts towards austerity) (129). This study found 
indications that DAH funding levels to Tanzania are beginning to plateau, supporting 
findings from the IHME. The impact of this trend will depend on government’s expenditure 
on health (336), but it may call for increased efficiency of spending (337). One way to do 
this would be to allocate resources to where they are mostly needed. However, this does 
not just mean towards diseases with the highest burden, but also to where they can make 
the most impact and be most cost-effective.  
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Increases of DAH have taken place unevenly across different priorities. There has been an 
active debate in the literature regarding the relative merits of vertical and horizontal funds, 
with some arguing that they lead to coordination difficulties and only benefit the targeted 
services (109, 117) whilst other studies have shown the potential for positive interactions 
and synergies between these initiatives and health systems (338-339). This study found 
that although both types of funding had increased in real terms, in relative terms vertical 
funding has contributed an increasing share of all DAH, raising concerns about coordination 
of funds. Diagonal approaches, which have been presented as bridging the vertical-
horizontal divide by investing in the health system through the use of project modalities, 
have also increased. There have been concerns about diagonal approaches being good in 
principle, but not being accompanied by an increase in funding (120). This study found that 
in absolute terms diagonal approaches saw an increase, although in relative terms they still 
make up a small proportion of DAH funds to Tanzania (fluctuating around 7%). This shift in 
aid modality may have an impact in terms of the achievability of aspects of the Paris 
Declaration such as alignment and harmonisation. This will explored further in Chapter 8. 
With regards to the sub-sector distribution of DAH, increases in DAH have also been 
uneven across different priorities. As part of their Global Burden of Disease project, the 
IHME have estimated the Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) in Tanzania49. These can 
give an indication of the distribution of DAH funding according to burden of disease. For 
instance, this study found that resources were largely skewed towards HIV/AIDS (making 
up about 50% of all vertical DAH). The IHME’s Global Burden of Disease project found that 
HIV/AIDS contributed to an average of 4.7 million DALYs in 2010. In a cross-country 
regression, Boussalis and Peiffer found that need (defined as GDP per capita and HIV 
prevalence) was an important factor in distribution of HIV/AIDS bi-lateral funds (103). 
Whilst this may be the case when examining the global distribution of HIV/AIDS resources, 
                                                          
49 http://www.healthdata.org/search-gbd-data?s=Tanzania  
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when analysed at the country level against other financial resources, the distribution looks 
rather skewed, compared to the prevalence of other diseases. The second biggest vertical 
priority is malaria, which is also targeted by the Global Fund and the US. DAH targeted to 
malaria has greatly increased in absolute and real terms, making up 17% of all vertically-
delivered DAH in 2010. Given that the burden of malaria in 2010 was 3.2 million DALYs, it 
seems that malaria and HIV/AIDS funding is somewhat associated with disease burden 
relative to each other. The third vertical priority is RMNCH. The Countdown to 2015 project 
has been tracking resources for RMNCH from 2003, and, as was the case with HIV/AIDS 
funding, it found that distribution across countries was targeted towards countries with 
higher maternal and child mortality, particularly from 2005 (104). Once more, this is a 
cross-country distribution, rather than within a recipient country. According to IHME 
figures, maternal, neonatal, and nutritional disorders50 accounted for 10 million DALYs in 
2010. RMNCH made up 7.5% and other infectious diseases less than 1% of vertically-
delivered DAH, and therefore DAH targeted at these conditions looks disproportionately 
lower than DAH targeted to HIV/AIDS and malaria.  
In contrast to these three priorities, non-communicable diseases, water and sanitation 
interventions for health and other infectious diseases have received consistently low levels 
of DAH funding. These trends have also been observed at the global level, where a cross-
country study found that per DALY DAH was up to 20 times higher for HIV/AIDS, malaria 
and tuberculosis than for non-communicable diseases (105), indicating that these 
conditions may be underfunded at the national level.  
A recent study exploring HIV/AIDS funding in Honduras, Rwanda and Thailand found that 
the arrival of big initiatives targeting HIV/AIDS had displaced funding from other DPs (153). 
This was not found to be the case in Tanzania, where all DPs increased their funding for 
                                                          
50 This definition may not completely match the definition of RMNCH used in this study 
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HIV/AIDS between 2000 and 2010. However, this chapter found that government level of 
financing for HIV is much lower than DP funding. This mismatching of domestic and DAH 
financing may be an indication of differing priorities or again of fungibility taking place. This 
will be explored in more detail in Chapter 8.  
Finally, increases in DAH have been coupled with changes in the makeup of the agencies 
providing DAH during the 2000-2010 time period. At the start of the time period, bi-lateral 
and multi-lateral agencies made up similar proportions of funding. However, the rate of 
increase of bi-lateral agencies has outweighed that of multi-laterals, driven by drastic 
increases in US funding. New multi-lateral players, such as the Global Fund and GAVI have 
appeared in the time period of study, constituting an increasing share of DAH, whilst the 
share of funds contributed by UN agencies has been on the decline. These findings are 
consistent with global trends reported by the IHME (2, 331). Despite increasing discussions 
in the literature regarding emerging DPs and South-South cooperation (7, 9-10), this study 
found these DPs provided a very small proportion of DAH. This may have been because 
data on these DPs are harder to obtain, but a study has also recently highlighted that some 
of this cooperation (namely from China) does not qualify as Official Development 
Assistance (8).  
There has been some discussion in the literature of the merits of different types of 
agencies, some ranking individual agencies based on their performance on a number of 
quality indicators (15, 340), others arguing that aid delivered through multi-laterals is more 
effective because of their incentive systems and lower political pressure (6), that multi-
laterals are better are targeting their funds according to need (104) and provide more 
predictable disbursements (341), or that bi-lateral aid is more effective at reducing AIDS-
related mortality (24). This chapter found an increasing number of DPs active in the 
Tanzanian health sector with differing priorities, resulting in the allocation of DAH being 
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more associated with the DP profile than the disease profile of the country. In particular, 
the prominence of the Global Fund and the US, which together made up over 60% of total 
DAH in 2010, and which both prioritise HIV/AIDS and malaria. In the context of Tanzania, it 
is therefore more important to assess the fragmentation of DAH and how the large number 
of DPs coordinate the increasing amount of funds and their priorities, than the merits of 
the composition of the different agencies. These are further explored in Chapter 8.  
Three methodological findings arise from this research. First, values for the selected 
indicators varied according to the source used, although with the exception of AidData, the 
variation observed was not substantial. A consolidated country system for measuring 
health financing flows, both domestic and external, would ensure consistency and be more 
efficient. A study undertaken at the same time as this thesis compared commitments and 
disbursements from the OECD-CRS, IHME, AidData, the Global Health Expenditure and NHA 
databases for the Sub-Saharan African region (as a region and by country) (342). The 
authors found differences between the results obtained from the different sources, with 
the biggest differences observed when analysing a single country or DP agency (less so for 
regional and global analyses) (342). The authors recommend that NHA should be 
institutionalised and data on expenditures used for DAH analyses (rather than 
commitments or disbursements, which do not show the actual amounts spent), but 
acknowledged better reporting by DPs needs to happen at the country level for this to be 
possible (342).  
The findings from this study somewhat contradict these recommendations, as the 
differences found between the different sources were not substantial. In Tanzania, some 
effort to harmonise data sources is being made through the PERs and NHA (which are 
already institutionalised). In addition, the recently-adopted Aid Management Platform51, 
                                                          
51 http://amp.mof.go.tz/  
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which was established by the Ministry of Finance to collate all development assistance 
flows quarterly, and to which all DPs are requested to report their aid disbursements, is an 
excellent way of consolidating DAH funds. The key may lie in integration between the PER 
and Aid Management Platform for external health flows (rather than having separate 
processes for collecting these data) and improving the consistency of the levels of data 
disaggregation of the PER. Given the annual nature of the PER, it can be used to influence 
decision-making in resource allocations. The NHA could then stay as a larger less frequent, 
more resource-intensive exercise, where important but less rapidly changing issues (such as 
out-of-pocket expenditures) can be monitored. In addition, it would be recommended that 
efforts to make the Aid Management Platform publically available are increased, so that 
independent assessments of development assistance can be undertaken. 
Second, re-coding was not found to make a difference to categories that were already 
present in the CRS, but it was important to enable the creation of new categories, such as 
RMNCH and essential for classifying DAH by channel of delivery. Future analyses would be 
more accurate if DPs reported to the CRS consistently and accurately and if it allowed for 
multiple coding of projects (for instance, for malaria and maternal and child health, 
something that has already been called for (239)), although until DPs report more 
consistently and accurately, there is no guarantee that adding additional fields would result 
in an improvement. In addition, it may be more important to report DAH expenditure by 
levels of care than vertical projects. However, the data obtained in this study did not allow 
for this.  
Despite there being no standard way of including GBS as part of health sector funds, this 
study found that it makes an important difference to the results obtained, not just in the 
total amount of DAH, but importantly also in the comparison of the sub-sector distribution 
of funds, particularly by increasing the proportion of DAH delivered through the 
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government and in the form of horizontal approaches. It has also helped to calculate the 
amount of government expenditure on health as a source. The method used here is 
different to that used by IHME studies of fungibility (158, 343-344), who calculate GHE-S by 
deducting DAH-G from all the government expenditure of health as an agent. We feel the 
method used in this chapter is more robust (if still crude and more resource-intensive), as it 
relies on GHE-S from the budget speech (which is government sanctioned) and then 
subtracts from it the proportion that would have been contributed by GBS.  
The trends reported in this chapter need to be interpreted with caution, as several 
methodological difficulties were encountered and assumptions made when conducting this 
research. First, there is likely to be under-reporting of DAH, both at the sector and sub-
sector level because despite the efforts to construct a comprehensive database, some DPs 
are not captured. Second, HIV/AIDS and malaria were not included as part of RMNCH, as 
the focus was on disease priorities rather than population groups. This means that the 
amount recoded as RMNCH is much lower than it may be in studies focusing on population 
groups (as it has been shown that HIV/AIDS makes up over half of reproductive health 
funds (255, 345)).  
Third, re-coding and estimations were kept to a minimum and care was taken to be 
transparent about assumptions made and not to over-analyse the limited data (echoing Pitt 
et al.’s call for caution when making conclusions based on this type of data (239)). 
However, there are problems comparing project disbursements to health systems 
components with diseases, as there are overlaps and vertical disease projects contribute to 
the health system and investments in the health system benefit vertical programmes. 
Although this means the trends outlined here must be interpreted with caution, it is 
possible to conclude that DAH is heavily skewed towards HIV/AIDS funding. Forth, manual 
re-coding was only done by one person, so there is potential for bias in the allocation to 
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priorities. In addition, the method of estimating the proportion of GBS allocated to the 
health sector (as a proportion of government expenditure on health), although advised by 
local experts is hindered by the lack of counterfactual, and does not take into consideration 
the fact that the surge in funding provided by GBS may not be absorbed in equal amounts 
in all sectors, or that conditions for social spending may result in higher spending in health 
than would have otherwise have taken place. Finally, no analysis was possible of DAH 
distribution by health sector activities (human resources, prevention activities, policy, etc.), 
as there were not enough data available, which would have allowed for comparison of 
priorities against recommended benchmarks, such as 40% investment in capital (human 
and infrastructure) recommended by the High Level Taskforce on Innovative International 
Financing of Health Systems to improve absorption capacity (346).   
In conclusion, this chapter has shown the importance of taking the perspective of a 
recipient country when tracking domestic and external health financing flows. This chapter 
has found that the increases in the amount of external resources the Tanzanian health 
sector has received may not be sustainable, resource allocation is skewed towards 
HIV/AIDS and that the aid architecture has become increasingly complex with an increase 
in the number and diversity of agencies. It is therefore important to coordinate DP agencies 
and have priority-setting dialogue with government to identify how best to allocate 
resources. Finally, some recommendations on how to improve availability and quality of 
data at the country level have been made.  
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7 DEVELOPMENT OF AN ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
GLOBAL AID EFFECTIVENESS AGENDA 
This chapter addresses the third objective of the thesis. The aim is to develop a set of 
measurable indicators to assess the principles of aid effectiveness in the context of the 
Tanzanian health SWAP. The chapter starts with a brief description of the rationale for 
developing indicators to assess aid effectiveness as well as the criteria used to identify 
indicators in this study. This is followed by a description of the international and Tanzanian 
national declarations on aid effectiveness. The third section provides, for each principle, 
the definitions and indicators that have been used in global and national documents and in 
the literature, and proposes a set of indicators for use in this study. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the implications of the main findings. 
7.1 Introduction 
Differences in local interpretation of aid effectiveness principles have been shown to affect 
coordination efforts of aid resources within the Sector Wide Approach (SWAP) (347). This is 
in part driven by the importance of the context in which these principles are applied, but 
also results from the vague nature of the language used in international declarations of aid 
effectiveness. Moreover, the indicator frameworks used to assess progress towards aid 
effectiveness declarations has been criticised for being narrow in scope (90). 
Given that this study uses the aid effectiveness agenda as a lens to assess the SWAP in 
Tanzania, it was important to develop a set of indicators that were comprehensive and 
relevant to the country context. This was done through document and literature review 
and in-depth interviews as described in pages 92-103 through three steps. First, a review 
how principles of aid effectiveness have been defined and assessed in international 
declarations of aid effectiveness and the literature was undertaken. Second, this study 
explored how these principles are defined in national policies and understood and 
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interpreted by local stakeholders. Third and based on the first two, a list of measurable 
indicators for use in Tanzania was developed.  
When selecting the indicators to assess each principle the SMART criteria were used: 
indicators must be specific, measurable, assignable, realistic and time-related. In order to 
ensure indicators were realistic, a data scoping exercise was undertaken for each of the 
indicators identified from the document and literature search; only those for which enough 
data were available were included.  
 
Box 2: Key messages of Chapter 7 
 The global aid effectiveness agenda has evolved over time – basic principles have 
remained the same, but the way they are defined and measured, and the weight 
placed on them has changed. 
 Definitions of aid effectiveness principles are often vague and have multiple 
dimensions. 
 Although having broad non-specific definitions of aid effectiveness principles at 
the global level is not necessarily a bad thing, more specificity would facilitate 
measurement of progress.  
 Indicators in the agenda do not always reflect the definition of the underlying 
principle, or only address one aspect of it. They are often based on processes 
and structures (technocratic). 
 Lack of specificity of indicators and their inability to measure principles means 
the agenda is assessed through a narrow, technocratic focus.  
 Definitions of aid effectiveness principles and indicators proposed for their 
measurement vary across the different sources reviewed – aid effectiveness 
policies (national and international), literature and between actors.  
 Definitions and indicators of aid effectiveness principles are in part context 
specific and should be adapted to the context, interpreted locally and set with 
the input of national stakeholders.  
 Both quantitative and qualitative indicators are needed to evaluate the global 
aid effectiveness agenda. 
168 
 
7.2 The global aid effectiveness agenda 
Increases in the amount of development assistance and concerns regarding its 
effectiveness have resulted in the international community holding a number of high level 
forums aimed at improving the effectiveness of aid (Table 7.1). In 2002, during the 
Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, donor countries committed to 
mobilise financial resources and increase financial and technical cooperation for 
development. The international community then signed the Rome Declaration on 
Harmonization in 2003, and pledged to deliver development assistance following partner 
country priorities and using harmonised procedures. This was followed by the Joint 
Marrakech Memorandum on Managing for Results in 2004, where development banks 
agreed to orient development cooperation towards country results. The key forum to date, 
however, has been the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, held in 2005, where over 100 
signatories agreed on five principles of aid effectiveness: 
 Ownership 
 Alignment 
 Harmonisation 
 Managing for results 
 Mutual accountability 
The Paris Declaration proposed a set of indicators to measure progress, with targets to be 
achieved by 2010. The Paris Declaration was followed by Accra Agenda for Action in 2008, 
which was aimed at accelerating progress towards the Paris Declaration principles, and as 
such did not have any measurable indicators or targets. The latest high level forum on aid 
effectiveness took place in Busan in 2011, where partners signed the Busan Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation. Following the signing of the Partnership, a global 
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monitoring framework consisting of 10 indicators with targets to be achieved by 2015 was 
agreed. 
In addition, there has been one global, health sector-specific declaration – the International 
Health Partnership (IHP+) – which was signed in 2007, with the aim of applying the 
principles of the Paris Declaration to the health sector (189).  
The five principles of the Paris Declaration are found in previous and subsequent 
declarations, and are therefore referred to as the five principles of aid effectiveness 
henceforth.  
Table 7.1: International and Tanzanian policies aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of aid 
Year International declaration Tanzanian national declaration 
1997  Helleiner review’s 18 “Agreed Notes” 
2000 Monterrey Consensus on Financing 
for Development 
 
2002  Tanzanian Assistance Strategy (TAS) 
Health SWAP Code of Conduct 
2003 Rome Declaration on 
Harmonization 
Health Basket Fund Memorandum of 
Understanding 
2004 Marrakesh Memorandum on 
Managing for Results 
 
2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness 
 
2007 International Health Partnership Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania 
(JAST) 
Health SWAP Code of Conduct 
2008 Accra Agenda for Action  Health Basket Fund Memorandum of 
Understanding 
2011 Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation 
 
The Tanzanian aid landscape has also experienced major changes in the last two decades. 
Tanzania is a signatory of all the international declarations on aid effectiveness. In addition, 
it has its own aid policies. Since 1997 Tanzania has adopted three aid effectiveness 
frameworks: the Helleiner review’s 18 “Agreed Notes”, the Tanzania Assistance Strategy 
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(TAS) and the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST). These echo international 
commitments towards aid effectiveness, and emphasise transparency, accountability, local 
ownership, coordination and harmonization (348-349).  
7.3 Results 
Results are presented following the five principles of the aid effectiveness agenda. Given 
that there is often a disconnect between how principles are defined and measured, 
definitions and indicators for measurement are presented separately. A set of dimensions 
was developed to classify the different definitions and indicators of each principle. Where 
appropriate, the definitions and indicators of each principle are reported by the different 
dimensions. At the end of each principle, a table is provided summarising the different 
definitions and indicators found according to the different dimensions of the principle, as 
well as the indicators selected for this study. 
7.3.1 Ownership 
The definition of ownership 
This study found differences in how the different declarations, literature and national 
stakeholders interviewed defined and assessed ownership. Ownership is mentioned from 
the early declarations (Monterrey, Rome, Marrakech), often in conjunction with leadership. 
However, it was not until the Paris Declaration in 2005 that ownership was internationally 
recognised as a principle of aid effectiveness, later considered “the first priority” (Accra). 
Giving the recipient country ownership of the development process is often hailed as the 
major advantage of the SWAP approach (212), and both Tanzanian health SWAP and basket 
fund documents talk about the importance of increasing government ownership. Despite 
this, however, it is unclear whose ownership is discussed in these documents, or of what.  
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In terms of whose ownership, international declarations usually refer to the “partner 
country”, although in the JAST national ownership is defined in terms of government 
leadership of the development process (even if the role of non-state actors in development 
is acknowledged). The definition of “partner country” has also evolved, with initial 
declarations being very focused on the recipient government, but Accra, Busan and the TAS 
extending it to include Parliaments, local authorities and civil society. This broadening of 
the definition of “country” was echoed by some Development Partners (DPs), who viewed 
the increasing role civil society is playing as an essential part of “the system”. 
“... that’s for me a strengthening of the system. That's a great thing, and that's the 
best development which happened in this country: the civil society has got 
stronger.” (DP)  
When defining ownership of what, the Paris Declaration principle of ownership states that 
“partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and 
strategies and co-ordinate development actions”. This definition can be divided into two 
dimensions: leadership of development policies and coordination of development actions. 
The latter part of the definition has received the most attention in national and 
international declarations of aid effectiveness. It is encompassed in Busan (where it is 
called leadership of development partnerships), the JAST, which defines ownership as 
having a “government planned and organised dialogue process (…) and domestic 
stakeholder involvement in managing the development process”. Some studies in the 
literature also define ownership as the government having leadership of the development 
process (350-353). For the Tanzanian government representatives, ownership meant all of 
the above: having health and broader strategy documents and the capacity to coordinate 
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funds, negotiate and lead the dialogue. However, for most DPs the definition of ownership 
was restricted to the degree of government engagement in the SWAP dialogue52.  
“If I was looking to answer that question, I would look and see actually how – within 
the last year or two years – how much the government owns or engages in that 
process” (DP) 
Relatively little importance is given to the former part of the Paris Declaration’s definition 
of ownership (country leadership of development policies) in international declarations. In 
Busan it is toned down to development policies being tailored to country context and 
needs, and in Accra DPs agreed to change their conditionality rules to make them more 
consistent with country ownership. In contrast, for some non-government stakeholders this 
was the key definition of ownership, which they described as having the “upper hand” 
when deciding priorities of domestic and foreign resources. Similarly, a DP used the 
metaphor of giving the government ownership by putting it in the “driver’s seat”, although 
acknowledged this did not guarantee government ownership. 
“… we talk a lot about ownership, government is in the driver seat, and then if we 
complain all the time about the driver and the driver's style of driving, I think that is 
very difficult then for the driver to really maintain the driver's seat responsibility.” 
(DP)  
Confusion as to what this meant in practice led to frustrations amongst national 
stakeholders, who felt that ownership was interpreted by DPs as not being involved in the 
“nitty gritty” technical level health sector management. 
“At least it’s a misunderstood concept; if that is the way it is perceived. I have heard 
development partners maintain that they should not be technically involved in what (the 
government) are doing here because that would reduce ownership...” (Non-government)  
                                                          
52 The SWAP dialogue is made up of different structures where DPs, government and other 
stakeholders meet to plan and account for the use of health resources (see Chapter 5 for a 
description of these structures) 
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The definition of ownership as the recipient country leading development policies has also 
received much attention in the literature, although interpretations have ranged from giving 
the government control of external financing (351), letting the government set its priorities 
(354-355), in an inclusive process involving all major stakeholders (including DPs) (356), or 
having national policies that are supported by domestic and external resources (205). A 
related issue, which is receiving increasing attention in the literature, is the impact external 
financing has on domestic resource priorities. This is known as fungibility, and although 
largely absent from international declarations, some studies have explained fungibility as 
the result of differing priorities between governments and DPs (160, 162), a view 
supported by some DPs: 
“It’s the government that makes the marginal decisions. So if (DPs) say we are 
going to provide an extra X hundred million dollars for health, the total amount of 
health is still up to the government.” (DP) 
If fungibility is interpreted as the government having its own priorities and re-allocating its 
resources in response to foreign finance, then it is also a definition of ownership. There are 
different definitions of fungibility in the literature. These include general fungibility (aid 
intended for a general purpose is used for a different expenditure, for instance investment 
vs. consumption), categorical fungibility (aid is spent for a purpose other than what it was 
intended for) and fungibility as non-additionality (aid is allocated to the intended 
expenditure but government’s own resources are reallocated elsewhere) (357). The latter 
definition was used by national stakeholders in relation to ownership. 
“... we’re shovelling money in and they’re shovelling money out.” (DP)  
Finally, some definitions of ownership in national declarations overlapped with 
international declarations’ definition of alignment. For instance, the TAS asks DPs to adopt 
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the national expenditure framework and the JAST it includes national capacity 
development as part of ownership.  
In summary, despite recognition of the importance of ownership, there was no consensus 
regarding its definition among the data sources reviewed in this study. Definitions can be 
classified as those which describe whose ownership and those which describe what should 
be owned. The notion of whose ownership has evolved and broadened over time to include 
government and non-state actors. Definitions of what should be owned by countries 
included development partnerships (favoured by national and international declarations) 
and development strategies (more prominent in the literature and amongst stakeholders 
interviewed).  
Review of indicators 
Despite the multiple dimensions of ownership mentioned in international declarations, the 
literature and by national stakeholders, the indicators proposed to measure the attainment 
of this principle have a narrow focus. A review or the ownership discourse concluded the 
Paris Declaration indicator for ownership is restrictive, quantitative and arbitrary (358). 
Given that ownership only became a principle of aid effectiveness in Paris, it is the first 
declaration to propose an indicator for it, which is whether countries have operational 
development strategies. This indicator was also used by some studies in the literature (355, 
359-360). The Accra Agenda does not have indicators, and the indicator that is proposed to 
assess ownership by the Busan partnership is the extent of use of country results 
frameworks by co-operation providers. This shows that despite the changes in definitions 
for ownership over time, the indicators proposed to assess it have not changed, except for 
incorporating a results-based focus. Nationally, the TAS has two indicators: the degree of 
government leadership in developing policy priorities and strategic frameworks and the 
degree to which DP policies complement domestic capacity building efforts. In the JAST, 
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the principle of ownership is assessed through the use of the Paris Declaration indicators 
for alignment: the percentage of technical cooperation for capacity development through 
coordinated programmes, and having reliable procurement and public financial 
management systems in place. Other indicators for ownership found in the literature 
include the degree of control governments have over resources, both domestic and 
external, including setting priorities and managing DP funds (205, 351, 354-356, 361) and 
whether there is evidence of a coordination committee meeting regularly and if they are 
attended by different stakeholder groups (362). 
Studies of fungibility53 are often undertaken across countries to assess fungibility through 
the comparison of the amount of Development Assistance for Health (DAH) going through 
the government (DAH-G) and the amount of government expenditure on health as a source 
(GEH-S) (67). Fungibility has been studied at the country level in Vietnam by comparing 
observed health outcomes of discrete projects in different regions (69). 
Ownership indicators selected 
To develop a set of comprehensive and context-specific indicators that assess the aid 
effectiveness principle of ownership, a combination of the indicators found in national and 
international declarations as well as in the literature and stakeholder interviews was used. 
These indicators assess the different dimensions of the definition of ownership identified.  
The indicators proposed to assess ownership are: 
1. Existence of a health sector strategy and financial expenditure framework 
(international and national declarations and literature) 
2. Stakeholder perceptions of national participation in the dialogue (interviews and 
literature) 
                                                          
53 This is limited to the non-additionality definition of fungibility 
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3. Degree of national leadership in priority-setting of domestic and external resources 
(interviews and literature) 
4. Trends in domestic and external health financing (fungibility) (interviews and 
literature): 
a) Trends in total Government Expenditure on Health as a Source  
b) Trends in Government Expenditure on Health as a proportion of Total Government 
Expenditure  
c) Trends in total Development Assistance for Health delivered through the 
government 
d) Trends in Development Assistance for Health as a proportion of total official 
development assistance and Total Government Expenditure 
The first indicator selected was the Paris Declaration indicator. This is because it is the main 
indicator in international declarations, is commonly used to assess ownership in the 
literature (359-360) and it was mentioned by national stakeholders. However, both the 
literature and interviews showed that this indicator was too simplistic, so three further 
indicators are proposed. The second and third indicators assess national participation in 
and leadership of the dialogue respectively. Given that the inclusiveness of actors that 
count as national has increased in later declarations, and that stakeholder interviews 
revealed that non-government actors have played an increasingly important role in the 
dialogue over the timeline of the SWAP, the term national here includes government and 
non-government agencies involved in the health sector (such as the relevant ministries, 
Parliament and civil society). The second and third indicators are measured qualitatively 
through non-participant observation of dialogue meetings and in-depth interviews. The 
final set of indicators addresses fungibility. Fungibility is assessed by comparing trends in 
health financing from domestic and external sources. Availability and quality of data on 
national expenditures on health is limited (see Chapter 3); therefore, quantitative trends 
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are described and possible explanations for the trends were discussed during in-depth 
interviews. We compare trends in total domestic and external health expenditure and the 
relative shares each represent of total (domestic and external) expenditure to give an 
indication of how they change in relation to each other and as an overall priority to DPs and 
government.  
Government ownership of technical assistance is an indicator of ownership in the TAS; 
however, it was not included here because of a lack of adequate data to track it.  
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Table 7.2: Definitions and indicators of the principle of Ownership54 
Dimension 
Policy Documents Literature Interviews 
Proposed indicators Definition Indicators Definition Indicators Definition 
Leadership of 
development 
partnerships 
 
 Strengthen 
government 
leadership of 
dialogue, 
including 
leading 
coordination 
of DPs (JAST, 
Accra, Paris, 
Busan) 
 Degree of 
integration of 
resources into the 
strategic 
expenditure 
framework (TAS) 
 
 DPs work with govt 
(351) 
 Coordination mechanisms 
are institutionalised and led 
by the government (205, 
361) 
 Coordination committee 
meeting regularly with 
stakeholder participation 
(362) 
 Government 
participation in 
the dialogue 
 Capacity and 
exercise of 
leadership 
dialogue 
 
 Stakeholder 
perceptions of 
national participation 
in the dialogue 
 
Leadership of 
development 
policies and 
priorities 
 Countries 
determining 
and 
implementing 
their 
development 
policies (Paris, 
Accra, Busan, 
TAS) 
 
 Partners have 
operational 
development 
strategies  (Paris, 
IHP+) 
 Extent of use of 
country results 
frameworks by co-
operation providers 
(Busan)  
 Giving govt control 
of money (351)  
 Government sets 
its priorities and has 
control over finance 
and operations (354-
355), in an inclusive 
process with major 
stakeholders, 
including DPs (356) 
 Partners have operational 
development strategies 
(Paris) (359-360) 
 Government has 
leadership of the 
development process (350-
353), domestic and external 
resources (361), health 
programmes (363) 
 
 Government 
being in the 
driving seat 
 Degree of DP 
involvement in 
health sector 
management  
 Fungibility 
 Existence of a health 
sector strategy and 
financial expenditure 
framework    
 Degree of national 
leadership in priority-
setting of domestic 
and external resources  
 
 
                                                          
54 Indicators that are repeated across different sources are underlined 
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Dimension 
Policy Documents Literature Interviews 
Proposed indicators Definition Indicators Definition Indicators Definition 
   
  DPs change 
conditionality 
to make it 
more 
consistent 
with 
ownership 
(Accra) 
 Degree to which 
DP policies 
complement 
domestic capacity 
building efforts (TAS, 
Rome, JAST and 
IHP+) 
 Domestic and 
external resources 
support national 
policies (205) 
 Government leadership of 
the process of designing 
development strategies 
(364) 
 Partners have the capacity 
to implement development 
strategy (365) 
 Degree of control recipient 
governments are able to 
secure over implemented 
policy outcomes (366) 
 Fungibility: change in 
Government Health 
Expenditure as Source with 
increases in Development 
Assistance delivered 
through the government 
(38, 67) 
  Trends in total 
Government 
Expenditure on Health 
as a Source  
 Trends in 
Government 
Expenditure on Health 
as a proportion of 
Total Government 
Expenditure  
 Trends in total 
Development 
Assistance for Health 
delivered through the 
government 
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Dimension 
Policy Documents Literature Interviews 
Proposed indicators Definition Indicators Definition Indicators Definition 
 Trends in 
Development 
Assistance for Health 
as a proportion of 
total official 
development 
assistance and Total 
Government 
Expenditure 
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7.3.2 Alignment 
The definition of alignment 
Like ownership, alignment was mentioned in early declarations but did not become a 
principle of aid effectiveness internationally until Paris in 2005. It was no longer a principle 
in Accra or Busan, although they both include commitments to alignment under their 
ownership principles. However, in the national sphere, alignment appears in documents 
pre-dating the Paris Declaration. Definitions of alignment found in the sources reviewed in 
this study can be classified into three dimensions: adherence to country development 
strategy, increased use of country public financial management and procurement systems 
and improvements in the quality of country systems. 
The definition of adherence to country strategy was mostly uniform across the different 
sources. On the whole it meant respecting country’s priorities as stated in their sector or 
national development plans (Accra, JAST, IHP+, Paris, (367-370)), a view also supported by 
some DPs: 
“In our case we are aligned to the sector wide approach, our objectives, targets, 
indicators, they are taken from the (Health Sector Strategic Plan), the national 
reform agenda in the health sector, which is aligned to MKUKUTA55.” (DP)  
Some international declarations go a step further by asking DPs to report their expenditure 
on national budgets (IHP+ and Paris), if they attach conditions to their aid, to do so drawing 
from the country’s national strategy, and to link funding to a single framework (Paris).  
All sources also agreed alignment meant using country systems, which are defined as public 
financial management (PFM) (Paris, Accra, Busan, (371-372)) and procurement systems 
(Paris, Accra, (372)). More specific definitions of alignment include: providing funds in the 
                                                          
55 Poverty reduction strategy 
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form of general budget support and basket funds (SWAP code of conduct, JAST, TAS, 
Heillener, (368)); aligning to the government’s budgetary cycles (JAST, (362, 367)); relying 
on country audits and financial reporting systems (SWAP code of conduct, Marrakech); 
improving predictability (Paris, Accra, JAST, TAS, (372)); and untying of aid (Paris, JAST, TAS, 
(372)). DPs also saw alignment as using the government systems, although some were 
unsure about how to do this in practice. 
“So there’s a variety of models of how – working with government and how that 
would work. So we’re looking at that right now (...) about how we could make that 
engagement happen.” (DP) 
The government also viewed alignment in terms of DPs delivering aid “on budget” (through 
the government financial management system) and following government priorities. They 
also referred to alignment of reporting to its processes of accountability for resource use, 
rather than DPs asking for separate reports.  
The final dimension of alignment is improving the capacity of government systems, which is 
consistently referred to in international and national policies and in the SWAP code of 
conduct, often as a pre-condition of DPs using the government system. However, this was 
not a prominent feature emerging from interviews or the literature.   
In summary, definitions of alignment are mostly consistent between the different sources 
reviewed in this study. However, despite alignment featuring strongly in the Paris 
Declaration, its relative importance in subsequent international declarations has declined. 
Review of indicators 
Indicators proposed by different sources are in line with the three dimensions of the 
definition outlined above. Alignment to national strategies is measured as the proportion 
of aid flows reported on national budgets (Paris, Busan, JAST, (372)) and the proportion of 
technical assistance that is coordinated (Paris, (372-373)). Use of country systems is 
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assessed as: the percentage of aid flows disbursed through country PFM and procurement 
systems (Paris, Busan, JAST, (362, 367-368, 372-377)); the number of Parallel 
Implementation Units (PIUs) (Paris, (372, 374)); the proportion of funds committed that are 
disbursed in a timely manner (Paris, TAS, JAST); and the proportion of aid that is untied 
(Paris, JAST). In addition, the JAST has three additional indicators: percent of 
projects/programmes not aligned to national and sector strategies and the number and 
percentage of projects which are only for piloting, emergency and large scale infrastructure 
(conditions acceptable to the government to disburse aid as projects). The capacity of 
country PFM and procurement systems has been measured using criteria developed by the 
World Bank (PFM) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) (procurement) (Paris, Busan, TAS, JAST).  
Alignment indicators selected 
The indicators proposed in this study assess two of the dimensions of alignment: the use 
and strengthening of country systems. DP’s alignment with country strategies was assessed 
as part of ownership, and is therefore not included here. Country systems for monitoring 
and accounting for results will be included in the related principle (managing for results). 
The definition of “country systems” adopted was public financial management and 
procurement systems, as it was the prevailing definition in the literature and the Paris 
Declaration, and was also used by stakeholders during interviews.  
The indicators selected to assess alignment in this study are:  
1. Trends in the percentage of DAH going through the government (DAH-G) 
(international declarations and literature). 
2. Trends in the percentage of DAH-G that is in the form of budget support and basket 
fund (national declarations). 
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3. Stakeholder perceptions of the drivers of trends in channel and modality of DAH 
delivery (interviews). 
4. Stakeholder perceptions of quality of country systems (interviews). 
The first and second indicators assess the use of country systems quantitatively. This is 
done as the proportion of DAH that is disbursed through the government (indicator 1) and 
as the proportion of DAH disbursed through the government that is either budget support 
or pooled funds (indicator 2). The reason for the latter is to assess how DPs comply with 
national declarations of aid effectiveness. In addition, to understand why different funding 
modalities and channels were used, indicator 3 assesses stakeholder perceptions of the 
reasons behind changes in trends for indicators 1 and 2 since the establishment of the 
SWAP. The final indicator proposed assesses the quality of government systems. This will 
be measured qualitatively for two reasons. First, because the quality of country systems 
has already been assessed quantitatively in the evaluation of the Paris Declaration and, 
second, because assessment of stakeholder perceptions of quality is considered a 
precursor of aligning to the system in international declarations. 
The tying and predictability of aid and number of PIUs were not included in the indicator 
framework. The tying of aid was excluded because the quality of the data available did not 
allow for assessment and non-participant observation and interviews revealed that, with 
the exception of technical assistance, this was no longer an issue of concern for the 
government stakeholders that took part in the study. Although predictability of aid and 
number of PIUs are used as indicators of alignment in international declarations and the 
literature, DAH data were not sufficiently complete to allow for these indicators to be 
measured.   
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Table 7.3: Definitions and indicators of the principle of Alignment 
Dimension 
Policy Documents Literature Interviews 
Proposed 
indicators Definition Indicators Definition Indicators Definition 
Alignment to 
government 
strategy 
DPs base 
their support 
on partner 
countries 
national 
strategies 
(Paris) 
   Alignment of funds with 
sector priorities 
(compared with health 
strategic plan) (368) or 
with PRSP (369) 
  
Use of 
country 
system 
Use of 
country 
financial 
management 
and 
procurement 
systems 
(Paris) 
 % aid to government 
reported on national 
budget (Paris, Busan, 
JAST, IHP+) 
 % ODA disbursements 
using national financial 
reporting and auditing 
procedures (Paris, JAST) 
 
 
 
 
 DPs use of 
partners’ 
national 
development 
strategies as 
the 
framework of 
reference for 
programming 
country 
assistance 
(367) 
 
 Proportion of health aid 
reported on national 
budgets (372) 
 Use of country 
procurement system (Paris 
indicator) (373) 
 Use of recipients’ PFM 
systems (372-374)  
 
 Trends in DAH funding 
mechanisms (368) 
 Number of PIUs (372, 
378) 
 Working with 
the government 
 Delivering 
funds using 
their system 
  Trends in the 
percentage of 
DAH going 
through the 
government 
 Trends in the 
percentage of 
DAH delivered 
through the 
government 
that is in the 
form of basket 
fund and 
budget support 
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Dimension 
Policy Documents Literature Interviews 
Proposed 
indicators Definition Indicators Definition Indicators Definition 
 % DPs and aid flows 
using partner PFM and 
procurement systems, 
which either adhere to 
good practices or have 
a reform programme 
(Paris, Busan, JAST, 
IHP+) 
 Number of Parallel 
Implementation Units 
(PIUs) (Paris, JAST, 
IHP+) 
 Alignment to 
the budget 
cycle (362, 
367) 
 Stakeholder 
perceptions of 
the drivers of 
trends in 
channel and 
modality of 
DAH delivery 
Capacity of 
country 
system 
Capacity 
building in 
line with 
national 
priorities 
(Paris, IHP+, 
Busan, 
SWAP, 
Helliener, 
TAS) 
 Quality of PFM 
systems (World Bank’s 
Country Policy and 
Institutional Analysis 
criteria) (Paris, Busan) 
 Quality of 
procurement systems 
(OECD-DAC criteria) 
(Paris, Busan) 
 
  Proportion of technical 
cooperation that is 
coordinated (372-373) 
 Capacity and 
quality of the 
country system 
 
 Stakeholder 
perceptions of 
quality of 
government 
systems  
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7.3.3 Harmonisation 
The definition of harmonisation 
Early declarations made a strong emphasis on harmonisation. Emphasis on harmonisation 
has however decreased post-Paris, with Busan and Accra replacing it with inclusive and 
effective development partnerships. Reference to harmonisation is often found in the 
literature within discussions of coordination. Coordination is seen as a pillar of the sector-
wide approach (347), and has been defined as a way of managing inputs at the sector level, 
led by the government, with all DPs aligning to the national development strategy (205, 
361, 379). Harmonisation is therefore one aspect of SWAP coordination, following from 
ownership, for DPs to work together. However, harmonisation itself can be viewed as a 
coordination mechanism. Indeed, the definitions of harmonisation reviewed in this study 
can be divided into two dimensions: coordination of DP processes and procedures, and 
fragmentation. 
Harmonisation has been defined as DPs having common arrangements, including planning, 
funding, disbursement, monitoring, evaluating and reporting aid flows (Rome, Paris, IHP+, 
Helleiner, JAST (350, 356, 361, 376, 380-381)); procedures, such as field missions and 
country analytic work (Monterrey, Marrakech, Paris, JAST, with the goal of reducing 
transaction costs (382)); an effective division of labour (Paris, Accra, Busan, JAST, (381)), 
use of Programme Based Approaches (PBAs) (Paris, Busan, (351, 372)) and delegated 
cooperation (Busan). In addition, DPs have committed to changing their internal structures 
and incentives to achieve this (Rome, Paris). Other definitions found in the literature 
include the existence of DP meetings (376, 381, 383), having a strategic plan and 
consultative meetings (356, 376, 384) and pooling arrangements (376, 381). The latter two 
fall under the definitions of ownership and alignment adopted in this study respectively. 
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In Accra and Busan DPs also agreed to reduce fragmentation as part of their commitment 
to a harmonised approach. Fragmentation has also been used in the literature as a 
measure of effectiveness of DP harmonisation and coordination (54, 361), and was a 
matter of concern for DPs in Tanzania, some of whom saw it as an objective of the Paris 
Declaration. 
“… that’s the point of Paris, right? It’s try to minimize [fragmentation], try to 
minimize transaction costs, try to improve coordination, and harmonization and 
alignment...”  (DP) 
Review of indicators 
Of all the national and international declarations, only Paris, the Helleiner review and the 
JAST have proposed indicators to assess harmonisation. These include: the percentage of 
aid flows provided as a programme-based approach (defined as budget support, basket 
funding and projects delivered through a sector-wide approach) (Paris); the percentage of 
DP missions and country analytic work that are joint (Paris, JAST); and the number and 
frequency of coordination meetings between DPs and government (Helleiner, SWAP code 
of conduct (2007)). These indicators are not used in the literature, however. Studies in the 
literature assessed the efficacy of coordination systems according to whether they reduced 
duplication of services and decreased the number of conflicting policy signals (361), the 
existence of documentary evidence that stakeholders have attended preparatory meetings 
(362), reduced transaction costs (205), or through open-ended qualitative questions about 
existence of coordination mechanisms and how and whether they worked (385). 
When asked about how the success of harmonisation procedures should be assessed, all 
stakeholder groups felt that the purpose of DP harmonisation mechanisms was to build a 
common front for DPs. 
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“… (DPs) are supposed to act as one group with one voice ... they would meet – the 
donors – before  the official meeting with the government and others, to agree on 
their opposition regarding the agenda of the meeting” (Non-government) 
There is no indicator for fragmentation in international declarations. The JAST has two 
fragmentation indicators (number of active DPs per sector and number of sectors for each 
DP) to assess division of labour. Fragmentation has also been assessed in the literature 
quantitatively by measuring either project counts (44-45) and sizes (44), number of DPs 
(375) or DP concentration through, for example, the Herfindahl index (40, 45, 386) or the 
OECD index (44, 387). The latter measures the proportion of DPs that account for less than 
10% of DAH. Despite there being different indicators to assess fragmentation, there is no 
agreed cut off point beyond which fragmentation is considered harmful or excessive, and 
indeed some studies have shown too little fragmentation is also not desirable (particularly 
given DP volatility and uncertainty about levels of future funding) (12, 44). 
In summary, harmonisation has been defined and measured along two dimensions: DP 
coordination, which was particularly highlighted in international declarations and national 
stakeholders, and fragmentation, which was the focus of the literature and national 
declarations of aid effectiveness. Although the definition of harmonisation has not evolved 
over time, its importance has declined from being the sole purpose of the Rome 
Declaration, to being incorporated under “inclusive development partnerships” in Busan. 
Harmonisation indicators selected 
Five indicators were selected to assess harmonisation; the first two assess the functionality 
of DP coordination mechanisms and the last three assess fragmentation. Given that the 
Paris evaluation already assessed coordination mechanisms quantitatively, and quantitative 
data were hard to obtain, qualitative indicators are proposed for DP coordination 
mechanisms to explore how they have worked in practice. A combination of indicators of 
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fragmentation was selected from the literature. The OECD fragmentation index was chosen 
over the Herfindahl index as the latter is used in cross-country regression studies, and the 
OECD index combined with the other three indicators provides enough accuracy to assess 
trends over time in a single country, single sector. Instead, it was felt that it was more 
important to assess the fragmentation indicators at the sector and sub-sector level by DP 
and sub-sector priority to provide a more in-depth analysis of the DPs or priority areas that 
were driving the fragmentation trends observed.  
Therefore the indicators proposed to assess harmonisation are: 
1. Stakeholder perceptions of functionality of common arrangements and procedures 
(division of labour, joint visits, planning and monitoring), including whether they 
improve the management of the sector and reduce fragmentation, and therefore 
transaction costs (national and international declarations and interviews) 
2. Stakeholder perceptions of DPs’ ability to have a common position (interviews) 
3. Number of DPs (literature) 
4. Proportion of DPs accounting for less than 10% of DAH (literature) 
5. Number and average size of projects (literature) 
6. Stakeholder perceptions of the drivers and impact of fragmentation (interviews 
and literature) 
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Table 7.4: Definitions and indicators of the principle of Harmonisation 
Dimension 
Policy Documents Literature Interviews 
Proposed 
indicators Definition Indicators Definition Indicators Definition 
Coordination 
 
 Common 
arrangements and 
procedures (Paris, 
JAST, IHP+) 
 Incentives for 
collaboration 
(Rome, Paris) 
 Delegated 
cooperation (Rome, 
Accra, Busan, JAST) 
 Processes 
harmonised with 
national calendar 
(JAST)  
 Inclusive 
partnerships 
involving new 
actors (Accra, 
Busan)  
 
 
 Coordinated 
operational 
procedures 
(Monterrey, 
Rome, Paris, 
Busan, TAS), 
planning (Paris), 
DP missions 
(Rome, Paris, TAS, 
JAST, SWAP Code 
of practice) 
 Coordinated 
country analytic 
work – reviews, 
evaluations, 
accounting and 
reporting (Rome, 
Marrakech, Paris, 
TAS, JAST, Accra, 
IHP+) 
 
 Coordination of aid 
activities to reduce 
transaction costs (382) 
 DP coordination of 
resources across 
developing countries 
(382) 
 Differentiate between 
coordination within 
sector, sector-wide, 
across sectors at 
national level and 
global-level (380) 
 Common budgeting 
and accounting 
procedures (350, 376) 
 Consultative meetings 
(376) 
 DP-DP meetings (376) 
 
 Existence of 
coordination 
structure that 
meets regularly 
and is attended by 
key stakeholder 
groups (362) 
 Percentage of 
missions and 
analytic work that 
are joint (372, 377) 
 Programme/ 
project 
implementation 
through existing 
structures and 
mechanisms (362, 
367) 
 
 
 
 Coordination 
meetings 
 Burden on 
government 
 Division of 
labour 
 Common front 
(“speaking in 
one voice”) 
 Stakeholder 
perception of 
functionality of 
common 
arrangements 
and procedures, 
including 
whether they 
improve the 
management of 
the sector and 
reduce 
fragmentation 
and lower 
transaction 
costs  
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Dimension 
Policy Documents Literature Interviews 
Proposed 
indicators Definition Indicators Definition Indicators Definition 
 Division of labour 
(Paris, Accra, JAST, 
Busan) 
 Aid disbursed 
through PBAs 
(Paris, Busan) 
 Number and 
frequency of 
coordination 
meetings 
rationalised 
(Heillener) 
 Coordinated decision-
making, oversight and 
M+E and service delivery 
(385) 
 Aid disbursed 
PBAs56, including 
budget support 
and basket 
funding (372, 374-
377) 
 Stakeholder 
perceptions of 
DPs’ ability to 
have a common 
position  
Fragmentation   Number of active 
DPs per sector 
(JAST) 
 Number of sectors 
for each DP (JAST) 
 Proliferation of DPs 
and projects (40) 
 Concentration of DPs 
across sectors or 
countries (130) 
 Number of 
projects counts 
(44-45) 
 Size of projects 
(44) 
 Number of DPs 
(375) 
 Herfindahl index 
(40, 45, 386) 
 OECD 
fragmentation 
index (44, 387) 
  Number of DPs 
 Proportion of 
DPs accounting 
for less than 
10% of DAH 
 Number and 
average size of 
projects 
 Stakeholder 
perceptions of 
the drivers and 
impact of 
fragmentation  
 
                                                          
56 The definition of PBA varied across different studies 
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7.3.4 Managing for results 
The definition of managing for results 
Managing for results was a very important principle in early international declarations, and 
has regained importance since the Paris Declaration in 2005. Nationally, it was not a part of 
Tanzanian aid policies until the JAST (2007). Definitions of managing for results varied 
widely in the different sources reviewed as part of this study. 
Managing for results is broadly defined as DPs and recipient countries having an approach 
to development based on achieving results. Managing for results is often used 
interchangeably with results-based management (388). However, in the literature a 
difference has sometimes been made, with results-based management involving results-
specific information, capacities and results-specific objectives (389). As a result of tensions 
with ownership and predictability, results-based management has been toned down to 
“commitment to achieve results” rather than actually achieving them in the Paris 
Declaration (390). 
Specifically, there have been different interpretations of what “managing” means, with 
definitions varying between achieving results (Marrakech), aligning programming, 
monitoring and evaluation activities to expected results (Marrakech, Paris, JAST), keeping 
results reporting simple, cost-effective and user-friendly (Marrakech) and using results 
information in decision-making (Marrakech, Paris, JAST and Swiss (2005) (389)). Articles 
mostly defined management for results as an approach focusing on achieving outputs and 
outcomes, rather than inputs (391) or policy conditionality (392). DPs sometimes referred 
to it as “performance orientation of results”, without elaborating further. 
In addition, there are some disagreements as to what “results” means. The general 
definition used in the Paris and Marrakech agreements (also used by the OECD (388)) is 
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outputs, outcomes or impact. However, some studies have reported different agencies 
adopting different terms (393). In Busan, results were equated with eradicating poverty 
and reducing inequality, achieving sustainable development, and enhancing developing 
countries’ capacities. Finding the right measure of results was an issue for some of the DPs 
interviewed: 
“... it's easier to look at the big indicators. ‘Ah, infant mortality has gone down’ ‘Ah, 
under five mortality has gone down. great great.’ But we never asked ourselves 
with the money we inject we could've achieved a lot more” – DP  
In addition, some DPs felt that there was increasing pressure to show outputs and 
outcomes. 
“... you do get all of those questions about what has the basket accomplished? 
What are the outputs of the basket? What are the outcomes of the basket?” (DP)  
Similarly, another DP reported that despite increased awareness among DPs and 
government “that more needs to be done in terms of performance orientation of financing”, 
having performance indicators is not enough to manage for results. Government 
stakeholders did not have a specific definition for managing for results, but defined 
effective aid as that which achieves outputs (medications) and outcomes (saves lives), 
which reflects a results orientation.  
This lack of agreement on what managing for results is was reported with concern in the 
literature, particularly regarding the ambiguity of definitions of terms (392-394), and 
problems of assigning causality as there are multiple DPs and exogenous factors that can 
affect outcomes in addition to aid itself (392-393, 395). 
Review of indicators 
The Marrakech Memorandum of Understanding had eleven indicators to assess 
management for results (see Table 7.5), assessing: the extent to which strategies and 
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budgets of governments, development agencies and civil society organisations are linked to 
results; the capacity to manage for results; harmonisation of monitoring and evaluation; 
and information availability and use. In contrast, the Paris Declaration and the Busan 
Partnership only have one indicator each. The Paris Declaration focuses on countries having 
“transparent and monitorable” performance assessment frameworks.  This is taken further 
in Busan, which proposes that the use of these frameworks by DPs be assessed. These 
indicators are echoed in the literature, which focus on recipient countries having a results 
framework (396-398) that is unified and linked to a budget (399).  
Out of the national declarations, only the JAST has indicators to measure management for 
results. JAST indicators focus on the proportion of funds budgeted and spent on the 
poverty reduction strategy (MKUKUTA), which would better fit earlier definitions of 
ownership. Although sharing and using information is part of the definition of managing for 
results in these declarations and the literature, Paris, Busan and JAST have no indicators for 
this. National level stakeholders also reported that despite increased emphasis on 
measuring results, there were no clear guidelines on how to act on the information 
collected 
“So I mean all these together we have a lot of evidence, so in terms of 
accountability, now what do we do with that?” (DP)  
Managing for results indicators selected 
Three indicators are proposed to asses managing for results in this study. The first indicator 
assesses the existence and quality of a performance assessment framework. This is based 
on the indicators of the Paris Declaration and Busan Partnership (but also on those 
included in Marrakech and the literature), and would be the starting point for managing for 
results. However, the literature review and in-depth interviews revealed having a 
performance assessment framework in place is not enough to manage for results, the 
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information of the assessment of results needs to be made available in order to hold the 
government and DPs to account, but also to influence policy-making. The second and third 
indicators address these issues. Given the lack of clarity of what constitutes results outlined 
above, both outputs and outcomes were included (following the Paris Declaration and 
OECD definitions). 
The indicators proposed to assess management for results are: 
1. Existence of a unified, comprehensive and usable performance assessment 
framework with monitorable indicators that is used by DPs (international 
declarations)  
2. Stakeholder perceptions of availability of quality information on results (outputs 
and outcomes) to assess health system performance (interviews) 
3. Stakeholder perceptions of the use of results assessments in policy-making 
(interviews) 
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Table 7.5: Definitions and indicators of the principle of Managing for results 
Dimension 
Policy Documents Literature Interviews 
Proposed 
indicators Definition Indicators Definition Indicators Definition 
Commitment 
to managing 
for results 
 Focus national strategies and 
systems on country results 
(Marrakech) 
 Focus dialogue on results at 
all stages (Marrakech) 
 Align programmes and all 
activities to country results 
(Marrakech) 
 Focus on outcomes and 
impact and then identify 
inputs and activities 
(Marrakech) 
 Increased aid to strengthen 
country capacity to manage 
for results (Marrakech) 
 Development co-operation is 
focused on results that meet 
developing countries’ 
priorities (Busan)  
 %  national budget allocated 
and spent to MKUKUTA/ 
MKUZA (JAST) 
 Increased focus 
on outputs and 
outcomes, rather 
than inputs (388, 
392, 394, 400) 
 Programmes are 
aligned with 
objectives (398) 
 Evaluate by 
comparing 
against expected 
results (394) 
 Pay for 
performance 
(392, 394) 
 Commitment to 
achieve results 
rather than 
actually achieving 
them (390) 
  Increased 
emphasis on 
outputs and 
outcomes 
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Dimension 
Policy Documents Literature Interviews 
Proposed 
indicators Definition Indicators Definition Indicators Definition 
Performance 
assessment 
framework 
 Use and support country’s 
results framework (IHP+, 
Busan, JAST) 
 Integrate aid monitoring into 
government processes and 
strengthening government 
capacity to manage this (JAST) 
 Establish baselines, identify 
targets and indicators upfront 
(Marrakech) 
 Annual poverty reduction 
strategy progress report 
provides more favourable 
assessment of results focus 
(Marrakech) 
 Number of M&E reports 
prepared by civil society watch 
groups (Marrakech) 
 Number of countries with an 
integrated assessment of 
capacity for results based 
approaches (Marrakech) 
 Number of annual budget 
reports incorporating results 
based monitoring and 
evaluation data (Marrakech) 
 Number of agencies 
introducing a results-based 
approach to cooperation 
programs (Marrakech) 
 
 Formulate 
outcomes, goals, 
targets, 
objectives (392, 
394, 398, 400) 
 Need indicators 
for outcomes 
(394) 
 Have results 
framework 
(396-398) that 
is unified (399) 
 Prioritization 
within 
framework 
and strategic 
link to budget 
(399) 
 
 Contribution 
towards  
performance 
assessment 
framework 
 Definition of 
“result”  
 Existence of a 
unified, 
comprehensive 
and usable 
performance 
assessment 
framework with 
monitorable 
indicators that 
is used by DPs 
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Dimension 
Policy Documents Literature Interviews 
Proposed 
indicators Definition Indicators Definition Indicators Definition 
 Share of country 
cooperation programs with 
explicit results framework by 
agency (Marrakech) 
 Number of countries that 
adopt harmonized results 
reporting mechanisms based 
on national M&E systems 
(Marrakech) 
 Number of countries with a 
fully costed, integrated 
statistical action plan 
(Marrakech) 
 Number of consultations 
conducted by each agency 
(Marrakech) 
 Performance Assessment 
Frameworks are results-
oriented, transparent and 
monitorable (Paris) 
 
 
 
200 
 
Dimension 
Policy Documents Literature Interviews 
Proposed 
indicators Definition Indicators Definition Indicators Definition 
Availability 
and quality of 
data 
 Improve information 
systems (Accra) 
 Information is shared in a 
transparent, timely, clear and 
accessible manner (JAST) 
 Disseminate good practice 
(Marrakech) 
 Number of agency 
performance assessment 
reports published (Marrakech) 
 Need 
performance data 
(baseline and 
after) (389-390, 
394, 396-397, 
400) 
  Use of 
results in 
policy-making 
 Stakeholder 
perceptions of 
availability of 
quality 
information on 
results (outputs 
and outcomes) 
to assess health 
system 
performance 
Use of results 
in decision-
making 
 Use results in decision-
making (Busan) 
  Report and use 
results (393-394, 
396-397, 400) 
 Need capacity 
and incentives to 
act on 
information (389) 
   Stakeholder 
perceptions of 
the use of 
results 
assessments in 
policy-making 
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7.3.5 Mutual Accountability 
The definition of accountability 
Accountability is now a key principle of national and international declarations; however, it 
was not present in international declarations pre-Paris and was first mentioned nationally 
in the TAS (2002).  
Accountability of development assistance has been widely researched in the literature, 
where accountability is described as comprising different dimensions: “when” or at what 
stage of the aid process (decision-making, implementation, monitoring and evaluation) 
(174); “for what”: inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts (401); “to whom”: 
governments, DPs, end-users, institutions (402-403); type of accountability: financial, 
performance or political (404); and “how” or  through what mechanism (81).  
These distinctions are present in national and international aid policies. In terms of “when”, 
the emphasis in international declarations tends to be on end-stage results and monitoring 
and evaluation; however, national-level stakeholders and policies focus on the DP-
government dialogue, which serves for planning and accounting for results. The “for what” 
dimension was described in the managing for results section. 
 Interestingly, there has been a shift in the “to whom” dimension in national and 
international declarations. Up to Paris, international declarations have focused on DPs and 
recipient governments being mutually accountable for results and resource use. In Accra 
this was extended to DPs and recipient governments being accountable “to each other and 
their citizens”, and in Busan this is reaffirmed and taken further by also including 
organisations, constituents and stakeholders. The TAS focuses on accountability of the 
government, whereas the JAST focuses on mutual accountability between DPs and 
government (in line with Paris). DP-government mutual accountability is also the focus of a 
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study by Oliveira Cruz and McPake, who explored DP’s ability to hold the Ugandan 
government to account through the use of the “aid contract” (405).  
The final dimension is “how”. International declarations have focused on having joint (DP-
government) reviews (Paris, also in (175-176)). This was also supported in the JAST, which 
in addition requires independent reviews. In Tanzania, the core of health sector 
accountability took place through the dialogue, particularly in the Joint Annual Health 
Sector Review, where progress for the year was reviewed and milestones for the following 
year were established. Some DPs considered government participation in the SWAP 
dialogue was synonymous with accountability. 
“Are they showing up to the meetings? Are they accountable to the process?” (DP)  
Equally, some DPs also thought their participation in SWAP meetings ensured they were 
accountable to the government. 
“… in the sector wide approach [...] we join the annual planning meetings at the 
regional level, we are part and contributor and discussant of the annual review to 
the overall SWAP structure and dialogue processes, so I think accountability is more 
or less through the whole dialogue structure” (DP)  
National declarations and representatives from the GoT also viewed having the provision of 
reports on budget execution as a mechanism of accountability, as did a study in the 
literature (81). The literature also calls for mechanisms for holding those responsible to 
account (175, 406), although national-level stakeholders were not clear on what this would 
mean in practice.  
Finally, national and international declarations, as well as some studies in the literature, 
also defined accountability in terms of transparency, both in terms of the decision-making 
process and the use of funds (170, 176-177).  
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Review of indicators 
The indicators to assess accountability mostly focus on the “how”. The key indicator for 
accountability in international declarations was the existence of mutual assessment of 
progress (Busan, Paris and JAST). This can take the form of sector reviews, which have been 
assessed in terms of their completeness (inputs, activities, outputs and outcomes); degree 
of institutionalisation and promotion of reform towards achievement of the Paris 
Declaration; alignment with existing frameworks; and the degree of participation of 
governmental and non-governmental actors (407). In addition, in Tanzania assessment of 
progress also takes place through the annual JAST implementation and mid-term and final 
independent assessment reports (JAST, also agreed in the Health Basket Fund agreement) 
and audit reports from the Controller and Auditor General (TAS). Other indicators include a 
qualitative assessment of sector dialogue (JAST), the degree to which the GoT has created 
an appropriate national accountability system for public expenditure (TAS), the proportion 
of development assistance that has a good monitoring and evaluation framework (408) and 
the degree to which DPs are able to keep the government to account on its promises 
through the use of rewards and penalties (405).  
Transparency has been assessed in aid effectiveness declarations according to whether all 
DPs have a common, open standard for electronic publication of timely, comprehensive 
and forward-looking information on development co-operation (Busan), the percentage of 
DPs providing timely quarterly reports to government (JAST), the proportion of non-state 
agencies that adhere to code of conduct on transparency and accountability (JAST) and the 
degree of transparency in reporting and accountability at both national and sectoral level 
(TAS). Transparency has also been assessed in the literature in relation to DPs by whether 
they report to aid databases (408-410), the quality of this reporting (408, 411) and whether 
DPs are members of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (408).  
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Accountability indicators selected 
Some dimensions of the definition of accountability are included under other principles, for 
instance accountability for results (for what) is included in managing for results and 
participation in dialogue (how) is assessed as part of ownership. Given that the Paris 
Declaration and the JAST only focus on accountability between government and DPs, and 
that this was the only type of accountability mentioned by national stakeholders, indicators 
selected to assess accountability only focus on mutual accountability between DPs and the 
government, rather than to citizens of DP or recipient country.  
The evaluation of the Paris Declaration used the existence of a mechanism for mutual 
performance review to assess accountability. This was in place in the Tanzanian health 
SWAP – the Joint Annual Health Sector Review. However, based on the literature review 
and stakeholder interviews, it was felt that this alone was not enough to assess 
accountability. Therefore, this study proposes to explore accountability along three 
indicators. The indicators selected are all qualitative, in an effort to be less prescriptive 
than for the other principles. This is because the notion of accountability is not only context 
specific but also dependent on the perspectives of the different stakeholders, and 
accountability was the principle local stakeholders found the hardest to define. The 
indicators proposed here can be explored through different qualitative methods including 
in-depth interviews, document review and non-participant observation.  
The first indicator proposed is the ability of DPs to hold the government to account, as it is 
the focus of much of the literature. In addition, international declarations call for mutual 
accountability, which would also involve the government holding DPs to account. Therefore 
the second indicator is the ability of the government to hold DPs to account. Finally, given 
the importance of transparency in declarations of aid effectiveness, and particularly in the 
literature, this is proposed as the third indicator.  
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Therefore accountability in this study will be measured using three indicators: 
1. Stakeholder perceptions of ability of DPs to hold the government accountable 
(international and national declarations and literature) 
2. Stakeholder perceptions of ability of the government to hold DPs accountable 
(interviews) 
3. Transparency in the use of resources of both DPs and the government 
(international and national declarations and literature)  
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Table 7.6: Definitions and indicators of the principle of Mutual accountability 
Dimension 
Policy Documents Literature Interviews Proposed 
indicators Definition Indicators Definition Indicators Definition 
To whom 
 
 Accountability 
to beneficiaries, 
citizens, 
organisations, 
constituents and 
stakeholders 
(Busan) 
 Strengthen 
dialogue (JAST) 
 Independent 
monitoring group 
review progress 
of DPs and Govt 
(JAST) 
 Governments 
commit to 
involving all 
stakeholders to 
develop common 
vision for health 
sector (IHP+) 
 DPs and government 
jointly assess mutual 
progress (Paris, Busan, 
JAST, IHP+), holding 
each other accountable 
for mutually agreed 
results (Accra) 
 Government has 
created national 
accountability system 
for expenditure and 
receives clean audits 
from the Controller and 
Auditor General (TAS) 
 Inputs, activities and 
outputs, outcomes and 
impacts (401) 
 Accountability to DPs and 
end users (402) 
 Accountability to public 
and institutions (403) 
 Accountability to end users 
and governments (402) 
 Processes, institutions and 
information should be 
accessible to understand 
and monitor health matters 
(403) 
 Three types: financial, 
performance and 
political/democratic (404) 
 To whom and for what 
(412) 
 
 
 Share of ODA with 
good M+E 
framework (408) 
 Answerability (413) 
and controllability 
(406)  
 Government 
accountability 
to DPs 
 Accountability 
mechanisms 
 Stakeholder 
perceptions of 
ability of DPs to 
hold the 
government 
accountable 
 Stakeholder 
perceptions of 
ability of the 
government to 
hold DPs 
accountable 
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Dimension 
Policy Documents Literature Interviews Proposed 
indicators Definition Indicators Definition Indicators Definition 
 DPs 
accountable for 
delivering 
funding and 
technical support 
they commit 
(IHP+) 
 
 Mechanisms: reports and 
disclosure statements, 
performance assessments 
and evaluations, 
participation, self-regulation 
and social audits – tools vs. 
process (81) 
 Three dimensions: 
upward-downward, internal-
external and functional-
strategic (81) 
How Performance 
assessment 
framework is 
transparent 
(IHP+) 
 Provide reports on 
budget execution, PER, 
GBS annual review, 
MKUKUTA 
implementation and 
JAST progress (JAST) 
 
 
 
 Decision-making progress 
and use of funds (170, 176-
177) 
 Ease of access to 
agency’s staff 
information and 
costs via website 
and email (409-410) 
 Whether DPs 
report info to DAC 
and CRS or other 
database (408-410) 
 
  Transparency 
in the use of 
resources of 
both DPs and 
the government 
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Dimension 
Policy Documents Literature Interviews Proposed 
indicators Definition Indicators Definition Indicators Definition 
 DPs report 
disbursements to govt 
and non-state actors 
quarterly and these  
share info on their 
activities and resources 
with their constituents 
and the Govt (JAST) 
 Greater transparency 
in the use of external 
and domestic resources 
(Accra, Paris, Accra, 
TAS), including 
establishing aid 
management systems 
(Busan). 
 Quality 
(completeness) of 
data available (408, 
411) 
 Whether a DP is 
member of the 
International Aid 
Transparency 
Initiative (IATI) (408)  
 Decisions and 
actions taken openly 
and information 
available to assess 
that relevant 
procedures are 
followed (406) 
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7.4 Discussion 
This study has developed a framework based on the principles of the global aid 
effectiveness agenda to evaluate the Tanzanian SWAP based on a synthesis of international 
and national data sources and stakeholder views in country. This is the first attempt to 
provide measurable and locally specific indicators for measuring the implementation of the 
global aid effectiveness agenda (some efforts have been made on individual principles 
(351)). The set of indicators proposed here include a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative measures, based on data availability at the country level and local and global 
appropriateness. Some of the proposed indicators are novel, such as the ability of DPs to 
form a common front to measure harmonisation (based on country-level interviews) and 
fungibility as an indicator of ownership (based on the literature and interviews). 
This research found that the five principles that constitute the global aid effectiveness 
agenda (ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and accountability) 
have been a consistent feature of international and national documents for some time. 
However, the way they are defined, measured and the relative weight that is placed upon 
them has changed. The principles have evolved and show an increasing recognition of the 
role of non-state actors. For instance, ownership was initially focused on the recipient 
government and was later expanded to include civil society. Similarly, accountability was 
defined as being mutual between DPs and country recipients in the Paris Declaration, 
whereas in the Busan Partnership the notion of accountability was extended to citizens of 
donor and recipient countries.  Moreover, the weight given to the individual principles has 
also changed. For instance, managing for results was initially very important with a whole 
declaration devoted to it, but lost weight during the Rome and Paris Declarations, which 
placed more emphasis on harmonisation and ownership, but is back to being a key 
principle in the approach to development outlined in Busan. Conversely, the principle of 
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harmonisation was key in the Rome Declaration, was still important in Paris, but 
subsequently decreased in importance. The decline of harmonisation has been associated 
with efforts to attract non-DAC DPs to discussions (382).  
This chapter has found that the definitions used for each principle in international and 
national declarations are often vague and have multiple dimensions. This is particularly the 
case with the principle of ownership, but also with managing for results and accountability, 
which may be due to the fact that they are abstract concepts and are therefore hard to 
define and measure. Sometimes the definitions and indicators of principles overlap, 
particularly between those that assess ownership and alignment.  
Despite the multi-dimensional nature of some of the principles, indicators often only focus 
on one aspect of the principle. For instance, ownership is defined as recipient countries 
having a development strategy and leading dialogue structures, yet the focus of the 
indicator used in international declarations is only on the first aspect of the definition. 
When assessing managing for results, the indicator used from the Paris Declaration 
onwards only measures whether there is a results framework in place or the extent to 
which it is used by DPs, and not whether information is available to evaluate results, and if 
anything is done with the results of the evaluations.  
Further, indicators tend to focus on the technocratic aspect of the definition, such as 
having structures/processes in place rather than whether these structures lead to the 
attainment of the principles (for instance joint assessment of performance to assess mutual 
accountability). This is further compounded by the fact that indicators in international 
declarations are quantitative in nature, which restricts their evaluation to elements that 
can be measured in this way (191) (although the Paris Declaration evaluation employed a 
thematic qualitative study (414)). The proposed indicators in this chapter expand those in 
declarations by not just assessing whether a process is in place, but by exploring whether 
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the process takes place and is found by those involved in it to contribute to its related 
principle. These indicators are more difficult to assess routinely, but a start could be to add 
open-ended questions to interviews and surveys used to evaluate aid effectiveness 
principles.   
This study also found that the definitions and indicators used to measure the principles of 
the agenda varied across the different data sources used (national and international aid 
effectiveness policies, the literature and in-depth interviews with Tanzanian stakeholders); 
although this varied between different principles. For instance, international declarations 
and the literature focused their measurement of harmonisation on whether DPs had 
common arrangements and procedures, whereas for national-level stakeholders 
harmonisation was dependent on the extent to which DPs could form a common front 
when meeting with the government. The indicators also varied between global and 
national aid effectiveness policies, despite the JAST being based on the Paris Declaration. 
For instance, the JAST and TAS have more detailed indicators of accountability mechanisms 
than the Paris Declaration. Further, the indicators of the TAS were not easily measurable, 
as they were vague in nature and read more like a wish list. This has changed in the JAST, 
showing improvement in the design of national aid effectiveness policies. Further, with the 
change in language from aid to development in the Busan Partnership, it will also become 
important to understand what development means in different contexts and for different 
stakeholders (191). 
Differences found between the global and national level show that one size does not fit all 
when it comes to aid effectiveness, neither for how the principles are defined or measured. 
This was also found by Sundewall et al., who assessed how ownership and coordination 
were understood in Bangladesh, Uganda and Zambia, and concluded that definitions varied 
between different participants and contexts (351). This means that perhaps having non-
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specific definitions and indicators at the global level may be a good thing, if they are then 
interpreted and assessed nationally through locally relevant definitions and indicators. 
However, in a separate study Sundewall et al. found that differences in local interpretations 
of ownership and coordination did result in problems when disagreements in health sector 
management arose (347). The global agenda would therefore benefit from being more 
specific in certain respects, for instance by defining who makes up “national” ownership, 
what “results” means (input, outcome, output or impact), or, given that accountability has 
been expanded since Accra to include citizens, it would be helpful to develop an indicator 
to measure this at the global level. 
The analytical framework developed in this chapter has some important weaknesses. The 
purpose was to adapt indicator frameworks available to assess the five principles of aid 
effectiveness to the Tanzanian health sector, rather than to develop a multi-component 
replicable index of aid effectiveness. Nevertheless, the indicator framework proposed in 
this chapter has some major shortcomings. No weight has been given to the different 
principles, the dimensions or indicators within them; in addition, although modifying the 
weights given to different components has been used to assess the robustness of multi-
dimensional indices (415), this was not done here. Chapter 3 describes the steps taken to 
ensure validity and reliability of the qualitative part of the study. However, this could have 
been taken further to improve the robustness of the framework by testing criterion and 
construct validity (416) and by re-testing the indicators to check if the same result is 
obtained to assess the reproducibility of the framework (417). 
Despite these shortcomings, the indicators developed as part of this study could be used 
elsewhere, especially those derived from the literature and international declarations; the 
others could be tested in other settings. However, the advice would be to always try to 
develop indicators that capture contextual factors and are relevant to the local 
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stakeholders. This may not always be feasible, in which case when doing evaluations of aid 
effectiveness, researchers should include open-ended questions for interviews and employ 
an inductive analysis to allow for themes to emerge, although this would of course increase 
the cost of and expertise needed to conduct evaluations. Having selected a set of 
indicators, it is also important to apply them to a real-life context. This is done in the next 
chapter to evaluate the extent to which the health SWAP has achieved aid effectiveness 
principles in Tanzania. 
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8 HAS THE TANZANIAN HEALTH SECTOR-WIDE APPROACH 
ACHIEVED THE PARIS DECLARATION? 
This chapter addresses the fourth objective of the thesis and aims to complement the 
SWAP literature by assessing whether the Tanzanian health SWAP has achieved the five 
principles of the aid effectiveness agenda, using the set of indicators reviewed in Chapter 7.  
The chapter starts with a brief overview of the current state of the literature on SWAPS. It 
then provides an outline of the analytical framework used to assess each of the principle of 
aid effectiveness. This is followed by the results of applying the framework to each 
principle. The chapter ends with a discussion of the reasons for the findings observed, 
including whether these principles remain achievable and desirable as a means to improve 
aid effectiveness.  
8.1 Introduction 
The literature review in Chapter 2 reported that concerns about the effectiveness of aid 
have led the international community to develop the aid effectiveness agenda and to adopt 
a new aid management mechanism – the Sector-Wide Approach (SWAP). There has been a 
wide recognition that the functioning of the SWAP is dependent on the policy, institutional 
and economic environment in which it is implemented (418). Evaluations of the sector-
wide approach in the health sector have therefore normally adopted a case study 
approach, either of a single or multiple countries. These studies have found mixed results, 
with Development Partners (DPs) increasingly integrated into budget processes, joint 
reviews and procedures successfully established, but highlighting concerns regarding low 
DP accountability, government leadership and the management complexity of the SWAP 
(204-206).  
Despite these evaluations, there are concerns in the literature that the health SWAP 
remains under-studied (38, 205). If the SWAP is viewed as a vehicle to achieve aid 
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effectiveness, then one way to evaluate its implementation would be by using the aid 
effectiveness agenda itself as a framework (213). There has only been one previous study 
that has empirically done this in the recently-established health SWAP of the Solomon 
Islands (207). The study found that there had only been modest adherence to the Pacific 
Islands principles of aid effectiveness (based in the Paris Declaration), and cautioned 
against an approach that is too focused on processes and inputs (207).  
There is now a need to evaluate whether a more established SWAP has attained the aid 
effectiveness agenda principles and whether the concerns highlighted in the Solomon 
Islands have been overcome. This chapter does this by applying the analytical framework 
developed in Chapter 7, based on the literature, the global and Tanzanian aid effectiveness 
agenda and the interpretation of national stakeholders, to assess each of the five aid 
effectiveness principles. The specific objectives are to assess whether the SWAP has led to: 
increased country ownership; the alignment of Development Assistance for Health (DAH) 
with government systems; harmonisation of DPs; an approach based on management for 
results and mutual accountability between the government and DPs. 
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Box 3: Key messages of Chapter 8 
 There have been mixed results in the attainment of the different principles. 
o All actors in the health sector work under a unified sector strategy, but 
this does not guarantee country ownership 
o Initial progress towards alignment and pooling of funds was observed, 
but there are indications this is now reversing 
o There have been significant efforts towards harmonising an increasingly 
fragmented and diverse DAH architecture, although it is uncertain 
whether this has reduced transaction costs. 
o Performance assessment frameworks have been adopted, but concerns 
regarding data quality and the use of evidence in policy-making may 
undermine managing for results. 
o There has been limited progress towards mutual accountability.  
 Generally, the indicators of international declarations, which have a 
technocratic focus, showed better progress than the indicators developed as 
part of this study, where broader definitions and the context are incorporated. 
 When applied at the country level, the agenda was found to include 
contradicting principles and be hindered by institutional factors, such as DP 
dependency on headquarters and government capacity; but the SWAP remains 
feasible and desirable. 
 There is fatigue and commitment to the SWAP approach has been declining. 
This may be improved if SWAP structures become more streamlined and 
government leadership is strengthened.  
 Findings from this chapter highlight the importance of studying the institutional 
factors that may help understand these results. 
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8.2 Assessment framework 
The Tanzanian health SWAP is made up of the following structures:  
- Policy and expenditure framework 
- Common funding mechanisms 
- DP harmonisation mechanisms 
- Performance assessment framework 
- Policy dialogue for budgeting and accounting for financial resources 
The indicator framework developed in Chapter 7 to assess aid effectiveness principles was 
applied to assess each of these structures of the SWAP. Table 8.1 below summarises for 
each aid effectiveness principle, the indicators used, the relevant SWAP mechanisms, and 
which quantitative and qualitative methods were used to measure indicators.   
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Table 8.1: Framework used to assess the attainment of aid effectiveness principles 
Principle Indicator 
SWAP mechanism 
studied 
Qualitative methods 
Quantitative 
methods 
Ownership Existence of a health sector strategy and financial 
expenditure framework 
Policy and 
expenditure 
framework 
Policy dialogue 
 Non-participant 
observation  
 Document review 
 In-depth interviews 
N/A 
 Stakeholder perceptions of national participation in the 
dialogue 
SWAP and Health 
Basket Fund policy 
dialogue 
 Non-participant 
observation 
 Document review 
 In-depth interviews 
 
 Degree of national leadership in priority-setting of domestic 
and external resources  
Policy dialogue  In-depth interviews  
 Trends in domestic and external health financing (fungibility) Funding 
mechanisms 
 In-depth interviews Analysis of 
domestic and 
external health 
expenditure  
Alignment Trends in the percentage of DAH going through the 
government 
Funding 
mechanisms 
 Document review Analysis of DAH 
flows 
 Trends in the percentage of DAH delivered through the 
government that is in the form of basket fund and budget 
support 
Funding 
mechanisms 
 Document review Analysis of DAH 
flows 
 Stakeholder perceptions of the drivers of trends in channel 
and modality of DAH delivery 
N/A  Document review  
 In-depth interviews 
 
 Stakeholder perceptions of quality of government systems N/A  Document review  
 In-depth interviews 
 
 
 
 
219 
 
Principle Indicator 
SWAP mechanism 
studied 
Qualitative methods 
Quantitative 
methods 
Harmonisation Number of DPs Funding 
mechanisms 
 Analysis of DAH 
flows 
 Proportion of DPs accounting for less than 10% of DAH  Funding 
mechanisms 
 Analysis of DAH 
flows 
 Number and average size of projects 
 
 
Funding 
mechanisms 
 Analysis of DAH 
flows 
 Stakeholder perceptions of the drivers and impact of 
fragmentation 
  In-depth interviews  
Stakeholder perception of functionality of common 
arrangements and procedures, including whether they 
improve the management of the sector and reduce 
fragmentation and lower transaction costs  
DP harmonisation 
mechanisms 
 In-depth interviews 
 Non-participant 
observation 
 Document review 
 
Stakeholder perceptions of DPs’ ability to have a common 
position  
 
DP harmonisation 
mechanisms 
 In-depth interviews 
 Non-participant 
observation 
 
Managing for  
results 
Existence of a unified, comprehensive and usable 
performance assessment framework with monitorable 
indicators that is used by DPs 
Performance 
assessment 
framework 
 Document review 
 In-depth interviews 
 Non-participant 
observation 
N/A 
 Stakeholder perceptions of availability of quality information 
on results (outputs and outcomes) to assess health system 
performance 
Performance 
assessment 
framework 
 Document review 
 Non-participant 
observation  
 In-depth interviews 
N/A 
 Stakeholder perceptions of the use of results assessments in 
policy-making 
Performance 
assessment 
framework 
 
 In-depth interviews 
 
N/A 
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Principle Indicator 
SWAP mechanism 
studied 
Qualitative methods 
Quantitative 
methods 
Mutual 
accountability 
Stakeholder perceptions of ability of DPs to hold the 
government accountable 
 
SWAP and Health 
Basket Fund policy 
dialogue 
 Non-participant obs 
 In-depth interviews 
 Document review 
N/A 
 Stakeholder perceptions of ability of the government to hold 
DPs accountable 
SWAP and Health 
Basket Fund policy 
dialogue 
 Non-participant obs 
 In-depth interviews 
 Document review 
N/A 
 Transparency in the use of resources of both DPs and the 
government 
SWAP and Health 
Basket Fund policy 
dialogue 
 Non-participant obs 
 In-depth interviews 
 Document review 
N/A 
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8.3 Results 
The rest of this chapter reports on the results of this, and is structured by each principle of 
the aid effectiveness agenda: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, management for 
results and mutual accountability. This is followed by a brief account of stakeholder views 
on the aid effectiveness agenda. 
8.3.1 Ownership 
The principle of ownership was assessed according to the existence of a health sector 
strategy and financial expenditure framework, national participation and leadership of the 
dialogue and fungibility. 
Existence of a health sector strategy and financial expenditure framework  
An essential component of the SWAP is having a single policy and expenditure framework. 
In Tanzania these are known as the Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP) and the Medium 
Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) respectively (see Chapter 5 for a description). The 
first HSSP was adopted in 1999 (and is now in its third version) and the first MTEF in 
1999/2000 (419). All DPs interviewed stated they adhere to the health sector strategic 
plan; however, it has 11 strategies and 6 cross-cutting themes, and so encompasses most 
priorities. The MTEF was reported to guide discussions and the budget, and was seen by 
both DPs and the government as a vehicle for guaranteeing country ownership.  
“Everything is done within the context of the MTEF, so I think there definitely is that 
ownership.” (Anonymous) 
Stakeholder perceptions of national participation in the dialogue  
When discussing national participation in the SWAP dialogue two themes came up: who 
participated (government and non-government) and how engaged the government was. 
For some DPs the SWAP dialogue was successful because it was led by the government and 
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had participation from all national agencies active in the health sector, including civil 
society. 
“… in Tanzania, frankly speaking, (the SWAP dialogue) works. We have the civil 
society, we have the private sector, the faith based, the donor agencies, the UN. I 
mean all the people around the table ... And the ministries are chairing. So this 
works.” (DP)  
When asked about their participation in the dialogue, a member of civil society explained 
that the government was initially reluctant to involve them, but this had improved over 
time. 
“In the beginning it was a bit tough (for civil society) to be accepted ... There were 
instances where email addresses for civil society organizations went missing in the 
mailing list and therefore, you learned of an event after it had happened, but 
nowadays it is not like that …” (Non-government) 
However, participation of other non-government groups (including the private sector and 
other civil society organisations) in the SWAP dialogue is still weak and has some way to go. 
One of the main concerns expressed by DPs in interviews and coordination meetings was a 
decline in government engagement in the formal dialogue process in recent years, with 
technical and financial meetings often happening late. This affected the budget process and 
resulted in DP frustration and the use of less inclusive mechanisms for engaging with the 
government, such as the basket fund meetings, where only the government and DPs are 
present. 
“… the SWAP has not happened that well. It’s rarely happened on time, so rather 
we tend to use informal mechanisms...” (DP) 
When asked about why there had been a decline in government participation, respondents 
alluded to the structure of the SWAP dialogue, which, although inclusive and logical, is 
burdensome and consumes substantial amounts of government and DP time, particularly in 
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preparing for and attending meetings. Every year there are two SWAP and two Basket Fund 
Committee (BFC) meetings, 12 meetings for each Technical Working Group (TWG) and sub-
groups and four BFC audit sub-committee meetings. 
“I think probably the government thinks that the DPs are too hands on. Part of that, 
I think is because the architecture around the TC-SWAP57 is extremely onerous ... it 
sort of turns the government off working with the DPs, because it seems to be so 
complicated ... And I question whether all that administration is a good use of the 
ministry’s resources.” (Non-government) 
However, the key barrier for government participation in the dialogue mentioned by most 
stakeholders was its limited capacity, which, together with the demanding structure of the 
SWAP, resulted in low attendance at meetings by government officials, which in turn led to 
DP frustration and fatigue.  
“But the big issue, I think, is just capacity. You get a sense of government just being 
overwhelmed by expectations of donors and donors frustrated with the government 
not delivering and it becomes a vicious cycle.” (DP) 
This was not a unanimous view, however. One DP believed that limited government 
engagement in the dialogue on certain issues was a result of a lack of political willingness to 
participate rather than a lack of capacity.  
“... when so many donors are involved in these discussions that string along for 
years and years with hardly any progress, and people are wondering whether it’s 
maybe something to do with capacity. Rubbish, it has nothing to do with capacity; 
it’s a clear indication that there is no desire to take that thing forward” (DP) 
Some DPs also believed the reason for government disengagement with the dialogue was 
that they did not perceive it to be contributing to the management of the health sector, but 
saw it rather as an imposition from DPs. 
                                                          
57 TC-SWAP: Technical Committee of the SWAP 
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“... my big issue is (the dialogue) is donor driven. We push for it. We push for 
meetings, ... and it feels like the government is often just responding to our needs 
as opposed to the government having a dialogue in place to serve their purpose 
which should be the point...” (DP) 
Moreover, this DP also felt that the government viewed the SWAP dialogue as “something 
that is getting in their way or a nuisance to them”, rather than a useful mechanism. 
Degree of national leadership in priority-setting of domestic and external resources  
This section explores national leadership in priority-setting within the main two 
government-DP dialogues: the SWAP and the Health Basket Fund (HBF) dialogue. By 
definition, the Technical Committee of the SWAP and the TWGs are led by the government. 
In-depth interviews with government representatives showed that they felt the 
government had ownership of its priority-setting process, as it first set its priorities and 
then looked for assistance. At the end of negotiations with the government as part of the 
Joint Annual Health Sector Review (JAHSR), DPs reported that most actors were successful 
in getting their priorities onto the agenda, which suggests that rather than a negotiation, 
the dialogue resulted in an expanded list of priorities. 
“I mean, everybody just wanted to be at the table. That’s, I think, how it ended up 
with how many (milestones)? twenty? Thirty?” (DP) 
Overall, respondents believed the dialogue was DP-driven; however, some DPs perceived it 
not to be the real forum for decision-making, with some important decisions being taken 
by the government behind closed doors. 
“Well I think it’s something that’s more secret and in house, isn’t it? I don’t think 
they seek to make the decisions in committees with large numbers of donor 
personnel there trying to influence the discussion.” (DP)  
The HBF dialogue was perceived to be of better quality. Early Tanzania SWAP documents 
show tensions between the priorities for the health basket fund between the government, 
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who wanted these resources to remain at the central level (and fund tertiary care) and DPs, 
who favoured the strengthening of local primary health care (310). This was also recounted 
by some of the DPs who had been in the country for a longer period of time. 
“... the initial requests from – in terms of the basket fund was on tertiary care, and 
blood transfusion, and out-of-country medical treatment, and we said, ‘Hold on.  
We’re interested first and foremost in providing basic services to the population.’”  
(DP) 
The issue of de-centralisation was still under discussion during health basket negotiations. 
However, when describing the basket fund dialogue, both government and DP 
representatives currently involved in the dialogue reported being satisfied with the priority-
setting process and the balance of power in negotiations, even when government and DPs 
had different priorities, with a basket DP describing that DPs “compromise where we need 
to, and the government stands its ground if we’re being ridiculous”. 
Fungibility 
Fungibility was assessed by exploring trends in health financing. Figure 8.1 below shows 
trends in health expenditure channelled through the government (as an agent), both 
domestic expenditure (Government Health Expenditure as a source (GHE-S)) and external 
funding (Development Assistance for Health delivered through the government (DAH-G)). 
These are shown as absolutes and as percentages of government expenditure on health 
(Figures 8.1a and 8.1b), as percentages of Total Government Expenditure (TGE) (Figure 
8.1c) and as expenditure per capita (Figure 8.1d).  
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Figure 8.1: Trends in GHE-S and DAH-G financing in Tanzania in the time period of 2001-2010 
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Figures 8.1a and 8.1d show that both domestic and external sources of government 
expenditure on health have increased during the time period of observation. From the time 
period of 2001 to 2006 domestic expenditure was consistently higher than external 
expenditure; however, with the exception of 2009, between 2006 and 2010 there was a 
greater increase in DAH, which surpassed domestic expenditure. DAH-G represents a 
growing share of government expenditure on health increasing from 25% in 2001 to 50% or 
more from 2007 (Figure 8.1b). When examining GHE-S and DAH-G as a proportion of total 
government expenditure (Figure 8.1c), DAH-G increased steadily between 2001 and 2008, 
before decreasing again. Up to 2007 GHE-S represented a higher percentage of TGE, but 
since 2007 DAH-G has made up a higher proportion. Notably, in both cases the percentage 
has decreased since 2008 (probably due to increases in total government expenditure). 
These results therefore show that DAH-G has overall experienced higher rates of growth 
than GHE-S. 
When asked about whether fungibility was taking place, DPs and non-government 
stakeholders believed it was happening because as a share of total government 
expenditure, government expenditure on health as a source had decreased.  
“... (the government) share of the total (government expenditure) has been going 
down. The general response from finance is that in relatively good economic growth 
that the overall government budget is going up, therefore you’re getting a smaller 
share of a growing budget. Certainly that’s true, but that is not the idea. I mean the 
idea was the Abuja target.” (DP)  
Equally, when asked about resource allocation at the health sub-sector level, DPs and other 
non-government actors believed fungibility was taking place, particularly with the basket 
fund and drug expenditures. 
“All the time, of course. That’s how it is. All the money you provide to the health 
sector, I mean, the government takes it out in the other end.” (Non-government) 
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However, government stakeholders did not agree. They reported that domestic 
expenditure on health has increased steadily over the last few years. When probed, 
government respondents thought it was rational for the government to spend their money 
on things other than those funded by the health basket. This view was supported by some 
DPs, who acknowledged why the government may choose to reduce its share of health 
sector funding. 
“So if it’s a zero sum game because you do have limited resources, if you have funds 
that are coming in, is it a poor choice then to switch your attention to fund the 
other thing? And if I’m playing devil’s advocate I would say that’s a smart thing to 
do…” (DP) 
The reduction in domestic expenditure on health could also be interpreted as the 
government exercising ownership of its health budget and expenditure, by deciding how 
much to allocate to the different (sector and sub-sector) priorities and re-adjusting its 
expenditure accordingly following the commitment or disbursement of external funds.  
8.3.2 Alignment 
The principle of alignment was assessed by measuring the use of country systems and by 
exploring the capacity of the government system.  
Use of country systems 
Three indicators were used to assess the use of country systems: trends in percentage of 
DAH going through the government, trends in the proportion of DAH delivered through the 
government that is in the form of basket fund and budget support (pooled DAH) and 
stakeholder perceptions of the drivers of trends in channel and modality of DAH delivery.  
Figure 8.2 below shows trends in funding instruments through which DAH is delivered over 
the time period 2000-2010. The graphs show expenditure in real terms (8.2a and 8.2c) and 
as a proportion of total DAH (8.2b and 8.2d). Graphs 8.2a and 8.2b include DAH funds for 
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which the channel could not be coded (purple bars), whereas Graphs 8.2c and 8.2d only 
show trends in DAH channel for DAH disbursements for which the channel could be coded.  
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Figure 8.2: Funding modality used to deliver development assistance for health in the time period 2001-201058 
 
                                                          
58 HBF shows DAH funds delivered as health basket funding. Projects are discrete, earmarked interventions, which can either be delivered through the government or a 
parallel system. The share of GBS going to health was calculated in Chapter 6 based on the proportion of government expenditure that is spent on health. 
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Looking at the purple bars first, they show that the amount (and proportion) of DAH flows 
for which the channel could not be specified represent a larger share of total DAH between 
2000-2004, making it difficult to draw firm conclusions for these years. Of the DAH that 
could be coded, the green (health basket), dark blue (projects through the government) 
and light-blue (proportion of General Budget Support (GBS) allocated to the health sector) 
bars represent the external funds going through the government system. Absolute 
amounts of these funds show an increasing trend, peaking in 2008 (Figures 8.2a and 8.2c). 
As a proportion of total DAH, funds channelled through the government fluctuated 
between 40-60% of total DAH (Figure 8.2b). However, as a proportion of DAH funds for 
which the channel could be coded, DAH channelled through the government represent 77% 
of the total in 2005 (previous years are too inaccurate); they decrease in 2006, before going 
up again in 2007. From 2007 to 2010 they represent a decreasing share of DAH, accounting 
for 61% in 2010 (Figure 8.2d).  
Increases in funds channelled through government systems have mainly been in the form 
of project funding. Project funding is the dominant lending modality going from under 20% 
in 2000 to about 70% of all DAH in 2010 (both through and outside of the government) 
(Figure 8.2b). In contrast, basket funding and budget support fluctuated between 20-30% 
between 2001 and 2009, before decreasing to 16% in 2010 (Figure 8.2b). This decrease is 
even greater if DAH funds for which the channel of delivery could not be coded are not 
taken into account (Figure 8.2d).  In real terms, however, the basket fund increased from 
$7 million to $90 million between 2001-2010 and GBS going to health went from an 
estimated $13 million to $67 million between 2001 and 2009, before decreasing again to 
$34 million 2010 (this is a reflection of both GBS trends stabilising after 2005 and the share 
of TGE that is spent on health decreasing post 2008). 
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Figure 8.3 below explores channel of delivery further by showing the levels of DAH and 
percentage share channelled through the government by each DP. It shows most of DAH 
that is channelled through the government is provided by the Global Fund and the World 
Bank through its International Development Association (IDA), who together have made up 
80-90% of DAH delivered through the government since 2005, followed by Canada and 
European DPs. The US was the biggest DP disbursing outside of the government, disbursing 
$239 million in 2010, representing 68% of DAH funds channelled outside of the 
government (data not shown). 
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Figure 8.3: DAH channelled through the government by DP in real terms and as a 
proportion of total DAH 
 
The table below explores DAH funds in more detail by describing trends in the proportion 
of DAH that is delivered through the government (including and excluding funds for which 
the channel could not be specified) and in pooled funds as a proportion of all DAH going 
through the government.  
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Table 8.2: Proportion of DAH that is delivered through the government and in pooled 
funds.  
 A B C 
Year Proportion of DAH 
delivered through the 
government (DAH-G) (out 
of total DAH) 
Proportion of DAH delivered 
through the government (DAH-
G) (out of DAH for which 
channel could be coded) 
Proportion of 
DAH-G that is 
pooled59 
2001 42.0 84.4 56.5 
2002 47.5 73.44 64.1 
2003 47.4 80.6 62.4 
2004 52.1 89.1 64.6 
2005 54.3 76.5 44.0 
2006 50.7 64.8 40.5 
2007 63.5 77.6 32.4 
2008 65.0 72.9 29.4 
2009 57.3 65.7 38.3 
2010 58.5 61.1 28.1 
If DAH funds with channel blanks are taken into account (Column A), then the proportion of 
funds going through the government has increased from 42% to 59% of all DAH between 
2001 and 2010. However, if only DAH for which a channel could be specified is taken into 
account (Column B), then the proportion of funds going through the government has 
decreased from over 84% to 61%. The proportion of funds that can be coded has increased 
substantially in later years, explaining why the two columns are more similar in these years. 
Whether the proportion going through the government has decreased or stayed constant 
would depend on where the coding was least accurate. The US makes up a large 
percentage of the funds that could not be coded, and US funds are not usually disbursed 
through the government (although sometimes they are through delegated cooperation).  
This would suggest that at least some of the non-coded projects are delivered outside the 
government, and therefore the proportion of DAH going through the government may 
have stayed constant. Finally, the proportion of DAH that was delivered to the government 
in the form of pooled funds (GBS to health and HBF) has steadily decreased from 57% in 
2000 to 28% in 2010. In reality, we saw that both project and pooled funding modalities 
                                                          
59 DAH-G includes projects that could be coded as projects delivered through the government, 
health basket fund and GBS going to health (therefore figures in Column C represent projects for 
which the channel was specified 
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have experienced significant growth in absolute terms in the time period of 2001-2010 
(Figure 8.2). However, despite DPs adopting GBS and HBF modalities in Tanzania, project 
funding still exceeds horizontal funding as a share of total DAH and in absolute terms. 
Discussions on the choice of modalities during in-depth interviews shed some light on these 
trends. They revealed that new (pooled) modalities and alignment to country systems were 
first met with great enthusiasm and high expectations by DPs. As a consequence, DPs 
initially switched from project modalities with parallel systems to approaches that relied 
more on the government’s public financial management and procurement systems. 
However, the trend has since been reversing back to projects. There are several reasons for 
this. First, DPs expected results from pooled funds very quickly. 
“There was too much change of approach too sudden ... I think the failure has been 
always to throw away the existing old fashioned work modalities, collaboration 
modalities, because we find that something new should be there ... you can’t throw 
away parallel systems from one day to the other.” (Non-government) 
Second, limited government capacity meant that projects had to continue. A DP who 
delivered DAH using both projects (through and outside the government) and basket funds 
reported that given the increasing amounts of DAH they were delivering, they had to find a 
balance between the basket and projects, which they did based on what they believed was 
the government’s capacity to manage the increasing amounts of funds. 
“...  it’s finding a balance between the government’s capacity at any given time and 
working toward increasing the government’s capacity, but balancing that with 
making sure that services that need to get delivered now get delivered.” (DP)   
Third, DPs were under increasing pressure to show results, which is easier to do through 
projects than investing in the health basket or institutional reform. A multi-lateral DP 
described this shift as countries needing to “attribute (money) to results”, particularly in 
“such hard economic times they can’t make a strong case to justify it”. 
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Fourth, trends in funding modalities in the past decade, ranging from very earmarked to 
un-marked budget support (and back), have been attributed to peer pressure and the 
influence of international aid effectiveness declarations. A DP described it in this way: 
“… when I arrived we were at the peak of joint assistance strategy to Tanzania, the 
so-called JAST. It was the aftermath of Paris, and we had Accra, and then we got 
Busan and there was a group of development partners who were very strongly 
advocating for GBS, with (DP X) moving out of even sector budget support60 and all 
to GBS. And it was a very strong peer-pressure to go away from projects and even 
sector budget support. And everybody thought we had found the Holy Grail, but I 
think now the people are a little bit more critical and realise that it's not that easy. 
And now we see another move moving away from GBS, sector budget support and 
back to projects, and putting the flag...” (DP) 
Finally, the switch from projects to pooled funds and budget support and working under a 
SWAP was associated with DPs losing some control of their funds in return for participating 
in the policy dialogue. However, disappointment with government participation in the 
policy dialogue was also seen to be contributing to the move back to projects by some DPs. 
“I used to hate the vertical programs, because I thought they were capacity 
destroying and external and sort of anti-developmental, and I was in favour of 
providing financial support and having discussions about policy and things, ... there 
aren’t really any policies, or there’s not any willingness to have a discussion about 
them anyway. ... Then maybe it’s not a good idea to just pour money into that.” 
(DP)  
Central government respondents also confirmed that pooled modalities were in decline 
and project ones were again on the rise. However, they did not express a view about the 
decline. The government has stated its preference for budget support in the JAST, where it 
clearly details the specific conditions whereby aid can be delivered through project-based 
modalities (pilots, emergency funding and large infrastructure programmes). Further, local 
                                                          
60 DAH to Tanzania has never been disbursed as sector budget support. It is assumed therefore that 
this respondent refers here to the basket fund 
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government respondents reported being “100% dependent” on the basket fund for 
undertaking supervisory visits and buying supplies. 
Quality of country system 
Broadly, DPs were concerned that the government lacked capacity to allocate and manage 
its financial resources, including the “ability to prioritize, or ability to disburse against, to 
even move the money”, particularly at the local level. Respondents from all institutions, not 
only DPs, felt that there had been insufficient efforts from the government and DPs to 
strengthen or reform health financial management and procurement systems, and this had 
limited the ability to align development assistance. For instance, a non-government 
stakeholder reported that they were still fighting “the same shortcomings that we were 
facing in the 90s”, including “severe delays and not being able to carry out the work we set 
out to do because we can’t get the money”. 
However, government respondents felt some aspects of capacity had improved over the 
last few years, particularly the capacity of regional managers to coordinate activities and 
provide support to the local level. 
Many DPs and some non-government respondents believed that rather than invest in 
capacity development, by delivering their funds through the system it would automatically 
improve, and now, disappointed with the lack of results they were moving away from 
channelling money through government systems.  
“So everyone started with, ‘Okay, let’s put all of our money into the government 
systems and hope that it functions.’ I don’t think there was enough effort at the 
upfront … into building the capacity of the government systems ... So I think after 8-
10 years of that, people are realizing, ‘Well the system didn’t really deliver on us. 
We’re worried about corruption, we’re worried about accountability ... And we 
haven’t seen an evolution or a strengthening in the government systems.’ Whereas, 
we needed to invest in those things. ... And so we’re now kind of abandoning it…” 
(DP) 
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Not all DPs were as pessimistic, however, with some recognising the problem and 
increasing their investment in the government systems to improve their capacity, and 
others, such as one DP interviewed, acknowledged that although lack of capacity led to “a 
lot of issues in terms of financial management, procurement, monitoring evaluation”, they 
still “very much use country systems” to disburse funds.  
8.3.3 Harmonisation 
The principle of harmonisation was assessed by analysing trends in fragmentation and 
exploring the success of DP coordination mechanisms. 
Fragmentation 
Fragmentation was assessed by calculating the number of DPs, the proportion of DPs that 
account for less than 10% of DAH, the number and average size of DP funded projects, and 
through in-depth interviews. Table 8.3 shows trends in the number of DPs present in the 
Tanzanian health sector, the number and size of projects, and the effect of the basket fund 
on these indicators.  
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Table 8.3: Trends in DAH fragmentation and impact of the health basket fund on these61 
 A B C D E F G H 
Year Total 
DAH 
(2010 
USD  
million) 
No of 
DPs in 
health 
sector 
No and % 
of all DPs 
accounting 
for less 
than 10% 
of DAH 
No of 
projects 
% DAH 
could 
not 
allocate 
to a 
project 
Average 
project 
size 
(USD 
2010 
million) 
% decrease 
in 
proportion 
of DPs 
accounting 
for less than 
10% of DAH 
with HBF 
% 
increase 
in 
average 
size of 
project 
with 
HBF 
2000 36.3 19 10 (52.6) 55 2.3 0.63 40.0 31.0 
2001 96.3 22 16 (72.7) 88 37. 5 0.81 56.3 11.0 
2002 157.2 23 17 (73.9) 167 5.2 0.67 41.2 27.6 
2003 175.5 26 22 (84.6) 108 44.9 1.37 50.0 16.1 
2004 420.6 27 22 (81.5) 143 36.3 1.70 50.0 34.7 
2005 319.1 26 20 (76.9) 117 19.6 2.63 35.0 16.1 
2006 733.9 27 21 (77. 8) 228 12.4 1.51 28.6 11.7 
2007 669.8 28 25 (89.3) 311 6.2 1.39 36.0 12.6 
2008 631.6 29 27 (93.1) 343 1.1 1.74 29.6 15.8 
2009 548.7 29 27 (93.1) 384 0.6 1.48 29.6 14.8 
2010 716. 7 33 29 (87.9) 334 1.3 2.15 24.1 14.2 
 
Table 8.3 shows that the number of DPs delivering DAH to Tanzania has increased from 19 
in 2000 to 33 in 2010. The percentage of DPs accounting for less than 10% of DAH has also 
increased considerably (from 53-88%) meaning DAH has become more fragmented. The 
number of projects (Column D) has increased from 55 in 2000 to 334 in 2010. This by itself 
does not mean an increase in fragmentation as the overall amount of DAH has also 
experienced a big surge (Column A). Average project size is a better measure of 
fragmentation, as it accounts for increases in DAH. Average project size initially increased 
during the time period, meaning that DAH was becoming more concentrated, but between 
2005 and 2009 this trend was reversed.  Average project size increased again in 2010. The 
proportion of funds that could not be allocated to a project was particularly high for the 
                                                          
61 GBS is excluded from this because it is managed with the rest of government funds. Columns A-F 
include the basket fund 
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years 2001, 2003 and 2004 (Column E), meaning the number of projects would be 
underestimated for those years, and the average size of project over-estimated.   
One could argue that one of the objectives of the basket is to reduce fragmentation levels, 
by decreasing the proportion of DPs accounting for less than 10% and increasing average 
project size. Columns G and H of Table 8.3 test this by showing the difference the basket 
fund has made to these measures of fragmentation. Including the basket fund in 
calculations resulted in a 40% decrease in the proportion of DPs accounting for less than 
10% of DAH in 2000. However, the basket fund effect reduced over time, and only resulted 
in a decrease of about 20% in 2010. Similarly, the introduction of the basket increased the 
average size of projects by 31% in 2000, it fluctuated between 11% and 34% between 2001 
and 2004, after which it decreased steadily until 2010, when it decreased project size by 
14%. This shows that the basket has had some effect in decreasing fragmentation; however 
the effect has decreased over time (linked with the increase in project-based DAH over the 
time period). The basket did not make an important difference to the number of projects. 
This is because all DPs who participated in the basket also provided DAH through other 
modalities.  
Overall, total DAH has increased, but it has also become more fragmented (despite some of 
this fragmentation being off-set by the introduction of the basket fund). To try and better 
understand the reason for increased fragmentation, we examined the number of projects 
and average project size by sub-sector priority and for each DP (Figure 8.4). Graphs 8.4a 
and 8.4b show the number and average size of projects by sub-sector distribution and 
graphs 8.4c and 8.4d by DP.  
Until 2005 the number of projects was similar across sub-sector priorities, except for 
malaria, for which there were less than ten projects active per year prior to 2005 (and only 
increased to 22 by 2010). However, the number of HIV/AIDS projects (dark blue line) 
241 
 
increased from 6 in 2000 to 77 in 2010. The HIV/AIDS average project size also increased 
from $0.95 million in 2000 to $5 million in 2009 before decreasing again to $4.7 million in 
2010. The sub-sector priority with the second highest number of projects is diagonal health 
systems funding, with 70 projects in 2010. The average size of health systems projects also 
increased from $0.5 million in 2000 to $2 million in 2010. Similarly, the number of projects 
for RMNCH rose exponentially from 6 in 2000 to 59 in 2010; however, the average project 
size remained constant at around $0.6 million during the same time period. Therefore 
although HIV/AIDS had the highest number of projects, it also had the biggest projects, 
whereas health systems projects were smaller (but also high). Conversely RMNCH had the 
lowest average project size, and was therefore the most fragmented. Malaria was the least 
fragmented priority, with the lower number of projects but also high average size ($4.3 
million in 2010). The un-coded projects also show high degree of fragmentation; however, 
it is not possible to say to which sub-sector priority they belong to (or indeed whether they 
come from one or multiple priorities).  
In terms of DPs, most DPs had fewer than 15 projects active per year prior to 2006. From 
2006 Germany, Canada, the US and Norway substantially increased the number of projects 
they fund. Conversely, with the exception of the US, these DPs do not fund the largest 
projects. The Global Fund and the World Bank (IDA) having the largest average project size 
($14.2 million and $15.7 million respectively in 2010), followed by the US. This would 
suggest that bi-lateral DPs focusing on health systems funding are the most fragmented. 
Paradoxically, these DPs are also important contributors to the basket fund.    
Stakeholders were aware of the high levels of fragmentation in the health sector. When 
discussing the reasons for fragmentation trends, DPs believed that health attracted DPs 
because it was viewed as an important sector to be involved in. For instance, a respondent 
described how a DP had left the health sector because “they didn’t need a thirteenth donor 
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in the health sector”. However, this DP had now come back to the health sector because 
“health’s important, so you have to be involved”.  
In addition, DPs agreed that fragmentation levels had reduced with the SWAP approach, 
but this trend was now reversing.  
“[fragmentation]’s gotten better but there are concerns that it’s gone backwards 
and that it’s going to start reversing the trend.” (DP)  
This indicates that fragmentation levels can also be explained by some of the issues raised 
by stakeholders under alignment, particularly with regard to trends in modalities and a 
move back to project funding. 
 In-depth interviews also revealed that DPs were worried about the level of fragmentation, 
and that it has had an impact on the quality of the dialogue. 
“... there are so many activities and initiatives and implementing agencies that the 
dialogue often remains very general and at a higher level we are not able because 
of the multitude of actors to coordinate all activities very well yet.” (DP)  
However, not everyone agreed fragmentation was necessarily bad. Some non-government 
actors did not think it was a big issue, and one DP actually thought fragmentation benefited 
the health sector dialogue because it helped get attention from the government. 
“… there’s a more active dialogue in health than there is in some other sectors I 
think, like education, ...  perhaps because there’s more donors, or perhaps there’s 
more projects, or for whatever reason, there’s a bit more substance in the 
discussions between donors and government in the health sector I think.” (DP)  
In summary, quantitative measures show fragmentation has increased, both as the number 
of DPs active in the health sector, the number and size of projects they fund. Results from 
in-depth interviews suggest health is viewed as an important sector to be involved in, and 
that although fragmentation levels hinder the dialogue and increase the need for 
coordination, they may also result in the government paying more attention to the health 
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sector. The next section explores the ability of the SWAP to coordinate all the actors and 
initiatives active in the health sector.  
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Figure 8.4: Number and average size of project by DP and sub-sector allocation  
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Common arrangements and procedures 
A significant challenge for the SWAP is to coordinate such an amount of diverse DPs, 
initiatives and priorities. To address this, different DP coordination mechanisms have been 
set up. All DPs coordinate their activities through the Development Partner Group for 
Health (DPG-H), which is led by a Troika of three DPs who communicate with the 
government through regular meetings on behalf of the whole group. In addition, DPs 
providing DAH in the form of basket funds coordinate through the basket fund committee. 
Finally, DPs who provide DAH in the form of vertical projects coordinate through the use of 
delegated cooperation (providing DAH through other DPs to reduce burden on the 
government) and engage with the government through the SWAP Technical Working 
Groups.  
The success of these forums was assessed according to the degree to which DPs had 
harmonised arrangements and procedures for planning and reporting for the use of DAH 
resources, the extent to which stakeholders perceived these had lowered the transaction 
costs of aid and the degree to which DPs have a common voice when meeting the 
government (next section). Arrangements and procedures here refer to: division of labour 
so that DPs are not doing similar work in the same region; increasing information-sharing 
among DPs; reducing or carrying out joint field missions; and relying on SWAP procedures, 
rather than their own evaluations, for reporting. 
The evidence from in-depth interviews suggests that some aspects improved and others 
did not. Overall, DPs and government valued DP coordination forums, which were seen as 
harmonising planning, reporting and facilitating information sharing amongst DPs. The 
government felt that DPs had harmonised their reporting requirements, which was an 
improvement from previous years.  
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“… definitely I think (the DPG-H) is very good in terms of information sharing and 
coordination.” (Anonymous) 
However, some DPs felt planning was only done at a superficial level, and there was need 
for more detailed planning at the national and district levels, with increasing information 
shared about what each DP was doing where, in order to avoid duplication of efforts on 
some priorities and neglecting others (thereby improving division of labour). 
“… we don't have a clear overview, who is doing what. It’s more the very broad, 
large categories that we talk about priorities not so much in terms of 
implementation or practical support. I'm sure if we would (look into who is working 
on what and where) we would see many clusters ... and other areas are fully 
neglected.” (DP)  
Reporting was supposed to be harmonised under the SWAP, with DPs relying on joint 
reviews for assessment of their programmes and avoiding “backdoor” meetings with the 
government (313). Some DPs certainly did so, but government representatives reported 
that some DPs required separate reporting for their projects, which were very time-
consuming for the government.   
In terms of overall transaction costs, the view of most DPs was that coordination structures 
had increased rather than lowered transaction costs; although they still valued them as 
worthwhile exercises. In particular, DPs regarded coordination structures as successful in 
reducing DAH fragmentation,  
“... the coordinating mechanisms that we have help to reduce fragmentation. We 
have development partners group, I think having the health basket also helps 
reduce fragmentation. If you had eleven partners each trying to spend their portion 
of $100 million a year separately it would be a disaster.” (DP)  
On the other hand, other DPs believed the SWAP has reduced the burden of development 
assistance, for instance by reducing the number of field missions, but suggested the parallel 
increase in funding makes it difficult to see the effect of the SWAP:   
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“I would like to see the counterfactual, ... the number of health missions might have 
stayed the same ... but the amount of donor funding probably has quadrupled, and 
you might have had 2000 missions by now per year if it wasn't for the SWAP.”  (DP)  
When asked about how DP coordination could be improved, some DPs believed that the 
government would need to show stronger leadership and demand greater DP coordination. 
For instance, one DP felt that DPs would coordinate better if the government said:  
"Development partners, I want one annual planning and this planning session I 
want to know what is your investment, on which activity, package, and where in the 
country are you doing this."  (DP)  
Nonetheless, most respondents thought problems with harmonisation of DAH were a 
result of DP agencies delivering DAH in the form of vertical, single disease projects, and 
increasing levels of fragmentation. 
“… one thing, which has also undermined a little bit this Paris agenda is the fact 
that we had on the one hand the agencies playing by the harmonisation and 
alignment rules and we still had apart from that these huge resources coming in 
and distorting the system focusing on certain specific issues like HIV/AIDS, TB, 
malaria, immunisation...”  (DP)  
Another DP supported this view, and attributed the high burden of DAH in terms of field 
visits and reporting requirements to agencies providing vertical funds: 
“… a lot of ... missions to the country (are) based on specific projects … here in 
Tanzania the huge bulk of funding is coming from the Global Fund and from the 
PEPFAR, so I guess it depends very much what their standards are in terms of 
missions, reporting, monitoring, follow up and so on.” (DP)    
When interviewed, a representative of a DP agency that delivers DAH in the form of vertical 
programmes acknowledged the problems of having separate structures and being highly 
fragmented, but also defended their approach indicating that projects were discussed as 
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part of the SWAP technical working groups, thereby minimising the burden they caused on 
the government:  
“… the discussion comes with a broader participation and development of the 
strategic plans for the sector, and then you may have some further discussion 
within the TWG to clarify … it’s more of a management burden on us as well to run 
these other things.” (DP)  
This suggests that although the number of projects has increased, SWAP structures have 
allowed for more efficient coordination.  
In contrast, vertical agencies and programmes were seen as having undermined DP 
harmonisation by creating separate coordination and dialogue structures. For instance, the 
Global Fund has its own country coordinating mechanism (the Tanzania National 
Coordination Mechanism or TNCM62) and there is a separate HIV/AIDS development 
partner group (DPG-AIDS63) and dialogue with the government. A DP described the Global 
Fund’s coordinating mechanism as being “very active and very functional but not so much 
integrated into the health sector dialogue”.   
The separate HIV/AIDS dialogue was created due to the initial multi-sectoral nature of the 
response to HIV/AIDS. However, despite most HIV/AIDS activities now falling within the 
health sector and representing a significant proportion of health sector funding, the 
HIV/AIDS dialogue has remained outside the health sector. Representatives from the Global 
Fund, DPG-AIDS and DGP-H do sit in each and update each other’s forums, but there is no 
coordination or agreement on policies between the different coordination or dialogue 
structures. Efforts to bring the two dialogues together have had some success in DP 
coordination mechanisms, but have been met with some government resistance. 
                                                          
62 The TNCM was established in 2002 and although members vary from year to year, it is made up 
of government departments, DPs, civil society and private sector agencies.  
63 DPG-AIDS was set up in 2000 and is made up of all DPs providing HIV/AIDS funds 
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“... because the government sees the Global Fund dialogue structure and says, 
‘That’s enough. How much more do you really want us to talk about HIV and AIDS in 
the Global Fund?’”  (DP)  
In addition, integration is also hindered by the fact that the health and HIV/AIDS dialogues 
fall under different ministries. The HIV/AIDS dialogue is led by the Tanzania Commission for 
AIDS (TACAIDS), which falls under the Prime Minister’s Office, whereas the health dialogue 
is led by the Ministry of Health. 
Agencies delivering funds through vertical programmes have reacted to criticisms and, 
faced with similar problems when working with the government and coordinating their 
resources as the other agencies, are now becoming more engaged with the health 
dialogue, something which led to a certain degree of frustration amongst DPs who had 
been involved in coordination structures for some time: 
“I'm afraid it's a little bit late... (vertical DPs) now come close because they are 
under pressure, they realise they face fiduciary risk and accountability issues, which 
are the same we face, and we have a lot of experience on that so suddenly they say 
'hey hey we're interested to work with you'... ah! finally!” (DP)  
This would suggest that although agencies, such as the Global Fund, look more integrated 
into the government system by delivering their funds through the government, they may 
actually place a higher burden on the government as they function outside of SWAP 
coordination mechanisms.  
Speaking in “one voice” 
Most respondents perceived the main objective of DP coordination mechanisms was to 
facilitate DPs having a common front when engaging with the government. Early SWAP 
documents describe tensions between DPs who adopted the basket fund and those who 
did not, as the former were seen as having more access to the government and could 
negotiate more than DPs that did not join the basket (310). Such tensions were not found 
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in this study. When describing DP coordination meetings, some respondents considered 
these mechanisms were successful at unifying DP’s position despite their different and 
often conflicting priorities, with some DPs being directive, wanting to “really drive a 
priority”, and others preferring government to lead. A non-government respondent 
reported DPs having improved their ability to speak in one voice. 
“(DPs) are quite good at working out a common line between them, we get spared 
a lot of that debate. Obviously they do have different views, but I think they are 
better at being, you know, speaking with one voice.” (Non-government) 
However, some DPs acknowledged having difficulties arriving at the common position, 
which they described as a reluctantly accepted position, rather than “once voice”. Further, 
a non-government attendee of SWAP dialogue meetings reported the common position 
easily disintegrated once DPs arrived at the meeting. 
“... they are supposed to act as one group with one voice, but that has not usually 
been the case. Although they would meet, for example, before the official meeting 
with the government and others, ... during the meeting you will still see that they 
have not totally agreed with the position that has been proposed.” (Non-
government)  
The majority of interviewees believed DPs still need to improve their ability to speak in one 
voice, as their failings on this resulted in DPs undermining each other in their dialogue with 
the government.  
“On the face value you think they are together, they are talking the same language, 
but when it comes strictly to implementation of serious actions against the 
government, they are not together ... which means then the government is not 
forced to implement the actions...”  (Non-government) 
An example of this was noticed when undertaking interviews with local government 
stakeholders, who reported that the DPs had changed the rules so local government could 
not have training with DP funds disbursed “on-budget”, but DPs then separately conducted 
their own training workshops.  
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8.3.4 Management for results 
Management for results was assessed according to the existence of a performance 
assessment framework, availability of quality information on results and the use of results 
assessments in policy-making. 
Existence of a performance assessment framework 
The Tanzanian health sector performance is reviewed annually through the health sector 
strategy performance assessment framework, the JAHSR milestones (in place since 1999), 
the national performance assessment framework and different ad-hoc performance 
appraisals, including Poverty and Human Development and Millennium Development Goals 
reports (in addition to individual DPs’ requests for performance reports). As such, there is 
performance assessment, but no unified framework. In addition, the available frameworks 
have too many indicators for a feasible, good quality, annual review. For instance, this is 
seen in the assessment of the health sector strategy – the Health Sector Performance 
Profile Report, which has 46 indicators, only 5 of which were assessed in the 2009/10 
report (420).   
Availability of quality information on results to assess health system performance  
Health information is collected through the Health Management Information System 
(HMIS). Despite investment in this system with external and domestic technical input, many 
respondents were worried about the quality of the information it produced.  
“Like the performance reports, you question the sources from time to time and 
sometimes you know they make very precise statements that you know are based 
on not so precise data. So you have to take it with a grain of salt sometimes.” (DP)  
DPs reported having access to results from the various assessment exercises; however, 
their availability to the wider public and on the internet was limited.  
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Use of results assessments in policy-making 
There was some indication that evidence informed policy-making although this was not 
always the case. During the JAHSR the results from the assessment of the milestones were 
discussed and were observed to influence the setting of the milestones for the following 
year. On the other hand, as discussed above, both government and DPs also tried to 
influence the milestones during the dialogue, and the reasons for this were not perceived 
to be fully evidence-based.  
“We all know that the government has responsibility and these difficulties about 
Paris agenda. But the donors have an equal responsibility because our decisions are 
not related to the evidence of what's going on in the countries.”  (DP) 
Instead, this DP described decisions as sometimes being driven by “political reasons”. In 
contrast, other DPs reported using evidence when deciding what programmes to invest in. 
“… (we have tools) to look at where you’re going to get impact and improvement in 
peoples’ health versus your – what intervention, and then you can overlay that with 
costing as well.”  (DP)  
Therefore, although significant efforts have been undertaken to assess and monitor 
performance, these would benefit from becoming further unified and transparent, and if 
the results from these exercises had a stronger influence on decision-making. 
8.3.5 Mutual Accountability 
Ability of DPs to hold the government accountable  
DPs believed the government was accountable to them by attending meetings, preparing 
quality and timely reports and if there were consequences when the government did not 
meet its obligations. DPs reported that government interest in SWAP accountability has 
been waning in the past year, which was a matter of concern discussed in DP coordination 
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meetings and in the interviews. For example, the government was not always ready for 
dialogue meetings, which resulted in delays. 
“... the main issue is with the timing of the meetings. Meetings that are supposed to 
take place in February might not take place until April and that pushes back the 
entire process”. (DP)  
In addition, audit reports were neither timely not entirely satisfactory, although they were 
considered to be “good enough” by most DPs. 
“... you put in place your triggers for accountability and the government never 
meets them 100%, but you set your threshold ... We would like the government to 
be closer to the 100% of meeting their triggers, but ... we need to be realistic with 
our expectations.”  (DP)  
Despite all the accountability mechanisms, most respondents believed that nothing 
happened when the government did not fulfil its commitments, showing once more they 
are not always unified when communicating with government.  
“... we send completely erratic messages to the government. On one hand we can 
say your management is not good enough, and then we give them more money.”  
(DP)  
DPs felt they were more effective at holding the government to account when money was 
involved as they were able to either withhold funds or ask them to be returned. For 
instance, a basket DP reported that the government had to return some money to the 
basket “holding account” resulting from an unsatisfactory audit.  
“There was an audit a couple of years ago where there were –it involved some civil 
works and some of the contracts were not procured correctly so the Ministry had to 
refund that money to the holding account of the basket fund.”  (DP) 
However, this appeared to be an extreme example, and DPs reported it was more common 
for funds to be delayed than to be returned. Nevertheless, this may help explain why the 
basket dialogue was perceived to be more effective than the overall SWAP dialogue. 
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Ability of the government to hold DPs accountable  
Despite all the mechanisms for government accountability to DPs, there were no formal 
mechanisms for government to hold DPs to account. For instance, the Health Basket Fund 
Generic Document outlines procedures that should be taken in case of financial 
mismanagement by the different government agencies, but only states that “DPs disburse 
as early as possible in the (Tanzanian) fiscal year their total annual commitments”, without 
any indication of consequences for this not happening. Some respondents felt that DP 
accountability to the government happened just by DPs taking part in the JAHSR and the 
SWAP structure. There was no evidence of action being taken if DPs did not keep to their 
commitments.  
DP and government transparency on the use of resources 
Respondents felt that the JAHSR process was in itself very transparent, as they were invited 
to participate in meetings; further, the documents have been made publically available 
through the Development Partner Group website64. However, there were concerns voiced 
by DPs and other non-government stakeholders about the government’s degree of 
transparency outside of this forum, with reports of government reluctance to share results 
or health expenditures.  
“(The basket) follows the normal government system; it is as transparent that you 
can read it in the newspaper every day.” (Non-government) 
This study found DPs were transparent in sharing data and plans with each other, the 
government and other stakeholders. However, DPs were much more transparent in the use 
of the basket than with vertical programmes (for instance, Chapter 6 shows that the PER 
does not capture all vertical flows).  
                                                          
64 http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/index.php?id=1203  
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Both government and DPs are becoming increasingly transparent online. DPs, through the 
DPG-H website65, share many documents relating to the functioning of the SWAP and the 
basket, and many report expenditure on their websites and to the OECD, although the 
amount and quality of information reported was variable amongst DPs and years. During 
the period of fieldwork (2011-2012) the government started publishing aggregated national 
and local health expenditures online66, indicating that government transparency is also 
improving. 
8.3.6 The aid effectiveness agenda 
Stakeholders were asked about their views of the aid effectiveness agenda. Some 
respondents felt the agenda itself does not reflect country ownership. This has resulted in 
an imposition of “country ownership” on recipient countries, as DPs have pressure to show 
to their headquarters and taxpayers that they work with the government. In Tanzania, this 
was perceived to contribute to government fatigue, with the government seeing meetings 
as something needed more to sustain the SWAP partnership than to address the problems 
in the sector.  
“Here we sort of desperately are trying to get country ownership and see the 
leadership to drive that but often we’re driving the –it doesn’t make any sense – but 
to some degree we’re driving the country ownership by saying, ‘This needs to be 
you guys doing this.’ And they’re like, ‘Well, can you do it for us?’ And we’re like, 
‘Well, that’s not how it’s supposed to be.’” (DP)  
When asked about the importance of international declarations, all sets of actors 
acknowledged the importance of the Paris Declaration, although very few had heard of 
Busan, and none mentioned the International Health Partnership. Since Tanzania is not a 
signatory of the International Health Partnership, it may be expected that it was not 
                                                          
65 http://hdptz.esealtd.com/index.php?id=6  
66 http://www.pmoralg.go.tz/ 
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mentioned in the interviews; however, the disengagement with Busan suggests a decline in 
the relevance of these international forums at the national level. 
“To be honest, I don’t think people paid as much attention to Busan. I read the 
outcomes of Busan and I couldn’t even tell you what they accomplished.” (DP) 
Moreover, some participants also questioned whether these principles can just be applied 
and then expect for aid to be more “effective”, or if it would be wiser to use them as goals. 
“I think the reality is that we all in this country moved into Paris aid effectiveness 
agenda and put a whole lot of stock in the government of Tanzania to deliver for us 
on that. So everybody said, ‘Let’s put all our money into the government of 
Tanzania and use its systems and do everything that Paris tells us we should do’ 
Well, Paris should have been seen as more of an end game as opposed to a starting 
point.” (DP) 
Overall, both DPs and government revealed signs of disengagement with the aid 
effectiveness agenda and sector-wide approach.  
8.4 Discussion 
The aim of this chapter was to assess if the Tanzanian health SWAP has contributed to the 
attainment of the five principles of the global aid effectiveness agenda: ownership, 
alignment, harmonisation, management for results and accountability. To do so, it used a 
set of indicators previously developed based on aid effectiveness declarations, the 
literature and the interpretations of national stakeholders of the five principles. This study 
has found mixed results, with the indicators of the global agenda, such as the existence of a 
health sector strategy and performance assessment framework, which have a technocratic 
focus, showing greater progress than those developed for this study, including having a 
common voice and government participation in the SWAP dialogue, which were based on 
the Tanzanian country context and the literature.  
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Ownership was assessed according to the existence of a national health strategy, national 
participation and leadership in the dialogue, and trends in external and domestic health 
financing. Results show that operational policy, expenditure and institutional frameworks 
have been successfully set up, in the form of the HSSP, the MTEF and the SWAP dialogue 
respectively, and therefore the indicator of the Paris Declaration has been met in the 
Tanzanian health sector (the evaluation of the Paris Declaration also found it had been met 
nationally (421)). This is no small achievement, given the number of different actors with 
different priorities present in the Tanzanian health sector, and has not been achieved in all 
SWAPs (for instance the Zambian health SWAP did not succeed in bringing all DPs under a 
common framework (211)). 
However, this study found these frameworks are not a guarantee of country (or 
government) ownership. The findings suggest the dialogue was led by DPs, but also that it 
may not be the only forum for some critical decision-making. This is consistent with 
findings from the Bangladeshi health SWAP, where DPs were found to dominate the 
dialogue but had limited influence on the government strategy (422), from Ghana, where 
the government was found to formulate development strategies to please DPs, but did not 
actually change everyday politics (350), and from Malawi, where the budget process has 
been described as a “theatre that masks the real distribution and spending” (423). Further, 
in this study DPs were concerned that government participation in the SWAP dialogue has 
declined over time, something DPs perceived may have been because the government 
viewed the dialogue as a mechanism to suit DPs’ purposes rather than something in its 
interest. Therefore, in reality, setting up the SWAP dialogue may have had little influence 
on government ownership of its development strategy.  
Government ownership of external resources was mixed. On one hand, there was a 
balance of power in negotiations with DPs in the basket (although this may depend on the 
aid modality used, as vertical programmes and projects are already defined by DPs and GBS 
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grants the government near full ownership). On the other hand, this study found 
indications of DAH fungibility taking place both at the health sector and sub-sector levels, 
which could ultimately be seen as a form of government ownership of the overall amounts 
the different priorities receive, if the government re-allocates its resources in response to 
external resources. 
Chapter 7 reported DP confusion regarding the definition of ownership has resulted in 
uncertainty about the extent to which DPs should be technically involved in the 
management of the health sector, which is echoed by national aid strategies that 
emphasise the need for technical assistance to be demand-driven and a study by Goldberg, 
which suggests capacity building should itself be country owned (424). At the same time 
DPs have much to contribute to the development process, not just in the form of financial 
resources, but as technical assistance and partners in the policy-making process, and their 
lack of engagement in health sector management led to some frustrations in-country. This 
tension was also found in a multi-country evaluation of SWAPs, which found national 
ownership was not sufficient to achieve results and concludes that respecting national 
ownership and leadership does not mean agencies, such as the World Bank, cannot 
undertake technical assessments and provide advice (205). Despite successive international 
declarations advocating for government ownership, and it forming the basis of the SWAP 
approach, the key may be in finding the balance between ownership and partnership, 
where the government has more information about the country context and needs, but DP 
intervention may sometimes be allowed in areas where local competency may be lacking. 
However, a suitable way to achieve this balance remains to be found (425).  
Alignment was assessed by exploring the extent of DP use of country systems, the 
proportion of funds that were pooled and the capacity of government systems. DPs 
pledged to align themselves to the government system and to disburse funds in the form of 
pooled modalities, and initially made some progress towards this. This progress is now 
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reversing, driven by DPs’ pressure to show results quickly and concerns about absorption 
capacity. Further, disappointment with the quality of the policy dialogue resulted in a loss 
of enthusiasm for budget support and pooled funding mechanisms. These findings differ 
from a study in Vietnam, which found that DAH was mostly delivered through projects 
because there was no costed health financing plan (100), but are similar to a case study of 
DAH alignment to country systems in Uganda, which found that the proportion of pooled 
and on-budget funds had decreased in the last decade due to an increased focus on 
achieving short-term results, as opposed to longer-term investments in health 
infrastructure, human resources or institutional capacity building (37).  
A trend of moving out of the government systems is of concern as it may hinder 
government’s capacity to plan for and allocate resources. In addition, reverting back to 
projects is also worrying as they have been shown to hinder coordination mechanisms and 
increase transaction costs (137-138) (for instance, worries about “institutional destruction” 
due to proliferation of projects are mentioned as early as the 80s (426)).  
There has also been disappointment from DPs in the lack of strengthening of government 
systems for public financial management and procurement, which is a reflection of lack of 
government capacity, low investment in health sector reform and the fact that it takes time 
to see results from reform. The key to improving both of these indicators may be in 
disbursing according to the government’s absorptive capacity and investing in 
strengthening it. However, there is no agreed threshold for how to balance improving 
absorptive capacity with addressing population needs. There have been some attempts to 
determine the amount of development assistance that can be absorbed. For instance, a 
study comparing aid absorption capacity and Gross Domestic Product found that for 
Tanzania, the estimated Official Development Assistance/Gross Domestic Product 
threshold was 15.6% (335); however, the study did not specify the sectoral threshold. This 
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study found that DAH delivered through the government as a proportion of total 
government expenditure was above 5% in 2010 and the proportion of government 
expenditure on health that came from external sources was over 50%. Both of these 
proportions appear large. In addition, the Taskforce on Innovative International Financing 
for Health System recommended 40-48% of health system investment should be on capital 
expenditures to increase absorption capacity (346). Data constraints meant it was not 
possible to assess how much of health expenditure was allocated to capital investment in 
this study, but it is recommended that DPs and government aim towards this target. 
The Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health System also cautions that 
high levels of DAH fragmentation can further decrease capacity by taking up government 
time (346). This study found the fragmentation of DAH has increased from a surge in 
project funding. Fragmentation has been found to be highest in democratic, poor countries 
and in social sectors (44), so high fragmentation could be expected from the Tanzanian 
health sector. Of particular concern are trends observed in the levels of fragmentation of 
RMNCH and diagonal (project-based) health systems projects, which raises concerns about 
the diagonal approach as a solution to the vertical versus horizontal DAH modality debate 
(118, 120). Fragmentation was also assessed in terms of the number of DPs and the 
proportion that account for 10% of DAH flows. Although fragmentation has been found to 
increase aid transaction costs (40), there may also be some advantages to having many 
different DP agencies may stop a single agency from pushing its own agenda and may help 
to depoliticise aid (6). The impact of fragmentation levels observed in this study is 
therefore dependent on how DPs’ ability to coordinate through harmonisation 
mechanisms.  
This study found that DP coordination structures have improved information-sharing 
amongst DPs and integrated reporting, although more needs to be done to improve 
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division of labour and eliminate DPs’ requests for additional reporting. However, it is 
unclear whether the SWAP has reduced transaction costs and to what extent, as there is no 
counterfactual. The SWAP approach in itself is very onerous, resulting in many committees 
and dialogue forums and taking up a significant amount of time of both DPs and 
government. However, transaction costs associated with vertical approaches are very high 
and with a proliferation of projects, the burden of DAH in the absence of the SWAP is likely 
to have been substantial. Therefore, although some transaction costs may have been 
lowered, they still remain high. This is consistent with findings from Zambia (427), but not 
from Bangladesh, where the SWAP was found to have reduced transaction costs through a 
systemic change in DP-government relations, increased DP coordination and common 
reporting requirements of pooled DPS (422). There is therefore room for further reductions 
in transaction costs in the Tanzanian health sector if DP agencies funding projects become 
more integrated in SWAP processes to reduce parallel dialogues (although it looks unlikely 
that separate HIV/AIDS forums will change in the near future). However, some costs 
associated with disbursing and managing funds will always be incurred, and additional 
coordination will also incur some costs in terms of meetings.  
Harmonisation efforts, although successful at increasing the sharing of information among 
DPs, have not resulted in fully harmonised procedures or DPs speaking in “one voice”. This 
is partly due to a lack of government leadership and the vertical nature of some agencies, 
particularly those targeting HIV/AIDS. This finding is consistent with two studies that 
concluded that political constraints, including the contractual nature of coordination 
mechanisms and the plurality of policy images, hinder DP coordination (382, 428), and a 
case study in Uganda that found that different interests and motives of various actors 
undermined alignment and harmonisation of Global Health Initiatives (429). However, it is 
in contrast to a study of the SWAP in Zambia, which found that HIV/AIDS support was 
better integrated than other support at local level, although the share of resources 
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provided as programme-based support had not increased (54). This shows that the impact 
of vertical agencies on harmonisation efforts may be dependent on the context.  
There has been progress towards measuring and managing for results, with improvements 
in the quantity of information available, although more needs to be done to improve 
quality, and enhance the transparency and use of information in decision-making. Previous 
evaluations of the SWAP approach have concluded that for the SWAP to work there needs 
to be a stronger link between resources and results, and stronger incentives are required 
for this to happen (205). However, there have also been concerns with an approach based 
on results, which can encourage a focus on quick-wins, incentivise an audit-type attitude of 
staff, and bias evaluations towards accountability to DPs rather than learning (39). These 
concerns were voiced in this study; particularly a focus on quick wins has run contrary to 
the use of government systems, pooled funds and longer term investments in the health 
system. However, the literature is yet to suggest a way to achieve this.  
Finally, mutual accountability between government and DPs has not been achieved 
because there are no official processes to keep DPs accountable, and DPs were often 
unable to hold the government to its commitments because of their lack of unity and 
mechanisms to hold the government to account. This study found that transparency of 
both DPs and the government has improved in the last decade, which is promising, 
particularly since a recent literature review of DP-government relationships in HIV/AIDS 
programmes, concluded that the key constraint to better leadership is a lack of information 
on the results achieved with the aid disbursed (92).  
In the end, this study found that government and some DP stakeholders are becoming 
fatigued with the SWAP approach. There was also a certain degree of disengagement with 
the global aid effectiveness agenda was detected, as most stakeholders referred to the 
Paris Declaration when discussing aid effectiveness but few had heard of Busan. 
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Furthermore, initial progress towards some of the principles, such as alignment to country 
systems, is now being reversed. There seems to be a cyclical pattern in aid practices, where 
every time an approach does not work (often in the short-term) it is abandoned. Limited 
institutional memory means that after a few years the same approaches are repeated. This 
study shows there are indications that DPs are moving towards the old project-based way 
of working, and even those contributing to the basket funds typically fund an array of 
projects in parallel, which is worrying given the reasons why they had moved from projects 
in the first place.  
Ultimately, although the Tanzanian health SWAP has made better progress towards aid 
effectiveness principles than other countries (such as the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(91) and the Solomon Islands (207)), the aims of aid effectiveness declarations outlined in 
the assessment framework have not yet been fully achieved. It is useful to reflect on two 
questions at this point: first is the global aid effectiveness agenda feasible and desirable; 
and second, is the current approach conductive to achieving the aid effectiveness agenda?  
In relation to the first question, this study found tensions arise between different principles 
when the agenda is implemented at the country level. For instance, increased emphasis on 
managing for results is resulting in DPs becoming less aligned to the government system. 
Similarly, enforcing conditionalities is part of achieving mutual accountability, but runs 
contrary to government ownership, and if DPs become more harmonised they may exert 
more power on the government and decrease its ownership. These findings are not unique 
to this study, tensions between ownership and results have been observed in projects 
funded by the Swedish International Development cooperation Agency in Tanzania, 
Zanzibar and Cambodia (430), and worries about ownership and conditionalities have 
resulted in the European Commission modifying their conditionalities from policies to 
outcomes (431). However, discussions on this have been limited and a practical solution is 
yet to be found. 
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Furthermore, the SWAP has a very complex structure and poses a high burden on the 
government, which lacks the capacity, leadership and willingness to effectively participate 
in the dialogue. In its current state, the SWAP may end up being counterproductive to 
achieving the aid effectiveness agenda. However, these concerns would not be addressed 
by going back to an approach based on projects, so the agenda is desirable, although 
current efforts have not so far not fully facilitated its attainment. In fact, some respondents 
perceived that the reason for this was not the SWAP structure, but that the approach and 
the aid effectiveness agenda had been imposed on the government by DPs, contrary to the 
implementation of the Paris Declaration in countries such as Colombia, where joining the 
agenda was a government decision to improve its ownership and leadership, a decision 
that was met with mixed feelings from DPs (187). 
In relation to the second question, the SWAP has been successful in setting up structures 
and processes for coordination and dialogue for DPs and the government, such as national 
development and health strategies, a performance assessment framework and a joint 
annual health sector review. These are significant achievements, particularly given the 
amount of DPs active in the health sector, and satisfy the Paris Declaration principles for 
ownership, managing for results and mutual accountability (which may explain the positive 
reviews Tanzania has received in its evaluation of the Paris Declaration (421)). However, 
the health SWAP has fared less favourably in the indicators developed for this study, such 
as DPs ability to speak in one voice and to keep the government to its commitments, or the 
government’s participation in the dialogue processes.  
One way to make further progress towards the aid effectiveness agenda may be to 
strengthen the basket fund, as a funding and coordination mechanism. There are several 
reasons for this. First, this study found stakeholders believed there was a balance of power 
in negotiations of the basket (potentially balancing government ownership and DP 
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involvement). Second, the basket fund uses government systems, but the additional checks 
and balances required ensure government accountability, and may themselves improve the 
quality of the system (and may eventually set an example of how the government could 
account for its own resources). Third, the basket decreases fragmentation, whilst still 
allowing for a number of different DPs with different views, which may enrich the health 
sector dialogue. At the same time, DPs would be more harmonized, and if they disbursed a 
higher amount of DAH through the basket and decrease their contribution through project-
based modalities, DPs may lower their burden on the government. Finally, local 
government authorities reported being highly dependent on the basket for running health 
services, which indicates it is having an impact. Intermediate outputs could be set for the 
basket to assess performance (such as the percentage of funds arriving at the district level 
or being allocated by the medical stores department), and allow to manage for results, 
without compromising alignment.  
The findings from this chapter suggest enthusiasm for basket funds is waning, so the basket 
may need to improve. For instance, it needs to find ways for DPs to be accountable to the 
government and the wider population, and to allow for the participation of other 
participants of the SWAP (like civil society) in the basket fund dialogue. Strengthening the 
basket fund may not solve the debate about agencies primarily disbursing DAH through 
vertical funds and the separate HIV/AIDS dialogue, but a separate HIV/AIDS basket could be 
set up, which would help in harmonising HIV/AIDS funds and lower transaction costs. 
Finally, there have been suggestions in the literature linking some of the findings of this 
chapter with political and instructional factors. For instance, this study found a lack of 
coordination among DPs may be a result of limited government leadership. This was also 
found in a study of the Bangladeshi health SWAP, where the author concluded that it was 
not in the government’s interest that DPs become fully aligned, as the government can 
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have more control of the health sector if DPs continue to have separate dialogues (50). Two 
additional studies have also suggested that the incentives of DPs and the political economy 
of aid hinder DPs’ ability to harmonise; for instance, due to collective action problems (38) 
and uncertainties of whether DAC DPs and those engaging in South-South cooperation 
actually have any incentive to harmonise under the aid effectiveness agenda (432). 
Previous studies have also highlighted the importance of exploring the incentives of high-
level politicians to better understand accountability (433) and transparency (434) of aid. 
Lastly, a study of two World Bank-funded projects in Timor-Leste found that technical 
quality was not sufficient for aid effectiveness, and that the political economy of the 
country needs to be conducive to aid effectiveness (97). It is therefore important to study 
institutional factors in more detail, particularly the relationships and incentives of the 
actors involved in the SWAP, and how these can be modified to allow for the achievement 
of aid effectiveness principles. This is done in the next chapter. 
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9 STUDY OF AID RELATIONSHIPS IN THE TANZANIAN HEALTH 
SWAP 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis has so far described the Tanzanian health SWAP both in terms of domestic and 
external health financing trends (Chapter 6) and dialogue structures (Chapter 5). It has then 
explored the definitions of the five principles of the aid effectiveness agenda (ownership, 
alignment, harmonisation, management for results and mutual accountability) and 
developed a set of indicators to assess its attainment in the Tanzanian health SWAP in 
Chapter 7. This set of indicators was subsequently applied to assess the extent to which the 
principles of the agenda have been achieved in Chapter 8. Results show that although the 
processes for the aid effectiveness agenda to be achieved were put in place, this did not 
fully result in the indicators being met. It also found the approach to achieve the agenda 
was too technocratic and that there were contradictions between the principles in practice, 
raising questions about the appropriateness of the agenda itself. Further, institutional and 
political factors not directly addressed by the agenda were found to hinder its 
achievement.  
The aim of this chapter is to explore these institutional and political factors, particularly the 
extent to which aid relationships are contractual, and therefore the appropriateness of the 
aid effectiveness agenda, and how these factors have influenced the attainment of the 
agenda. In doing so this chapter addresses the fifth objective of the thesis: “to explain the 
achievement of the aid effectiveness agenda through an analysis of institutional factors and 
relationships between the actors present in the Tanzanian health SWAP using a political 
economy framework”. This chapter presents the results of the stakeholder analysis carried 
out through in-depth interviews, document review and non-participant observation (as 
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described in Chapter 3). Specifically, it describes the institutions, actors, processes and 
political context of aid relationships in Tanzania.  
The results of the stakeholder analysis are interpreted through the theories outlined in the 
conceptual framework described in Chapter 4. Briefly, the framework explores the 
institutional factors explaining the degree of attainment of the aid effectiveness agenda by 
adopting a reformist approach to aid effectiveness, combining managerialistic and non-
managerialistic perspectives (267, 274). From a managerialistic, Principal Agent (PA) 
perspective, the aid effectiveness agenda is framed as an approach to maximise efficiency 
by aligning incentives, increasing information sharing and lowering transaction costs. 
Information sharing and transaction costs were explored in Chapter 8. This chapter 
explores incentive alignment between the different actors present in the Tanzanian health 
SWAP. In particular, it explores the extent to which ownership and mutual accountability 
serve to align the incentives of Development Partners (DPs) and government and their 
working towards common goals. In addition, managing for results is expected to align the 
incentives between DPs, government and beneficiaries, whilst harmonisation would align 
incentives between the different DPs. From a non-managerialistic perspective, the 
framework explores the power dynamics between DPs and the government, and between 
the different government agencies. Finally, the framework studies how the political context 
in which DAH is delivered affects the attainment of the agenda. 
The chapter uses this framework to firstly examine whether the relationship between DPs 
and the government is contractual (and therefore if the agenda is appropriate). Secondly it 
explores how institutional factors affect the attainment of the agenda principles. It finally 
steps back to examine the political context within which the agenda is played out.  
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9.2 Results 
The first step in analysing the institutional landscape of the Tanzanian health sector was to 
draw a map of all actors present in the sector and their interactions with each other 
(Appendix F). To understand this complex web of relationships, the multi-dimensional 
conceptual framework summarised above was used. The results are presented following 
the three objectives of the chapter:  
1. To examine whether the relationship between DPs and the government is 
contractual (and therefore if the agenda is appropriate) 
2. To explore how institutional factors affect the attainment of the agenda principles  
3. To examine the political context within which the agenda is played out 
9.2.1 Relationships  
The first objective of this chapter is rooted in principle agent theory and seeks to assess the 
nature of the contractual relationships in development assistance for health. In doing so, 
this section aims to examine whether the aid effectiveness agenda may be appropriate as a 
vehicle to ensure that implicit or explicit contracts for development aid are organised in a 
Box 4: Key messages of Chapter 9 
 DPs and government agencies have not managed to fully align their incentives; 
this hinders the attainment of the agenda, but also means it is needed. 
 There are contractual elements to the DP-government relationship; however, 
other political and power factors are at play, which are not addressed by the 
current approach to aid effectiveness. 
 A technocratic approach that does not involve an array of important actors has 
undermined the SWAP 
 There is a need to incorporate both managerial and non-managerial approaches 
to development in order to attain the aid effectiveness agenda. 
270 
 
way to ensure they are likely to result in efficiency (in terms of reaching social welfare 
objectives). This section tackles this question by exploring key contractual dimensions in 
the relationships between DPs and the Government of Tanzania (GoT). Chapter 8 showed 
that the Government of Tanzania and DPs were not able to hold each other to account. The 
reasons for this are explored further in this section, first by establishing the nature of the 
“aid contract” and in particular exploring why DPs are not fully able to enforce it. The 
section then examines how power dynamics may also impact contractual relationships and 
enforcement and the role of actors involved in the Tanzanian health sector beyond those 
active in the dialogue in enforcing that contracts are in line with beneficiaries’ needs. 
Accountability and the aid contract 
There are different contracts guiding the relationship between DPs and the government in 
the Tanzanian health sector, including the SWAP Code of Conduct, the Health Basket Fund 
Memorandum of Understanding and the contracts for bi-lateral agreements signed 
between single DPs and the government. There may also be an implicit contract. However, 
whether the relationship between DPs and government is contractual would in part 
depend on whether DPs (as principals) can keep the government (as agent) to account.  
Chapter 8 reported that respondents felt the only tool DPs had (as principals) to enforce 
the “aid contract” was to withdraw funds. However, the analysis reported in this chapter 
found DPs’ incentives were not conducive to this for different reasons. First, pressures to 
disburse funds at the DP level made them less inclined to withdraw funds if the contract 
was not respected, and hindered DPs’ coordination efforts (see below). Second, DP 
accountability lines to headquarters were stronger than to actors at the national level, 
which meant that the DPs were less united in enforcing the contract. Finally, respondents 
reported concerns about the potential impact of withdrawing funds; for instance, if DPs are 
disbursing funds using the government system, sanctions can cause delays or prevent the 
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government from keeping to its commitments. In addition, DPs feared they would punish 
the local population, which provides some explanation of why DPs may continue to provide 
funds even when the government is not complying. 
“… strategically the government allocates donor money into very sensitive areas in 
the sector, for example, procurement of medicine. And then if this fund is delayed it 
means no medicine in the facilities, and therefore this could cause more damage, 
probably deaths, something ... no one wants.” (Non-government) 
This is further complicated by Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) employees’ 
seemingly indifference for how much money they receive or when they receive it, which is 
partly due to a lack of results-based performance assessment (see below). A non-
government stakeholder described this as being a result of the fact that government 
employees’ salary is independent of how much money the government receives from DPs, 
and therefore whether DPs withdraw funds does not influence them personally, “it is more 
something secondary that it would be easier if (government employees) got the money in 
time”.  
Therefore, if DPs cannot always keep the government accountable, then it may suggest 
that the government has more power than would be expected from a PA model. 
Power 
When asked about DP-GoT power relations to form the content of contracts and support 
contractual enforcement, this research found a mixture of opinions. Chapter 8 reported 
there was a balance of power in the basket fund negotiations. However, this study found 
evidence that all three power dimensions highlighted in the conceptual framework: visible, 
hidden and invisible, in the behaviour of DP and government representatives. Visible power 
was observed during the budget negotiations in Chapter 8, where different actors fought to 
get their priorities onto the agenda in the form of annual milestones. An example of hidden 
power was reported by a DP when describing basket fund negotiations for the previous 
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year on the share of resources that would be allocated to the districts and the central 
government. In this case the GoT used its power by deciding the budget ceiling and 
guidance before involving the DPs, and thereby reducing the negotiation space. 
“... at the time that (budget negotiations were) happening, the budget guidelines 
and the budget ceilings had already gone out to the districts, so increasing the 
amount to the districts was logistically difficult ... and would require the districts to 
go through the whole planning process over again, and absorb more money. The 
donors were a little upset that the government hadn’t had that dialogue ... in time 
for the proper budget ceilings to go up.”  (DP) 
The final dimension of power is invisible power, which involves social conditioning and 
ideology. This was clearer from the DP side, where ideological changes at their 
headquarters resulted in changes in aid management practices, such as the introduction of 
performance measures, something some stakeholders feared may result in changing the 
basket fund so results can be more easily attributed to it. 
“... some of the performance stuff will come in and hopefully that will attract 
donors to it. The other part of it that may end up happening ... to bring in other 
donors like the US government ... is for it to be a little bit more earmarked.”  (DP) 
Therefore, the distribution of power in the government-DP relationship is complex, with 
both sides exercising power in different ways when negotiating resource allocation. This 
calls into question whether the GoT-DP is purely contractual, as the government is not as 
powerless as may be assumed by PA theory.  
Additional actors 
The focus of the main dialogue between DPs working in the health sector and the 
government happens through the MoHSW67. However, there are several other 
government agencies involved in the health sector, who have key roles in the 
                                                          
67 This refers to the health sector dialogue, and not the HIV/AIDS dialogue, where the MoHSW 
participates, but TACAIDS leads (see Chapter 8) 
273 
 
implementation of the contract, which did not participate in the health SWAP dialogue (or 
had weak representation), despite the fact that some of these agencies have formally 
signed the SWAP Code of Conduct and the Health Basket Fund Side agreement, so were 
officially included in the “aid contract”. These include the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the 
Prime Minister’s Office for Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG) 
and the President’s Office for Public Service Management (POPSM) at the central level, and 
Regional and Council health authorities (RHMT and CHMT respectively)68.  
Despite the wide variety of government actors operating in the health sector, and that 
funds flow from the MoF to the PMO-RALG, RHMT and CHMT, the MoHSW was seen as 
having the overall responsibility for the sector and as such the centre of domestic and 
external accountability and dialogue.  
“... if money runs out at the local level, the minister will probably be wheeled in 
front of parliament and press, the minister of health and not the minister for PMO-
RALG.” (Anonymous)  
When DPs talked about “the government”, they also often just referred to the MoHSW. 
The PMO-RALG and the MoF, which are both based in Dodoma (the capital) rather than in 
Dar es Salaam, and are key players in financing and providing health services, were less 
engaged in the dialogue. 
“… we always speak of the Ministry of Health, but the big minister in health is the 
PMO-RALG and those guys [...] implement all the health services from district down 
to the periphery. They have a huge responsibility and we hardly have exchanges 
with them [...] we just discuss with the technicians because they are here next door 
and because we like it” (DP)    
There are signs that this is improving through greater engagement with other government 
bodies in recent years, with efforts to strengthen the participation of the PMO-RALG in the 
                                                          
68 See Chapter 5 for a detailed description of the Tanzanian health sector actors, policies and 
budget mechanisms 
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health sector dialogue. Further, DPs who work at the GBS level have their own dialogue 
with the MoF, where some of the issues affecting the health sector, such as 
macroeconomic and wider political decisions, are discussed. However, respondents felt 
that the link between these two dialogues had eroded in recent years.  
Outside the Tanzanian national context, there are global and national actors that influence 
the Tanzanian health SWAP dialogue. Very important amongst these are the ministries in 
charge of development cooperation of bi-lateral DPs, which are discussed in section 9.2.3. 
Other actors include national and international pressure groups, which, although very 
important, fall outside the scope of this paper. 
This indicates that the design of the health sector dialogue that forms the core of the SWAP 
may be too narrow. DPs may be directing their power at the MoHSW, whereas important 
budgeting decisions are made at a higher level. Findings from this section therefore 
support the view that framing aid relationships as only taking place between two parties 
may be restrictive to understanding the aid effectiveness agenda. 
9.2.2 Institutions 
This section explores the macro-institutional incentives, structural factors and micro-
institutional incentives of Development Partners and the Government of Tanzania, and 
explores how each of these affects the SWAP dialogue and the attainment of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. 
DP 
Macro-institutional incentives 
When asked about DP motivations for giving aid (i.e. their utility function), a DP 
representative reported they were driven by humanitarian reasons, and that it was an 
“international obligation that the better off, the well to do countries support the least 
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developed countries”. This would suggest that, at least in part, the incentives of DPs are 
aligned to those of the beneficiaries, which would encourage country ownership of the 
development strategy, as national actors would have more information about beneficiary 
need. However, there is a risk that this type of response may be subject to social 
desirability bias, where a respondent wishes to present his/herself in a positive light to the 
researcher (435). 
Further, government and non-government respondents reported that DPs also gave aid to 
pursue their commercial and political interests, 
“(DPs give aid) because they want to be in control [of] policy, in control of 
processes, in control in terms of economy because then, depending on how much 
aid you give, the more recognition you get.” (Non-government)  
Where political incentives are out of line with maximising health benefits, this may misalign 
DP and beneficiary incentives, depending on the content of the policy of interest. These 
non-health incentives may also hinder aspects of the aid effectiveness agenda, including 
the management for results (if the results expected from DPs and beneficiaries are 
different) and country ownership (in terms of ownership of beneficiaries if their interests 
are not aligned to DPs). Further, if different DP agencies are pursuing different political 
interests, this would deter harmonisation. However, DP incentives may be in line with 
those of the government, potentially fostering government ownership, and it may 
encourage DPs to disburse DAH through government systems, if they view this as 
increasing their power over the government.  
Structural factors 
DPs acknowledged that their centralised structure was a key issue. Despite calls for mutual 
accountability between DPs and the GoT, respondents felt that DPs’ accountability to their 
head offices was stronger than their responsibility for actions on the ground. Priorities and 
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important decisions were seen as being dictated by headquarters; for instance, the decision 
by some DPs to pull back from the health basket (thus hindering the principle of alignment 
and explaining the results reported in section 8.3.2). This also shows that headquarters are 
more powerful than DP national offices. DPs reported that their headquarters and SWAP 
commitments pulled them in different directions, which had a negative impact on the 
dialogue, and affected DPs’ abilities to align to the government systems.  
“We had a change in the government ... they are interested that we are able to 
account for the (money) spent in development cooperation in our partner countries. 
So from the former focus on budget support and health basket … we have a slight 
change of political approaches ... from the implementing agency perspective we 
pointed out the importance of the health basket for the sector wide approach in 
Tanzania ... But it was a political decision.”  (DP) 
This may result in both lack of DP harmonisation and lack of DP accountability to the 
government (and therefore explain some of the results reported in Chapter 8), and had an 
impact on the dialogue, as it resulted in DPs going back on their commitments, something a 
bi-lateral DP acknowledged created tensions with the government, which requested 
“development partners not to steer so much from the headquarters, to be much more 
present here”. 
Micro-institutional incentives 
Individual DP employees reported, like their organisations, to be driven by humanitarian 
reasons. However, the institutional set up of DP agencies, particularly the way in which 
performance was assessed, resulted in a set of incentives that affected the way aid was 
delivered and implemented. DPs reported their performance was assessed as disbursement 
ratios. 
“They look at things like disbursement ratios so if you have whatever 10 or 15 
million that’s sitting around for the better part of the year, headquarters is going to 
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say, ‘What’s going on here? Parliament voted this money so that it could be used, 
not so that it could sit in a bank somewhere.’”  (DP) 
This was viewed to affect aid relationships and the aid effectiveness agenda in two ways. 
First, a DP stated that it was common practice for DPs to add (often large) unspent funds to 
the basket fund at the end of the year, resulting from fears about having a reduced budget 
the subsequent year, if all funds were not spent. These funds (which may be as much as 
five million dollars) come without any justification or request from the government, are 
outside of the budget process, resulting in “a whole lot of negotiation and then the money 
is not spent and the procurement drags”. This means that money comes when it is there 
and not necessarily when needed. In theory, this may support the alignment to country 
systems, if DPs disburse more of the funds as pooled funds; however, it would also affect 
the predictability of aid, and government’s ability to plan, thus disrupting the budget 
process. Second, a non-government stakeholder felt that since DPs’ primary objective was 
to disburse funds, it may make it less likely that they would withhold funds from the 
government, thereby hindering their ability to hold the government accountable. This 
explains why in Chapter 8, respondents reported that DPs sent mixed messages to the 
government and criticised DPs for disbursing funds despite being unhappy with the 
government. 
Respondents further felt that institutional incentives for career-strengthening discouraged 
DPs from reporting negative results to their headquarters, hindering problem-solving and 
learning, and resulted in incentives with unintended consequences for aid relationships, as 
it discouraged transparency and accountability between the DP national office in Tanzania 
and their headquarters. 
“... any negative message home to headquarters is a burden on their shoulders ... 
you send good, positive messages back to your headquarters … And if there’s 
anything with a problem, you just reduce it because … the one who is always 
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feeding positive things back to the headquarters will be the one with opportunity 
for career promotions.” (Non-government) 
From the perspective of a PA relationship between the DP headquarters (principal) and the 
DP country office in Tanzania (agent), this can be understood as an incentive to abuse 
information asymmetry for country-based DPs, and bias reporting towards only positive 
outcomes. 
Respondents from both the government and DPs reported a change in the skill set of DPs 
from the time the SWAP was introduced. Initially, DPs were very involved technically, but 
they gradually became more bureaucratic, administrative and diplomatic. 
“It is that gradual shift of development partner position … from being very much 
involved and very much working on (the government) side when we started the 
SWAP collaboration (to) people who have no knowledge about the sector … they 
can be economists, or some generalist of a kind” (Non-government) 
This had an impact in the dialogue and relationships with the government, and both 
government and DP interviewees reported the dialogue having become more formal and 
less constructive. However, not all respondents were in agreement on this. DPs discussed 
how to provide technical assistance to the government on proposal writing, and some DPs 
felt the dialogue was more constructive than in the past.  
Another factor that influenced the quality of the dialogue was the short nature of postings. 
Most of the people who designed the dialogue mechanisms were no longer around. 
Relationships take time to build and many stakeholders felt that often, by the time DPs 
really understood the context and developed good working relationships, they moved on. 
This also shortened institutional memory, and resulted in DPs repeating things that had 
already been done. 
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“... it used to have stronger relations. But I think also some of it must be a function 
of time because as the sculpturers of the framework have moved on, then is there 
that absolute buy-in and belief in the structure with new people?”  (DP)  
GoT 
Macro-institutional incentives 
The mission of the MoHSW is to improve the health of the Tanzanian population (436). 
However, DPs expressed reservations about the government’s ability to act in the interest 
of beneficiaries, clearly viewing the political process as insufficient to ensure that the 
government acted in the interests of its beneficiaries. The Tanzanian government as a 
whole was viewed by some DPs as wanting to keep getting funded by DPs.  
“They want to do enough to stay aided but that’s not very hard. They already do 
that so they don’t have to do anything else” (DP)  
Given that Tanzania is a democratic country, one would assume the government would also 
be incentivised by winning elections. These incentives are not necessarily perverse. The 
government is an agent of both DPs and beneficiaries, so if DPs’ and beneficiaries’ interests 
are aligned then this should pose no conflict. However, willingness to accept external 
funding (and to achieve internationally agreed objectives) was perceived by some non-
government respondents to be more important than what is best for the country. If this is 
the case, then differences between DPs and beneficiaries may decrease the effectiveness 
of aid, as the government accountability to DPs is stronger than to beneficiaries. Overall, 
actions of both DPs and the government were recognised by respondents to be motivated 
by more complex political agendas than the maximisation of the health of beneficiaries. 
Structural factors 
The hierarchical and bureaucratic structure of the MoHSW was also seen as important, and 
regarded by non-government stakeholders as deterring innovation. 
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“If we want to do something special, something to innovate the system, it’s almost 
impossible, because any small, small, small decision has to go the whole way to the 
very top of the organization, to have a signature, and come back. […] it can take 
months.” (Non-government) 
Further, a lack of communication and coordination between different departments of the 
MoHSW was viewed as affecting the dialogue because it hindered coordination of the 
different initiatives. The vertical and bureaucratic structure of the government also hinders 
innovation and may lower the capacity development of the government, resulting in DP 
frustration and hindering the quality of the government system and hence alignment. 
Micro-institutional incentives 
MoHSW employees also had a variety of incentives. They reported being motivated by 
improving health and their own performance targets, which were reviewed annually using 
the government’s Open Performance Review and Appraisal system (employees have 
annual targets, which are appraised by their line-managers). However, many non-
government respondents believed performance was assessed and rewarded in less 
transparent ways. This was seen as resulting from the government’s remuneration system, 
where employees receive a fixed salary but are paid allowances and per diems for 
attending meetings, training courses and conducting supervisory visits and trips, which 
diverted them away from their daily tasks. The performance assessment and remuneration 
system was blamed for distorting incentives and resulting in employees being 
unproductive.  
“… there's no incentive to perform. The allowance is not at all related to any 
performance or result. That's the biggest problem, which means if you are a 
director in the ministry, what you have to do is fight for having a slot in the budget 
to have a good training nationwide and that means that concretely you will travel 
for two months yourself to deliver the training with a few persons, so it's very good 
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for your position [...] and then you will also distribute allowances to those who 
come to training, which will reinforce your position.” (Anonymous) 
As with DPs, the short-nature of postings of government employees was also perceived to 
affect aid relationships, some of whom DPs had spent considerable time building. 
GoT micro-institutional incentives therefore hindered the attainment of managing for 
results, as the performance of neither government nor DP employees was assessed 
according to results. Overall, institutional factors were found to affect the attainment of 
the aid effectiveness agenda, by resulting in incentive misalignment and information 
asymmetries. However, this also means there is a need for the aid effectiveness agenda to 
tackle incentive problems.   
9.2.3 Political context 
This section outlines the political context within which aid relationships are played out, 
which influences but is not directly addressed by the aid effectiveness agenda. It primarily 
focuses on power within the GoT, but begins with a short section acknowledging and 
reinforcing the observation above concerning the balance of power between national and 
global DP offices. 
 DP Politics 
Regardless of whether they were bi- or multi-lateral, respondents reported that 
development partners were subject to the political context their headquarters were in, 
particularly given the centralised nature of aid agencies. There is, however, a clear 
difference between the politics of multi- and bi-lateral agencies that needs to be noted. 
Multi-laterals are accountable to a multitude of funders/member states and may be 
considered by some as less susceptible to direct political influence – and short term 
political shock. Moreover, many of the multi-laterals include recipients of development 
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assistance within their governance structures. Bi-lateral agencies by their very nature are 
directly accountable politically to one government, and therefore subject to electoral 
pressures and internal politics of a specific constituency. Some DPs believed donor 
countries are facing a financial crisis and a broader ideological shift towards austerity, 
which had implications for the way aid is managed. For instance, it may considered 
legitimate for a change of Minister of development political views to result in an agency to 
change approach in all countries, without taking into consideration the national context, 
relationships or prior commitments.  
This is further complicated by the fact that some bi-lateral DPs are dependent on two 
different ministries, subject to their own (changing) ideologies, personalities and power 
dynamics.  
“We have two ministries who are somehow linked to development cooperation and 
our major funding ministry is the ministry for economic cooperation and 
development, (which) is framing the policy and the policy is obviously linked to 
political parties and political environment.” – DP 
This affects the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda, as political factors may 
impact aid management practices, irrespective of national and international agreements. 
GoT politics 
As shown above, the health sector is made up of different government agencies. These are 
subject to relationships and politics between and within them. The MoHSW sits below the 
central ministries, but above the regional and council health authorities. This section will 
examine its relationship with both.  
When negotiating the budget and deciding priorities, the MoHSW has to negotiate with the 
three central ministries, which have more power than itself (MoF, POPSM and PMO-RALG). 
The relationship between the MoHSW and the local level has been marked by a de-
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centralisation programme known as “Decentralisation by Devolution” (308), which has 
been ongoing since 1994, when the government launched the Local Government Reforms 
Programme, and aims to provide more autonomy to the CHMT and RHMT. In particular, the 
reform aims to give Local Government Authorities (LGAs) responsibility for planning, 
budgeting and managing government services, including health services. The reform also 
changed the RHMTs, which became “facilitators” and part of the regional administration, 
rather than of the MoHSW. This reform was viewed by some as creating tensions between 
the MoHSW, who want to retain power, and the districts.  
“The central government wants to do everything but the LGAs can do it on their 
own.” (Anonymous)  
This has also resulted in tensions during the basket fund negotiations between DPs and 
MoHSW, when discussing resource allocation and the proportion of funds that would be 
spent at the central versus the local level. 
“So as development partners kept pushing the government to put more money into 
the districts, the government pushed back and said, “We need money for drugs and 
medicines and that serves the districts well.” – DP  
As a result of this power struggle, some respondents felt the local level was suffering as it 
has increased responsibilities, but the funds are still controlled centrally. However, this may 
falsely portray the CHMT as being the least powerful and having the most responsibility. In 
reality, due to poor public financial management, funds are often delayed, and typically 
arrive to the CHMT six months late. This means that for the second half of the year, the 
CHMT are spending funds in a different financial year than they had been planned for, and 
therefore have more discretion as to how to spend funds. The actual amounts spent would 
only be recorded by the Exchequer, but these are hard to access, reportedly even by some 
sections of the government. Despite the fact that de-centralisation meant it was harder to 
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monitor funds, DPs have favoured this approach and are in favour of providing more 
support to the local level. 
“... what astonishes me is that the DPs seem to sort of just assume that (health 
being managed at the local level)’s a good thing so that more and more money gets 
paid out through PMO-RALG to the local level and I think there’s very little evidence 
of what that’s doing”  (Anonymous) 
This has implications for the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda. First, ideology 
influences some of the decisions that are made, even at the cost of DPs having less 
information. Second, the importance of local government authorities has implications for 
the principles of ownership, alignment and accountability, particularly in specifying who 
owns development strategies, whose strategies DPs should adhere to and who should DPs 
hold accountable and be accountable to.  
In addition, unforeseen political factors also have an impact on the dialogue. For instance, 
during the time of fieldwork Tanzania experienced a period of doctor strikes over salaries, 
which lasted for seven months and ended with 300 doctors dismissed (437). This drove the 
operations of the ministry to a halt, ended with a change in senior positions and had an 
impact on the government’s prioritisation of the health sector. 
“I think the unfortunate thing is that we were starting to do better in the dialogue 
with the government and in the management of the health basket, but then the loss 
of all of the things that happened with the Ministry of Health and all that, six 
months or so, it’s been a bit of a setback. It’s delayed a lot of the dialogue.” (DP)  
DP involvement in GoT politics 
Despite this complex and diverse political structure and the myriad of actors present, DPs 
were criticised by some respondents for not being sufficiently involved in national politics. 
Some local stakeholders believed DPs were in a privileged position, with high access to 
policymakers and should therefore be involved in the management of the health sector, for 
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instance in influencing political decisions that local stakeholders found harder to engage in, 
such as the issue of per diems mentioned above. 
“... development partners ... have to acknowledge that they have a role being non-
politicians here (and they should) put pressure on things that other state-funded 
groups have difficulties dealing with here. As a politician it’s very difficult to do 
something against that allowance culture ... everyone in the government will be 
against them from day one.”  (Non-government) 
DPs acknowledged this and recognised that they often either focused on administrative or 
very technical micro- issues, at the cost of engaging at the broader socio-political level. For 
instance, a bi-lateral DP reported the DPG-H had made significant progress at the technical 
level to develop a health financing strategy with the government, but now needed the 
political support for the necessary reforms to take place, with DPs working “in the flow 
between political dialogue and technical dialogue and decision making”, again reflecting 
that the approach to aid management may be too technocratic. 
This lack of involvement however can be seen in another light, as other stakeholders 
criticised DPs for being too involved and  for “micro-managing” the sector, which ran 
contrary to the achievement of the principle of country ownership. This shows that lack of 
precision in aid effectiveness declarations on whose ownership and of what has 
implications on the implementation of the agenda at the country level. 
The results of this chapter therefore suggest that although there are contractual elements 
in the DP-GoT relationship, and indeed incentive misalignment within DP and GoT agencies 
are hindering progress towards aid effectiveness principles, the PA framework may be too 
simplistic to analyse aid relationships and the aid effectiveness agenda. Taking all the 
factors explored in this chapter into consideration, Figure 4.1 from the conceptual 
framework can be redrawn to reflect the context and all of the actors present in which aid 
relationships take place as shown in Figure 9.1 below. 
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Figure 9.1: Modified conceptual framework69 
 
 
9.3 Discussion 
Earlier chapters examining the attainment of the aid effectiveness agenda at the country 
level in the Tanzanian health sector have shown that it is hampered by institutional and 
political factors. The aim of this chapter was to explore these factors, using a conceptual 
framework consisting of economic (principal-agent theory) and policy dimensions (power 
and politics). Specifically, this chapter has sought to address whether the agenda is 
                                                          
69 Figures in black represent the actors involved in the Principal Agent framework shown in figure 
4.1. Figures in blue represent all additional actors influencing the SWAP dialogue and the political 
context they are embedded in. DPHQ: Development Partner headquarters, DPNAT: Development 
Partner national (country) office, Ind: Individual employee, GoT: Government of Tanzania, NGO: 
Non-Government Organisation, MoF: Ministry of Finance, PMO-RALG: Prime Minister’s Office for 
Regional Administration and Local Government, POPSM: President’s Office for Public Service 
Management, RHMT: Regional Health Management Team, CHMT: Council Health Management 
Team  
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adequate to improving relationships between DPs and recipients, by exploring the 
existence of incentive misalignments and what additional power and political factors are 
present that are not currently addressed by the agenda.  
Firstly using a PA perspective, the global aid effectiveness agenda has been framed as 
improving aid effectiveness by aligning incentives, improving information flows and 
lowering transaction costs. This study has found that both institutions and individuals 
involved have incentives beyond improving the health of the Tanzanian population, and 
that these incentives may be complex and  not always aligned. This complexity may have a 
perverse influence on the achievement of the agenda by hindering DPs from holding the 
government to account and using a harmonised approach.  
In addition, the lack of results-based performance assessment of DP and government 
employees could be interpreted to reflect the fact that the internal principals and agents 
within these institutions have not aligned their incentives to achieving results, which in turn 
means they have little incentive to manage for results. PA theory suggests that in 
contractual relationships where outcomes  are not easily observable, there is an input bias 
in performance assessment of the agent by the principal (6). This was observed here, and 
has been documented in previous studies of the World Bank and of DPs in Uganda (179, 
405). In addition, the broken feedback loop in aid chains, where those receiving the 
services (beneficiaries) are not the same as those paying for them (DPs), has been 
recognised as a hindrance to effective aid (6). In this study, the fact that the GoT is and 
agent and both DPs and beneficiaries share their role as principals means beneficiaries’ 
power to hold the government to account may be  diminished; they lack power for 
engagement in the dialogue. This may be improved if the role of beneficiaries as principals 
is strengthened. One way this can be achieved is by giving a more prominent role to civil 
society, as representatives of beneficiaries. However, much of the aid effectiveness agenda 
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focuses on the contractual relationships between DPs and national governments. The 
involvement of civil society in the dialogue in Tanzania has indeed increased, partly due to 
DPs’ insistence (295), but it is not yet enough (this of course relies on the assumption that 
civil society can represent the interest of Tanzanian citizens). In addition, a study in 
Cambodia found that despite investing in civil society capacity, DPs actually sabotaged civil 
society reform by delivering aid in a fragmented project-based manner (438).  
However, although PA is found to be relevant to study relationships within DP and 
government agencies, there are other factors, such as power and politics, not addressed by 
PA theory, which were found to have a potential role in both the achievement of social 
welfare, and the enactment of the aid effectiveness agenda in this study. For instance, 
Chapter 8 showed that DPs pledged to align themselves to the government system and 
initially made some progress towards this, although this is now reversing. On the one hand, 
this is driven by DPs’ role as agents of their home populations, and the pressure they have 
to show results quickly. But on the other hand, DP headquarters are also subject to political 
and ideological influences, which have been shown here to influence the choice of funding 
modality.  
This is also the case with harmonisation, where a lack of incentive alignment between the 
DP headquarters and the national office prevents DPs, as multiple principals, to coordinate, 
resulting in inefficiencies and hindering DP ability to hold the government accountable. This 
echoes findings from a similar study in the health and education sectors in Zambia, where 
Leiderer found collective action problems explained the lax adherence to aid effectiveness 
principles (38). However, in this study harmonisation was found to be further complicated 
by the political nature of decision-making, leading to power struggles amongst DPs; 
something also observed by Hyden in his study of power relations amongst DPs in Tanzania 
(295). In addition, this study found that tackling DP power struggles requires government 
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leadership, which it may not have an incentive to provide, given that by acting as one DPs 
would have much more power (439).   
Further, Chapter 8 showed DPs and GoT have not managed to keep each other 
accountable. This chapter found that this may be in part due to a lack of unity between DPs 
and the pressures they are under to disburse funds. It also means that by depicting the GoT 
as an agent, PA theory would assume it is powerless against DPs, however its dual agency 
of accountability towards it beneficiaries means that this is not the case. In addition, 
findings from this study suggest the government exerts its power in different ways (for 
instance, by excluding DPs from some negotiations). Furthermore, a number government 
agencies are active in the health sector, resulting in no clear chain of accountability, and 
are not included in the PA framework. This suggests that either DPs do not have as much 
power as would be assumed, or they are either not using it or are directing it too narrowly 
at the MoHSW. For instance, issues of fungibility (Chapter 8) and allowances, which affect 
the health sector, should be addressed at the GBS dialogue. This would call for DPs to be 
more engaged in the national politics of Tanzania; however, individual incentives together 
with the hierarchical structure of DPs currently stop this from taking place. Further, this 
may also be difficult because DP involvement in country politics may go against the 
principle of ownership and respecting GoT sovereignty.   
Apart from incentive alignment, the aid effectiveness agenda intended an increase in the 
availability of information. Chapter 8 reported that this was partially achieved through 
harmonisation efforts (which increased information sharing among DPs) and a shift 
towards managing for results (which improved the quantity of information available from 
the GoT, although more needs to be done to improve its quality). However, DPs did not 
fully understand the government public financial management and procurement systems, 
and found it hard to obtain certain information from the government. This is likely a 
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consequence of moving towards a government system, as DPs would naturally have less 
information than in vertical, project-based modalities (295). However, a lack of information 
is also a function of limited institutional memory, which results from short postings (295). 
DP rotation practices observed in this study therefore contribute to a lack of information. 
Furthermore, government hierarchical structures meant information-sharing was difficult 
between and within government agencies. Theories that regard information as power 
would explain why different players may not want to share information (298), but this also 
highlights the danger for DPs of being less involved technically, as they would decrease 
their knowledge of the sector and therefore their power. Despite the above and although 
more progress remains to be made, this study suggests the implementation of the aid 
effectiveness agenda has reduced information asymmetries.  
The findings in this chapter are subject to two key methodological limitations. First, the 
institutional set up is unique to Tanzania, and therefore some of the findings are context-
specific. However, it is hoped that key weaknesses described in the approach to 
development can be translated to other contexts that are facing similar issues and 
institutional setups. Second, analysis of power dynamics and the political context was used 
to complement weaknesses of PA theory, rather than an analysis its own right. Although 
some attempt was made to explore power beyond the visible dimension of power as 
decision-making, the design of the study and methods used did not allow for in-depth 
exploration of less explicit dimensions of power, such as Luke’s second and third (power as 
non-decision making and thought control) dimensions of power (300). These dimensions of 
power are harder to measure and would involve understanding the spaces for engagement 
and the levels of power (local versus global) (440), but in doing so would provide a more 
complete picture of who and how determines what decisions are made. However, this is 
also a strength of the approach, as combining different disciplines allows for issues to be 
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explored from different lenses and eventually to propose better informed 
recommendations to improve the aid system.  
Nevertheless, this chapter has also made some important contributions to the 
development literature. First, it has explored the applicability of the PA framework to 
evaluate aid relationships, and has found that whilst it is very useful for internal 
relationships within agencies, some of its assumptions do not hold for government-DP 
relationships. This is because PA theory misses some of the complexity of the context DP-
government relationships take place and power dynamics in these relationships, which are 
neither simple nor static. To explore and unpack these in depth, it is useful to adopt 
theories and methods from the political sciences, such as power frameworks and 
stakeholder analyses. Second, the modified framework developed as part of this study can 
be applied to other sectors and contexts to evaluate the application of the aid effectiveness 
agenda or any other policy. Third, it has also shown a way of bridging across different 
disciplines arising from managerialistic and non-managerialistic approaches to 
development to analyse whether the institutional set up of the health SWAP in Tanzania is 
conducive to achieving the global aid effectiveness agenda.  
In conclusion, although progress has been made towards decreasing information 
asymmetries, the aid effectiveness agenda has not been fully successful at aligning the 
incentives of the different actors active in the Tanzanian health SWAP. Therefore the 
agenda is relevant and needed, but the current technocratic approach may be insufficient 
to improve incentive misalignment. The results of this study suggest that to increase 
incentive alignment that would further the attainment of the aid effectiveness agenda, 
agencies involved in aid should undergo institutional reform. Furthermore, the agenda may 
not be sufficient, as it does not address important policy factors, such as the different 
government agencies involved, the different levels of government-DP dialogue and the 
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political context in which aid relationships are played out. In a study of the application of 
the Paris Declaration in Colombia, McGee also argued that development aid is a political 
rather than technical exercise and the application of the five principles of aid effectiveness 
increases complexity and encourages power games (187), and in Vietnam Dodd and Olive 
argued that aid reforms need to be understood as political, rather than merely technocratic 
efforts (100). This chapter would therefore recommend DPs explore ways to address the 
politics in which aid takes place, whilst still respecting country ownership. 
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10 DISCUSSION 
The aim of this PhD project was to develop and apply methods to assess and explain the 
achievement of the global aid effectiveness agenda at the country level, using the 
Tanzanian health Sector Wide Approach (SWAP) as a case study. To fulfil this aim, the 
following objectives were undertaken: 
1. To describe the history and the current structure of the Tanzanian health SWAP 
policy landscape 
2. To analyse health financing flows (domestic and external) to Tanzania during the 
time period of 2000-2010 
3. To develop a set of indicators to measure whether the implementation of the 
Tanzanian SWAP is consistent with the principles outlined in the global aid 
effectiveness agenda  
4. To apply the indicators developed to assess the extent to which aid effectiveness 
principles have been achieved 
5. To explain the achievement of the aid effectiveness agenda through an analysis of 
institutional factors and relationships between the actors present in the Tanzanian 
health SWAP using a political economy framework  
6. To develop policy recommendations based on the findings for national 
policymakers implementing SWAPs, Development Partners (DPs) and researchers 
at the national and global level 
This chapter addresses the final objective of the thesis. It first summarises the overall 
findings from this study. It then shows what this thesis has contributed to knowledge, 
before outlining the limitations of the research. The chapter concludes with policy and 
research recommendations based on the results of the thesis. 
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10.1 Summary of findings 
The aid landscape of Tanzania is characteristic of the changes that have taken place globally 
in the last 15 years, with flows of Development Assistance for Health (DAH) increasing 
exponentially, new actors appearing (such as the Global Fund and GAVI), certain bi-laterals 
gaining importance (such as the United States (US)) whilst more traditional multi-lateral 
agencies (particularly the United Nations) representing a decreasing share of resources. 
The management of the Tanzanian health sector has experienced some important changes 
with the establishment of the sector wide approach in 1998, the health basket fund in 1999 
and the adoption of national strategies of aid effectiveness as well as all international 
declarations of aid effectiveness between 2000 and 2010. The Tanzanian health SWAP 
therefore makes for an ideal case study to explore whether and how the global aid 
effectiveness agenda has been achieved at country level. 
The Tanzanian health SWAP has a unified sector plan with a medium-term expenditure 
framework, common funding arrangements and DP harmonisation structures and a joint 
annual health sector review. This is consistent with the key elements of the SWAP 
approach (418, 441), and is supported by the aid effectiveness agenda, which advocates for 
an approach to delivering development assistance that is owned by the recipient country, 
who designs its own development strategy, to which all DPs adhere, working under a 
harmonised approach that is focused on managing for results, for which DPs and 
government are mutually accountable. This study used a mixed-methods approach to 
develop and apply a framework to analyse the Tanzanian health SWAP through the lens of 
the five principles of aid effectiveness: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for 
results and mutual accountability. The rest of this section summarises the findings of this 
thesis, and is structured following the five principles of the agenda.  
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10.1.1 Ownership 
Having a unified plan and expenditure framework is a core component of the Sector Wide 
Approach and is also the indicator for measuring country ownership in international 
declarations. All actors active in the Tanzanian health sector work under the Health Sector 
Strategic Plan (HSSP), which is linked to the medium-term expenditure framework; thereby 
meeting the country ownership principle in international declarations.  
This study found ownership was the hardest principle to define and assess for three 
reasons. First, the definition of “country” has evolved, in the early years of SWAP being 
interpreted as the government, but later broadening to include participation of non-
government actors in the dialogue. Second, the definition of government is unclear, with 
DPs mainly engaging with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW), whilst other 
government agencies with more power over the health sector are not very active in the 
health dialogue, including the Prime Minister's Office Regional Administration and Local 
Government (PMO-RALG), the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the President’s Office Public 
Service Management (PO-PSM) at the central level, and the regional and council 
management teams at regional level and below. Further, despite the global aid 
effectiveness agenda assessing ownership based on the existence of a plan and 
expenditure framework, national interpretations of ownership went beyond this to include 
aspects such as the extent of national actor participation in the SWAP dialogue and the 
degree of government leadership in decision-making.   
The extent to which the Government had ownership over the main priorities set in the plan 
was hard to assess, but this study findings suggest that there is still some way to go. The 
HSSP was very broad (encompassing 11 strategies and 6 cross-cutting themes). 
Furthermore, this study found that the extent of leadership, and thus ownership, of the 
government in the process of priority-setting and decision-making within the health 
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strategy and expenditure framework was mixed. Officially, priority-setting took place 
annually as part of the joint annual health sector review. This study found many 
stakeholders perceived this process as being DP-driven, echoing concerns in the literature 
over the influence of DPs on priority-setting in aid dependent countries (442). Moreover, in 
recent years the government’s participation in the SWAP dialogue has decreased, 
something that was attributed both to a lack of government capacity and willingness to 
engage. Nevertheless, this study found that the SWAP dialogue was often not the real 
forum for decisions regarding budget allocations (likely decided by some actors not present 
in the dialogue with DPs, such as the MoF, PMO-RALG and POPSM). This was perceived by 
some to be an indication that the SWAP dialogue was more a requirement from DPs, than a 
government decision-making forum, something that has also been suggested in Malawi 
(423) and globally (191). The study also found some evidence that the government 
determined overall amount of funds going to the health sector and different sub-sector 
priorities by adjusting its own expenditure to the changing patterns of aid flows 
(fungibility).  
Finally, this study found no mechanism has been put in place to encourage ownership of or 
direct accountability to the Tanzanian population (beyond accountability through their 
elected representatives). It is hoped that increased participation of civil society in the SWAP 
dialogue can improve this (although this would only be of use if the dialogue is the actual 
forum for setting priorities and if civil society are able to represent the interests of the 
Tanzanian population). This has been particularly encouraged in the Accra Agenda for 
Action, but also in the literature (183). 
Institutional analysis provides some explanations for the results found. On the one hand, 
DPs were found to have a variety of motivations for providing DAH, including humanitarian 
reasons, but also to serve their own individual and institutional interests. Some of these 
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motivations may not be fully aligned with the interests of the government or beneficiaries, 
and therefore DPs may not have an incentive to grant them full ownership of the process. 
Government incentives were to stay funded and win elections. While both of these 
motivations may be considered to be in line with the interests of beneficiaries; the former 
may create a culture of aid dependency, which over time may not enhance ownership, and 
mean that governments may not act in the interest of the Tanzanian population, but act in 
the interest of DPs. This may suggest that DPs (as providers of development assistance) are 
in a more powerful position than the government (as recipient) (6), which would not be 
conducive to government ownership. However, this study found this is not fully the case in 
Tanzania, as the government also has ways of exercising its power, by excluding DPs from 
some negotiations (such as discussions of the budget ceilings) that happen away from the 
SWAP dialogue.  
In conclusion, despite ownership being regarded as a key principle of aid effectiveness, the 
interpretations of country ownership varied between the global and national level, but also 
between different stakeholders. The Tanzanian health SWAP has been successful at setting 
up a forum for all actors to meet and jointly agree on priorities, which is a significant 
undertaking, given the amount and variety of actors present. However, the degree to which 
the SWAP has been able to address and balance the power of different actors remains 
limited, and the extent to which the beneficiaries’ interests are represented unclear, with 
civil society having a limited voice. Ownership is also difficult to achieve because the 
interests of the different actors are not fully aligned. Further, there has been relatively little 
discussion on the desirability of the ownership principle, if it is interpreted as DPs not being 
technically involved, as DPs may also make valuable contributions to the development 
process. The key may be to achieve a balance between country ownership and partnership 
with development partners and other actors active in the health SWAP (425), as the 
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government has more information about the country context but DPs can contribute 
important technical competencies.  
10.1.2 Alignment 
The second component of the SWAP is for DPs to use common funding arrangements. This 
corresponds with the principle of alignment in the international aid effectiveness agenda, 
which goes further by urging DPs to use strengthened country systems, and in national aid 
policies, which specify that DPs should deliver DAH in the form of budget support and 
pooled funds. Definitions of alignment were quite consistent between the different sources 
reviewed in this study; the indicators developed to measure it focused on the degree of use 
of country systems, the quality of these and trends in the different funding modalities. 
This study found that there has been a shift towards working with the government systems 
with the amount of funds delivered through government financial systems increasing from 
$35 million to $441 million; although as a proportion of total DAH, the amount of DAH 
delivered through the government stayed constant between 40 and 60%. One dimension  
of the SWAP approach (supported by the national aid effectiveness agenda) is for DPs to 
reduce their direct funding of vertical projects; and engage in supporting the government 
set priorities across the sector through a basket fund (443). However, although the amount 
of DAH channelled as budget support and basket funds increased, the main increase in the 
use of government systems was driven by the rise in vertical funding, making up to 70% of 
all DAH and about 40% of DAH delivered through the government by 2010.  
Moreover, although early enthusiasm on the SWAP and the aid effectiveness agenda 
resulted in most agencies (although not all) shifting towards using government systems and 
delivering funds as budget support and basket funds, this trend is now beginning to 
reverse, with some DPs moving out of the basket fund and reverting back to projects. 
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Conversely, there are signs that some of those who did not initially move towards using the 
country system may do so now, even in the form of pooled funds, which means the health 
basket  has been highly fluid with some DPs moving away from it whilst others are joining 
it. This fluidity of the commitment by DPs to using country systems raises questions 
regarding the desirability of DPs using the system, as it may impact government’s ability to 
plan in the medium and long term. 
Institutional factors go some way towards explaining these trends. First, there were 
concerns from some DPs regarding the quality of the government system, and a perception 
amongst most respondents that it had not improved sufficiently under the SWAP. This 
challenges the view that DPs can strengthen country systems by using them (378). Instead, 
DPs were criticised by non-government stakeholders for having moved to using 
government systems too quickly, without investing in institutional reform and capacity 
(something DPs themselves admitted). From the DP perspective, lack of system 
strengthening was also regarded as a reflection of a lack of willingness from the 
government to embark on a health sector reform. Worries about the absorption capacity of 
the government to manage DAH, particularly given the huge increases in DAH (from $34.5 
million in 2000 to $718 million in 2010), have also resulted in DPs disbursing through Non-
Government Organisations (NGOs). DP disbursement of funds through non-government 
channels may have some benefits in terms of civil society strengthening and increasing 
capacity; however, it has been previously been shown to fragment the aid management 
system and may weaken government health systems by attracting workers from 
government into the NGO sector through higher salaries (88). 
Second, some DPs felt that the amount of information sharing did not improve sufficiently 
after joining the government system. This could be expected to some extent, as by using 
the government system to deliver funds, DPs are relinquishing some control as to how 
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funds are used, yet some DPs also felt it was a result of the government being reluctant to 
share information with them. The lack of information sharing  contributes to a lack of trust 
in the government aid management system, which means DPs still require checks and 
balances (basket) or vertical projects to maintain their accountability, rather than funding 
the government completely through general or sector budget support.  
Third, the trend to channel more or less aid flows through pooled funds were reported to 
be a result of the pressures DPs are under to show results quickly and needs for visibility, in 
some cases highlighting that accountability towards their headquarters and constituencies 
may be stronger than to their commitments on the ground. The changing economic climate 
and political changes in DP home countries also affected the management of aid. For 
instance, the appointment of new development ministers was reported to result in 
ideological changes – such as not using pooled funds – being pursued globally, without 
taking into account recipient country contexts or previous commitments. This raises 
concerns about DPs using the government system to push their own political objectives 
rather than adapt approaches to the situation on the ground. In his 2008 discussion paper, 
Knoll argues that this has happened when delivering General Budget Support (GBS), where 
conditionality rules have been more influenced by Bretton Woods Institutions perspective  
on economic reform, rather than with recipient country-owned poverty reduction 
strategies, and that progress towards alignment and harmonisation was slower than DPs’ 
need for visibility and improvements in public financial management systems and 
transparency (444). 
Findings therefore show that initial enthusiasm with the SWAP approach corresponded 
with an increase in the delivery of DAH through government systems and in the form of 
pooled modalities. Unfortunately this progress is now reversing due to a perceived lack of 
capacity of the government systems and DP needs to retain control of how funds are spent 
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and to show the results achieved with them, partly driven by changes in the political and 
economic climate. 
10.1.3 Harmonisation  
In Tanzania, under the SWAP, development partners have set up coordination structures 
and mechanisms to improve DP harmonisation, including the Development Partner Group 
for Health, the basket fund committee and delegated cooperation. The principle of 
harmonisation was initially given the most importance in the global aid effectiveness 
agenda, but since the Paris Declaration this has decreased, in an effort to attract non-
Development Assistance Committee DPs (382). This decline was not observed at the 
country-level in Tanzania, where DPs have become increasingly harmonised and 
harmonisation was perceived by many government and non-government stakeholders as a 
success of the SWAP.  
The indicators developed to assess harmonisation in this study fell into two categories: the 
degree of fragmentation (based on the literature) and the success of coordination 
mechanisms at increasing information-sharing and reducing transaction costs (based on 
national and international declarations) and bringing DPs under a common position when 
negotiating with the government under the SWAP dialogue (based on respondents’ 
interpretation of harmonisation). 
This study found that information sharing amongst DPs has increased, but has remained 
superficial and has not resulted in fully harmonised planning and reporting procedures. 
Lack of counterfactual meant the effect of the SWAP on transaction costs could not be 
estimated; although results suggest transaction costs remain high. DPs have improved their 
ability to speak in “one voice” when interacting with the government, although more 
progress is needed as competing voices still undermine each other in the dialogue with the 
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government. Fragmentation has been shown to have increased during the time period of 
study (2000-2010) despite the introduction of pooled funding mechanisms and 
coordination efforts, with the number of DAH projects increasing from 55 in 2000 to 334 in 
2010 and the number of DPs active in the health sector going from 19 to 33 during the 
same time period.  
This study has found several institutional factors hampering DP harmonisation efforts. First, 
DP accountability lines, which are stronger towards their headquarters, have sometimes 
hindered them from fully aligning their incentives on the ground and adopting a common 
approach when negotiating with the government (particularly when disagreements arose 
between different DPs, who often had different ideas on how DAH should be managed). 
The basket fund committee meetings have had some success at bringing DPs together; 
however, not all DPs participate in this forum. Second, some DPs believed that if the 
government had stronger leadership and required them to work under a harmonised 
approach, harmonisation would improve; although the government may not have an 
incentive to do so, as it may make the DPs stronger (something previously found in the 
Bangladeshi health SWAP (439) and de-centralisation and governance policies in Indonesia 
(445)). Third, agencies delivering their funds through vertical projects, particularly those 
targeting HIV/AIDS were found to undermine DP harmonisation efforts, by having their 
own separate dialogue and coordination structures (field visits and reporting 
requirements), driving fragmentation. However, there are signs that they are becoming 
more integrated into SWAP coordination and dialogue structures.  
Therefore, findings show that DPs on the ground have made impressive progress in 
coordinating their resources, adopting a common position and reducing (although not 
eliminating) parallel dialogues with the government. This is particularly needed given that 
increases in funding have come with increased levels of fragmentation. However, 
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harmonisation efforts were hampered by DP reliance on headquarters (particularly when 
there were differences in opinion or ideological shifts) and project-based vertical 
approaches, particularly those targeting HIV/AIDS. 
10.1.4 Managing for results 
The Tanzanian health SWAP has a performance assessment framework, thereby fulfilling 
international aid effectiveness declarations for managing for results. In addition, there has 
been a shift in management practices at DP head offices to achieving results. However, the 
indicators developed in this thesis to assess the extent of managing for results in the 
context of the Tanzanian health SWAP show a mixed picture. First, a review of the 
definitions of managing for results revealed disagreements regarding what “results” were. 
Despite most definitions encompassing outputs, outcomes or impact, the core of DP 
internal performance assessment was based on inputs in the form of disbursement ratios. 
This performance assessment practice was not conducive to managing for results, and 
hindered DPs from adopting a harmonised approach and holding the government 
accountable. Second, despite significant efforts to unify the performance assessment 
framework, government and DPs still face regular data requirements for parallel 
assessments of performance. Finally, although they certainly play a role in decision-making, 
results do not form the basis of the SWAP dialogue.  
However, the shift to measure and manage for results has increased sharing of 
information, particularly amongst DPs, but also by the government, increasingly making 
information on health expenditure available online, carrying out assessments and making 
them public. Despite growth in the quantity of data that are available, this study found that 
poor data quality was the key constraint to holding DPs and the government to account. 
For instance, data on financial flows (inputs) were difficult to obtain directly from the 
government, so a combination of global and national publically available data sources was 
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used in this study. This sometimes resulted in different results for the same indicator (for 
instance, the amount of total DAH in 2009 varied from $5.6 billion in the OECD Creditor 
Reporting System to $6.8 billion in the National Health Accounts). There are hopes that 
data quality will improve with the setting up of the aid management platform for external 
resources by the government, but this needs to be made publically available. Data on 
outputs and outcomes are available from the Health Management and Information System 
(HMIS). However, these data were perceived by some of the stakeholders interviewed to 
be unreliable. Efforts to improve the availability and quality of data are ongoing. 
Furthermore, some indicators are difficult and costly to measure, particularly if needed on 
a regular basis. 
Once more, institutional arrangements were found to undermine SWAP mechanisms for 
managing for results. DP and government internal performance assessment procedures 
were not results-driven and therefore not conducive to managing for results. DP 
performance was assessed primarily on inputs through the proportion of funds disbursed. 
Government performance assessment was harder to ascertain, but the remuneration 
system based on allowances and per diems for attending meetings and training workshops 
was not perceived to be linked to achieving results, as it rewarded government employees’ 
attendance at meetings and training workshops at the cost of their daily tasks. Although 
activities rewarded by allowances were perceived as sometimes necessary, respondents 
felt the time spent on them was excessive compared to other activities that may have been 
more conducive to achieving results.  
Managing for results has received increased emphasis in the global aid effectiveness 
agenda, which has led to some concerns, and also go some way in explaining the results 
found. First, there are worries that increased monitoring and evaluation are leading to a 
proliferation of indicators and disproportionate reporting requirements, without 
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understanding the causes of poor availability of health statistics or investing sufficiently in 
health information systems (446), also reflected in this study. This may explain the 
pressures DPs are under to measure and show results. Further, the emphasis on results has 
given rise to tensions with disbursement through horizontal (pooled) modalities, where 
results cannot be easily attributed to a single agency. Pressures to show results favour 
vertical projects, as they may be more effective in the short run, allow for visibility of 
results and for DPs to more easily take credit for achievements. This pressure to show 
results may therefore in part explain modality trends reported above. It is indisputable that 
DAH should achieve results and ultimately improve the health of the beneficiary 
population, and there have already been criticisms that DAH itself and its evaluations have 
been too process-driven, rather than based on outputs and outcomes. Results need to be 
achieved, and a push to accomplish them is needed; however, this is not synonymous with 
DPs’ needs for quick results and visibility.  
Therefore, although there has been some progress towards measuring results and making 
information available, this change in approach is still to be translated into institutional 
reform to align DP and government incentives to manage for results. Furthermore, there is 
a need for a more explicit definition of what managing for results means in practice and 
how it can be implemented without detriment to other aid effectiveness principles.  
10.1.5 Mutual accountability  
Mutual accountability takes place through the Joint Annual Health Sector Review, which is 
a DP-government joint assessment of mutual progress, and forms the core of the health 
SWAP dialogue. Despite being a comprehensive evaluation exercise, not all DPs rely on it 
exclusively, and some still require separate reports from the government as part of their 
vertical programmes. The indicators developed for this study assessed mutual 
accountability as the extent to with DPs and government held each other to account. 
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As with other principles, having a structure in place is no guarantee of mutual 
accountability taking place. When the government did not keep to its commitments DPs 
struggled to hold it to account. There were several reasons for this. First of all, DPs were 
not unified and undermined each other’s efforts of holding the government to account. 
This again shows that DPs have not aligned their incentives, as meeting their own goals was 
more important than keeping the government to account, again stemming from DP 
accountability to their head offices. Second, respondents felt the only tool available for DPs 
to hold the government to account was to withdraw funds, which was difficult because of 
their performance assessment procedures were based on the proportion of funds spent, 
but also because of fears of punishing the local population. Third, the health sector in 
Tanzania has a diffuse nature, with different agencies at the central, sector, regional and 
district levels having different roles and responsibilities. Despite this, the MoHSW is the 
central focus for the sector’s accountability. As a result, DPs are aiming their influence too 
narrowly. For instance, issues of allowances and fungibility should be dealt with at the level 
of the MoF, and the districts are accountable to the PMO-RALG; however, both MoF and 
PMO-RALG have little engagement with health sector DPs. Finally, for DPs to be able to 
hold the government to account they need to have power over the government. This study 
found power relations were complex, with the government also exercising power, for 
instance by excluding DPs from some negotiations or pre-agreeing the overall health sector 
budget before meeting with DPs. This also suggests framing the DP-government 
relationship as contractual may not be entirely accurate. 
Under current SWAP arrangements there are no mechanisms for the government to hold 
DPs to account. This has previously been highlighted as an issue of concern (442), with 
studies emphasising a move to approaches that rely on government systems not being 
synonymous with DPs having less responsibility to account for the use of their financial 
resources (167).  
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Furthermore, the main line of accountability of government and DPs should be towards the 
beneficiaries. At present there is little way of accounting to beneficiaries, although the 
increased role of civil society may go some way to improve this (433). A study on Tanzania 
accountability mechanisms found that civil society (particularly the faith based sector) was 
well respected by the government, but more as a potential supplier of development 
projects for DPs’ constituencies than to represent Tanzanian citizens (406), suggesting 
more needs to be done to strengthen civil society’s capacity to represent citizens. In 
addition, DPs are in a difficult position, as they also need to be accountable to their 
funders, and there is a geo-political distance between funders and beneficiaries preventing 
funders from knowing the needs of beneficiaries and their satisfaction with the services 
they receive. 
In conclusion, comprehensive regular accountability mechanisms have been put in place. 
However, they may not involve the right actors, both in terms of who is accountable (the 
MoHSW should not be the only government agency to be held accountable) and towards 
whom accountability is directed, as there is little accountability to the Tanzanian 
population. In addition, accountability mechanisms are not working as well as they could, 
as institutional factors and the government’s own power hinder DPs from holding the 
government to account, and there are no mechanisms for the government to hold DPs to 
account.  
10.1.6 Conclusion 
The move towards a health Sector Wide Approach that adopts the five principles of aid 
effectiveness in Tanzania has been a huge effort on the part of all actors involved, which 
has seen commendable improvements in the way DAH is managed, bringing all actors 
together under a unified sector plan. This is no easy task given the variety of stakeholders 
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involved, their different motivations and the political context in which these relationships 
are played out.  
Despite these achievements, actors have become fatigued with the process and 
disheartened at the slow pace of progress towards aid effectiveness and the management 
burden of new aid modalities. DPs informally compared working under the SWAP to being 
in an “unhappy marriage”. There is now a real danger of DPs moving back to old ways of 
working and reverting back to project-based approaches (after all, so far the history of 
development has followed cyclical patterns), and thus ending this marriage.  
This thesis has contributed evidence to a fragmented literature on an issue that is so 
context-dependent that it can only be meaningfully evaluated through the use of case 
studies (either single or multi-country). In many ways the findings of this study support 
previous evaluations of the health Sector Wide Approach and the aid effectiveness agenda. 
For instance, an evaluation of the International Health Partnership found progress in 
national planning processes, mutual accountability and use of country systems, but little 
evidence of improvement of the quality of public financial management systems and of 
integration of performance assessment frameworks (189). Further, this study has shown 
that although international declarations and the introduction of the SWAP have led to a 
more coordinated delivery of DAH, despite over 10 years of literature and high level 
forums, DPs and governments are still grappling with the same issues of power that 
undermine DPs’ ability to harmonise found by Buse and Walt in the late 1990s (50, 383). 
In contrast, this study found the approach adopted to achieve aid effectiveness in Tanzania 
(encouraged by the global aid effectiveness agenda) was essentially technocratic, based on 
setting up processes to achieve the five principles. However, all actors need to go further 
and reform their institutions to enable these processes to serve their real purpose of 
enhancing country ownership.  For example, DPs should align with the government under a 
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harmonised approach that achieves results, for which all agencies are held accountable. 
Further, aid takes place in a heavily politicised environment, both globally and nationally at 
the level of donor and recipient countries. A technocratic approach was perhaps 
undertaken by the international community to avoid the politics of aid; however, in doing 
so it undermines itself, and indeed a study in Colombia has shown may even increase 
complexity and encourage power games (187). An approach that addresses the political 
context in which it is embedded is more likely to succeed.  
Finally, SWAP structures need to be reformed, as currently they are too burdensome and 
the level of discussions is too superficial. This not only requires institutional reform, but a 
flexible, step-wise approach that is adapted to each recipient country. This echoes 
recommendations from previous studies, which found that in Mozambique incremental 
approaches (where DPs demands increased progressively as the system strengthened), DP 
willingness to take risks and adopting a long-term view were determined to be critical 
factors for the success of aid management mechanisms (381), and in Zambia where a study 
found the SWAP could improve by taking contextual factors into consideration (447). 
 It is unclear exactly what “working with the country” means in practice, in terms of how 
funds are disbursed, the degree of technical and political involvement, how results are 
measured and how DPs can be held to account, with sometimes contradictions between 
the different principles. There is a danger of applying “universalist” aid effectiveness 
principles to diverse contexts (187), and the uncertainties highlighted in this study can only 
be addressed at the country level through a flexible approach that encourages a certain 
degree of risk-taking and innovation, and is therefore sometimes allowed to fail.  
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10.2 Methodological findings and limitations 
The literature review in Chapter 2 revealed methodological difficulties in assessing whether 
aid effectiveness principles are achieved, the reasons for this, or even in how to measure 
achievement. Some of these difficulties included data availability, lack of counterfactual 
and the importance of contextual factors. This study has been affected by these and other 
factors, but has also sought to make some inroads into improving the methodologies and 
data sources available to evaluate aid effectiveness. This section describes the 
methodological limitations and contributions of the approach used in this study, 
summarised in four categories: the case study approach, the study design, measurement of 
aid effectiveness and the theoretical framework. For each category, the contributions to 
the literature and limitations encountered are described.   
10.2.1 Case study approach 
Previous studies examining DAH effectiveness issue did so by means of quantitative 
analysis across multiple countries (19-21, 448) or very in-depth single-issue case studies in a 
single country (22, 53-54). This PhD has explored DAH from the perspective of a recipient 
country, but looking at the aid effectiveness agenda as a whole, rather than concentrating 
on a single aspect of it.  
Taking the perspective of a recipient country has several advantages. First, cross-country 
health resource tracking studies are useful for holding DPs to account globally and 
identifying issues hindering the effectiveness of aid globally. A recipient country case study 
provides complementary information resulting from in-depth analysis of the distribution 
and management of resources at the country level, facilitating recipient countries holding 
DPs to account on commitments to principles of aid effectiveness and providing 
information to guide dialogue and priority-setting.  
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Methodologically, focusing on a single country has allowed for access and contrasting of 
different global and national data sources, thus providing a more complete and accurate 
picture of the health financing landscape of a country. Further, given the smaller size of the 
database, doing a single country study enabled manual review and coding of individual 
disbursements. This is a very labour intensive process that would not be feasible at the 
global level, but that allows for a more accurate description of results, as some categories 
have a high proportion of blank fields (for instance the channel of delivery field was empty 
for over 80% of projects up to 2003, gradually decreasing to 20% in 2010). In this thesis the 
channel of delivery and sub-sector distribution were manually re-coded for all health 
projects in the time period of 2000-2010 (manual re-coding allowed for the identification of 
the channel for about half of the empty cells), which is the first time this has been done in 
Tanzania and in so much detail (a study of DAH modalities in Uganda undertook some re-
coding, but not in as much depth (37)). Studies of fragmentation often use data from the 
OECD without the necessary re-coding to distinguish between projects and single 
transactions (a DAH project can be delivered through several transactions, therefore not 
differentiating between the two may result in overestimating fragmentation levels) (44, 
134), which has been done here. This is also one of the few studies to analyse DAH flows 
together with domestic expenditure, which allows for the analysis of the interaction 
between the two sources of financing, and the eventual repercussion of external funding 
on domestic resource allocation; however, this analysis is hindered by availability and 
quality of data (domestic resource flows are harder to obtain).  
Second, the case study approach enabled an assessment of how globally agreed principles 
are understood and implemented at the country level and whether aid effectiveness 
principles are actually leading to better aid practices, as well as the identification of 
context-specific solutions that can be undertaken to tackle these problems. A country level 
assessment of coordination and ownership was also conducted in Uganda, Bangladesh and 
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Zambia (192); however, this is the first time such a study is conducted for all the principles 
of the aid effectiveness agenda.  
Third, some issues, such as fungibility, are very context specific, but had previously only 
been studied through the use of quantitative multi-country analysis of trends (19, 64, 67, 
72, 155, 158, 162, 357, 449). Such an approach has the advantage of being able to 
demonstrate statistical significance in relation to selected outcomes. However, there are 
worries about the quality of the data on which they are based (156) and they cannot shed 
light on how or why such trends emerge. This study has provided for the first time evidence 
on this issue from the country level, including reasons why fungibility takes place, the 
actors involved and suggesting ways it can be tackled.  
By taking a historical perspective from the time the SWAP was introduced, this study has 
been able to map changes in actors and policies both at the national and international 
levels. For instance, trends in the use of basket funds and harmonisation mechanisms and 
the political reasons behind them have not been assessed previously. We have also shown 
that the principles of alignment and managing for results may undermine each other, as 
well as put forward proposals for institutional reform in order to align the incentives of DPs 
and governments to bridge contradictions between the two principles. However, this may 
also have been a weakness of the approach used in this study, as a historical overview was 
sometimes difficult to achieve in practice, as older documents were not always available, 
quantitative data before 2003 were difficult to obtain or of poor quality, and most of the 
relevant stakeholders had moved on (although it was possible to interview two DPs, one 
government and one non-government representatives that had worked in the Tanzanian 
health sector since the beginning of the SWAP). 
Whilst conducting a single-country case study has the advantage of taking contextual 
factors into account; it has repercussions for the generalisability of the findings. This is 
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because the actors present in the SWAP relationships, the set up of the government and 
broader cultural norms are unique to Tanzania. It is hoped that the study findings 
nonetheless resonate among recipient countries with similar characteristics to Tanzania 
(heavily aid-dependent health sector and SWAP dialogue structures) and among other 
countries in the region that may have similar government structures and cultural norms. 
Further, this study has contributed to the theory on DP and government relationships, and 
therefore may contribute conceptually.  
10.2.2 Measurement of aid effectiveness 
This study has contributed to the framing of the global aid effectiveness agenda in three 
ways. First, the study used the aid effectiveness agenda as a framework to evaluate the 
SWAP (which to our knowledge is the first time it has been done empirically). Second, this 
thesis systematically assessed the evolution of the aid effectiveness agenda in terms of 
how the principles are defined, the weight given to them and how the indicators selected 
to assess them shape the approach to achieve the principles. This was done both through 
analysing the different high level declarations on aid effectiveness and the literature and 
interviews. Third, this study developed indicators for two key issues in the literature of aid 
effectiveness (fungibility and fragmentation) within the frame of the agenda, under the 
principles of ownership and harmonisation respectively.  
Third, this study has developed a novel approach to assessing aid effectiveness in the 
health sector-wide approach by using a locally-adapted indicator framework of the global 
aid effectiveness agenda. This is innovative because the global aid effectiveness agenda has 
been predominantly assessed globally through quantitative measures. For instance, the 
Paris Evaluation evaluations at the global level only include quantitative indicators (185); 
although a thematic study of the Paris Declaration evaluation was undertaken (414), it 
remained focused on the global relationship between aid and development (414). At the 
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Tanzania level the Paris Declaration evaluation only includes a narrative provided by the 
government (421). By developing and applying qualitative indicators, this study has been 
able to provide a deeper interpretation of the issues affecting the implementation of the 
agenda, such as institutional factors or the degree of participation in dialogue structures, 
which would have been missed through the use of purely quantitative indicators. In 
addition, this study is innovative in being the first time some of the elements contributing 
to aid ineffectiveness (such as fungibility and fragmentation) have been explored as part of 
the aid effectiveness agenda and through the use of qualitative methods, as previous 
studies have all been quantitative. This has allowed a deeper understanding of whether 
and how different stakeholder groups perceive these two factors to hinder aid 
effectiveness and what could be done to improve the situation. Further, framing these two 
issues through the lens of the aid effectiveness agenda has allowed for a different 
understanding of them, for instance, when interpreted as part of country ownership, 
fungibility may look rational rather than the more commonly held view of something 
negative and detrimental to aid effectiveness. Finally, the principles of the global aid 
effectiveness agenda and the indicators developed to assess them lack clarity, are 
sometimes incomplete and are not applicable to all contexts. Therefore, by developing a 
country-specific assessment framework, this study has shown a way to apply the agenda in 
country.  
However, there are several limitations to the approach taken to study aid effectiveness. 
First, this study did not assess the effect of DAH on health outputs or outcomes; it rather 
concentrated on the achievement of the agenda designed by the international community 
to help achieve these outcomes. This was an unanswered question worthy of investigation, 
and data constraints in many low income countries mean it is simply not possible to obtain 
annual outcome data.  Furthermore, it would be very hard to attribute changes in DAH to 
changes in outcomes at the country level because of a lack of counterfactual and the 
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limited data available. However, a comparison between two different regions that receive 
different amounts of DAH, or that are favoured by different DPs, may have allowed for this.  
Second, using an approach that focuses on the agenda as a whole required the use of 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Although this is necessary to conduct a 
comprehensive study of the implementation of the agenda as a whole, it inevitably results 
in forgoing the depth that could be achieved by focusing on one aspect of the agenda, for 
instance by conducting an ethnography of the government’s ownership over the health 
SWAP dialogue. In addition, some elements of the agenda, such as managing for results, 
generated less discussion during the interviews and have therefore received less attention 
in this thesis than other issues, such as ownership and harmonisation. 
Finally, the view of mutual accountability and ownership adopted in this study was narrow 
as it only included government and DPs, whereas the main accountability should be 
towards beneficiaries. This broader definition is included in Busan and would be important 
to explore more in further studies, as their perspectives are absent in this study. 
10.2.3 Methodological approach 
Although the methodological approach to assessing aid effectiveness was innovative, there 
were some limitations to the individual methodologies used in this study. This includes the 
quantitative and qualitative methods as well as the procedure used to integrate them.  
The quantitative part of the study had several weaknesses. First, the overall amount of DAH 
has been underestimated because regional funds were not included. Second, despite 
manual re-coding, gaps remained in the database compiled for the study. These have been 
shown in the graphs, but may have altered the distribution of resources, although it is 
impossible to predict how. Further, accessing domestic health financing data was 
challenging. A combination of different data sources was used, and although careful 
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consideration was given to where data were obtained from, the different sources may have 
produced different results. Further, as only aggregate data were available for domestic 
health flows, it was not possible to check its accuracy or perform manual re-coding. Third, 
the amount of DAH delivered outside of the government is an underestimate as funds from 
international NGOs are not included. GBS funds were included in this analysis rather 
crudely (assuming that the amount allocated to health is equal to the proportion of total 
government expenditure on health), which may not be accurate, and may have resulted in 
an underestimate of how much DAH is delivered to the health sector if DPs attach strings to 
sectoral allocation of GBS. Fourth, it was not possible to fully disaggregate DAH funds into 
single disease and health systems, as single disease funds contribute to health systems 
functions and health systems funds benefit vertical disease programmes. Data constraints 
have meant that two indicators of the global aid effectiveness agenda (predictability and 
tying) were not included, which restricted the scope of the indicator framework. In 
addition, the fragmentation index may have been overestimated, as some DPs coordinate 
funds through delegated cooperation (by disbursing to another DP). Although these 
projects would still incur a transaction cost, it may not be incurred by the government, and 
would still be lower than if they were disbursing each project individually.  
The qualitative part of the study also had some limitations. The most important limitation 
of the study is the under-representation of the Tanzanian voice. Several factors have 
contributed to this. First, when undertaking the interviews, many of the Tanzanian 
respondents did not allow the interview to be recorded. This may decrease the accuracy of 
the representation of their views, as I was relying on my notes, rather than transcriptions, 
and was not able to re-listen to the interview to contextualise the tone in which 
respondents spoke. Second, most of the GoT respondents did not give permission to be 
directly quoted. Efforts have been made to incorporate their views in the narrative (in line 
with their wishes), but their voice is largely absent in the form of quotes. In addition, 
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interviews were conducted in English, as all Tanzanian respondents readily spoke English, 
and to reduce the inaccuracies of having transcripts translated, or having a translator 
present whilst conducting the interviews. However, there may have been differences in the 
content of what was said in the interviews if respondents felt less comfortable speaking in 
English or if there were concepts they were not able to readily translate. It is hoped that 
attendance at meetings and informal conversations over the course of the fieldwork go 
some way to avoid misrepresenting their views. In addition to practical limitations to 
representing Tanzanian views, the interpretation of the results would have been biased by 
my cultural background and philosophical beliefs, which are different from those of a 
person of Tanzanian origin. Having stayed in the field for a year greatly facilitated my 
understanding of local culture and customs, but being foreign influenced both the 
information that was given to me and the way it was interpreted. 
There are also some limitations to the sampling strategy used to identify interviewees. The 
inclusion criteria were for actors to be active in the health SWAP dialogue and I sampled to 
saturation (until no new themes arose). However, this research would have benefited from 
the views of actors present but not active in the dialogue; for instance, faith based 
organisations and the private sector, but also representatives from central ministries such 
as the MoF and POPSM (although access to the latter may have been difficult). Given that 
saturation was reached, it is hoped that the impact of this is minimal; however, it is not 
possible to predict what representatives of these groups would have contributed. It was 
not possible to interview one respondent, and therefore their views have been missed.  
A similar concern arises from the document review, as some of the documents that were 
intended to be included in the review were not available; for instance a report carried out 
by the Controller and Auditor General on the allocation of resources by the Medical Stores 
Department could not be accessed in full, but only as a summary PowerPoint presentation. 
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Also, only the final version of the Milestones agreed for the Financial Year 2012-13 was 
available, but not the intermediary one that was subject to great discussion and prolonged 
negotiations. Finally, ethical restrictions have prevented the reporting of some of the 
content of the meetings observed, which would have added to the evidence on which this 
thesis is based.  
There are also limitations to mixing different methods. Although care has been taken to be 
transparent about the reasons for using different methods and the method used to 
integrate them, the use of different methods inevitably means less depth was achieved 
with each of the methods. Further, some would argue against using quantitative and 
qualitative methods, as they come from fundamentally different positions (223) and may 
undermine the quality of qualitative methods. This is not the view taken here, however, as 
qualitative methods are viewed as having provided essential explanations to the 
quantitative trends observed, rather than being added as a complement to quantitative 
methods. Nevertheless, future evaluations of the aid effectiveness agenda and the SWAP 
would benefit from employing a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. This may be 
more resource-intensive and may not always be feasible to do in depth, particularly at the 
global level; however, studies may benefit from including some open ended questions in 
quantitative questionnaires.   
10.2.4 Conceptual approach 
This study has contributed to the literature conceptually by exploring the relationships that 
underlie the “DAH system”. It has tested some of the hypotheses raised by previous studies 
empirically, and generated new evidence on how these relationships take place on the 
ground, which incentives are at play, how different stakeholders are accountable to each 
other and how stakeholders exert power over each other. It has used Principal Agent (PA) 
theory empirically for the first time to frame the aid effectiveness agenda, and it has 
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extend previous work on PA in Uganda (405) by conducting empirical research at country 
level of macro- and micro-institutional factors affecting the attainment of the agenda 
(applying the framework set out by Martens et al. (6)). By looking at the whole chain of aid 
relationships, this study has also been able to show the repercussions of incentives at one 
point in the chain, such as the impact the pressure DPs have to disburse has on the overall 
aid system. This study has found that the incentive structure generated by DAH in Tanzania 
is not fully geared towards the achievement of aid effectiveness principles, and therefore 
further institutional reform is needed to achieve the agenda.   
In addition, this study found that PA theory was relevant to study aid relationships, 
especially in understanding micro-institutional factors that affect aid relationships (both 
DPs and GoT have hierarchical structures) and the degree of incentives alignment and 
information asymmetries. However, PA theory cannot alone describe or explain all the 
issues surrounding DP-GoT relationships, particularly because the DP-government 
relationship is not fully contractual and the government has more power than a 
straightforward PA relationship would depict. It is therefore important to emphasise the 
political part of political-economic framework. This has recently been called for in the 
development literature (450-451), but this study argues it is also essential in studies of the 
health sector. 
Perhaps the most important theoretical contribution of this thesis is by going beyond the 
health and economic literature and adding two dimensions to the analytical framework of 
this thesis: a power dimension informed by Luke’s three dimensions of power (300) and 
Gaventa’s power framework (301); and a stakeholder analysis to explore the political 
context in which these relationships are played out, and thereby studying aid relationships 
beyond the aid contract. It is also the first time managerial (efficiency-based) and non-
managerial (relationships) approaches are combined in a framework empirically at the 
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country level. Policy models have previously been used to evaluate the Paris Declaration 
(78) and coordination in Bangladesh (79); however, this study has examined power and the 
political context in which actors interact when disbursing and distributing DAH at the 
national and local level and combined it with economic theory, an approach that would be 
recommended for future studies of this kind, particularly because the implementation of 
the aid effectiveness agenda has been essentially technocratic in nature, and therefore 
following a managerialistic approach. However, this needs to be complemented with non-
managerialistic approaches to find ways to engage in the political aspect of aid (rather than 
avoid it) and propose solutions to achieve institutional reform.    
There are also some limitations to bringing together methodologies and theories from 
different disciplines, in this case health economics and health policy. Although each 
discipline contributes to analysing the relationships between the actors in this study and 
this thesis postulates they are complementary, they arise from different beliefs about how 
people behave. Economic theory is based on the assumption that people are rational, 
respond to incentives and act in ways that enhance their welfare. On the other hand, some 
of the works that have influenced the policy arms of the framework would argue that 
actors are driven by power and political interests. Moreover, one disadvantage of mixing 
the two disciplines in this study is the level of depth achieved in the analysis. In particular, 
this study was not originally designed to assess power, and therefore the analysis was 
mostly limited to dimensions of power that could be observed. A more in-depth analysis of 
power for instance, would have revealed more information on how and where and by 
whom resource allocation decisions are made. 
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10.3 Recommendations 
The rest of this chapter provides recommendations for policymakers and researchers based 
on the findings from the thesis. Recommendations are classified into five themes: tracking 
health financing flows, the aid effectiveness agenda, the sector-side approach, institutional 
reform and further research. 
10.3.1 Tracking health financing flows 
This study can make some recommendations for future health financing tracking exercises, 
both for policymakers and researchers. First, it is recommended that this type of analysis 
be performed from the perspective of an aid-recipient country, both by researchers and 
practitioners, as this enhances ability to hold government and DPs to account at the 
country level, and provides valuable evidence for the priority-setting dialogue, taking into 
account resource availability and need. However, this must be accompanied by a real 
investment in this type of assessments at the country level, as currently most investment at 
the country level appears o be directed at measuring outputs and outcomes, whist 
assessment of inputs is prioritised at the global level. 
Second and specific to Tanzania, efforts to systematically and routinely collect data on 
health financing flows are commendable, but have led to three different processes (Public 
Expenditure Review (PER), National Health Accounts (NHA) and the Aid Management 
Platform (AMP)). It may be preferable to unify all three into one transparent system that 
periodically collates external and domestic health finance data, as this would improve 
efficiency. The first step to do this is to ensure DPs improve their reporting in country, as in 
Tanzania national databases were not as complete as global ones (particularly on DAH 
delivered as vertical programmes). For instance, DP technical assistance may be needed to 
ensure the AMP is accurate, up to date and transparent. The PER could then be used as the 
annual mechanism to track domestic and external expenditure (the latter could be 
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extracted directly from the AMP). As it is less resource-intensive, the PER can be performed 
in time to assist budget planning. Finally, the full NHA could be performed less regularly 
(every three to five years), given that it is more resource-intensive. This would compromise 
the ability of researchers to perform cross-country comparisons (as the NHA framework is 
standard, whereas that of the PER is country-specific), but would benefit country level 
planning and assessments. It is also important that expenditures are made publically 
available in a timely manner (and on the internet), to allow other stakeholders to 
undertake analyses of them, thereby increasing accountability. Furthermore, investments 
to strengthen the Tanzanian Health Management Information Systems should continue, to 
increase the availability of data on outputs and outcomes and thereby facilitate analysis 
linking these to inputs.  
At the global level, the completeness of the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) has 
improved dramatically. This is to be commended. This study recommends further 
improvements continue to be made. First, by DPs improving their reporting practices, to 
ensure all DPs report consistently and accurately, leaving no empty fields. Second, as the 
database becomes more complete, some modifications to its structure could be 
considered. For instance, as Pitt et al have previously recommended (239), analysis of CRS 
data could be enhanced if the database allowed for multiple codes of different purposes; 
for instance, different population groups (child health) and conditions (malaria). It is 
possible that this may make the database very complex, particularly compared to other 
(non-health) sectors. To be more consistent with other sectors, the CRS database may also 
consider tracking DAH by level of care, perhaps including only a few key disease-specific or 
health system indicators, such as HIV/AIDS and human resources. 
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10.3.2 The aid effectiveness agenda 
Several recommendations arise from the assessment of the aid effectiveness agenda. This 
study found there is a danger that international declarations are becoming less influential 
at the country level, so it is important to re-engage with national-level practitioners. 
Definitions of principles are sometimes vague and it is unclear how they should be adapted 
at the country level. Clarifying the meaning of some of the principles at the global level may 
therefore be of benefit. This is particularly the case for the principles of ownership and 
managing for results, which may benefit from clearer definitions of whose ownership the 
agenda refers to and precisely what results mean.  
It is particularly important to have more clarity on the meaning of results, as a shift towards 
managing for results was found to hinder other principles, particularly alignment to country 
systems and the use of pooled mechanisms. There is a need to reconcile DP need for 
visibility and achieving quick demonstrable results, with achieving long term sustainable 
investment. One way to do this may be for intermediate outputs to be used (for instance 
drugs and medical supplies delivered through the basket, or even money flows through the 
government system). Having health systems-based indicators for success may suffice for DP 
accountability to their home populations, but may not be enough for accountability to 
some interest groups (such as those advocating for a single priority, such as HIV/AIDS or 
maternal health). Therefore a balance may need to be found between a few disease-
specific indicators and broader health systems ones. Ultimately, this study does not aim to 
be prescriptive in the indicators that should be used to measure results, but calls for a 
more coherent set of indicators, adapted to the context of recipient countries, that may be 
compatible with non-project based modalities.  
Conversely, the indicator framework developed to assess aid effectiveness principles is 
prescriptive, but also rather restrictive in the dimensions of the principles it focuses on. 
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Here, we support critics of a “universalist” approach to aid effectiveness (187), but suggest 
that broad principles of aid effectiveness may be good at the global level as a set of goals of 
best practice. However, the specific meaning of each principle and the indicators and 
targets to assess progress towards them should be defined at the country level. This has 
been done in Tanzania with some success, but the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) does 
not include measurable indicators and the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) 
indicators are almost identical to those included in the global agenda, so there is some 
room for making the principles and indicators more relevant to the local context.  
This study found capacity was an important constraint to achieving aid effectiveness, 
particularly that of the Tanzanian government and non-government agencies, but also of 
development partners. It is therefore recommended that more emphasis on capacity is 
placed on future declarations of aid effectiveness, particularly linking leadership with 
capacity as part of the principle of ownership and further strengthening the emphasis on 
building the capacity of country systems in the principle of alignment. 
Finally, an improvement of the Busan Partnership was the broad consultative process that 
preceded signing the declaration, where civil society organisations were particularly 
engaged. This is to be praised and further involvement of civil society is to be encouraged, 
at the global and national-level dialogues on aid effectiveness. Also, and most importantly, 
the presence and contribution of recipient countries in high level forums needs to continue 
to be strengthened, particularly given that there was a perception by some stakeholders 
that the aid effectiveness agenda had been imposed on the Government of Tanzania. 
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10.3.3 The sector-wide approach 
This study found that overall the SWAP was a good vehicle for achieving the aid 
effectiveness agenda. The structure of the Tanzanian health SWAP (made up of the 
Technical Committee for high level decisions and Technical Working Groups (TWGs) for 
technical issues) is very logical. However, the way the SWAP has been implemented in the 
Tanzanian health sector has been too focused on bureaucratic processes, resulting in a high 
burden on both DPs and government. The SWAP structure needs to be streamlined to 
reduce the burden it has on both DPs and the government by having a more efficient 
allocation of tasks. For instance, the Technical Working Groups should be attended by the 
more technical people (already happening in some cases), which would deepen the level of 
the dialogue. As there are so many aid agencies involved in the SWAP, greater delegation 
of tasks between agencies should be encouraged, to reduce the number of people 
participating in the TWGs. In addition, some TWGs were reported to work better than 
others, which means there is scope for learning from the good-performers. In addition, DPs 
could strengthen their support with the health basket (and in some cases re-engage with 
it), as it was found to have a more productive and efficient dialogue. The decision to leave 
the basket was often political, and not based on the Tanzanian context. This study 
therefore recommends DPs reconsider their position with regards to basket funds. 
Ultimately, given the high number of players active in the health SWAP, the most efficient 
way to reduce the burden of management structures may be to reduce the number of DPs. 
This is a very difficult decision politically, but one that has already been adopted by some 
DPs (who have become more concentrated across countries and/or sectors). Bi-lateral DPs 
could increase their delegation to multi-laterals; in addition, European DPs could rely on 
the European Union to assist them in organising their cooperation across countries and 
sectors (particularly if delegating to the European Union as a DP is difficult). 
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Further, the Tanzanian health SWAP would benefit from integration of the health and 
HIV/AIDS harmonisation and dialogue mechanisms. In particular, the Global Fund should 
become further integrated into health structures to avoid placing an additional/parallel 
burden on the government. This does not mean the HIV/AIDS dialogue should lose its 
multi-sectoral approach, but given that most HIV/AIDS interventions now fall within the 
remit of the health sector, greater coordination between the two structures would allow 
for more efficient management of funds. One way this could be achieved is the health 
sector-specific interventions, such as the provision of antiretrovirals, to be coordinated 
through the health SWAP structures, whilst prevention activities could still be coordinated 
at the multi-sectoral level.  
Participation of civil society in the SWAP dialogue has improved and was found to play an 
important role in keeping the government accountable in Tanzania, but needs to be 
strengthened further. More investment is recommended to strengthen the number and 
capacity of civil society organisations, in order to expand on the essential role they already 
play in keeping the government accountable. There may be a danger in increasing the 
number of players (with their own interests) in the dialogue; however, in the Tanzanian 
context, this study found civil society was under-represented in dialogue structures. In 
addition, civil society groups should also be encouraged to be equally critical of the work of 
the DPs and to ensure they provide a fair representation of the voice of the Tanzanian 
population (for instance by the use bottom up accountability processes, such as score cards 
and surveys). 
Finally, disappointment with the SWAP appears to be resulting in moving back to old ways 
of managing development assistance. This study found that generally all stakeholders felt 
the basket fund was the best delivery mechanism, so it would seem a shame to abandon it. 
Instead, a better way of building the capacity of systems and government employees 
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should be found. For instance, in his study of the Ministry of Health of the Republic of 
Tajikistan, Mirzoev suggests a set of short, medium and long-term measures that can be 
adopted to improve capacity, including improving knowledge and expertise of staff (short-
term), recruitment of more qualified staff and wider involvement of civil society (mid-term) 
and a change in working culture (long-term) (452). This can also be applied to Tanzania; 
using a short, medium and long time frame is more likely to be conducive to long term 
reform, and also provides measurable outcomes to assess performance. 
10.3.4 Institutional reform 
This thesis found that institutional factors have hindered the achievement of aid 
effectiveness principles and have sometimes hampered SWAP structures. Although 
institutional reform is a long and difficult process, it is an essential one. The set of 
recommendations provided here start with the end goal that should ideally be achieved, 
but also attempt at outlining some initial steps needed to accomplish this goal.  
First, it would be desirable for DP agencies to have a more decentralised structure, so 
country offices have more power to decide on priorities and funding instruments, can 
better harmonise with other DPs and keep to their agreements at the country level and 
therefore minimise susceptibility to political changes at their headquarters. This may be 
difficult to implement politically; however, it is in the DP’s interest (altruistic and 
otherwise) that aid is effective, and this approach would help increase DP accountability to 
the recipient government. This would signify a significant change in aid management 
practices, and may need to be achieved gradually through a series of smaller actions. One 
step in the right direction would be to have internal consultations prior to important policy 
decisions (such as funding modalities) and give more weight to evidence and expert 
opinion. Different DP agencies do this to different degrees, and are not all so centralised. 
For instance, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) recently carried out 
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two reviews on its approach with the aim of influencing future strategies (453) (although it 
has still been criticised by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact for not doing 
enough to incorporate evidence into its approaches (454)). In contrast, other agencies that 
participated in our study felt frustrated by the political and centralised nature of decision-
making.  
Second, DPs should modify their internal performance appraisal system by decreasing the 
weight given to disbursement ratios and increasing accountability for results. This does not 
mean increasing the need for visibility or showing results, DPs (and their employees) should 
be assessed for improvements at the sector level if they engage in budget support and 
health basket funds. Better systems should be in place to measure inputs (financial flows 
disbursed and followed through the system), outputs (human resources, facilities, drugs 
and medical supplies), outcomes (such as health facility utilisation, health care deliveries) 
and impact (under five and maternal mortality). These are all in place in Tanzania (although 
as already highlighted can be strengthened), but only inputs are used for performance 
assessment of employees. Targets to measure the performance of DP employees could be 
developed with the input of national staff, and could include intermediary outputs, such as 
the amount of funds that reach the districts in a timely manner, or stock outs. In addition, 
the international community may need to adjust its expectations on what can be achieved 
with development assistance, and could make more realistic pledges, which may be easier 
to account for. 
In addition, internal performance management of DP employees should be modified to 
facilitate reporting of negative results. This would involve relaxing incentives for career 
advancing and rewarding innovative behaviour that involves local institutions (government, 
but also research groups and civil society) in the design and evaluation of projects. 
Furthermore, DP agencies would benefit from enhanced institutional capacity, which could 
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be achieved by: DP employees having more technical training in the sector in which they 
work and having longer duration of posts (for instance, increasing the length of stay to five 
years); by having induction procedures for new staff that include training in political 
economy and the history of the country; and giving more responsibility to national staff, 
who are more likely to be permanent and have a better understanding of the cultural, 
political and historical context (although this needs to be balanced with brain drain fears). 
This would also give DPs a better understanding of the political situation in which they are 
working, and allow them to engage more productively with the government; for instance, 
by knowing who to engage with and what elements of the health system are highly-
sensitive politically.  
It is also necessary for the Tanzanian government to modify its internal performance 
assessment to make it more transparent and results-based. This would involve a reform of 
remuneration structures so all payments are made in the form of a monthly salary, rather 
than per diems (employees of course need to be repaid for the costs of travelling, etc. but 
this should be done to repay costs rather than for profit). This, again, is a highly politicised 
and difficult reform, but one where DPs and civil society should be involved (particularly as 
they pay the per diems (455). A step in the right direction would be for DPs to adopt a 
common policy of not paying for (or reducing the amount of) allowances. Civil society could 
follow suit. This may be difficult at first, but in the long run it would send the right signal to 
the government. However, this would require DPs to be harmonised and for central offices 
to understand that in the short run it may cause some delays (and potentially reduce 
government attendance to trainings and meetings). This would also require for the 
continuum between health DPs and DPs working at the GBS and macro-economic level to 
be strengthened. The GBS dialogue should engage much more in political issues, such as 
allowances and funding for the different sectors (as it has access to government agencies 
330 
 
that make key decisions influencing the health sector). The health sector dialogue can then 
be more technical.  
10.3.5 Further research 
Aid effectiveness in general, and the institutions and relationships that make up the aid 
system in particular, are understudied. This may be a result of methodological difficulties in 
assessing these, but does not mean research in this area is not needed. There is a need for 
more creative ways of delivering and coordinating aid. In addition, academic research has 
much to contribute to the aid effectiveness debate, as it may be more impartial and could 
be carried out in more depth (for instance by looking at trends over time). 
This thesis can be taken forward in different ways. First, more research is needed on how 
to further integrate political and economic elements of frameworks to analyse aid 
relationships. In addition, further research could use different political frameworks, such as 
frameworks of trust and relational theory, and economic frameworks, such as game theory. 
It would also be of great importance to adopt an approach based on complexity theory, 
given the dynamic nature of the many actors involved in aid relationships, something 
suggested by Ramalingam in his recent work (456-457).  
The conceptual framework developed here could be applied to other settings, but also to 
different aid relationships. For instance, to study the relationships between international 
NGOs and recipient government and national NGOs. In addition, it is important to research 
relationships further upstream, as the incentives and political contexts of international 
interest groups, and actors in donor countries have an important influence on aid 
management practices.  
From the perspective of a recipient country, more research is needed to identify ways to 
improve the participation of the population in the development dialogue. Further, it would 
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be interesting to undertake a comparative study of two countries, one good performer and 
one failing, or an aid darling and orphan, such as Rwanda and Burundi, to explore how the 
aid effectiveness agenda is implemented in different settings that have a similar culture.  
Finally, at the global level, better methods and indicators are needed to evaluate the aid 
effectiveness agenda (and aid effectiveness). More research is needed to develop these 
globally and in recipient countries. 
10.4 Final thought 
After the considerable effort made to establish the sector-wider approach it would be a 
shame to move away from it, or the aid effectiveness principles it promotes. It would be 
more advisable to adopt a step-wise approach to achieving aid effectiveness ideals, 
including reforming the SWAP structures and the institutions involved.  
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 1 
1 Introduction 
There has been a long history of high-income countries providing development 
assistance to low- and middle-income countries (LMIC), most pledging to devote 0.7 
per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP) for this purpose (Clemens and Moss 
2005). Although most countries have not met their target, the amount of development 
assistance has risen exponentially over the past ten years. This, together with worries 
about the sustainability of increases in funding given the current economic climate, has 
resulted in widespread interest on the impact of development assistance, with a growing 
literature seeking to assess whether it has had any impact on growth and social 
development. As we shall see below, this literature shows mixed results, hindered by 
methodological difficulties and lack of data. The aim of this paper is to examine the 
current evidence regarding the effectiveness of aid in the health sector in order to shed 
some light on what the current state of knowledge is, and how the future of the aid 
effectiveness debate looks. 
 
The history of development assistance has taken many turns, with infrastructure and 
‘hard’ sectors being favoured in the earlier decades, and ‘softer’ social sectors preferred 
in the first decade of this century. The health sector has received particularly generous 
funding, having quintupled from US$5.82 billion in 1990 to US$27.73 billion in 2011 
(Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 2011).The amount of development 
assistance for health (DAH) roughly remained at the 1995 level until 2000—the new 
millennium saw a surge in DAH. Secular upward trends occurred from 2002 to today 
(OECD-DAC data). The prominence of recognition of HIV/AIDS as a global problem 
resulted in a proportion of DAH going to HIV/AIDS, rising from being around 10 per 
cent of total amount DAH in 2000 to nearly 40 per cent by 2007 (see Figure 3). Table 1 
shows historical trends in DAH from the early 1970s until the present day.  
 
This increase in funds has been accompanied by a proliferation of actors who provide 
(governments, private foundations, individuals and the corporate sector), manage (bi-
lateral agencies, inter-governmental agencies, global health partnerships, non-
government organizations (NGOs), private foundations) or spend (DAH (multi-lateral 
agencies, the UN, global health partnerships, NGOs, private sector, and low- and 
middle-income governments and civil society organizations) (McCoy et al. 2009). This 
wide variety of actors deliver development assistance for health using different funding 
modalities, depending on the amount of earmarking they require and the extent to which 
they rely on government systems for planning, disbursement and monitoring of funds. 
These include project, programme aid, sector wide approaches and budget support, with 
projects having the most earmarking and budget support the least (Foster and Leavy 
2001). See Section 2 for a discussion of aid modalities. 
 
Concerns about the efficacy and effectiveness of development assistance are not new 
and have resulted in several international declarations endorsing ‘good practice’ 
principles aimed at improving aid effectiveness, including the Monterrey Consensus on 
Financing for Development in 2002, the Rome Declaration on Harmonization in 2003 
and the Joint Marrakech Memorandum on Managing for Results. 
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Table 1: Development assistance for health flows (2009 constant US$ millions) 
Year Africa (non-
specified) 
America (non-
specified) 
Asia (non-
specified) 
Europe Far East Asia Middle East North & 
Central 
America 
North of 
Sahara 
Oceania South & Central 
Asia 
South America South of Sahara Unspecified Grand Total 
1973    19.49618124 99.09566662  0.224883675 86.45212557 7.31569032 19.27003169 212.8359661 157.1627558  601.853301 
1974     88.82041736 0.218576842 94.21013857 6.833660202 11.58165584 67.76448141 85.1858849 232.3985212  587.0133364 
1975     22.16357456 5.820907485 139.7931362  11.28823437 244.7256012 23.66324801 113.2291298 0.334288516 561.0181201 
1976 0.185255234   0.797308746 82.94963823 1.46886642 272.6727707 45.28607588 17.09836561 65.56233124 67.40752577 127.7409597  681.1690975 
1977    1.683612553 56.34726082 28.24052027 32.50201807 19.46373256 13.41630898 190.4349687 13.91713511 165.8500812  521.8556382 
1978 0.64424937 2.407134489   304.9456878 9.619513637 106.8552672 70.69806449 14.05097418 166.6985811 117.3475973 172.9945688  966.2616383 
1979    0.656009348 282.1369811 1.043703107 13.11640587 26.3156607 2.303883385 195.6303932 77.46865771 160.8694557  759.5411501 
1980    0.220564825 215.0893301 5.96849822 130.8539787 129.5146723 1.133146624 418.8830741 65.0447117 170.4085443 0.831600417 1137.948121 
1981 23.72775573 0.561410674 3.274241392  343.8508778 1.643417314 190.9883859 178.3422077 4.186935329 389.7997009 92.49871885 337.5526393 21.61191989 1588.038211 
1982 36.70946899 1.016795121 1.972266023  295.4943745 33.45537484 149.9040715 92.35166283 2.143727253 275.4197726 166.534109 517.537324 9.907532937 1582.44648 
1983 43.40458006 1.672416269 5.848357826 0.146689821 194.3253649 49.09825335 88.03043469 90.24167459 8.665171139 367.5543838 100.9937196 455.3169493 25.63260323 1430.930598 
1984 38.30078099 0.341132947 10.4192989  369.7263166 70.06226917 93.04281003 25.40165552 12.46461285 613.1957146 135.8226601 383.6588151 31.12587668 1783.561943 
1985 49.57091594 5.153573279 11.51282964  262.9445092 38.43715391 243.4221234 99.96144241 60.54215798 501.0997819 96.62394804 538.6044055 19.13791908 1927.01076 
1986 45.61528242 19.74073163 16.43205202  150.028725 27.26953315 198.5645749 77.42756903 25.36959723 661.0881285 40.90386525 560.6046753 36.38635574 1859.43109 
1987 86.25503584 5.131764224 9.130717893 12.70385789 253.7941038 26.28985006 266.6659099 84.85236219 14.57758588 450.9709619 69.96222605 699.6512452 45.28452494 2025.270146 
1988 151.0943332 25.72323125 6.610118796 3.474178205 185.0122078 19.47655811 182.433026 189.7367565 20.81628327 467.192683 155.5220581 1018.128238 131.3011133 2556.520786 
1989 118.1543848 11.22204105  0.175825347 236.477793 23.8114055 204.7960558 78.04519964 32.50218388 533.3964754 112.5014853 921.1126746 114.0111471 2386.206671 
1990 61.05424184 6.900219148 5.760949909  318.6135082 17.84398583 180.7909335 31.85183698 37.21699946 775.1818979 130.0766592 887.208564 29.49459915 2481.994395 
1991 116.1217346 2.864988749 7.468618557 0.691127457 317.9888423 64.10963183 192.4856672 74.53718663 75.4050643 681.0682667 175.0132787 1128.498768 63.52189442 2899.775069 
1992 41.98112471 2.491130521 6.567949316 33.47311336 117.6393361 21.91256822 177.6068949 122.6479086 49.14549442 1109.875167 181.0898923 1176.568002 142.696812 3183.695393 
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1993 26.47668252  4.189576967 2.10677583 658.2643838 87.57190556 297.89413 148.9527058 44.30314551 552.0848201 199.9856795 1166.24185 253.0334743 3441.105129 
1994 69.88280702 0.021327116 3.457786711 31.33195046 385.8234545 50.19230698 141.4072371 115.7409639 34.74439055 1029.741309 137.9220842 1088.202962 740.2835278 3828.752107 
1995 39.70945512 2.347773389 1.076049237 40.21565817 446.9439108 80.54901454 238.8550051 130.1487862 8.391671703 406.932973 300.065659 1381.407387 845.0651599 3921.708503 
1996 47.01138919 3.878246699 2.377169733 45.32448539 728.3707097 83.52769031 249.8788306 79.47585121 82.99346758 1162.385648 123.9831447 1174.461465 467.9699887 4251.638087 
1997 94.10113241 41.94251181 54.23891852 55.28475789 329.7822297 54.89582616 279.8529643 59.83357953 55.81654336 1446.655852 255.1929963 1272.530341 567.6754737 4567.803126 
1998 51.30337345 16.46345326 19.39075532 64.99931609 469.5838767 89.34071089 433.5516426 455.3025303 76.01717453 1561.667063 211.0861327 1622.407016 586.2108839 5657.323928 
1999 91.36473544 13.97389845 30.21191096 129.5222975 571.3185059 97.21006292 332.88719 152.9182551 147.2913747 832.2528149 313.6423953 1734.016945 614.2476208 5060.858007 
2000 122.2966317 21.8745737 29.56580329 228.2127936 570.3159148 145.1818712 214.0607453 202.8628406 205.909608 1314.157179 198.648662 2707.311943 596.4864843 6556.88505 
2001 78.35436128 38.55702649 34.92323908 82.42543579 713.7963168 115.8466706 267.0792706 114.2183161 101.1764853 792.2695059 251.3471443 2881.298785 930.2545101 6401.547067 
2002 73.00076346 28.75589583 68.58262614 112.7643773 818.5022685 249.643004 424.8545476 106.4480679 137.0596077 1025.274809 247.6124065 3147.858946 1508.263458 7948.620779 
2003 125.7008984 16.60087488 36.9511949 186.7975106 982.366066 228.9164228 370.2401227 98.84183708 125.2296951 1397.21378 357.9395983 4041.083241 1776.675985 9744.557227 
2004 803.0569352 522.0791525 336.3560142 4633.411447 11945.3586 13566.48616 4898.820409 4281.15107 1452.810176 17891.25914 4685.382864 34888.09703 15113.81615 115018.0851 
2005 583.4397282 525.9642569 881.7921555 6627.64663 14399.36678 25924.44902 5587.403291 3479.319614 1307.561031 19338.03315 3933.329389 43478.56035 14559.71106 140626.5765 
2006 48.90396041 19.46542205 19.08829623 199.6676687 1225.346277 447.7125212 466.2802792 217.8485907 155.3642153 3155.973204 257.3045151 6050.547723 3178.26001 15441.76268 
2007 209.7076477 48.10007203 70.352063 183.9678724 1148.472301 299.8163644 438.818928 218.2165315 116.0177964 2799.027106 288.9828523 7570.435107 3333.847031 16725.76167 
2008 122.6016923 49.29439215 82.00519215 285.6391601 1312.414283 369.8554684 478.4763388 243.1542854 206.0053196 2220.96943 312.7120835 8853.899668 3043.574955 17580.60227 
2009 87.39993038 169.7937733 195.1448603 263.7147833 1502.733271 295.3387056 597.2671315 288.8558004 172.6528812 1807.676339 399.833272 9962.099381 4213.150444 19955.66057 
2010 172.3375214 135.4383654 96.96826942 360.3804622 1333.468512 333.8217602 606.3909644 134.5220091 220.0949605 2276.666525 276.3407893 9364.452268 3974.507305 19285.38971 
Source: based on OECD-CRS data. 
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The most important declaration so far has been the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 
2005, where donors, recipient countries and multilaterals agreed on five principles of ‘good 
practice’: ownership, alignment, harmonization, mutual accountability and results-based 
management. The mid-term evaluation found that although some progress was being made, it 
was not fast enough (OECD 2008b), which lead to the signing of the Accra Agenda for 
Action in 2008, to accelerate progress towards ownership, inclusive partnerships and results. 
The deadline of the Paris Declaration is now up, and its evaluation found that overall the 
quality of aid has improved, but highlights lack of transparency and aid management burden 
as impeding progress. Importantly, it calls for more realistic expectations of the contribution 
of aid to development (Wood et al. 2011). 
 
The Paris Declaration was followed by the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 
which took place in Busan in November 2011. The principles for best practice agreed are not 
too dissimilar from previous declarations with partners committing to ownership of 
development priorities by developing countries, focus on results, inclusive development 
partnerships and transparency and accountability to each other. By the middle of 2012 a set of 
indicators will be developed to monitor progress towards these principles. 
 
It is therefore important to assess what we know about the effectiveness of development 
assistance for health, successes, failures and what has worked in making aid more effective. 
After this introduction this paper will cover methodological challenges in assessing the 
effectiveness of development assistance for health, followed by a review of the current 
evidence on whether aid works. Section 3 will then outline the different aid modalities, 
examples of their successes and lessons learnt. This is followed by an overview of the factors 
hindering the effectiveness of DAH in Section 4. Section 5 will then highlight the issues 
associated with scaling up aid-funded health programmes. The paper will finish with a 
discussion summarizing key issues in the current debate on aid effectiveness and with a look 
at the future of development assistance for health, including new donors and partnerships, 
shifting donor priorities and the effect of the financial crisis on DAH. 
2 Methodological challenges in assessing aid effectiveness  
How can we study the impact of aid? One obvious way is to examine welfare benefits that 
can be attributed of aid funding to the recipient countries. In the early literature around 
growth and development, which emphasised rapid capital investment and emerged in the 
1950s after many low- and middle-income countries gained independence, it was argued that 
aid would make up the shortfall in foreign reserves and domestic savings that many countries 
consistently faced (Chenery and Strout 1966). It was also recognized that there would be 
humanitarian aid. Further, the geopolitical landscape of the Cold War ensured that foreign aid 
would flow to poorer countries which would not have expressed developmental concerns 
(Bourguignon and Leipziger 2006; Bobba and Powell 2007) . Although aid sceptics voiced 
strong views, particularly the British economist P.T. Bauer in the 1970s, a strong body of 
literature only emerged nearly ten years after the Cold War when aid giving was expressly 
meant for raising the level of wellbeing in LMICs (see bibliography in (Rajan and 
Subramanian 2008). Controversies around aid effectiveness centred on bilateral aid; multi-
lateral aid seemed to have generated very little controversy. For example, Headey (2007) 
argues that multilateral aid for 56 countries for years 1970-2001, which may have had less 
political intent, has had a positive effect. We did not find much of analysis that centred on 
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ineffectiveness of multi-lateral aid; we note below that responsiveness to, for example, 
concessionary loans seems to be positive.  
 
In answering questions around aid effectiveness, the primary concern has been growth. Given 
the recent emphasis on development assistance for health and aid aimed specifically at 
particular development aims, questions around effectiveness of particular type of funding 
have also emerged. Concerns about the process of aid-giving have also been raised. A 
question around process involves domestic fiscal response to aid; another involves questions 
around modality of offering aid. The last two questions lead to qualitative issues around 
accountability. The issues can be summarized into three categories: (1) welfare implication of 
aid; (2) fiscal response to aid; and (3) modality of aid. In this section we examine some 
methodological issues that pertain to examining aid effectiveness, whether it be overall aid 
effectiveness or sector specific effectiveness.  
2.1  Aid benefits 
Questions as to whether aid benefits recipient countries or not is methodologically 
confounded by endogeneity problems, including reverse causality. This problem is beyond 
just being a methodological issue. In recent years we note the phenomenon of being a ‘donor 
darling’ when certain countries have, starting from a surge, a large number of donors along 
with large per capita development assistance. The surge follows the recipient country 
experiencing sudden economic upturn or a period of peaceful recovery from conflict. Cassen 
(Cassen 1986) noted the tendency for aid to follow well-performing countries. Although this 
may indicate that donor countries would like to see their aid work and claim credit for good 
performing countries, it also makes it difficult to measure the impact of aid. Thus, it is 
possible we will find that aid follows good performance while lack of aid follows bad 
performance. Further, if aid improves some type of performance around education, health or 
economic growth, we should not expect the impact to be completely instantaneous but to 
have a lagged effect. As Rajan and Subramanian (2005) put it we want to know: can aid take 
a country to its potential, a higher rate of consistent economic growth rate? This entails that 
longer horizons be examined whenever impact of aid is studied (Rajan and Subramanian 
2005), which would necessitate longer run analysis. An important way of seeing if the 
potentials are met is to examine if aid affects intermediary factors such as human capital, 
health and investment, as has been done by Arndt et al. (2011). 
 
What constitutes ‘longer run’ would be a natural and empirical question to ask. Should this be 
a time when the current aid recipient countries started receiving aid? If so, the post-
independence period of 1960 to today should be the examination period. This may be an 
interesting period but the purpose and mode of aid giving has dramatically changed since the 
1960s. In 1960 a developing country on average received aid from two countries, while the 
corresponding number was 28 in 2008 (Frot and Santiso 2008). Also in this period, many of 
the larger recipients were given aid for political reasons, thus it is common to single out 
countries such as Egypt (Rajan and Subramanian 2005) and adjust for countries where 
motivations for aid may be political and not socioeconomic development. This adjustment 
does not solve the problem of endogeneity, even in a panel data with fixed effect, as one 
might notice, for example, the problem of ‘aid darlings’ might arise and disappear within the 
period of analysis. The use of fixed country effect, structural model or generalized method of 
moments with  instrumentation for aid giving to isolate the exogenous element of aid giving  
go some ways to correct for some of these problems. A host of instrumentations have been 
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used to find exclusion condition which cannot be related to economic performance (see 
(Rajan and Subramanian 2008; Hansen and Tarp 2000; Arndt et al. 2011), among others). 
Testing for exogeneity in time series, (Juselius et al. 2011) find aid is not usually exogenous. 
Most likely, the choice of the years included in the study will matter, as years since the Cold 
War may have had more economic interest attached to aid giving. One way of avoiding 
making a choice is to report on different divisions of 1960 to the present with some time 
effect. Another natural division is to report on impact of aid since the end of Cold War (Lu et 
al. 2010). The shorter period ignores the cumulative and the long-term effect of aid (Arndt et 
al. 2011).  
 
Rajan and Subramaniam (2005) along with many others concluded that total development 
assistance did not result in higher growth rate, see (Doucouliagos and Paldam 2011). The 
opposite has also been shown. Arndt et al. (2011) show a positive impact on growth through a 
structural model where life-expectancy along with investment and education are intermediary 
factors through which aid affects growth. An interesting tact is to examine effectiveness at 
the country level as done by (Dollar and Easterly 1999), finding aid ineffectiveness in 
general, and Juselius et al. (2011), finding aid effectiveness in general. Few studies have 
measured the impact of development assistance on health. As something like DAH may lack 
apparent political motivations and be expressly aimed toward improving wellbeing, some 
authors have tried to measure the impact of developmental aid setting aside non-
developmental aid such as military aid. Clemens et al. (2004) indicated that for the short run 
aid allocated to support budget and balance of payments commitments and infrastructure 
result in rising income. Similarly they speculate that aid promoting democracy, health and 
education will have a long-run impact on growth. Minoiu and Reddy (2010) show through 
Gaussian mixture model (GMM) estimation that when total is separated into developmental 
and non-developmental aid, non-developmental aid does not contribute to growth while 
developmental aid’s contribution to growth is strong.  
 
Examining the link between development assistance meant for the purpose of development 
goes some way toward seeing if DAH is effective. But it is not a direct method of measuring 
the impact. A question can be how much donor expenditure targeted as DAH contributes 
toward development. Mishra and Newhouse (2007) present some interesting discussions 
regarding inferring links between donor expenditure and developmental indicators. First, one 
might think lagged values of aid might be predictor of current development indicator along 
with country fixed effects; however, as indicated before, country fixed effects do not take 
account of country-specific factors that are time variant and may be related to health and 
DAH. Donors may respond to previous health system crises for example. Mishra and 
Newhouse estimate system GMM method for data from 1975 to 2004 to obtain a result that 
shows doubling health aid decreases infant mortality by 2 per cent in a subsequent five-year 
period. Obviously regression methods show marginal changes; thus a slightly ambitious 
interpretation the authors give is that DAH may have saved 170,000 lives at the costs of 
US$76 million ($432/life) (Mishra and Newhouse 2007). This is corroborated by Burnside 
and Dollar (1999), who find that for countries with effective public management, aid reduces 
infant mortality—they find that aid equivalent to 1 per cent of GDP reduces child mortality 
by 0.9 per cent. But on the other hand, Wilson (2011), using data from 96 high-mortality 
countries found that DAH has no effect on mortality and its effectiveness has not improved 
over time. Finally, the paper by Masanja et al. (2008) on Tanzania links drops of 24 per cent 
of child mortality with doubled expenditure on health, decentralization policies, the sector-
wide approach (SWAP) and vertical programmes to prevent malaria and improve nutrition. 
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The discussions around relevant time periods for analysis draw attention to how aid was seen 
from the point of donors. After the Cold War donors tended to express concerns over specific 
developmental aims, for example improved health. A question one can raise is: how do 
recipients view aid when it is specifically designated for a particular sector? This issue 
revolves around how DAH would be seen by the recipient country. Recipient governments 
would see DAH simply as income, although they might constrain themselves to spending at 
least the DAH amount, and adjust their expenditure accordingly.  
2.2  Fiscal spending and foreign aid 
When isolating the impact of DAH it is often asked whether it is legitimate to expect that the 
recipient sees the budget provided for health or development is as solely for the purpose of 
additional amount of expenditure on health. Thus US$100 million for health yields a health 
budget US$100 million above what the recipient would have planned on spending. This is 
known as the issue of fungibility. If donors earmark aid by specifying it as DAH then they 
expect recipient public expenditure on health should rise by exactly that much from the level 
planned. It is, of course, very difficult to observe what was planned. We take up the 
measurability issue around fungibility.  
 
Questions around fungibility stem from the literature known as the flypaper effect which is 
observed for public financing under fiscal federalism (Hines and Thaler 1995). Empirical 
findings indicate that money given to states in the USA by the federal government is actually 
spent rather than replacing state-level revenue. Of course, extra funding should result in some 
expenditure increase due to income effect, but the observation has been that funding induces 
expenditure beyond what would be predicted by income effect. The stickiness of the flypaper 
is perhaps what motivates earmarked funding in the international setting. Economic theory 
goes against the view that federal allocation earmarked for particular activities should be seen 
anything other than the regular income generated by the states, say, through income tax. As 
van de Walle and Mu (2007) point out economists would find fungibility as the norm. 
However, in international policy circles the expectation is for there to be no fungibility; the 
donor community would expect no decline in domestic expenditure when aid budget is 
increased for a particular sector. As any measure of fungibility requires that a counterfactual 
be known, a simpler question is, all things being equal, if a country receives US$1 extra in 
health aid in comparison to another country, does that lead to US$1 increase in public 
expenditure on health? The question is whether or not aid funding to government results in 
exactly the same amount of government expenditure. Feyzioglu et al. (1996) report that US$1 
increase in bilateral foreign aid induces much less than US$1 rise in government expenditure; 
the corresponding increase seems to be much higher than induced by concessionary loans 
received from multi-lateral donors. 
 
There is even the expectation of additionality; there should be some matching of increasing in 
domestic allocation as donor funding for a sector is increased (Brown et al. 2006). 
Conceptually, additionality may be easier to detect for a new programme, for example an 
HIV/AIDS programme, and this is where this concept has been emphasized. As donor 
countries put in more money, the same amount of money must be committed by the recipient 
from a point of zero funding. Fungibility is slightly different, as there is an expectation of 
some type of optimal behavior. It is easier to ask as stated before: does the total sectoral 
government expenditure, financed from resources made up of domestic revenue and foreign 
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aid targeted to the sector, increase exactly by the amount of targeted developmental aid?1 
Usually the test has been to detect whether or not the coefficient for the relation between the 
public domestic sectoral expenditure and earmarked funding is near to unity in some type of 
regression. The meaning of the coefficient is not exactly clear in welfare terms.  
 
As noted above, foreign aid was often thought of in terms of filling a gap—perhaps one can 
think of development assistance as complimenting recipients’ domestic efforts. In this view 
one would note low levels of domestic expenditure on health, say, and this low level would 
be supplemented by donor funding earmarked for health to have a total amount not too much 
beyond the DAH. In recent years, the notion that fungibiltiy should be prevented entails that 
country do not see DAH merely as an income for the overall budget; the expenditure on the 
earmarked sector would be beyond what would be predicted by income effect (van de Walle 
and Mu 2007).  
 
In examining the relation between DAH and domestic expenditure the usual issues around 
endogeneity apply. As already stated, the empirical work is not exactly testing fungibility 
which embeds a counterfactual concept; however, we will use the word ‘fungibility’ below as 
shorthand. There is also a plethora of number of indicators used as dependent variables to 
reflect fiscal commitment, such as public expenditure per capita or public expenditure as a 
ratio of GDP. 
2.3  Modality of aid-giving  
The way in which aid is distributed may have different implications. Modalities can consist 
of giving direct aid within the budgetary process in the recipient country, carrying out 
specific projects through governmental channels, or directly funding projects through the 
private sector—private providers and NGOs to provide goods at subsidised rate. Discerning 
these channels from existing datasets has been difficult. Lu et al. (2010) suggest, using their 
own imputated data as to what might be funded through the non-governmental sector in the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data on foreign 
assistance, that donor contribution through private means induces governments to increase 
their expenditure at a higher rate.  
 
Another concern has been that aid is provided through multiple transfer instances and there 
are multiple donors for a single country as indicated above. Multiple events induce 
bureaucratic pressures. The presence of multiple donors induces unexpected impacts. 
Standard measures of concentration of donor activities using indices similar to the Herfindahl 
index of monopoly power indicates that fragmented aid giving is large (Acharya et al. 2006). 
The implications of fragmentation are debatable. Easterly (2002) claims donors can act as a 
de facto cartel in dictating what is done with the funding, hence the fact that the modality of 
funding dispersment does not matter. Knack and Rehman (2007) argue that it is unlikely a 
donor will internalize utilities of success and failure of other donors in a given country as the 
number of donors is large. There is diffused responsibility if the number of donors increases. 
Development assistance for health has become a favourite type of aid, as we note below. 
Thus the question of fragmentation is not inconsequential with regards to health. We also 
note below that multiple aid events, which may be more prevalent when non-government 
channels are used to deliver health, may impose a great deal of bureaucratic burden.  
                                                
1 Pack and Pack (1993); Boone (1996); Feyzioglu et al. (1998). 
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3 DAH modalities 
Despite the methodological difficulties highlighted in Section 2, the literature assessing the 
effectiveness of aid, and DAH in particular, is growing. As outlined in the introduction, 
donors disburse funding using different modalities, depending on the degree of earmarking 
and trust in country systems. This section will summarize the current knowledge on the 
different aid modalities, and highlight successes and what can be learnt from them 
3.1  Project aid 
Project aid is the most earmarked type of aid. Projects are discrete interventions usually 
delivered through parallel systems, bypassing the government, where donors have control 
over the design, monitoring, disbursement and accountability procedures, and NGOs or the 
private sector are in charge of implementation (Foster and Leavy 2001). Projects are also 
sometimes delivered using government systems, where donors control the policy conditions 
and the sector in which the project is situated, but the funds are disbursed and accounted for 
using government systems. Projects have been criticised for lacking sustainability (Leader 
and Colenso 2005), having high transaction costs (Quartey 2005; NORAD 2008) and 
hindering partner country ownership (Marshall and Ofei-Aboagye 2004).  
 
An analysis of projects financed by the World Bank throughout the years 1983-2009 (Denizer 
et al. 2011) found that the success of projects was correlated with overall country 
performance. In addition, it highlighted that the true impact of projects only becomes 
apparent over time and later evaluations tend to be less optimistic. This is particularly the 
case in the health sector, where the impact of interventions takes time to be seen. The 
evaluation found that some factors, such as high preparation costs and low country 
ownership, were associated with lower impact of projects. On the other hand, smaller size, 
good management and supervision were correlated with a higher impact of projects. 
However, the authors of the analysis (Denizer et al. 2011) do acknowledge that a significant 
proportion of the variation observed in project performance cannot be explained by these 
factors, highlighting the importance of the local context on project outcomes. A series of case 
studies conducted by the What Works Group at the Center for Global Development found 
that a World Bank funded project in China averted 30,000 cases of tuberculosis per year. The 
project’s success was associated with high levels of political commitment at all levels of 
government and the use of creative incentives to both patients and providers (Levine 2004). 
Table 2 below summarizes other studies of successful projects. 
 
Despite their criticism, projects can be effective in achieving their objectives. However, 
concerns regarding sustainability and weakening of country systems have driven the 
international community to favour programme-based approaches, such as SWAPs and budget 
support. This shift was at the heart of the Paris Declaration in 2005 and is still being pursued 
by many donors.  
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Table 2: Development assistance for health projects 
Author(s) Title Year of 
publication 
Year of study Type of 
Publication  
Type of policy 
intervention 
under analysis  
Country/Region  Rural/Urban Methodology 
used 
(experimental -
what type of 
experimental 
design; non- and 
quasi-
experimental 
approaches) 
Sample size Outcome 
variables used  
Main findings (and shortcomings) weblink (U
Denizer, C., 
Kaufmann, D. 
& Kraay, A. 
Good Countries 
or Good 
Projects? 
Macro and Micro 
Correlates of 
World Bank 
Project 
Performance  
 2011 Unspecified Working paper  Project  World  Both   Non-
experimental 
(regression 
analysis of 
World Bank 
data) 
 6,253 projects Whether project 
has met its 
development 
objective  
The study found that the success of projects was 
correlated with overall country performance. In 
addition, it highlighted that the true impact of 
projects only becomes apparent over time and later 
evaluations tend to be less optimistic. This is 
particularly the case in the health sector, where the 
impact of interventions takes time to be seen. The 
evaluation found that some factors, such as high 
preparation costs and low country ownership, were 
associated with lower impact of projects. On the 
other hand, smaller size, good management and 
supervision were correlated with a higher impact of 
projects. The authors acknowledge that a significant 
proportion of the variation observed in project 
performance cannot be explained by these factors. 
 http://docu
curated/en
od-countrie
macro-mic
bank-proje
 Munishi, G. K. Intervening to 
address 
constraints 
through health 
sector reforms in 
Tanzania: some 
gains and the 
unfinished 
business 
 2003 Unspecified  Journal article Urban health 
project 
Tanzania Urban  Non-
experimental, 
case study 
design 
Unspecified Rehabilitation of 
Dar es Salaam’s 
health services 
facilities. 
Improved 
system capacity 
to deliver health 
services. 
Implementation 
of government’s 
decentralization 
reforms 
The Dar es Salaam Urban Health Project 
succeeded in creating an organized health system, 
introducing the minimum health services package, 
strengthening monitoring and evaluation and 
improving community participation. Key in achieving 
this was the sequencing of activities, where 
structural quality was addressed before 
implementing other activities, such as the provision 
of drugs. Despite these achievements, the study 
highlights the lack of political support and the 
reliance on donor funding as concerns, particularly 
with respect to project sustainability. 
http://online
10.1002/jid
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C Edwards, S 
Saha  
From home to 
hospital, a 
continuum of 
care: 
making progress 
towards 
Millennium 
Development 
Goals 4 and 5 in 
rural 
Bangladesh 
 2011  Journal article   Integrated 
maternal and 
child health 
project 
Bangladesh Rural Non-
experimental 
 Proportion of 
mothers 
receiving 
antenatal care. 
Choosing a 
community 
skilled birth 
attendant. 
Having access 
to caesarean 
section. 
Having post-
partum care 
The study found that women living in the catchment 
area of the project have much better outcomes than 
the national average. The authors attribute this to 
the integrated system of care, providing a 
continuum of care between the hospital and the 
home, the provision of health worker training and 
community involvement. However, the study 
acknowledges that the model is very resource-
intensive and would not be replicable by the 
government, hence being aid-dependent and 
potentially unsustainable. 
 http://onlin
10.1111/j.1
0528.2011
Buse, K., Ludi, 
E. & Vigneri, M. 
Beyond the 
village : The 
transition from 
rural 
investments to 
national plans to 
reach the 
MDGs. 
Sustaining and 
scaling up the 
Millennium 
Villages 
 2008   Evaluation 
report 
Millennium 
Village Project  
Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Malawi, Uganda  
 Rural Non-
experimental 
  Distribution of 
long-lasting 
insecticide-
treated bednets. 
Malaria 
treatment rates. 
Deliveries 
attended by 
trained health 
workers/birth 
attendants. 
Vitamin A 
supplements. 
Immunization. 
Deworming. 
Voluntary 
counselling and 
testing. 
Anti-retroviral 
therapy. 
Health services 
utilization 
The villages taking part in the project have achieved 
huge gains in all of their health indicators, although 
some differences are observed across countries 
and indicators. The success of the project is linked 
to the concentration of resources at the community 
level and the priority given to lowcost, effective 
interventions. There are concerns, however, about 
the scalability of the project to the national level, as 
the budget is too limited to address upstream 
investments, rural-urban linkages and infrastructure 
and institutional constraints. 
  
Mize L. S., 
Harrison, M., 
Hoekman, N., 
Mercer, M. A. & 
Thompson, S 
Health Alliance 
International: 
Improving 
maternal and 
newborn 
health in Timor 
Leste final 
evaluation 
report. 
2008  2008 Project 
evaluation report 
Child Survival 
Grant 
Timor-Leste  Rural Before-after 
study 
 7 districts Proportion of 
women with 
children aged 
under two who 
received one or 
more antenatal 
visits. Last 
delivery was 
attended by a 
skilled birth 
attendant. 
Received at 
least two tetanus 
toxoid vaccine in 
their last 
pregnancy.  
Received 
Vitamin A 
supplement 
post-partum 
The project met and exceeded its objectives. The 
evaluation attributes the success of the project to 
the technical ability of its staff and  the investments 
made on their skills, accepting leadership from 
government, research and community consultations 
carried out before designing the project and the use 
of video and photographic materials for health 
promotion.  
 http://pdf.u
ACM429.p
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Exclusively 
breastfed in the 
first months 
Hounton, S., 
Menten, J., 
Ouédraogo, M., 
Dubourg, D., 
Meda, N., 
Ronsmans, C., 
Byass, P. & De 
Browere, V. 
Effects of a 
skilled care 
iInitiative on 
pregnancy-
related mortality 
in rural Burkina 
Faso. 
2009 2006 Journal article Skilled Care 
Initiative 
Burkina Faso Rural Quasi-
experimental 
2 districts Pregnancy 
related mortality. 
Utilization of 
maternal health 
services 
The study found that the Skilled Care Initiative 
project increased the number of babies delivered at 
health facilities (the aim of the project); however, it 
had no effect on pregnancy related mortality. The 
authors also found a low rate of caesarean 
sections, which they interpret to mean that 
substantial barriers still exist to service delivery, 
which may explain the lack of impact on health 
outcomes.  
http://www
med/18578
Source: authors’ illustration. 
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3.2  Programme-based approaches 
Programme-based approaches (PBAs) are defined by the OECD as having the following 
characteristics:  
1. being lead by the partner country; 
2. having a single, comprehensive programme and budget framework; 
3. donor co-ordination and harmonization of donor procedures for budgeting, 
management, procurement and reporting; 
4. increased use of partner country systems (OECD 2008a). 
They encompass basket funding, SWAPs, and budget support. They also include project aid 
that is delivered as part of a SWAP or pooled through a basket fund. Driven by the discontent 
with traditional project aid, donors committed to giving two-thirds of their aid in the form of 
PBAs by 2010 at the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005. However, the mid-term 
evaluation found that the proportion of aid delivered as PBAs had only increased from 43 per 
cent in 2005 to 47 per cent in 2007 (OECD 2008a). The final evaluation of the Paris 
Declaration found that with a few exceptions, such as Uganda, there had been no rapid or 
linear move towards PBAs, with most of the evaluated countries and donors delivering aid 
using mixed modalities. In fact, it found a general reluctance on the part of the donors to 
move towards these approaches, mainly due to the slow pace of public reforms, which 
contributed to high fragmentation of aid. However, it also found that although PBAs require 
more effort than traditional project aid, they resulted in higher policy influence by the donors 
(for instance, in better targeting of expenditure on poorer communities), and better 
understanding of performance-based approaches by the partner governments, which lead the 
evaluators to reinforce the suitability of PBAs as the core target of the Paris Declaration, and 
to recommend it be included in further declarations and policy discussions (Wood et al. 
2011). Examples of PBAs are shown in Table 3. SWAPs and budget support are discussed 
below. 
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Table 3: Programme-based approaches 
Author(s) Title Year of 
publication 
Year of study Type of 
Publication 
Type of policy 
intervention 
under analysis 
Country/ 
Region 
Methodology 
used 
Sample size Outcome 
variables used 
Main findings (and shortcomings) web link (URL) 
Chansa, C. 
Sundewall, J. 
McIntyre, D. 
Tomson, G. 
Forsberg, B. 
C.  
Exploring 
SWAP 
contribution to 
the efficient 
allocation and 
use of 
resources in 
the health sect
or in Zambia. 
 
 2008 2005-2007 Journal article SWAP Zambia  Non-
experimental, 
case study 
approach 
26 
stakeholders 
(21 in-depth 
interviews and 
one group 
interview) 
Administrative, 
technical and 
allocative 
efficiency 
The SWAP was not found to have 
achieved the expected improvements 
in efficiency. The authors attribute 
this to the partial implementation of 
the SWAP or the fact that it had not 
been embraced by all donors. 
Although they do not classify the 
SWAP approach as unsuccessful, the 
authors find it ineffective in its current 
form. 
 http://heapol.oxf
nt/23/4/244.long 
Buse, K. Keeping a tight 
grip on the 
reins: donor 
control over 
aid 
co-ordination 
and 
management 
in Bangladesh 
1999 1996 - 1997 Journal article SWAP Bangladesh  Non-
experimental, 
case study 
Discussions 
with 87 
stakeholders 
and  
22 semi-
structured 
questionnaires  
Effectiveness 
of aid co-
ordination 
instruments 
The study found that the SWAP did 
not succeed in allowing the 
government to play a leading role in 
aid management. This is in part due 
to donors not trusting country 
systems and in part because of the 
politics and power associated with aid 
co-ordination and particularly, with 
having a leading role.  
 http://heapol.oxf
nt/14/3/219.full.p
Bowie, C. 
Mwase, T. 
  
Assessing the 
use of an 
essential 
health package 
in a sector 
wide approach 
in Malawi. 
2011  2008 Journal article SWAP Malawi Cost-
effectiveness 
analysis 
55 Essential 
Health 
Package 
interventions 
Technical 
efficiency, 
defined as ‘the 
efficient 
delivery of 
health care to 
a population, 
through an 
analysis of the 
appropriatenes
s of the EHP 
interventions 
and their 
coverage’ 
This study found that the SWAP 
invested in more cost-effective 
interventions than donor 
governments acting on their own. 
This leads the authors to conclude 
that the SWAP has resulted in an 
improvement in health service 
delivery at low cost. 
 http://www.healt
systems.com/co
9-4.pdf 
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Lister, S., 
Carter, R. et al. 
Joint 
Evaluation of 
General 
Budget 
Support 1994-
2004 
 2006 2005 Evaluation 
report 
General 
budget support 
(GBS) 
Burkina Faso, 
Malawi, 
Mozambique 
Nicaragua, 
Rwanda, 
Uganda, 
Vietnam 
 Non-
experimental, 
case study 
approach 
7 country case 
studies 
GBS 
relevancy, 
efficiency and 
effectiveness 
in achieving a 
sustainable 
impact in 
poverty 
reduction and 
growth 
promotion. 
Partnership GBS (PGBS) was found 
to improve harmonization, alignment 
and policy development on all 
countries reviewed, as well as having 
a positive influence on allocative and 
technical efficiency of public financial 
management in five of the countries. 
However, the study also found that 
unpredictability and volatility of PGBS 
were a problem. 
 http://www.oecd
746,en_2157136
79_1_1_1_1,00.
Caputo, E., de 
Kemp, A & 
Lawson, A. 
Assessing the 
impacts of 
budget 
support: Case 
studies in Mali, 
Tunisia and 
Zambia 
2011 2010 Working paper General and 
sector budget 
support 
Mali, Tunisia 
and Zambia 
 Non-
experimental, 
case study 
approach 
Three country 
case studies 
Extent to which 
budget support 
provides means 
for 
implementing 
national and 
sectoral 
priorities 
Efficiency and 
effectiveness of 
national 
priorities 
Sustainable 
outcomes and 
impacts on 
growth 
They study found that budget support 
had resulted in better budget 
management, although its design, 
harmonization and alignment ere not 
optimal. In addition, the authors found 
that budget support was associated 
with increased public expenditure on 
social services, which resulted in 
improvements in health. For instance, 
in Zambia increased health service 
provision was associated with a 
decrease in the incidence of 
tuberculosis, malaria, diarrhoea and 
maternal and child mortality. 
However, the study highlights 
concerns with respect to the quality of 
these services. 
http://www.oecd.
8934753.pdf  
Visser-Valfrey, 
M. & Umarji, 
M. B. 
Sector Budget 
Support in 
Practice 
Case Study 
Health Sector 
in 
Mozambique 
 2010  2008 Project report Sector budget 
support 
Mozambique   Non-
experimental, 
case study 
approach 
36 stakeholder 
interviews  
Extent to which 
SBS has met 
the objectives 
of partner 
country and 
donors 
The study found an increase in the 
number of donors engaging in sector 
budget support, better co-ordination 
and a positive influence on sector 
management, policy and monitoring 
and evaluation. However, it also 
found that more progress is needed 
in improving the budgeting process, 
systems for financing de-centralized 
services and technical assistance 
and capacity development.  
 http://www.odi.o
6405.pdf  
Source: authors’ illustration. 
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3.3  Sector-wide approaches 
Sector-wide approaches (SWAPs) arose in the mid 1990s as a result of the prevailing 
discontent with project aid (Harrold and and associates 1995). Although there is no 
agreed definition of precisely what SWAPs involve, they are a co-ordination mechanism 
for donors working on the same sector that aims to improve donor co-ordination, 
government ownership and lower transaction costs of aid (Sundewall and Sahlin-
Andersson 2006, Hutton and Tanner 2004). In essence, a SWAP represents a 
partnership between donors and the partner government, lead by the health ministry of 
the partner government (Hutton and Tanner 2004). The terms of this partnership are 
often agreed in advance, and vary between different countries (Sundewall and Sahlin-
Andersson 2006). SWAPs are often associated with delivering aid as budget support, 
further supporting partner ownership and country systems.  
 
Box 1: Health sector-wide approaches in practice: the cases of Zambia and 
Bangladesh 
The sector wide approach was introduced in the Zambian health sector in 1993, with the aim of aligning 
and co-ordinating aid, as well as supporting the plans of the health ministry (ODI and Mokoro 2009). 
Chansa et al. (2008) carried out an evaluation of the Zambian SWAP in 2008 with the aim of assessing its 
contribution to efficiency, in the form of administrative, technical and allocative efficiency. The study 
found that the proportion of funds channelled through the SWAP made only modest increases during 
1998-2005. In addition, the evaluation found that many donors were still operating outside the SWAP, 
with this trend increasing rather than moving towards a more harmonized approach. In terms of 
efficiency, the study found that the SWAP had resulted in small improvements in administrative 
efficiency, although transaction costs remained high, due to the amount and intensity of related meetings, 
which happened alongside meetings for donors operating outside of the SWAP—a fact probably 
enhanced by the arrival of global health initiatives in the time period of study. The authors of the 
evaluation found that both the funding to hospitals and the bed occupancy rate in these decreased since 
the introduction of the SWAP, resulting in a decrease in technical efficiency. Finally, the evaluation found 
small improvements in the allocative efficiency of the budget execution, particularly at the level of district 
funding. The results of this evaluation are disappointing, although the authors do not rule out the SWAP 
as a successful co-ordination model, they do conclude that the set up of the Zambian SWAP was not 
effective (Chansa et al. 2008). 
 
The Bangladesh SWAP—known as the Health, Nutrition and Population Programme—started in 1998. It 
is often referred to as the biggest and oldest SWAP and has been the subject of a few evaluations. A study 
carried out by White (2007) found that the health SWAP in Bangladesh had succeeded in lowering 
transaction costs, and that the associated budget support had been a successful funding mechanism. 
However, the study also found that donors were still driving the policy process and that projects were too 
complex. Amongst the recommendations, White stressed the need for donors to adopt a more ‘hands-off’ 
approach, giving the government space to make their own decisions and restraining from criticism, whilst 
investing in its monitoring and accountability systems ((White 2007). Other studies of the Bangladeshi 
SWAP have found donors’ unwillingness to fully participate due to lack of trust in country systems (Buse 
1999) and that despite of the clear contributions the SWAP has made towards donor alignment and 
predictability, and strengthening national health policy, the SWAP has failed to bring about 
organizational and governance reforms, government ownership, as well as stopping donors from 
developing parallel systems (Martinez 2008). However, the failure of the SWAP mechanism to fully 
achieve its intended results is not seen as a consequence of the inappropriateness of the SWAP model, but 
rather as a result of its implementation. The lack of success is seen as a consequence of the poor quality of 
the underlying health plans and monitoring systems, rather than on the SWAP itself (Martinez 2008). 
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Although the evidence on the impact of the sector wide approach mechanism on the 
health sector is mixed (Box 1), it is important to take into account that the SWAP 
mechanism involves a reform in the way aid is given and in the relationship between the 
donors and the government, which means it will take time for the impact to be seen 
(Hutton and Tanner 2004). In addition, the SWAP can be seen as a set of principles to 
give aid, but its implementation varies between the different countries, as the local 
political and cultural context have been found to influence the ‘shape’ of the SWAP in 
different countries, and hence its effectiveness (Sundewall and Sahlin-Andersson 2006).  
3.4  Budget support 
Budget support is a type of programme-based approach that is characterized by having 
little or no earmarking. There are two types of budget support: general budget and 
sector budget support. General budget support involves donors providing aid directly to 
the government’s budget, linked to a poverty reduction strategy. Success of budget 
support is dependent on the governance and policy environment of the partner country, 
with concerns regarding corruption and misuse of funds (Bourguignon and Sundberg 
2007). During 2002-06 only 6.4 per cent of all aid was allocated as budget support (Piva 
P 2009), reflecting donors’ concerns and unwillingness to engage in this aid modality. 
However, the popularity of budget support is growing (Marshall and Ofei-Aboagye 
2004), particularly amongst European donors. A study of general budget support in 
seven countries over 1994-2004 found positive results in all but two countries. It found 
that, overall, it was a relevant aid modality and that general budget support increased 
government ownership, accountability and capacity for public financial management. In 
addition, it enhanced the quality of aid by improving donor harmonization and 
alignment (Dom 2007). These findings have been corroborated in further studies (Carter 
and Lister 2007; Marshall and Ofei-Aboagye 2004; Leader and Colenso 2005). 
 
Although donors do not select how the funds are distributed, negotiations of general 
budget support can increase budget allocation to the health sector. In addition, budget 
support can be delivered as sector budget support, where funds are earmarked to a 
particular sector, often the health and education sectors. A study of ten sectors in six 
African countries found that sector budget support had improved the efficiency of 
public resource use by supporting planning, budgeting, management and accountability 
processes. However, it found that although access to services had been greatly 
expanded, the quality and equity in the delivery of these services had not (Williamson 
and Dom 2010). Another study found sector budget support to lower transaction costs of 
aid programmes (Dom 2007) 
3.5  Global health initiatives 
Recent increases in the levels of development assistance for health have not only been 
associated with different funding modalities but with the arising of new donors and 
initiatives. Since the year 2000, there has been a proliferation in global health initiatives 
(GHI), which tend to focus on a single disease or group of diseases. Some of the more 
prominent GHIs include the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Global Fund for 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the GAVI Alliance in support of childhood  
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Box 2: Global Health Initiatives 
Global Health Initiatives (GHIs) have been successful in bringing specific health problems into the global 
health agenda and in gathering large amounts of resources to tackle them. However, they have also been 
at the centre of criticisms for drawing resources away from broader health system issues and further 
complicating the aid architecture. Two large studies have been conducted to assess the interactions 
between GHIs and country health systems and the impact of GHIs on country co-ordination mechanisms.  
 
The first of these studies, conducted by the Maximising Positive Synergies Collaborative Group at the 
World Health Organization, reviewed 221 existing reports and conducted 15 new studies to assess the 
interactions between GHIs and health systems. The study analysed these interactions in six different 
dimensions: health service delivery, health financing, governance, health workforce, health information 
systems and supply management systems.  
 
The study found mixed results. In terms of health service delivery—defined as access, equity and 
coverage—the report found that while access to services targeted by GHIs increased, there was mixed 
evidence regarding access to other services. GHIs were accredited to have made some contribution to 
equity but not towards the causes of inequity or social determinants of health. In addition, whilst GHIs 
were found to improve quality by the provision of guidelines, there were also concerns that pressure on 
performance had compromised quality of services. With regards to health financing, it was found that 
GHIs resulted in an increase in funding, improved the availability of free services at the point of care 
(albeit not systematically) and contributed to improvements in predictability of aid funding. However, 
alignment with national priorities or the burden of disease was weak. GHIs were found to have an overall 
positive influence on health sector governance, by exposing weaknesses, improving accountability and 
productivity, and increasing capacity and community participation. Nevertheless, there were worries that 
the performance-based approach employed by GHIs may distort these indicators towards their specific 
targets. In terms of health information systems and supply management systems, GHIs have resulted in 
improvements in both, but only for their targeted diseases. In addition, they were also found to create 
parallel systems and, in the case of supply chains, to duplicate and displace local systems, resulting from a 
lack of co-ordination. 
 
The study concludes that GHIs and country health systems are dynamic and inter-connected, and have 
positive and negative effects on each other, although policies to ensure the maximization of positive 
interactions are missing. The study recommends that the health systems strengthening agenda be given 
the same ambition and speed that characterises GHIs, to introduce health systems targets to existing 
GHIs, to improve alignment between GHIs and country health systems, for more data to be generated on 
costs and benefits of improving health systems, and for increases in funding for health systems in a 
predictable manner. 
 
The second study, Spicer et al. (2010), examined the effects of three GHIs—the Global Fund to fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 
and the World Bank’s Multi-country AIDS Programme (MAP)—on co-ordination in seven countries in 
Europe, Asia, Africa and South America. The study involved 379 in-depth interviews with stakeholders at 
the national and sub-national level. Overall, it was found that different contexts actually shared similar 
experiences. The study found that GHIs, particularly the Global Fund, had a positive effect on national 
level co-ordination and have achieved wide stakeholder participation, although participation from non-
health government departments and civil society organizations (CSOs) remained weak. Country 
ownership, on the other hand, was found to be inhibited by weak decision-making power of co-ordination 
mechanisms, particularly at the sub-sector level. Although some improvements in ownership were 
observed over time, the study found that a lack of transparency and communication, competition for 
resources, and weak secretariat and managerial capabilities were impeding further progress. 
 
A number of recommendations to improve the co-ordination and therefore the effectiveness of GHIs are 
made. These include improving secretariat capacity at national and regional level through financial and 
technical support, better positioning of co-ordination mechanisms within government to enhance their 
authority, increasing financial and training support to CSOs to improve their participation at the national 
and regional level, and better definitions of the roles of the members of national and sub-national co-
ordination structures. 
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vaccination and the Stop TB Partnership. However, there are many others. Their 
increase in popularity (and funding) has sparked a debate between vertical, disease-
focused programme and horizontal health system approaches. 
 
Proponents for ‘vertical’ disease-focused programmes advocate that the urgency of 
tackling the spread of some diseases means specific programmes have to be designed 
and implemented for them (Biesma et al. 2009, World Health Organization Maximizing 
Positive Synergies Collaborative Group et al. 2009). On the other hand, broader health 
systems constraints have been identified as slowing down progress towards making 
improvements in these diseases, and in health more generally (Cavalli et al. 2010, 
Lieberman et al. 2009, Shiffman 2006b). There has been mixed evidence on the impact 
of vertical programmes on the health system, although it has been found that weak 
health systems are particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of GHIs (Cavalli et al. 
2010). 
 
The evidence on which this debate is based is scarce, with both sides using anecdotal 
evidence to make their case. However, some recent studies have shed some light on this. 
A multi-country review carried out by the World Health Organization’s Positive 
Synergies Collaborative Group (2009) found that although there were significant gaps 
in the data, there was potential for global health initiatives to positively interact and 
reinforce the health system. A seven-country study by Spicer et al. (2010) found that 
although GHIs (the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria particularly) have 
had positive effects on co-ordination at the national level, they increased the complexity 
of the aid architecture, undermined alignment and lacked harmonization, especially at 
the sub-national level (Spicer et al. 2010). In contrast, Dodd and Lane (2010) found that 
global health partnerships have successfully innovated new approaches to raising and 
delivering funds and can provide longer-term funding, from which other donors should 
learn—more details on these can be found in Box 2. 
 
A third ‘middle’ way has been put forward, known as the ‘diagonal’ approach. This 
approach consists of using single disease projects and programmes to address broader 
health systems issues, such as human resources, drug supply and financing (Frenk et al. 
2003). However, there are warnings that unless accompanied by an increase in funding, 
this new approach will fail (Ooms et al. 2008). Examples of the diagonal approach 
include the Global Fund’s health systems strengthening programmes2 and PEPFAR’s 
investments in human resources, supply chains and health systems infrastructure 
(Moore and Morrison 2007). 
4 Factors affecting the effectiveness of DAH 
4.1  Allocation of DAH 
As outlined in the introduction, the amount of DAH disbursed has increased 
dramatically over the past ten years. However, this increase has been uneven both 
between countries and across different health priorities. The share of DAH allocated to 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has increased steadily (albeit departing from low levels of 
investments in the sector, see Table 1) to account for 29 per cent of all DAH in 2008, 
                                                
2 Globa Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (2007). 
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making it the best-funded region in the world (Institute for Health Metrics and 
Evaluation 2010), which also reflects the severe deficits in health service provision in 
the region.  
 
A cross-country analysis found no correlation between countries’ GDP per capita and 
the amount of DAH they received, although this is improving (Ravishankar et al. 2009). 
This should not be taken as a measure of whether DAH has resulted in increased 
growth, but rather as an assessment of whether DAH is provided to countries that need 
it most. Some problems arise when contrasting total DAH with GDP per capita, as a few 
newly emerging middle-income countries—such as India, Pakistan and China—have 
large populations and receive large total amounts of foreign aid. India was actually the 
largest recipient of DAH in 2007; however the per capita DAH it received is actually 
low compared to almost all lower-income countries. Given that expressed motive for 
development assistance is to aid poor countries, DAH distribution is fairly consistent 
with this motive. Figure 1 shows the relation between the cumulative proportion of poor 
(defined as living under US$1 a day) and the cumulative amount of health official 
development assistance (ODA) distributed for 56 countries, including India and China, 
but excluding countries with a population smaller than one million and for which DAH 
made up less than 1 per cent of their total government budget. These countries were 
ranked by per capita income, averaged over 1995-2006. For this sample of countries, the 
first 25 countries amounted to containing 26 per cent of the total poor while the amount 
of health ODA going to these countries amounted to 51.5 per cent of the total amount of 
aid in our sample. Of these countries 22 were in SSA, two in South Asia and one in 
Central Asia. The 26th country is India, home to 44 percent of the poor people in our 
sample. India received 17 per cent of the health ODA. At the point of India in Figure 1 
the cumulative proportions are equalized.   
Figure 1: Cumulative distribution of health ODA in relation with the distribution of poor 
in 2006 
 
Source: authors’ illustration using OECD and World Bank poverty data from 2004-06. 
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Another indicator that may be important is the proportion of total health expenditure 
that DAH makes up; after all, DAH should make up the short-fall in health expenditure 
for poor countries. The evidence suggests that DAH measured as the amount going into 
a country makes up a larger share of total health expenditure for poor countries. 
Figure 2 depicts this relationship. Here we show that DAH is distributed in a pro-poor 
manner. In some countries DAH does nearly make up the entire public sector health 
budget. Although the political economic implications of this relationship are not clear, 
DAH makes up a large proportion of the health expenditure and budget for poor 
countries.    
Figure 2: DAH as a share of total health expenditure and log income, average 2004-08 
 
Source: authors’ illustration using OECD and World Bank income data 2004-08. 
 
Given the increase in earmarked project funding, one implication of the foreign source 
of health expenditure being large centres on whether the project funding meet the 
priorities within a country. The literature highlights some (but not full) correlations 
between countries’ burden of disease and the level of funding they receive (Ravishankar 
et al. 2009; MacKellar 2005). For instance, Ravishankar et al. (ibid.) found that of the 
US$13.8 billion DAH in 2007 for which project-level information was available, 
US$4.9 billion was spent on HIV/AIDS, compared with US$0.6 billion on tuberculosis, 
US$0.7 billion on malaria, and US$0.9 billion on health sector support. Another study 
found that non-communicable diseases received US$0.78 per disability-adjusted life 
year (DALY) in 2007, compared to US$23.9 per DALY attributable to HIV, 
tuberculosis, and malaria (Nugent 2010). Differences in funding are also observed 
amongst the goods and services that are funded; for instance, more funding is allocated 
to the procurement of drugs than to human resources or infrastructure (Juliet et al. 
2009). Analysis of OECD Creditor Reporting System data shows the prominence of 
HIV funding, but also recent increases in broader health systems priorities: 
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Figure 3: Trends in priorities of development assistance for health (2009 constant US$ 
billion commitments) 
 
Source: Tandon (unpublished), compiled from OECD-DAC data, reproduced with permission from author. 
 
If funding decisions are not fully based on disease burden, then what other factors are 
influencing donors’ choices? Discussions in the literature indicate that donors have non-
altruistic motives. Countries may use DAH as a strategy within their foreign policy and 
security (Labonte and Gagnon 2010); for instance, to control infectious diseases that 
pose a threat to donors’ national security (Shiffman 2006a; Shiffman et al. 2002). In 
addition, there is some evidence that priorities are set to serve the interest of donor 
countries’ foreign policy and trade agenda (Feldbaum and Michaud 2010).  
 
The current distribution of DAH affects its effectiveness in two ways. First, resources 
are not directed to where they are most needed, and hence are not achieving their 
potential impact. Second, the popularity of some countries and priorities means that 
donors and implementing agencies crowd around them, resulting in duplication and 
competition (see fragmentation below). 
4.2  Predictability 
By its very nature, DAH is discretionary spending for donors, and as such can be 
extremely unpredictable. Predictability is defined by the OECD as the provision of 
long-term indicative figures of aid flows, as well as the disbursement of committed 
funds in a timely manner (OECD 2008a). Donors often fail in both dimensions. A panel 
regression in 60 low-income countries for the time period 1990-2005 found that, on 
average, levels of annual aid disbursements and commitments differed greatly, 
particularly in SSA. It also found that this had only shown small improvements over 
time. Perhaps surprisingly, lack of predictability was found both as shortfalls and as 
excesses in the amounts of funds expected, with SSA countries more likely to receive 
excess disbursements (Celasun and Walliser 2008). This has been corroborated in 
single-country studies in Uganda (Orem et al. 2009) and Zambia (Sundewall et al. 
2009). Other studies have found significant differences between countries (Strategic 
Partnership for Africa–Budget Support Working Group 2005), and that the poorest 
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countries are particularly affected by the unpredictability of DAH (Celasun and Walliser 
2008). 
 
Different reasons are found in the literature for the lack of predictability of aid flows. A 
survey of donors found that unmet policy conditions, donor administrative problems, 
recipient government delays in meeting conditions and political problems in the donor 
country all contributed to a lack of predictability (Strategic Partnership for Africa–
Budget Support Working Group 2005). Celasum and Walliser (2008) found that 25 per 
cent of unpredictability was explained by recipient country stability and levels of aid 
disbursed. They blamed the rest on ‘fickle’ donor behaviour (Celasun and Walliser 
2008). This lack of predictability has lead to DAH only funding the developing budget 
in countries such as Tanzania, as recurrent costs need to be constant, and hence it is 
risky to have them depend on external assistance. 
 
Lack of predictability can hinder aid effectiveness in several ways. First, it hinders 
recipient governments’ ability to plan their budgets (Orem et al. 2009). This is a 
particularly important problem in the health sector, as health systems development is a 
long-term process, where many costs are recurrent, resulting in governments being 
reluctant to scale up activities (Vassall and Martinez Alvarez 2011, Dodd and Lane 
2010). Furthermore, budget aid that is larger than planned for may not be incorporated 
into the budget, and its expenditure will either be delayed or allocated to recurrent rather 
than investment spending. Second, lack of predictability has resulted in recipient 
ministries of finance being unwilling to allow long-term health spending commitments 
(Cavagnero et al. 2008), hence contributing to fungibility. Third, unpredictable aid 
undermines recipient governments’ budgets by forcing adjustments in expenditure and 
changes in original allocations during budget execution, hindering the achievement of 
government objectives, and disrupting the implementation of poverty reduction 
strategies (Celasun and Walliser 2006).  
4.3  Fragmentation 
As mentioned in Section 2, increased levels of development funding have resulted in the 
proliferation of the number of donors and the amount of projects and programmes they 
fund. This phenomenon is known as fragmentation. Fragmentation, which has been 
associated with decreased DAH effectiveness, affects countries differently (Frot and 
Santiso 2010). A study by Frot and Santiso (2010) found that poor and stable 
democratic countries, such as Tanzania, which had 1,601 aid projects in 2007, suffer 
most from fragmentation. The authors suggested that this was associated with donors 
preferring stronger institutions, which are found in these countries.  
 
There are several reasons why fragmentation of DAH decreases its effectiveness. 
Acharya et al. (2006) classify these as direct and indirect costs. The direct (transaction) 
costs are a result of both the large number of donors, which require substantial amounts 
of senior officials’ time, and the amount of projects they fund, which incur a 
considerable managing and reporting burden for governmental authorities (Acharya et 
al. 2006). Indirect costs include aid agencies attracting public servants away from the 
government, thereby exacerbating staff shortages (Aldasoro et al. 2010); time and 
money spent by donors on technical assistance and training of local staff, which results 
in reduced worker productivity (Acharya et al. 2006; Mueller et al. 2011); governments 
finding it easier to protect their interests as donors can exert less pressure by acting 
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alone (Burnell 2002), but having to balance out many different interests; more difficult 
co-ordination resulting in duplication; and, lack of individual sense of responsibility 
(Knack and Rahman 2007).  
4.4  Fungibility 
The issue of fungibility is often hotly debated in discussions concerning the 
effectiveness of DAH. Methodological issues encountered when assessing fungibility 
were discussed in Section 2. Here, we outline the current views on the matter. 
Fungibility is the process by which the recipient government ‘offsets donor spending for 
a particular purpose by reducing its own expenditures on the same purpose ... therefore 
aid substitutes rather than supplements local spending’ (Foster and Leavy 2001). The 
existence of fungibility of development assistance has been documented extensively in 
the literature from as early as 1993 (Pack and Pack 1993, World Bank 1998). 
Fungibility can occur at the macroeconomic (Gottret and Schieber 2006), sector (Farag 
et al. 2009, Gottret and Schieber 2006, Lu et al. 2010) and subsector (Shiffman 2008, 
Gottret and Schieber 2006) level. Although the data available on health sector spending 
in low-income countries is often scarce and of bad quality, several studies have found 
that it is particularly affected by fungibility (Lancaster 1999). Estimates of the extent of 
fungibility in the health sector for every dollar spent vary from a decrease in US$0.27-
$1.65 (Farag et al. 2009, Gottret and Schieber 2006, Lu et al. 2010) to a US$1.50 
increase (Mishra and Newhouse 2007). Much of these calculations in regards to DAH 
depend on methodologies used including how the dependent variable is constructed. 
Some attempt needs to be made in regards to critically survey this literature.  
 
Merely documenting whether fungibility takes place is insufficient, it is more important 
to explore why it happens (Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 2004; Ooms et al. 2010) and 
whether it is detrimental to DAH effectiveness. Some factors have been associated with 
increased fungibility, including low levels of recipient country income (Farag et al. 
2009), fragmentation (Gottret and Schieber 2006), lack of predictability and the short-
nature of DAH flows (Farag et al. 2009; Gottret and Schieber 2006), and lack of 
information (Halonen 2004). It is also important to explore why governments may 
choose to divert their spending from the health sector. It may be a government’s way of 
reallocating funding to other sectors, to anticipate the long-term unreliability of DAH, 
or to smooth DAH by spreading it across different years (Farag et al. 2009), a practice 
advised by the IMF (Stuckler et al. 2011).  
 
Fungibility is often highlighted as a cause of aid ineffectiveness, as donor funds 
substitute rather than complement recipient governments’ budget for health, and some 
studies consider it synonymous with corruption (Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 2004). 
However, fungibility has also been described as a rational and responsible response to 
DAH, resulting from donors’ and recipients’ differing priorities (Gottret and Schieber 
2006; McGillivray and Morrissey 2000), where recipient governments reallocate the 
resources available to them according to their priorities (Waddington 2004). It may be 
seen as an indication that the recipient governments are aware of the DAH coming into 
the country, which may explain why funds channelled through NGOs do not result in 
fungibility (Sridhar and Woods 2010). In addition, some studies have concluded that 
fungibility has limited consequences (McGillivray and Morrissey 2000; Wagstaff 2011), 
that it is too narrow a concept to analyse aid effectiveness (Pettersson 2007), and that it 
may distract from the real issues (McGillivray and Morrissey 2000). 
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4.5  DAH relationships 
In Section 2 we mentioned that the process of giving aid is in itself often a subject of 
study. Here we outline the current thinking on these issues. It is first important to 
acknowledge that DAH ineffectiveness is not just the responsibility of a particular actor 
or agency, but of the system of relationships that it generates. A variety of actors are 
involved in the delivery and use of DAH. These actors form dynamic and interactive 
relationships, which are shaped by differing underlying incentives, motivations, and 
information and power asymmetries and often result in lack of accountability (Eyben 
2006, Holvoet and Renard 2007, Gibson et al. 2005, Alonso 2004). This section will 
explore the notions of accountability, incentives and information and power 
asymmetries that characterise DAH relationships. 
 
Accountability is understood as the ‘means by which individuals and organizations are 
held responsible for their actions’ (Edwards and Hulme 1996). It is considered vital to 
the effectiveness of DAH, and has been repeatedly called for in the various declarations 
and commitments to aid effectiveness (Organisation for Economic and Development 
2008, Balabanova et al. 2010). Accountability should happen at all stages of the aid 
process, from decision-making, through implementation, monitoring, and evaluation 
(Kapur and Whittle 2010). There are four components to a well-functioning 
accountability system: a clear statement of goals (ODA 1993), transparency of decision-
making and use of funds (Ebrahim 2005; Ebrahim 2010, World Bank 2006), an 
appraisal process with published results (Ebrahim 2010; ODA 1993), and mechanisms 
for holding those responsible to account (ODA 1993). 
 
In theory, beneficiaries should hold donors and implementing agencies to account, and 
donors and implementing agencies should be mutually accountable to one other for the 
distribution and outcomes of DAH. However, accountability should not be regarded as a 
linear process, as the many actors involved interact to form a complex web of 
relationships (Ebrahim 2005; Eyben 2006).  
 
Repeated calls for mutual accountability between donors and recipient governments 
have proven difficult to implement in practice. Several reasons have been put forward in 
the literature for this. First, the DAH system faces the problem of being a ‘global public 
good’, where every country can benefit from improved health indicators and 
development in general (Alonso 2004), which may result in donors eluding individual 
responsibilities, as the rewards will be shared amongst all donors. Second, donors’ main 
accountability line is to their funders—the taxpayers (Haan 2009), and they therefore 
feel less responsibility towards the recipient government for their actions. Donor 
incentives are also often skewed towards spending of funds rather than achieving 
results, a trend known as the ‘money-moving syndrome’ (Monkam 2008b), which 
hinders accountability to beneficiaries. Third, accountability lines within donors mean 
that country offices are accountable to their headquarters, rather than the recipient 
government. Given the different motivations for giving DAH, country offices may be 
forced to follow the ‘official line’, even if that means bypassing mechanisms of country 
ownership, harmonization and alignment. Long project cycles and short-term posts in 
donor offices have also been blamed for hindering accountability (Monkam 2008a).  
 
Lack of trust in recipients’ accountability mechanisms has resulted in donors either 
setting up parallel systems, which further undermine the government (Buse 1999), 
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attaching conditions on how assistance is managed and accounted for, which limits its 
predictability and country ownership, or attempting to improve governments’ systems 
through technical assistance, which has been blamed for wasting resources on 
international consultants or luring government employees away from their jobs for 
training purposes with per diems or salary top-ups (Mueller et al. 2011). 
 
Recipient governments and those implementing DAH funded services may not be fully 
accountable to their beneficiaries due to a phenomenon known as the ‘broken feedback 
loop’, whereby the people paying for the services are different to those receiving them 
(Easterly 2008). This is slowly changing, however, largely due to the advocacy efforts 
of increasingly stronger CSOs, both in donor and recipient countries. 
 
Accountability is also hindered by power inequality between donors and recipients 
(Eyben 2006), as donors have control over resources, and can withdraw them at any 
point if they feel the recipient governments are not adhering to the conditions attached 
to the DAH (Ebrahim 2003). In contrast, there is no mechanism for sanctioning donors 
if they default on their commitments (Eyben 2006). Having said this, donors also face 
the Samaritan’s dilemma, which arises when the cost of enforcing conditionality (i.e. 
withdrawing DAH) is higher than the cost of the conditions not being met (Gibson et al. 
2005). 
5 Scalability of aid-supported health care programmes 
The aid influx into some countries, particularly to African and some of smaller South 
East Asian countries has increased the overall public expenditure on health 
dramatically. Consequently, scaling up of public activities around health has been 
observed for many of these countries. 
 
However, several barriers, both financial and non financial, have been encountered 
when trying to scale up aid-funded health programmes (Hanson et al. 2003). A review 
by Mangham and Hanson (2010) highlighted absorption capacity and health system 
needs as key constraints to scaling up health interventions. Concerns regarding 
absorption capacity arise due to micro- and macro-economic constraints countries face 
in using additional aid resources effectively. There are worries regarding the effect 
increased development assistance may have on the partner governments’ ability to plan, 
manage, and budget these resources, and their impact on service delivery (De Renzio 
2005, 2007; International Monetary Fund 2007). There are also concerns about 
diminishing returns of increased aid, although studies have shown that these levels of 
funding have not yet been reached (Bourguignon and Sundberg 2006; Feeny and 
McGillivray 2011). Non-financial barriers to scaling up aid-funded health programmes 
can be encompassed as health system needs. These include the capacity of health 
workers and the appropriate policy and institutional framework that need to be in place 
for additional assistance to be used effectively (Mangham and Hanson 2010). 
 
Two further concerns are quality and equity (Mangham and Hanson 2010). There are 
worries that scaling up health services will decrease the quality of those services, 
particularly if health systems needs for the scale up are not in place. For this to be 
prevented, it is important that additional expenditure on health infrastructure is 
accompanied by increased recurrent spending to support the additional health sector 
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supply. There is some evidence that this is happening, with the Global Fund funding the 
construction of facilities, training health care personnel as well as improving the 
availability of medicines (Yu et al. 2008; Schwartlander et al. 2006). Moreover, there 
may exist a trade off between efficiency and equity when scaling up health programmes. 
This is because it would take more resources to reach the poorest populations, as they 
are often hardest to reach, and therefore scale ups that aim to reach as many people as 
possible may not reach in these populations (Mangham and Hanson 2010). This has 
been found to be the case in two studies evaluating the affordable medicines facility for 
malaria initiative and the evaluation of the ‘3 by 5 Initiative’ by the WHO.3 In both 
cases they found that although the interventions had achieved wider coverage, this 
tended to be focused on the upper quintiles, with the poorer populations still 
experiencing the most acute shortages of medicines (Battistella Nemes et al. 2006; 
Cohen et al. 2010). 
 
Work undertaken by Hanson et al. (2003) identified five levels at which the above 
constraints can operate, and to which interventions to address them should be aimed. 
The first is at the level of the community and household, where the key constraints are 
lack of demand and use of interventions. The second is at the level of health services 
delivery, which includes health systems issues, such as the quantity and quality of 
human resources, availability of drugs and medical supplies, etc. The third level of 
constraints is at the level of health sector policy and strategic management, where 
constraints include lack of adequate policies and incentives and over-reliance on donor 
funding. The final level includes public policies cutting across sectors and 
environmental and contextual characteristics, such as governance and the overall policy 
framework.  
 
Despite all of the above, many examples can be found in the literature of successful 
scale up interventions (see Table 4 for a summary of these). A study of the scale up of 
an adolescent and sexual health programme in Tanzania was reported to achieve high 
coverage. The authors associate the success of the scale up with the structured nature of 
the process. However, they express concerns regarding the quality of the programmes 
and the need for increased supervision (Renju et al. 2011). In a set of case studies 
carried out by Medlin et al. (2006), the authors found that country ownership, strong 
leadership and management, and realistic financing were all associated with effective 
scale up of programmes. Similarly, three case studies conducted as part of the 
commission of macroeconomics and health in Chad, India, and Tanzania highlight the 
importance of addressing demand and supply issues by engaging with the community to 
integrate their needs and perceptions, and managing human resources and health 
infrastructure (Wyss K et al. 2003). They also highlight the need for clear objectives and 
information systems for monitoring progress, strong evidence-based technical design 
and innovative approaches to address constraints at the policy and management level 
(Rao Seshadri 2003), and the importance of sequencing and addressing policy and 
infrastructure constraints, often outside the health ministry (Munishi 2003). 
  
                                                
3 WHO (2009); http://www.who.int/3by5/en/.  
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Table 4: Summary of successful scale-up intervientions 
Title and authors Study summary
Steketee, R. W. and T. P. Eisele 
(2009). ‘Is the scale up of malaria 
intervention coverage also 
achieving equity?’ PLoS One 
4(12): e8409. 
Review of Demographic and Health Surveys, Multiple Indicator 
Cluster Surveys, and Malaria Indicator Surveys in African malaria-
endemic countries in the time period of 2006-2008. The study found 
great variation between levels of coverage of insecticide-treated 
mosquito nets (ITNs), treatment rates and intermittent preventive 
treatment (IPTp). Furthermore, the authors found that 52 per cent of 
the countries studied had an equitable distribution of ITNs, 30 per 
cent of treatment coverage and IPTp in pregnant women was higher 
in urban and richer households. This study shows that equitable scale 
up of malaria programmes is possible, although only two countries 
achieved equity in all three areas, with distribution of mosquito nets 
achieving higher coverage levels. The study found that countries with 
higher coverage did not necessarily achieve higher levels of equity. 
Furthermore, they conclude that two factors are associated with 
higher equity: the policies and delivery strategy, and the quality of 
delivery systems available.  
Wolkon, A., J. L. Vanden Eng, et 
al. (2010). ‘Rapid scale-up of 
long-lasting insecticide-treated 
bed nets through integration into 
the national immunization 
program during child health week 
in Togo 2004’.  Am J Trop Med 
Hyg 83(5): 1014-1019 
This study analyses the coverage of a campaign to scale up 
ownership of ITNs by integrating ITN delivery with the vaccination 
campaign in six regions of Togo. The authors conducted community-
based cross-sectional surveys one and nine months after the 
campaign to assess coverage, equity and use of ITNs. The study 
found that the intervention achieved high levels of coverage and 
equity, even nine months post-campaign. Despite high levels of 
coverage, however, the study found low levels of use of ITNs. The 
authors of this study conclude that integrated campaigns are an 
effective way to scale up coverage, and therefore recommend this 
strategy to other countries. In addition, they reinforce the message 
that distributing ITNs free of cost was key in achieving high coverage. 
Cohen, J. M., O. Sabot, et al. 
(2010). ‘A pharmacy too far? 
Equity and spatial distribution of 
outcomes in the delivery of 
subsidized artemisinin-based 
combination therapies through 
private drug shops’.  BMC Health 
Serv Res 10 Suppl 1: S6. 
This study assesses the effectiveness of a pilot subsidy for 
artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs) used for malaria 
treatment in two districts of Tanzania. The study consisted of a 
baseline and four follow up surveys in the form of exit interviews over 
a period of 15 months. The results from the study indicate that 
although sales of ACTs increased substantially, there were significant 
geographical variations with shops closer to towns, main roads and 
accessed by individuals of higher socioeconomic status experiencing 
higher stocking and sales of ACTs. The study concludes that 
additional efforts are needed to achieve equity as this subsidy is 
scaled up across different countries. 
Scott, V. E., M. Chopra, et al. 
(2005). ‘How equitable is the 
scaling up of HIV service 
provision in South Africa?’ S Afr 
Med J 95(2): 109-113. 
This study reports on the findings of a cross-sectional descriptive 
study on the availability and use of HIV programmes, as well as 
management and support structures, in three districts of South Africa. 
The findings from the study reveal inequalities in service delivery 
between the richer, urban site and the poorer rural ones. The study 
concludes that the scale up of HIV services is exacerbating 
inequalities in service delivery and calls for policy makers to take into 
consideration equity issues as these may lower the effectiveness of 
interventions. 
Renju, J. R., A. B. A. Bahati, et al. 
(2011). ‘Scaling up adolescent 
sexual and reproductive health 
interventions through existing 
government systems? A detailed 
process evaluation of a school-
based intervention in Mwanza 
Region in the Northwest of 
Tanzania’.  Journal of Adolescent 
Health 48(1): 79-86 
This study reports on the scale up of a school-based reproductive and 
sexual health programme in Tanzania. The study found that the 10-
fold scale up achieved a high coverage, which the authors attribute to 
the structured nature of the process. However, the authors express 
worries that this may have come at the cost of quality of the 
intervention. The study recommends higher levels of supervision and 
incentives to improve on this. 
Improving the Health of 
Populations: Lessons of 
Experience (Medlin, C. A., M. 
Chowdhury, et al. 2006). 
This series of 17 case studies found that country ownership, strong 
leadership and management, and realistic financing were all 
associated with effective scale up of programmes. 
Wyss K, Moto DD, et al. (2003). 
‘Constraints to scaling up health 
This paper reports on an assessment of the barriers to scaling up 
health interventions in Chad. It highlights the importance of 
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related interventions: the case of 
Chad, Central Africa’.  Journal of 
International Development 15(1): 
87-100. 
addressing demand and supply issues by engaging with the 
community to integrate their needs and perceptions, and managing 
human resources and health infrastructure. 
Rao, S. S. (2003). ‘Constraints to 
scaling up health programmes: a 
comparative study of two Indian 
states’.  Journal of International 
Development 15(1): 101-114. 
This study analyses the constraints phased by two Indian states when 
scaling up health interventions. It finds that in order to be successfully 
scaled up, programmes need clear objectives and information 
systems for monitoring progress, strong evidence-based technical 
design and innovative approaches to address constraints at the policy 
and management level. 
Schneider, H., D. Coetzee, et al. 
(2010). ‘Differences in 
antiretroviral scale up in three 
South African provinces: the role 
of implementation management’.  
BMC Health Serv Res 10 Suppl 
1: S4. 
This study compares the operational and strategic management of 
the antiretroviral therapy (ART) scale up in three provincial 
governments in South Africa, which had achieved different levels of 
coverage. The findings of the study reveal that although similar 
approaches were adopted for chronic disease care amongst the three 
provinces, differences were observed on political and managerial 
leadership, programme design, monitoring and evaluation systems 
and the nature and extent of external support and partnerships. The 
paper concludes by highlighting the importance of the managerial 
process for successful scale up of programmes. 
Abuya, T., A. Amin, et al. (2010). 
‘Importance of strategic 
management in the 
implementation of private 
medicine retailer programmes: 
case studies from three districts 
in Kenya’.  BMC Health Serv Res 
10 Suppl 1: S7 
This paper compares the scale up processes of private medicine 
retailers in three districts in Kenya. It found that technical support and 
sufficient resources were essential for successful scale up, although 
not enough. The paper found that an effective strategy for managing 
relationships and strong and transparent management systems are 
also needed. 
Seymour, J. (2004) Controlling 
tuberculosis in China. Millions 
Saved: Proven Successes in 
Global Health. What Works 
Working Group. M. Kinder. 
Washington, DC, Centre for 
Global Development. 
This study was part of a series of case studies demonstrating 
successful health programmes. It reports on the scale up of 
tuberculosis Direct Observed Treatment services from 0 to 90 per 
cent in five years. The author credits the success of the scale up with 
political commitment and the use of creative incentives. 
Source: authors’ illustration. 
6 Discussion 
This paper has provided a brief history of aid, and of the literature on aid effectiveness. 
In doing so it has highlighted the inherent methodological difficulties found when trying 
to ascertain the impact of aid on development and growth broadly and the health sector 
specifically. The key impediments to effective development assistance for health are 
summarized, including allocation of resources, donor fragmentation, fungibility of 
funding and issues associated with the process of giving aid such as accountability, 
power and information asymmetries. The different aid modalities, their success stories 
and failures are also summarized. In particular, the shift from project aid to programme-
based approaches is discussed, and the implications and constraints of scaling up 
successful projects reviewed.  
 
One thing that has become clear when looking at success stories in economic 
development over the last 50 years, is that the development process required thorough 
diagnosis of local contexts, which was followed up by eclectic policy prescriptions, 
where conflicting theories were at work even within one single country (Rodrik 2010). 
Whilst the overall ‘best practice’ principles endorsed at international fora on aid 
effectiveness are noble and have generally been found to improve the quality of 
development assistance (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness 2009), they are very 
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general, often unrealistic and need to be adapted to the local context. In addition, the 
international community has not managed to abide by them, although efforts seem to be 
moving in the right direction. Therefore transferability of ‘best practice’ is hard, 
particularly given that successful projects and programmes tend to be those that adapt 
best to the local circumstances and where there is real ownership by the local partners.  
 
It cannot, however, be denied that low-income countries do share some common 
characteristics, and that opportunities for cross-country learning abound. This does not 
necessarily have to take place by directly trying to replicate success stories, but by 
taking into account what worked under what circumstances. In that sense, new and 
emerging donors engaging in South to South co-operation can provide significantly 
valuable expertise, some of them being aid recipients until recently themselves (or still 
receiving aid). With that in mind, a new form of co-operation, known as triangular co-
operation, has emerged, where traditional donors—belonging to the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD—provide assistance to support southern 
donors’ programmes, given their technical advantage. An example of this is Germany’s 
support for Brazilian HIV programmes across Latin America (Working Party on Aid 
Effectiveness 2009). Table 5 shows some further examples of triangular co-operation. 
Table 5: Examples of triangular co-operation in the health sector 
DAC donor Emerging donor Recipient country Project/Programme 
description 
Canada Brazil Haiti Haitian National Vaccination 
Programme strengthening 
Japan Brazil Angola Development of human 
resources for health in Josina 
Machel Hospital  
Japan Brazil Madagascar Child health services 
improvement programme 
UK Brazil Peru HIV control 
US Brazil São Tomé and 
Príncipe 
Malaria control and 
prevention 
Italy Tunisia Niger Training of health workers 
Japan Mexico Nicaragua Integrated management of 
plagues 
Japan Sri Lanka Various African 
countries 
Hospital management 
Source: adapted from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/54/44652734.pdf. 
 
Few studies evaluating aid practices by new and emerging donors can be found in the 
literature. However, so far the evidence indicates that there are no significant 
differences between new and old donors in their distribution and practices, except that 
new donors do not appear to be influenced by the level of corruption of the recipient 
country when making decisions about aid allocation (Dreher et al. 2011). Emerging 
donors have been praised for bringing extra funds, but there are concerns about 
increasing fragmentation, their high levels of tied aid, a lack of engagement in dialogue 
with partner countries and an unwillingness to harmonize with other donors (Working 
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Party on Aid Effectiveness 2009). Other characteristics of non-DAC donors are that 
they provide more flexible assistance, and mainly engage in project assistance and 
technical co-operation (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness 2009).  
 
The international community has begun to acknowledge the importance of new donors, 
and of south to south co-operation, and has made efforts to include them into the high-
level fora on aid effectiveness. However, new donors did not adopt the Busan 
Partnership, but agreed to use its commitments and principles as reference for South-
South co-operation on a ‘voluntary basis’ instead. Although many see their engagement 
in the forum as progress, there is clearly some way to go before they are fully 
integrated.  
 
As a last word, worries that the increasing levels of DAH seen over the past ten years 
will not be sustainable have contributed to increased attention to the effectiveness of 
aid. They have also resulted in donors taking a closer look at how they spend their 
finances and more pressure to be accountable to their funders (taxpayer, other donors) to 
show ‘results’. This has lead to an increased emphasis on results and performance-based 
financing. There is also anecdotal evidence that some prominent donors are moving 
away from programme-based approaches, due to frustrations about the lack of progress 
and the increasing need to show results, which are harder to see in modalities such as 
budget support. Given the lack of clear evidence, and the difficulties in establishing 
whether DAH is effective, there is a danger that the international community keeps 
moving to different approaches due to external pressures without stopping to evaluate 
what has worked or failed and why. In addition, the results based agenda is problematic 
given the short window of analysis used. As discussed in Section 2, health as 
development is a long-term process, the results of which may take years to fully show. 
 
In conclusion, the international community is increasingly recognising that aid can only 
play a limited role in the improvement of health, and the principal drivers of progress 
are domestic, including public policies, governance and institutions, education levels 
and the absence of conflict (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness 2009). It is therefore 
important to have adequate expectations of how much can be achieved with 
development assistance. 
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Appendix B: Interview topic guide 
This topic guide is shown here as a sample. The interviews will not necessarily cover all the 
topics or follow the order of the topic guide, as it will be adapted to each participant. 
1. Introduction 
The information sheet of the consent form will be discussed and any questions answered. 
The participant will then sign the consent form and choose the anonymity option 
preferred. 
2. Ice-breaker 
- What does your job involve? 
- What does your organisation do? 
3. DAH effectiveness and best practice 
- In your view, what counts as effective aid? 
- Do you think aid has become more effective in the past ten years? Why/why not? 
How? 
- What do you think are the key factors affecting the effectiveness of DAH? 
- In your view, does international ‘best practice’ (Paris) lead to more effective aid? 
Has this been the case in Tanzania? Why? 
4. DAH disbursement in Tanzania 
Brief discussion of findings from quantitative element. Results will be discussed and 
explanations will be sought for the patterns observed. 
Distribution 
- I can see that DAH priorities have changed over time (explain how), what do you 
think has driven these changes?  
o Prompt – what has led to increases/decreases in DAH?  
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o Explore different health priorities – HIV and other  
- Do you think the situation has improved or got worse? Why?  
Aid modalities 
- Have aid modalities changed over the past ten years? How?  
o Explain what aid modalities means, give examples 
- Has this had an impact? What impact? Do you think the situation has 
improved/worsened? Why?  
Fragmentation 
- Do you think aid has become more or less fragmented over the last 10 years? Why 
do you think that is? 
- Do you think this has had an impact on the government or the effectiveness of aid? 
How?  
Harmonization and alignment 
- Do you think donors work under a harmonized approach? If so which ones? Are 
there mechanisms for promoting harmonization? Which ones? Which are most 
important/effective?  
o Prompt: Does the SWAP mean donors are more harmonized?  
- Do you feel that donors have become more aligned? If so which ones? Are there 
mechanisms for promoting harmonization? Which ones? Which are most 
important/effective?  
o Prompt: Do you feel the Paris Declaration principle has resulted in donors 
being more aligned with country systems? 
- Has H&A changed over the past ten years? How?  
- Do you think donors should be harmonized? Why/why not? 
398 
 
- Do you think donors should be aligned? Why/why not? 
- How would you describe the donor-government relationship? 
o Who initiates the relationship? 
o Who decides how much funding there is going to be? 
o Who decides what will get funded? 
- Is it different between the different donors/modalities? If so how? 
- How would you describe the donors’ relationships with each other? 
- Could you describe the relationship the donors have with their headquarters? To 
what extent are priorities decided at HQ or country office level?  
Predictability and macroeconomic considerations 
- Is predictability of DAH a problem? If so how? 
- Has this changed over the past ten years? How?  
- Do you feel DAH has impacted on macroeconomic forces? Please describe.  
o Prompts: exchange rate, monetary and fiscal policy, general inflation  
- Do you feel DAH budget may increase price of health in the private sector? 
- Does the government have any mechanisms for dealing with these? Are these 
mechanisms effective?  
Ownership 
- What does ‘country ownership’ mean to you? (prompt about ‘whose’ ownership) 
- Do you think there is strong country ownership in Tanzania? How is this 
demonstrated? How this changed over time? How/why?  
- Could you describe to me how the poverty reduction strategy (MKUKUTA) was 
developed? 
- Do you think it is appropriate? 
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- How would you describe the involvement of the government and the donors in 
this? 
- How would you describe the extent to which the government manages DAH 
(accounting, M+E, etc)? Has this changed over the last 10 years? How?  
- Do different donors respect the principle of country ownership differently? How do 
they do this? 
Fungibility 
- Do you think DAH has influenced government budgets and expenditure in the 
health sector? Prompt – have government health priorities changed as a result of 
DAH? How?  
- How about at the sub-sector level? 
- Why do you think the above has happened? 
- How would you value this influence? Why? 
5. Incentives 
- What are the objectives of your organisation? 
- Why does your organisation give aid? What about other donors?  
o Government: why do you think donors give aid? 
- What are your personal objectives for your job? 
- How is your performance in your job assessed? (if senior, how do you assess 
performance of the people in your team?) Prompt – how are promotions 
assess/decided?  
6. Accountability 
- Are there accountability mechanisms used by donors and government? Which are 
most important?  
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- Do you feel that the government and donors are able to hold each other to 
account? Why/why not? If yes, how does this happen? 
- Are there any mechanisms of accountability to the people of Tanzania? 
- Could you describe the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of the aid 
modalities of your organisation? Prompt- frequency, what gets reported, to whom 
it gets reported 
- What happens if a report is negative? 
- Could you describe the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of government 
(such as public expenditure review)? Prompt - frequency, what gets reported, to 
whom it gets reported 
- What happens if a report is negative? 
- Has accountability changed over the past ten years? How -  
- Is there transparency on financial flows from the donors and within the 
government? Has this changed over the past ten years?  
- How would you describe the JAHSR? 
o Prompt: who participates? Is it useful? Is it a transparent process? Do you 
feel it influences policy? To what extent? What other elements influence 
policy? 
Final question 
- Is there anyone you recommend I should interview? 
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Appendix C: Coding tree 
1. Ownership 
1.1. Ownership in Tanzania 
1.2. Definition 
1.3. Leadership 
1.4. Capacity 
1.5. Government lead 
1.6. Fungibility 
1.7. Other 
2. Accountability 
2.1. Accountability lines – to whom? (all actors including parliamentary commission) 
2.2. Processes (reporting, PER, JAHSR, MSD audits, CAG) 
2.3. Accountability for what? 
2.4. Corruption 
2.5. Consequences/enforcing conditionality 
2.6. Transparency 
2.7. Modalities 
2.8. DP responsibilities 
2.9. Gov responsibilities 
2.10. Cost effective / Value for money 
2.11. Other 
3. Harmonisation 
3.1. DP speaking in one voice 
3.2. Fragmentation 
3.3. Coordination 
3.4. Participation 
3.5. Development Partner Group 
3.6. Vertical agencies 
3.7. Delegated cooperation 
3.8. Burden on government 
3.9. Other 
4. Aid effectiveness / results 
4.1. International declarations 
4.2. Effective aid 
4.3. Management for results 
4.4. Causality 
4.5. Other 
5. Alignment 
5.1. Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania 
5.2. Government systems 
5.3. Parallel systems 
5.4. System strengthening 
5.5. Procurement 
5.6. Public financial management 
5.7. Health sector reform 
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5.8. Governance 
5.9. Gov top-down structure 
5.10. Other 
6. Priorities 
6.1. HIV funding 
6.2. DP priorities 
6.3. DP home politics/HQ 
6.4. Government priorities 
6.5. DP influence 
6.6. Basket Fund 
6.7. Maternal and child health 
6.8. Drugs 
6.9. Human Resources 
6.10. Primary Health Care 
6.11. Other 
7. Incentives 
7.1. Organisation roles 
7.2. Individual roles 
7.3. Allowances 
7.4. DP incentives 
7.5. Government incentives 
7.6. Risk-taking 
7.7. Impact of DP sanctions 
7.8. Performance management/assessment 
7.9. Other 
8. Modalities 
8.1. Trends 
8.2. Speed of change 
8.3. Vertical  
8.4. GBS 
8.5. BF 
8.6. Off-budget aid 
8.7. Earmarking/control 
8.8. Technical Assistance 
8.9.  “pulling out” 
8.10. Aid dependency 
8.11. Future/sustainability 
8.12. Other 
9. Policy dialogue 
9.1. SWAP 
9.2. Technical Working Groups 
9.3. Non-government 
9.4. Side of the table / sitting at the table 
9.5. Short postings 
9.6. DP skills (technical vs. admin/diplomat) 
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9.7. DP participation/involvement (inc. Nitty Gritty) 
9.8. Donor fatigue 
9.9. Government fatigue 
9.10. Unrealistic expectations 
9.11. Regularity of meetings 
9.12. Central vs. sector dialogue 
9.13. Political willingness 
9.14. BFC dialogue 
9.15. Power 
9.16. Information 
9.17. Vertical dialogue 
Other  
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Appendix D: Example of development of categories from themes
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 A : 1.1 Ownership in Tanzania Elements/Dimensions Categories/Classes 
1 : No 15 1. The CAG was not given a mandate for their health audits by 
the DPs 
 
2. Tz have good ownership, more than DPs think. If they really 
wanted to do PER, Planrep and health performance profile 
report, they have the capacity. It is because they are forced to 
do things 
CAG has ownership. 
There is ownership but no 
willingness 
Ownership by 
government level. 
Political willingness 
2 : No 16 Everything is done within the MTEF, so there is ownership. 
They still try to influence, but ultimately it is a soverign 
government so if they want to do thinks he doesn't like they just 
don't fund it. 
MTEF guarantees ownership. 
DPs try to influence. 
Tz can choose what it does and 
DPs choose whether to fund it 
MTEF. 
DPs level of influence 
3 : No 17 + 18 1. They talk about ownership and the government being in the 
driver seat, but if they constantly complain about their style of 
driving, it is hard for the government to maintain 
responsibility*. 
2. It is difficult to operate within the government frame where 
their allowances for travel are higher than they are allowed to 
pay. 
DPs drive ownership. 
Difficulties to maintain 
ownership with allowances 
Ownership driven by 
DPs. 
DPs level of influence 
5 : No 20 Ownership and engagement in the process has been declining, 
you can assess it by actions rather than words. 
Ownsership is declining Trends in ownership 
6 : No 20 post 
interview 
notes 
The PER is funded by USAID through Abt although lead by 
MoHSW, they draw up plan and then ask donors. 
Government has ownership of 
PER 
Ownership by 
government 
process/accountability 
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7 : No 21 DPs are driving ownership by telling the country what to do. It 
is a capacity issue.* 
DPs drive ownership. 
Capacity 
Onwership driven by 
DPs. 
Capacity 
8 : No 1 1. The JAST allows DPs to participate but discussion should be 
in line with govenment priorities and procedures 
 
2. There is country ownership 
 
3. The MoHSW determines the priorities and then looks for 
assistance. The DPs need to comply with priorities. 
DP participation and 
government ownership defined 
by the JAST 
Opinion on degree of ownership 
Government has ownership 
because it decides on its 
priorities 
JAST 
Degree of ownership 
Priorities 
9 : No 2 With the basket fund it is 50:50 BF ownership Different modalities 
11 : No 4 
 
 
1. There is an international shift towards increased ownership, 
but it is a misunderstood concept, whereby DPs believe they 
should not be involved technically. 
2. Transparency and accountability requirements are more 
important than ownership. 
3. Ownership can mean lack of involvement with the nitty-
gritty, and therefore less information, which hinders the 
relationship and looks arrogant.* 
4. It's a dream to think you can influence a soverign country 
through a policy dialogue, if they want to give money to Tz it 
should be on its own terms, that's their ownership. 
5. He is surprised tha the DPs do not take the initiative on the 
JAHSR, unhappy that it is because of ownership 
Ownership vs. Technical 
involvement and initiative on 
joint processes 
Transparency and accountability 
more important than ownerships 
Tz has ownership 
TA 
Importance of ownership 
Degree of ownership 
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13 : No 11 LGAs develop their own mission and vision, DPs can then 
come in and fund areas in line with their strategic plan, but 
don't tell them what they should fund. 
At the local level if there is a disagreement of what to do with 
foreign funds, either the government agrees with the DPs or 
they don't get the funding 
LGAs decide their own priorities 
and DPs then come in and fund 
DPs have their priorities, and if 
the government does not like 
them they do not get the funds 
Priorities 
Level of government 
20 : No 22 
 
  Occupation = 
Non-
government 
Sometimes the DPs have ownership, others it is the 
government, depending on the issue and the timing. The 
position of the government is predictable whereas the DP's isn't. 
Depending on the issue 
sometimes it is the DPs others 
the government that has 
ownership 
Degree of ownership 
* good quote     
408 
 
Appendix E: Information sheet and consent forms 
          
 
 
A study of Development Assistance for Health. The case of Tanzania 
Information Sheet 
 
Background 
Tanzania has been a major recipient of Development Assistance for Health (DAH) 
over the last ten years, making up over 60% of the health sector budget. At the same 
time, Tanzania has experienced some health improvements, although the extent to 
which DAH has contributed to these is uncertain. This research aims to assess the 
effectiveness of DAH in Tanzania for the time period of 2000-2010. 
Objectives and Methods 
The objectives of this research are first of all to determine whether DAH given to 
Tanzania is being disbursed according to international ‘best practice’, and then, to 
evaluate whether this has resulted in an efficient allocation of resources in the health 
sector, and the factors contributing to this. In order to do this, this project will 
require secondary data analysis on health financing and expenditure, as well as semi-
structured interviews with stakeholders, including government officials, donors and 
employees of non-government organisations. 
Participation 
You have been approached because we believe you may be able to contribute to our 
understanding of the process by which DAH is disbursed and distributed in 
Tanzania. By taking part in this study, participants are not putting themselves at any 
risk. Participants will gain from this study by having a chance to contribute to the 
improvement of the delivery of development assistance for health in Tanzania. 
Participation in this project will entail taking part in a semi-structured interview. 
Participation is completely voluntary, and should you agree to take part you may 
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withdraw at any time without giving a reason. Withdrawal will not have any negative 
impact on the participant. Should you like to participate, we would like to record the 
interview and have it transcribed to aid our analysis. However, you are free to 
indicate that you would prefer the interview not to be recorded, in which case the 
interviewer will take hand-written notes during the course of the interview. 
 
Confidentiality 
Where participants are happy for us to identify them, we will do so in any reports 
and academic papers that we publish. However, if you prefer to remain anonymous, 
we would ensure that your identity is anonymised. Should you wish us to, we will 
ensure that you will not be identified from any other information, such as the 
organisation that employs you, or your position within it. If you prefer not to be 
quoted at all, even anonymously, we will, with your permission, use information you 
provide us with to inform the analysis without specific citation or anonymous 
reference. I (Melisa Martínez Álvarez) will be the only person that will have access 
to the interview material. Where interviews are transcribed by a professional 
transcriber, the transcriber will be bound by a confidentiality agreement. All 
interview recordings will be destroyed at the end of the project. 
Please note that we intend to publish our results, and may quote from interviews, so 
please consider whether you would like to remain anonymous, and the degree of 
anonymity you would prefer. You may discuss these issues at the interview, when 
any questions you may have will be answered your wishes can be clarified and. 
Further Information 
If you have any questions of require further information, please contact Melisa 
Martínez Álvarez at the address below: 
Melisa Martínez Álvarez 
Ifakara Health Institute 
Kiko Avenue 
P.O.Box 78373 
Telephone: +44 (0) 7950 872 166 / 0788221586 
Email: melisa.martinez-alvarez@lshtm.ac.uk  
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Aid effectiveness in Tanzania: Has Development Assistance for 
Health resulted in an efficient allocation of resources in Tanzania? 
Consent Form for Interview Respondents 
 
Investigator’s name and contact details 
Melisa Martínez Álvarez 
Ifakara Health Institute 
Kiko Avenue 
P.O.Box 78373 
Telephone: +44 (0) 7950 872 166 / 0788221586 
Email: melisa.martinez-alvarez@lshtm.ac.uk 
 
To be completed by the participant 
1. I have read the information sheet for this study and I have understood what 
will be required of me if I take part in it               [   ] 
 
2. My questions regarding this study have been answered by the researcher   [   ] 
 
3. I understand that I may withdraw from this study at any time without giving 
any reason         [   ] 
 
4. I agree to take part in this study     [   ] 
 
5. Do you give permission for the interview to be recorded 
 
411 
 
a. Yes          [   ] 
b. No         [   ] 
 
 
6. Please read the following options carefully and tick ONE: 
 
a. I agree that material from this interview may be quoted and that these 
quotations may be attributed to me      [   ] 
 
b. I agree that material from this interview may be quoted but I would like my 
name to be anonymised,  although you may mention my organisation and my 
position within it       [   ] 
 
c. I agree that material from this interview may be quoted but I would like my 
name and my position within my organisation to be anonymised, although 
you may mention my organisation      [   ] 
 
d. I agree that material from this interview may be quoted but I would like my 
name, my position and my organisation to be anonymised; however, you may 
refer me to “a donor”, “a Ministry X official”, “a representative from an 
NGO/SCO”, etc  [   ] 
 
(if other please state......................................................................................) 
 
e. I agree that material form this interview may be quoted but I would like my 
name to be anonymised as well as any information that can be used to 
identify me, including my organisation and my position within it [   ] 
 
f. I do not agree that the material from my interview may be quoted, but the 
researchers can use information from my interview to inform their analyses 
 [   ] 
 
 
Name ........................................................................... Signed 
.......................................... 
 
Date .......................................................... 
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Appendix F: Schematic representation of all actors present in the Tanzanian health sector 
and how they interact with each other. 
 
 
